



*JULIUS CÆSAR'S Passage of the RUBICON.*

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THE  
ROMAN HISTORY

FROM THE  
FOUNDATION of R O M E

TO THE  
BATTLE of A C T I U M :

T H A T I S,

To the End of the COMMONWEALTH.

V O L. XIII.

*By Mr CREVIER, Professor of Rhetorick in  
the College of Beauvais, being the Continuation of  
Mr ROLLIN's Work.*

Translated from the FRENCH.

THE SECOND EDITION.

Illustrated with Maps, and Copper Plates.

L O N D O N :

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MDCCLIV.



**A L I S T of the CONSULS NAMES, and  
the Y E A R S comprehended in this V o-  
L U M E.**

**L. DOMITIUS AHENOBARBUS.**  
**AP. CLAUDIUS PULCHER.**

**A. R. 698.**  
**Ant. C. 54.**

**CN. DOMITIUS CALVINUS.**  
**M. VALERIUS MESSALIA.**

**A. R. 699.**  
**Ant. C. 53.**

**CN. POMPEIUS MAGNUS III.**  
**Q. CÆCILIUS METELLUS SCIPIO.**

**A. R. 700.**  
**Ant. C. 52.**

**SER. SULPICIUS RUFUS.**  
**M. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS.**

**A. R. 701.**  
**Ant. C. 51.**

**L. ÆMILIUS PAULUS.**  
**C. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS.**

**A. R. 702.**  
**Ant. C. 50.**

**C. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS.**  
**L. CORNELIUS LENTULUS.**

**A. R. 703.**  
**Ant. C. 49.**

**C. JULIUS CÆSAR II.**  
**P. SERVILIUS VATIA ISAURICUS.**

**A. R. 704.**  
**Ant. C. 48.**

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Continuation of the FORTY-  
FIRST BOOK.

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THE  
ROMAN HISTORY.

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**C**ÆSAR makes preparations for his return into Great-Britain. Before he passes over, he reduces the Treviri, who meditated a revolt. He takes with him all the prime nobility of Gaul. Dumnorix, refusing to go, is killed. Cæsar's passage, and exploits in Great-Britain. He grants peace to the conquered nations, and returns to Gaul. He finds it quiet in appearance, and puts his legions into winter-quarters. Tasgetius, King of the Carnutes, a friend of the Romans, is assassinated. Ambiorix, King of the Eburones, joining treachery to open force, entirely destroys a Roman legion, and five cohorts, that wintered in his territories. Ambiorix stirs up the Atuatuci and the Nervii, who attack Q. Cicero. Vigorous defence of the Romans. Singular example of military emulation

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L. DOMITIUS AHENOBARBUS:

AP. CLAUDIUS PULCHER.

A. R. 693.  
Ant. C. 54.  
*Cæsar makes preparations for his return into Great-Britain.*  
Cæf. de  
B. G. l. 5.

**C**ÆSAR considered only as an experiment what he had hitherto performed in Great-Britain. Some moderate advantages, and a treaty that was never carried into execution, did in no sort content his ambition. He resolved then to return with greater force; and therefore ordered his Lieutenant-Generals, when he set out for Italy, to build during his absence as many ships of war, and transports, as they possibly could; directing even the form that he judged most proper for the navigation of those seas.

His winter was not idle. He employed it, partly in holding the assemblies in Cisalpin Gaul; partly in an expedition to Illyricum, where his presence was necessary to put a stop to the incursions of the Pirustæ. The Pirustæ were a people of Illyricum, who had ravaged the Roman province; that is to say, that part of Illyricum which acknowledged the Roman government. Cæsar was put to no other trouble, than that of appearing in the country, to compel these Barbarians to give hostages, and  
make





make satisfaction for the damage they had A. R. 698.  
Ant. C. 54. caused.

At his return to Gaul, he found a great *Before he* deal of work done. The old vessels were all *passes over,* refitted, and twenty ships of war new-built, *he reduces* with about six hundred transports. He orders *the Tre-* the whole fleet to rendezvous at Port Itius : *viri, who* and as the Treviri seemed to project a rebellion, *meditated* and were even reported to solicit the Germans *a revolt.* to pass the Rhine to their assistance, he marches into their territories with four legions and eight hundred horse ; being desirous to quiet Gaul before he engaged in his enterprize against Great-Britain.

The Treviri were a potent nation, and had a numerous cavalry ; but they were embroiled at home. Two competitors, Cingetorix and Indutiomarus, disputed the first rank, and chief authority. Cingetorix, who probably was the weaker, puts himself under Cæsar's protection ; assuring him of his, and his party's attachment to the Romans. Indutiomarus, on the contrary, assembles his forces ; and, having sheltered the women and children in the forest of Arden, prepares for war. But the terror of Cæsar's arms, and the solicitation of Cingetorix, having deprived him of many of his partizans ; fearing he should be abandoned, he found it necessary to submit. Cæsar, who had no mind to be kept long in that country, took his excuses, and granted him peace : he insisted however on his giving him two hundred hostages, among whom was his son. Indutiomarus, already discontented, was moreover extremely piqued by the caresses which Cæsar bestowed on Cingetorix, and by the pains he took to procure him the good-will



A. R. 698.  
Ant. C. 54.

*He takes  
with him  
all the  
prime no-  
bility of  
Gaul.  
Dumno-  
rix, refu-  
sing to go,  
is killed.*

of the chief among his countrymen. He withdraws then in anger, resolved to renew the war the first opportunity.

Cæsar, who thought him not capable of doing any hurt, at least for some time, returned to Port Itius; where he found, as he had ordered, four thousand Gaulish horse, and all the prime nobility of the nation. His design was to take with him these nobles of the first rank, by way of hostages; and to leave behind him in Gaul but a very few, on whose fidelity he could rely. Dumnorix the Æduan, of whom much has been said, was of the number of those intended to make the voyage. Cæsar distrusted him much; knowing him to be a man who had capacity, and power, and indication too, to be troublesome. The Æduan would fain have excused himself from going, by various pretences; sometimes he was afraid of the sea; sometimes the ties of religion constrained him to stay at home. When he found his reasons had no weight with Cæsar, he began to cabal among the Gaulish Nobility; telling them, that Cæsar's intention was undoubtedly to destroy them all; and that, as he dared not execute this project in Gaul, he was now carrying them into a strange country, where he might find an opportunity of sacrificing them to his cruel policy.

However criminal such a conduct appeared to Cæsar, he still kept fair with Dumnorix, or rather with his Nation; for whom he had great esteem, and whom he apprehended he might irritate, by shedding the blood of one who was in a manner their chief: determined notwithstanding to continue inflexible; and to prefer to every other consideration the interest of the Roman



Roman Commonwealth, and the tranquility of Gaul. During twenty-five days that he was detained in port by a north-west wind, he contented himself with using, with Dumnorix, the ways of exhortation and persuasion; having him well watched all the time, by those he could depend on, who gave an account of every step he took. At length, the weather being favourable, Cæsar gave orders to embark. Every one knows the confusion, and the multiplicity of cares that take up the thoughts, on such an occasion. Dumnorix took the advantage of it, and retired with the Æduan cavalry. As soon as Cæsar was informed of it, he suspended his departure; and, laying every other business aside, detached a large party of horse to pursue him; with orders, to bring him back, if he would return to his duty; or, if he resisted, to kill him. Dumnorix's obstinacy compelled them to execute the latter. He insisted, that being himself free, and of a nation that enjoyed its liberty, they could not force him to march against his consent. Cæsar's soldiers thereupon followed their directions: Dumnorix was killed; and the Æduan cavalry, having lost their leader, returned without scruple to the Roman camp.

Cæsar, freed from all other cares, turned all his thoughts now to his passage. He left Labienus on the continent, with three legions and two thousand horse, to secure the ports and the coast of the Morini. He embarked on his fleet the same number of cavalry, and five legions: and, having set sail, towards sunset, he was retarded by some accidents; so that he came not in sight of Great-Britain 'till next day at noon. He extols the vigour of his



A. R. 695.  
Ant. C. 54.

soldiers in the voyage, who rowed the transports with such activity and strength, as equalled the expedition of the vessels with sails.

He landed at the same place he had debarked, the year before ; and was surprized to find nobody to oppose him. The great number of his vessels, which exceeded eight hundred, frightened, it seems, these Islanders, who had retired to their hills.

After Cæsar had completed the debarkation, without trouble or danger, his first care was to fortify a camp, in which he left ten cohorts, and three hundred horse, under the command of a general officer ; with the rest of his army he advanced in the country towards the enemy. But he had scarce essayed their strength in a slight skirmish, when he received news, that his ships, which lay at anchor, had been considerably damaged by a violent storm. He returned immediately to the sea-side ; and resolved, to prevent the like accidents, to draw all his vessels ashore, and inclose them in the same intrenchments with his camp. This was indeed a great undertaking : but his soldiers set about it with so much courage, working day and night without intermission, that the work was finished in ten days ; and Cæsar, having left orders for refitting the damaged vessels, went back again to attack the Barbarians.

He found their numbers had increased during his absence. Many of their nations had entered into an alliance, and obeyed, as Generalissimo, Cassivellaunus, whose kingdom lay on the other side of the Thames, and who, before Cæsar's arrival, was at war with his neighbours ; but the fear of their common enemy



had suspended all particular animosities. Several conflicts ensued, in which the Islanders chariots much incommoded Cæsar's cavalry. However, as the Romans were in the end victorious, and continued advancing, Cassivellaunus thought proper to retire behind the Thames, in order to dispute its passage.

A. R. 698.  
Ant. C. 54.

There was one only place where the Thames could be forded, and even there with much difficulty ; which the Barbarians had encreased by fortifying their side of the river with sharp stakes ; which they had also planted in the channel so deep that they did not appear above water. Cæsar was informed thereof by the prisoners and deserters ; he undertook notwithstanding to pass the river, even thus defended. His troops seconded his order ; and, though nothing but their heads was above the water, advanced toward the enemy with such vigour and boldness, that, unable to sustain the shock, they fled, and dispersed, like a flight of timorous birds.

Cassivellaunus from that time determined to avoid a general action : and, ordering his forces to separate, kept with him only four thousand chariots, with which he watched opportunities to fall on the stragglers ; or else, when he had enticed the Romans into a disadvantageous place, by the prospect of booty, he quitted his ambuscade, and put them into disorder by an unforeseen attack. These methods succeeded so well to him, that Cæsar was obliged to order his cavalry to keep always so near the foot, that they might be supported by them, if necessary ; and he wasted not the country faster than his infantry could advance.



A. R. 698.  
A.D. C. 54.

Mean while several nations in those regions submitted to Cæsar. The \* Trinobantes were the first. Their King, Imanuentius, had been killed by Cassivellaunus ; and Mandubratius, son of that unfortunate Prince, was in Cæsar's army ; to whom he fled, even into Gaul, for shelter and protection. Gaul was then the asylum of the dispossessed and persecuted British Kings. The Trinobantes had retained their loyalty to Mandubratius, and desired Cæsar to send him back to govern them. They obtained their request ; and, when they had supplied the Romans with corn, and delivered forty hostages, Cæsar not only spared, but even protected, their country. Five neighbouring nations, seeing the Trinobantes found so good an account in the party they had espoused, followed their example : and the Roman General, having learnt from these new friends that the capital of Cassivellaunus was not far off, resolved to attack it. That city was very different from what we now call a city. The Britons gave that name to a wood fenced with a ditch and rampart, where they retired with their flocks from the incursions of their enemies. Though Cassivellaunus's town was fortified by art and nature, it made no resistance. Cæsar having stormed it in two places at once, the Barbarians fled by a part which was unattacked, and left their cattle, their whole wealth, to the conqueror.

Cassivellaunus despaired not yet ; but, desirous of making a last attempt, sent directions to four petty Princes of Kent, to surprize and burn the Roman fleet. This would have been

\* They inhabited the left shore, to the north of the Thames, about London.



a *coup d' eclat* ; but they did not succeed ; and one of the chiefs, named \* Lugotorix, was made prisoner. Such a series of ill success discouraged at last Cassivellaunus. He had then recourse to the mediation of Comius, King of the Atrebates, to obtain peace from Cæsar ; who was easily prevailed on to grant it. The weather began to grow bad, and the motions of the Gauls made him uneasy. He demanded of the Britons hostages ; imposed on them a tribute, which probably was not very regularly paid ; and took under his protection Mandubratius and the Trinobantes, strictly forbidding Cassivellaunus to molest them : after which he returned to Gaul, with the glory of (a) having shewed Great-Britain to the Romans, rather than of having subdued it.

Even Gaul itself was far from being subdued, though during two years all had been quiet enough : but the fire was not extinguished, though it lay concealed under the ashes. The desire of recovering their liberty lived yet in the breasts of the Gauls : and, without doubt, Cæsar's absence, who had spent the greatest part of the two last campaigns either in Germany or Great-Britain, had facilitated the means of assembling and taking measures for shaking off his yoke, to a nation who wore it with regret.

Cæsar was unacquainted with this their disposition, as no symptoms of it had yet ap-

\* (Mr. Crevier seems to be mistaken in the name. Cæsar in his Commentaries calls him Cingetorix. Capto etiam nobili duce Cingetorige. B. G. l. 5. § 18.)

(a) Primus omnium Romanorum D. Julius cum exercitu Britanniam ingressus, — potest videri Ostendisse posteris, non Tradidisse. Tac. Agric. n. 13.

peared.



A. R. 698.  
Ant. C. 54

peared. At his return from Great-Britain he held, without any disturbance, at \*Samarobriva, the general assembly of Gaul : after which he thought he had nothing to do but to establish his winter-quarters. His distribution of them favoured the designs of the Gauls. The summer had been dry, and consequently the crop thin. For this reason Cæsar found it convenient to alter a little his usual method of quartering : and, instead of placing several legions together, as before he had always done, he chose, for the convenience of provisions and forage, to canton them separately one by one. One legion he quartered on the Morini, under the command of C. Fabius, Lieutenant-General : another among the Nervii, under Q. Cicero, brother of the Orator : a third with the † Essui, under L. Roscius : a fourth in the country of the Rhemi, on the borders of the Treviri, under Labienus : three in || Belgium, under three Commanders, M. Crassus, his Questor, youngest son of the famous Crassus, who was then preparing to invade the Parthians ; L. Plancus, and C. Trebonius : and the last and eighth, which Cæsar had newly raised on the other side of the Po, was sent, together with five cohorts, among the ‡ Eburones, between the Rhine and the Meuse, where Ambiorix and Cativulcus reigned ; at the head of this last corps were

\* *Amiens.*

† *This name is not known. Perhaps Essui, Eusubii, Sessuvii, are only different alterations of the name Lexovii, those of Lisieux. Vossius thinks that we should read here, in the text of Cæsar, Ædxi,*

*those of Autun : and that opinion seems probable too.*

|| *Belgium is not the same thing as Belgic Gaul. It is only a part of it, which may be considered as answering to what we call Picardy.*

‡ *The country of Liege.*



two Lieutenant-Generals, Titurius Sabinus and Aurunculeius Cotta. Cæsar, though he thus extended his quarters, had nevertheless took care that they should not be too distant from one another : for, Roscius alone excepted, who wintered in a friendly, quiet country, all the other quarters were comprehended in a space of \* an hundred miles, that is to say, of about thirty-five leagues. He had, besides, the precaution not to set out too soon on his customary winter's expedition to Italy ; but resolved to defer it 'till he had received advice from all his Lieutenant-Generals, and was assured that their quarters were established, fortified, and secured.

An unexpected event obliged Cæsar to withdraw from Belgium one of the legions placed there. The † Carnutes had for King Tasgetius, a friend to the Romans. This Prince was publicly assassinated by his enemies, supported by a powerful party in the nation. Cæsar, apprehensive that this might be the signal of a revolt, ordered Plancus to go and winter in that country with his legion.

Scarce fifteen days had elapsed since the arrival of the legions in their different quarters, when the general conspiracy of the Gauls broke out in the revolt of the Eburones. Their two Chiefs, or Kings, Ambiorix and Cativulcus, had been to meet Sabinus and Cotta in a friendly manner, and had supplied them with corn. But on a sudden falling on a small number of Roman soldiers, who were cutting off

A. R. 698.  
Ant. C. 54.

*Tasgetius, King of the Carnutes, a friend of the Romans, is assassinated.*

*Ambiorix, King of the Eburones, joining treachery to open force, entirely destroys a Roman legion and five cohorts, that wintered in his territories.*

\* From one end of the quarters to the other, there is more than an hundred miles. Perhaps Cæsar conceives a center, from whence the most distant

quarters may not extend further than the space here mentioned.

† Those of Chartres.

wood



A. R. 698.  
Ant. C. 54.

wood and making fascines, they cut them in pieces ; and afterwards attack the camp where the legion was intrenched. Repulsed with loss, they have recourse to cunning and perfidy.

Ambiorix, having demanded and obtained to have somebody sent to confer with him, made a most artful speech ; which, coming from a Barbarian Prince, is a proof that nature alone is sufficient to instruct men in the art of treachery : “ He protested he had in no  
“ fort forgot his obligations to Cæsar ; who  
“ had rescued him from the yoke of the  
“ Atuatici ; and who had restored him his  
“ son and nephew, which that people having  
“ received as hostages treated as slaves. That  
“ the hostilities he had lately committed were  
“ by no means the effect of his own private  
“ animosity to the Romans, but of the gene-  
“ ral desire of his nation, which he had not  
“ been able to divert. That the government  
“ in Gaul was such, that the People had occa-  
“ sionally as much power over their Kings, as  
“ the Kings over their People. That he could  
“ say this in excuse of his nation, that they  
“ had done nothing, in taking this sudden re-  
“ solution, but conform to the general sense  
“ of all Gaul. That all Gaul had agreed to  
“ storm in one day, the very day on which he  
“ spoke, all the quarters of the Roman army ;  
“ so that no one might be able to succour  
“ another. That he could appeal to his own  
“ weakness for the truth of what he related.  
“ That he well knew the Eburones were no  
“ match for the Romans. But that, after ha-  
“ ving performed what the common voice of  
“ his country demanded, he thought he was  
“ at liberty to listen to that of gratitude. That  
“ he



“ he found himself compelled by his attach-  
 “ ment to Cæsar, and by his friendship for  
 “ Sabinus, to give notice of the extreme danger  
 “ to which the legion designed to winter in his  
 “ country was exposed. That a great body of  
 “ Germans had actually passed the Rhine, and  
 “ would be there in two days at farthest. That  
 “ Sabinus and Cotta were to consider whether  
 “ it was not proper for them to retire, and go  
 “ and join Labienus, or Cicero. That, as for  
 “ himself, he engaged by all that was sacred  
 “ to secure their retreat through his dominions.  
 “ And that he undertook this the more readily,  
 “ as he should thereby reap a double advan-  
 “ tage; that of manifesting his gratitude to  
 “ Cæsar, and that of delivering his country  
 “ from the inconvenience of wintering the Ro-  
 “ mans.”

A. R. 698.

Ant. C. 54.

This harangue of Ambiorix, having been  
 reported to the two Lieutenant-Generals, occa-  
 sioned a difference of opinion, and in conse-  
 quence a sharp contest, between them. Cotta  
 would not hear of quitting the winter-quarters,  
 in which Cæsar had placed them, without his  
 express order for it. He alledged, “ That,  
 “ as they were in no want of provisions, they  
 “ should be able to sustain the attack of the  
 “ Germans, at least ’till such time as they could  
 “ be succoured by the neighbouring legions.  
 “ And that nothing could be more dishonour-  
 “ able, nor injudicious, than to follow the ad-  
 “ vice of an enemy in an affair of the last im-  
 “ portance.” On the contrary, Sabinus, who  
 gave entire credit to Ambiorix, pretended,  
 “ That the danger was so imminent that they  
 “ had not a moment to lose; and that the only  
 “ way to prevent all the legions being cut in  
 “ pieces,



A. R. 693. "pieces, one after another, was to re-unite se-  
 ANL C. 54 "veral together."

It was in a council of war that this affair was discussed ; and the Officers were divided upon it, as well as the Generals. Those of the first rank, and greatest courage, were of Cotta's opinion. But Sabinus obstinately persisted in his, to his own misfortune, and that of the troops entrusted to his care. He raised his voice, that he might be heard by the soldiers without : " You will have your way then," says he, in a passion, to Cotta and those of that party ; " I must submit : but, if any accident happens, those who hear me will know who to blame. In two days, would you but consent to it, they might rejoin their fellow-soldiers, and share the same fate. But you chuse, by keeping them separate and distinct from the rest of their comrades, to reduce them to the apparent necessity of perishing by sword or famine."

When he had thus spoke, he rose ; and the council was going to separate. But the Officers surround their Generals, and conjure them to be reconciled ; representing, that whatever resolution was took, whether to go, or stay, they should run no great risque ; but that their disagreement threatened the troops with inevitable destruction. Upon this, the conference is resumed ; and the deliberations were prolonged to midnight. At last Cotta suffered himself to be vanquished by importunity ; and, Sabinus having carried his point, orders were given for every one to be ready to march at day-break. The remainder of the night none employed in sleep ; for all were in motion, and taken up in choosing what things they should



should carry away with them, and what leave behind. In short, as Cæsar has observed, they did every thing to make their stay more dangerous ; and their defence, supposing they should be attacked on their march, more precarious. Troops, harrassed for want of rest, could not make the most vigorous resistance ; and besides, relying entirely on the word of Ambiorix, they marched in too extended a column ; and carried all their heavy baggage with them.

A. R. 698.  
Ant. C. 54.

The Eburones, attentive to what passed that night in the camp of the Romans, rightly judged, from the noise and motion therein observed, that they intended to leave it : they thereupon divided their forces into two bodies ; which they posted at two miles distance, about a hollow-way in the road by which the Romans must retreat. And, when they had imprudently advanced into this valley, the Gauls come out of their ambush, and pour upon them at once in front and rear.

Sabinus, who expected nothing less, was entirely disconcerted. Cotta was not surprized at an event he had foreseen ; and began to give orders with great presence of mind, performing at once the duty of General and Soldier. But as the untoward length of the column, formed by the fifteen cohorts, incumbered him ; because he could neither see from one end to the other, nor repair expeditiously enough to all the places where his presence was necessary ; he ordered, in concert with Sabinus, the troops to abandon their baggage ; and to form a circle, facing their adversaries on all sides. Cæsar observes, that this disposition was attended by great inconveniencies ; as it discouraged the soldiers,  
and



A. R. 69<sup>9</sup>. and augmented the enemy's confidence ; and,  
 Ant. C. 54 besides, gave an opportunity to many particulars to leave the fight, in order to fetch from the baggage what they had of most value.

Ambiorix acted on this occasion like an able General : “ Fellow-soldiers, cries he to his  
 “ army, the baggage is our own ; this is a  
 “ considerable advantage gained already ; but,  
 “ before we attend to any thing, let us take  
 “ care to make our victory complete.” His troops obey him ; and the Romans, briskly attacked and incommoded by their disadvantageous situation, defend themselves with difficulty, notwithstanding the equality of numbers. Only when they could join the enemy hand to hand, they preserved their superiority, and killed many of them. Ambiorix remedied that inconvenience ; he ordered his people not to come too near the Romans, to retire as they advanced, and to overwhelm them from afar with a shower of darts. The Romans suffered much by this method of fighting. If any cohort detached itself from the main body, to close with such of the enemy as were within reach, it did them no damage, as they dispersed in a moment ; and it exposed all the time its own flanks to those who occupied the eminences on either side. And, if the Romans kept all together, their valour became useless, as they had no opportunity to act. In this manner the combat continued, from day-break, to the eighth hour. At length, many of the bravest Roman Officers being killed or wounded, and Cotta himself having received a blow on the mouth from a sling ; Sabinus, who by his timid credulity had been the cause of this disaster, completed the ruin the same way. Perceiving



ceiving Ambiorix, who was animating his troops, he sent his Interpreter to beg of him quarter for himself and his soldiers. Ambiorix answered, That, if Sabinus had a mind to have a conference with him, he was very ready to oblige him; that he hoped he should obtain from his people to spare the lives of the Romans; and that, as to Sabinus himself, he gave his word, no hurt should be done him. Sabinus communicated this answer to Cotta; and would fain have persuaded him to go with him to Ambiorix. But Cotta absolutely refused to treat with an armed enemy. Sabinus, always blind, always inattentive to good advice, takes with him such Officers as were about him, and goes to Ambiorix: who, seeing him approach, ordered him to lay down his arms. The Roman General obeys, and orders his attendants to do the same. The Barbarian Prince spins out the conference, disputing every point, in order to give time to his people to surround Sabinus; and, after having caused him to be murdered by the most horrid perfidy, he returns to charge afresh the Romans at the head of his troops, who by their usual terrible shoutings proclaimed their victory.

It was now no longer a battle, but a Butchery. Cotta and the greatest part of the Romans were killed, fighting manfully: the rest retreated to the camp they had just quitted. He who bore the eagle preserved it 'till he came within reach of the intrenchments, and threw it in; then he returned to the enemy, and was slain fighting bravely before the camp. Those Romans, who survived that day's slaughter, had courage enough to defend their camp 'till night. But finding themselves without resource, and with-



A. R. 698.  
A. D. C. 54

*Ambiorix  
fires up  
the Atu-  
atici and  
the Nervii,  
who at-  
tack Q.  
Cicero.*

out hope, they killed one another to the last man. A few, who had escaped out of the fight, got by different ways to Labienus's camp, and brought him the news of this sad event.

Mean while Ambiorix, who wanted neither parts nor address, was endeavouring to reap the benefit of his victory. He hastes to his neighbours the Atuatici, and persuades them to revolt. From them he goes to the Nervii, and encourages them, by his example and promises of assistance, to attack Q. Cicero, who had established his winter-quarters in their country. The Nervii, easily induced to follow their inclination, assemble the nations subject to them; and in a short time a formidable army, composed of these people, march against Cicero, with such diligence that they were arrived ere he knew of Sabinus's calamity. Their cavalry, which preceded them, surprized a considerable number of Roman soldiers, who were in the forests cutting wood for firing and the fortifications of their camp. They then advanced with their whole force, and assault Cicero's camp; being repulied, they renew the attack the next day and the following, with new fury, but no better success.

*Vigorous  
defence  
of the  
Romans*

Cicero's first care was to write to Cæsar, to acquaint him with the danger he was in. But, as the enemy was in possession of all the roads, the couriers he dispatched from time to time were always stopped. So that for a while he was without any resource, save what his valour and military skill suggested. He used then all the methods of defence known at that time: All the intervals he had from fighting he employed in building towers, in strengthening his lines, and in adding parapets to his ramparts. The



The diligence of his soldiers is scarce credible. A. R. 698.  
Ant. C. 54. They worked without ceasing day and night ; even the sick and wounded contributed their part. Cicero himself, though much indisposed, directed all, animated all ; so that his soldiers were obliged to force him from time to time to take some repose. Ambiorix, having attempted several times in vain to storm the Roman camp, had recourse to the artifice that had so well succeeded with Sabinus. But Cicero would not be the dupe of his cunning, nor listen to his proposals.

The Nervii then undertook to block up the Romans, by constructing lines, whose ditch was fifteen feet deep, and whose rampart eleven high. This was a new sort of work to them ; but they had seen something of it in their wars with Cæsar, and the prisoners they had made gave them further instructions. The proper utensils were still wanting. This defect they supplied as well as they could, by cutting the turf with their swords, moving the earth with their hands, and transporting it in their cloaths, instead of sacks and gabions. Such was their multitude, that in less than three hours they had finished those lines, which took in a circuit of fifteen miles. To these they added some works and machines, in imitation of the Romans ; as towers, long scythes, and galleries.

The Roman soldiers were lodged in huts thatched with straw. This gave the assailants the hint of endeavouring to set the camp on fire. The seventh day of the attack, the wind being high, the Nervii threw into it red-hot balls of clay, and burning javelins. The fire, assisted by the wind, spread every where



A. R. 698.  
Ant. C. 54.

in an instant; and the adversary, encouraged by the prospect of success, advanced their towers and galleries, and prepared to scale the ramparts. The constancy of the Roman soldiery was such, that though they were in a manner enveloped in flames, and overwhelmed with a shower of darts; though they saw their huts, their baggage, and their whole little fortune was become a prey to the fire; not only no one quitted his post to endeavour to save any thing, but even very few of them so much as looked behind them: so intent were they on fighting and repelling the enemy. Their extraordinary valour was rewarded with success: and, if that day was the most laborious and dangerous to the Romans, it was that also on which their adversaries lost the greatest numbers.

*Singular  
example  
of mili-  
tary emu-  
lation be-  
tween two  
Roman  
Centu-  
rions.*

Cæsar has thought fit to transmit to posterity a singular instance of emulation between two of his Officers. They were two Centurions, or Captains, named Pulvio and Varenus; who were perpetually disputing one another the pre-eminence in courage. In the heat of the last-related battle Pulvio thus challenged Varenus: “Behold, says he, we have now an opportunity of determining our old difference. Let us see now which of us two can give the best proofs of valour.” So saying, he leaps out of the intrenchment, and advances to attack a large body of the enemy. Varenus, piqued in honour, follows him at a small distance. Pulvio presently kills one of the Nervii, but is soon after surrounded. Varenus runs up and disengages him; but soon falls into the same danger from which he had just extricated his rival; and is in his turn disengaged by him. Thus the two competitors mutually owed their  
lives



lives to each other ; and the prize of valour continued undecided. A. R. 698:  
Ant. C. 54.

The defence however of the Roman camp became every day more difficult and hazardous, on account of the great numbers wounded ; and Cæsar had yet heard nothing from them, none of Cicero's messengers having been able to get to him. At last a Gaulish slave, bribed by a promise of freedom, undertook to carry a letter of advice, escaped the vigilance of the Nervii by similitude of dress and language, and happily delivered it to Cæsar. Cæsar does not inform us where he then was, but he could not be at a great distance. Nothing seems to me more worthy of admiration in Cæsar, than his rapid expedition, scarce inferior to the progress of lightning. He received Cicero's letter an hour before sun-set. Immediately he sends orders to M. Crassus, who was among the Bellovaci, to march his legion at midnight to join him. He dispatches a courier to C. Fabius, who wintered with the Morini, to order him to lead his legion into the country of the Atrebates, which lay in the way to Cicero. He writes to Labienus to go into the territory of the Nervii. He himself in the mean time assembles about four hundred horse. The next day, at the third hour, he had advice of Crassus's approach. That day he marched twenty miles. Fabius joined him at the appointed place. But Labienus, whom the Treviri, encouraged by the victory of Ambiorix, were upon the point of attacking, esteemed it too hazardous to quit his station ; and informed Cæsar of the obstacles which prevented his obeying. At the same



A. R. 698. time he sent him the first relation of Sabinus's  
 Ant. C. 54. disaster.

Cæsar approved of Labienus's conduct; tho' he found himself thereby reduced to two legions, instead of having three, which he had depended on. He did not however abandon his enterprise; well knowing that the timeliness of the succour was what was most essential in these circumstances. He makes forced marches; and sends before a Gaulish horseman with a letter to Cicero, by which he informed him of his approach; but which was wrote in Greek, that, if it fell into the enemies hands, it might not be intelligible to them. This Gaul was ordered, in case he found it impracticable, to penetrate himself into the Roman camp, to tie the letter to a javelin and throw it in. This he executed; and the javelin by an accident stuck in a tower, and remained there two days unperceived. On the third a soldier saw it, took it down, and brought it to Cicero; who immediately read it in full assembly, and diffused the common joy thro' the whole camp. At the same time they perceived the smoke of the villages fired by Cæsar in his march, which put the arrival of the succours beyond ail doubt.

*The Gauls,*  
*to the num-*  
*ber of sixty*  
*thousand,*  
*are van-*  
*quished and*  
*put to flight*  
*by Cæsar,*  
*who had*  
*but seven*  
*thousand*  
*men with*  
*him.*

The Gauls were also informed of it by their scouts; and thereupon thought proper to quit Cicero, and go to meet Cæsar. Their army consisted of above sixty thousand men. Cicero immediately acquainted his General with their march; and the next day Cæsar himself saw them on the other side of an hollow-way with a river in front. As he had now no longer any reason to be in a hurry, he incamped in the place he then was, and prepared for the fight.

His



His legions were by no means compleat, A. R. 698.  
Ant. C. 54. making both together scarce seven thousand effective men. To try his fortune with so extremely unequal a force, was to run a great hazard; yet he took that resolution: all the advantage he proposed, was to draw the Gauls to attack him; determined however, if he failed, to go to them. The stratagem he employed was to render himself contemptible in their eyes. His camp could not at best take up much ground, as it consisted of no more than seven thousand men without baggage; he contracted it still as much as possible. He made it his business to show every sign of fear; he gave an unusual height to his ramparts, and stopped up his gates with great exactness: And, the Gaulish cavalry having advanced to defy the Roman, this last retreated according to order, affecting an air of timidity and concern.

Barbarians, who think themselves formidable, cannot help being presumptuous. Their whole army crosses the river; and advancing to the Romans gives them the wished-for opportunity of attacking them to advantage. Their confidence was so great, that they made proclamation round the Roman camp, that, if any of the Gauls or Romans had a mind to come over to them, they should be at liberty so to do till the third hour; but from that time they would give no quarter. They had already begun to scale the rampart, and fill up the ditch; when Cæsar ordered a general sally to be made by all the gates of the camp. The infantry and cavalry fall at once on the Barbarians, whom surprize and fright rendered incapable of resistance. Numbers of them were killed on the spot, and the rest fled.



A. R. 597.  
Ann. C. 34

Cæsar, as prudent as courageous, would not pursue them too far, because of the woods and morasses with which the country abounded. As his numbers were so inconsiderable, he was sensible that the least check might be attended with fatal consequences. Thus without any loss he relieved, and joined, Cicero. When he saw the works of the Barbarians, he was struck with admiration. He then reviewed Cicero's forces, and found there was scarce one man in ten unwounded: Which gave him a just idea of the greatness of the danger they had been exposed to, and of the vigorous defence they had made. He bestowed great commendations on the legion, and its Commander; and particular marks of esteem and affection on such Officers as Cicero made honourable mention of. For he well knew how powerfully well-timed caresses operate on men of honour; and that an army becomes capable of undergoing every thing for a General who knows how to esteem and reward merit.

*Grief and mourning of Cæsar for his legions exterminated by Ambrivix*

Cæsar learnt also from Cicero all the circumstances of the unhappy affair of Sabinus. As he loved his soldiers, he was extremely affected by it. He let his hair and beard grow, which among the Romans was the deepest mourning, nor did he shave himself till he had avenged the death of those brave men. So says \* Suetonius; from whence we must conclude that his mourning continued at least to the end of the next campaign.

*He passes the winter in Gaul, which was all over in motion.*

Cæsar returned C. Fabius to his winter-quarters among the Bellovaci; and he fixed himself about † Samarobriva with three legions, distri-

\* Suet. Cæs. 67. † Amiens.



distributed in three different cantonments, but very near one another. The situation of affairs would not permit him to pass his winter in Italy, as usual. All Gaul was in motion, and meditated a general revolt. The Senones had expelled their King Cavarinus, who was a friend to the Romans, after having failed in an attempt to murder him. We have already mentioned the Assassination of Tasgetius King of the Carnutes by his Subjects. The Armorican nations, that is to say, those who inhabited the sea-coast from the mouth of the Loire to that of the Seine, were endeavouring to renew their alliance which had been dissolved three years before. The Nervii, the Eburones, the Treviri, were in arms. In a word there was not one Gaulish nation but what was preparing for a revolt except the Ædui and the Rhemi; these were particularly attached to the Romans, the one by an ancient alliance, and the other by new engagements contracted with Cæsar and cultivated with mutual fidelity.

The Treviri in particular hastened to action. Their King, Indutiomarus, at first solicited the Germans to pass the Rhine and assist him. But the defeat of Ariovistus, and that of the Teuthi and Usipetes, had taught them better things. So that Indutiomarus could not prevail on any one of the German nations to come into his measures, *Indutiomarus, King of the Treviri, is killed in a fight with Labienus.* This restless, impatient, Gaul attacked however Labienus's quarters with his national forces, and those of some of his neighbours. But it was to his own destruction. For, as he imprudently came too near the Roman camp, Labienus sallied out on him with all his troops; whom he had ordered to single out Indutiomarus, and not to meddle with any one else before they had made sure of him. His design



A. R. 698. design succeed'd ; Indutiomarus was slain in  
 Ant. C. 54. passing a river that obstructed his flight. His  
 army, having lost their King and General, dis-  
 pers'd ; and, after that victory, Gaul was some-  
 what quieter the rest of the winter.

## S E C T. IV.

*Cæsar raises two new legions in Italy, and borrows  
 one of Pompey. Cæsar's expeditions during the  
 winter. The measures Cæsar takes to secure his  
 vengeance against Ambiorix and the Eburones.  
 He subdues the Menapii. The Treviri are van-  
 quish'd and subjected by Labienus. Cæsar passes  
 the Rhine a second time. He goes at length into  
 the country of the Eburones, and undertakes to ex-  
 tirpate them. Extreme, unexpected, danger to  
 which a legion, commanded by Q. Cicero, is  
 expos'd from the Sicambri. The country of the  
 Eburones is ravag'd ; but Ambiorix makes his  
 escape from Cæsar. Cæsar causes Acco, Chief  
 of the Senones, to be condemn'd and executed.  
 He goes to Italy, to pass there the winter.*

CN. DOMITIUS CALVINUS. \*

M. VALERIUS MESSALLA.

A. R. 699. **C**Æsar's forces were considerably lessened by the  
 Ant. C. 53. loss of the legion and five cohorts totally  
 destroyed with Sabinus. To repair that loss he  
*Cæsar* made new levies in Cisalpine Gaul ; and besides,  
*raises two* as Pompey in his second Consulship had enlisted  
*new legions* soldiers, though he had never marshalled them  
*in Italy,* in  
*and bor-* in  
*rows one of* in  
*Pompey.* in  
*Cæf. de B.* in  
*G. l 6.* in

\* These Consuls did not enter into their office till July. The six first months of the year there was an Interregnum. But, as we do not treat here of the affairs of the City, I have specified the whole year by the names of the Consuls as usual.



in form, having had no occasion for them, as he A. R. 699.  
Ant. C. 53. had continued at Rome, Cæsar desired him to set those troops on foot, and send them to him.

“ Friendship, says Cæsar, and the good of the  
“ Commonwealth equally determined Pompey  
“ to consent to that request.” It was indeed  
an useful succour for the Gaulish war : but how  
remiss a government must that be, where pri-  
vate persons could thus dispose of the public Plut.  
Cat. forces ! Cato was aware of the consequences of  
such disorder, and complained of it in the Se-  
nate. “ Pompey, said he, has lent a legion  
“ to Cæsar ; though the one never asked it of  
“ you, nor the other had your consent so to  
“ dispose of it ; so that bodies of six thousand  
“ men with horses and arms are now presents  
“ of friendship between private persons.” But  
it was Cato’s fate to speak always the truth, and  
never to be heeded. Cæsar by this reinforce-  
ment made himself ample amends for what he  
had lost : for in the room of fifteen cohorts he  
had three legions, which doubled their number.

These measures were indeed necessary. The  
spirit of the Gauls was by no means broke ; all  
those nations, who last year made preparations  
for a revolt, persisted in their design : and even  
the Treviri, far from being discouraged by the  
death of Indutiomarus, continued faithful to  
his memory and engagements. After having  
bestowed the supreme command on his relations,  
they made a new treaty with Ambiorix ; and  
took so much pains with the Germans that they  
at last obtained assistance from them.

Cæsar for these reasons thought proper to open Cæsar’s  
expeditions  
during the  
winter. the campaign early ; and knowing that the Nervii  
and the greatest part of their neighbours were in  
arms ; he assembles the four legions that lay nearest  
to



A. R. 699.  
Ant. C. 53.

to them ; enters at the head of them into their country ; lays it waste ; carries off many prisoners, and much cattle ; and compels them to submit and give hostages.

• *Paris.*

After this expedition which took up little time, he returned, and held the general Assembly of Celtic Gaul. But, finding that the Senones and Carnutes had sent no Deputies, he adjourns the Session, and transfers it to \* Lutetia ; whose inhabitants, though they had been united with the Senones for an age, did not appear to have been concerned with them in their revolt. The same day he declared this resolution he set out ; and made such haste that he surprized Acco, Chief of the Senones, before he could collect his forces. Intreaties were now the only means left. The Ædui, whose clients the Senones were, interceded for them. Cæsar, who had no mind to spend the season for action in proceeding formally against the guilty, took their excuses, and ordered them to bring him an hundred hostages. The Carnutes, being terrified, submit also ; and obtain the same conditions, by the mediation of the Rhemi, their Patrons. Cæsar then comes to Lutetia, puts an end to the Session of the States, and orders the Gauls to provide him cavalry.

*The measures Cæsar takes to secure his vengeance against Ambiorix and the Eburones.*

It was as yet but the beginning of the spring ; and Cæsar, thinking Celtic Gaul was now in a state of tranquillity, turned all his thoughts to the management of the war with the Treviri and Ambiorix. It was the last that he particularly aimed at ; and he purposed to revenge the slaughter of the Roman cohorts by his death, and the destruction of his nation. He endeavoured then to discover the intentions of Ambiorix ; that he might frustrate them, and prevent his escape.

He



He knew Ambiorix was in friendship with the Menapii; a fierce nation, who, living in a country full of woods and morasses, had hitherto eluded the efforts of the Roman army, and had never made the least step towards a submission to Cæsar. Ambiorix had also, by the means of the Treviri, entered into an alliance with the Germans. Cæsar determined, ere he marched against him, to deprive him of these two resources on which this cunning Barbarian depended. He sends two legions to Labienus in the country of the Treviri, to whom he commits the care of the baggage of the whole army; and goes himself against the Menapii, with five legions, who carried nothing but their arms with them. That nation, sensible that they were not able to keep the field against the Romans, had recourse to their usual artifice: and, instead of assembling forces, they dispersed; and concealed themselves with every thing they could carry off in their woods and morasses. But Cæsar, having divided his army into three corps, made such horrible havock in the country, plundering and burning every thing, and carrying away men and cattle, that the Menapii were obliged to beg peace of him. He granted it, on condition that they should not receive Ambiorix nor any one from him; threatening to treat them as enemies if they did. He left in their country Comius with a body of horse to keep them in awe; and prepared for the reduction of the Treviri. But he found the business done to his hands by the valour and conduct of Labienus.

The Treviri had of their own accord advanced to attack the Lieutenant-general. But, having learnt that he had received a reinforcement of two legions,

*The Treviri are vanquished and subjected by Labienus.*

A. R. 699.  
Ant. C. 53.

*He subdues the Menapii.*



A. R. 699  
 ANI. C. 53.

legions, they stopt short ; and resolved to wait for the auxiliaries they expected from Germany. Labienus thought proper to meet them ; and advanced within a mile of them. Between the two camps ran a river \*, with steep banks, and difficult to pass. The Roman General formed a scheme to draw them over this river ; that he might fight them when on disadvantageous ground, and before they could be joined by the Germans. With this view he declared publicly, that he intended to decamp, and to go and occupy some better post, where the baggage of the army which he had under his care might be safer. As his camp swarmed with Gauls, this was presently reported to the enemy. Night being come, he assembles the Tribunes and first Captains, and acquaints them with his real intention : after which he gives the signal to depart. The Gauls were soon advertised of it ; and reproaching one another with the cowardice of not daring to pursue a flying enemy, to whom they were superior in number, began at day-break to pass the river. Labienus gave them time to get all over. He then discontinues his march ; and, having placed the baggage on an eminence under a sufficient guard, he animates his troops. “ Behold, says he, the opportunity you longed for. The enemy present themselves in a place where they cannot possibly sustain your onset. Shew only under my command the valour you have so often manifested to our General. Think him present ; and that he sees, and observes you.” At these words the Romans give a loud shout, and throw their javelins. The Gauls, finding those march boldly up to them of whom they expected

to

\* *Probably the Moselle.*



to have seen nothing but the backs, are confounded and disconcerted, nor sustain even the first shock, but take to flight. The victory was compleat: multitudes killed; many prisoners made; and the Treviri, disheartened by the fatal blow, submit to the Romans. The Germans, hearing of the defeat of those they came to succour, repassed the Rhine; and with them the whole family of Indutiomarus. Cingetorix, who had been always faithful to the Romans, was made King of that nation.

When Cæsar came into the country of the Treviri, and found all quiet, he resolved to pass the Rhine a second time. To which he had two motives; to punish the Germans for sending succours to the Treviri, and to intimidate them so that they might not dare to give or promise a retreat to Ambiorix. He builds then a bridge like his former, but somewhat higher on the river; and, having finished the work in a few days, he crosses the Rhine.

The Suevi were the people who sent the succours that had so much irritated him. At his approach they retreated far into the country; and waited for him in good order at the entrance of a great forest called by them \* Bacenide. Cæsar tells us, that he was apprehensive he should want provisions, if he went after the Suevi, because Germany was very ill cultivated. It is probable too that he did not choose to advance too far into an hostile country, out of which perhaps he should find it difficult and hazardous to retire. He returns then to Gaul; but, to keep the Germans in fear, he would not demolish

\* Cellarius takes it to be the forest of Hartz in lower Saxony: in the principality of Holfenbutel.



A. R. 699. lish all his bridge; but only broke off about  
 Ann. C. 53 two hundred feet on the German side; and to  
 secure the rest of it he built thereon a tower of  
 four stories, wherein he left twelve cohorts un-  
 der a General Officer.

*He goes at length into the country of the Eburones, and undertakes to enter-  
 prise them.* Nothing now remained but the war with the  
 Eburones, which he had very much at heart.  
 Above all he would have been overjoyed to be  
 master of the person of Ambiorix. He endea-  
 vours then to surprize that able Gaul: and for  
 that purpose detaches his cavalry under the com-  
 mand of Minucius Basilius, with orders to cross  
 the forest of Ardenne with all expedition; and  
 to conceal his march as much as possible, that  
 he might arrive when he was least expected.  
 This stratagem was very near succeeding. Ba-  
 silius penetrated into the country before any one  
 knew of his coming; and took some prisoners,  
 who shewed him the retreat of Ambiorix. It  
 was an edifice in the midst of a wood; this wood  
 saved him. For, while some of his cavalry  
 stopped the Romans in a narrow way, he got  
 on horse-back, and rode off; with the loss how-  
 ever of his chariots, horses, and equipage.

Ambiorix, seeing the storm that was going  
 to break on his country, had recourse to the only  
 proper expedient; which was to order the Ebu-  
 rones to shift every one for himself; knowing  
 he could not possibly assemble an army strong  
 enough to make head against Cæsar. His coun-  
 trymen follow his directions. They dispersed;  
 and concealed themselves, some in woods, others  
 in inaccessible morasses, others in places near  
 the sea, which at high water became isles. Those,  
 who were on good terms with the neighbouring  
 nations, went there for shelter; the open coun-  
 try was quite abandoned. Cativulcus, who  
 shared



shared the rule with Ambiorix, being old and infirm; and therefore incapable of supporting the fatigues of war, or flight; poisoned himself\*, after venting bitter imprecations against his colleague for drawing him into so fatal an enterprize.

A. R. 699.  
Ant. C. 53.

Cæsar's intention was utterly to extirpate the Eburones; the difficulty was now to find them. To that end he resolved to divide his forces; and began by depositing the baggage of the whole army in the fort Atuatica†, which was situated in the heart of the country, the unfortunate quarters of Sabinus and Cotta. As its works were not absolutely demolished, he reckoned he should thereby lessen the labour of the legion he left there; which was one of the three lately raised in Italy. He gave the command of the fort, and legion, to Q. Cicero; whom he told at parting to expect him back in seven days. He takes with him three legions; gave three to Labienus, and three to C. Fabius: these three corps, distributed in three different cantonments, made terrible havock all over the country of the devoted Eburones. But the inhabitants, scattered here and there, still eluded his vengeance. To come at them it was necessary to penetrate into unknown places, of difficult access; and to pass defiles, exposed on all sides to ambuscades. If the legions kept together in a body, they could not get at the enemy; if they divided into small parties, or if the soldiers ventured singly, as it

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often

\* Cæsar adds, that it was with Yew; that is probably, with a juice extracted from that tree, which many Naturalists believe to have a deadly quality.

† Tongres in the country of Liege. The Atuatici, of whom we have elsewhere spoke, were a distinct people from the Eburones; and their Capital, as we have said, was according to many Geographers Namur.



A. R. 699  
Ant. C. 55.

often happened, in hopes of plunder, they frequently fell into the snares every where set for them, and perished themselves. At last Cæsar thought of a very extraordinary expedient; it was to invite the neighbouring nations to come, and plunder, and ravage, the habitations and lands of the Eburones. These, being acquainted with the country, were more likely to succeed; and, if they fell in the attempt, Cæsar was not much concerned.

*Extreme,  
unexpected,  
danger to  
which a le-  
gion, com-  
manded by  
Q. Cicero,  
is exposed  
from the  
Sicambri.*

This invitation gave room to a most surprizing event; which sufficiently demonstrates how necessary it is in war to be at all times upon one's guard. Not only the neighbouring Gauls were allured by the assurance of an easy prey; but, the news being carried over the Rhine, the Sicambri also laid hold of the opportunity. They pass the Rhine in barks to the number of two thousand horse; and begin by pillaging the Eburones, and carrying off what cattle they could meet with. As they were advancing into the country, one of the prisoners addresses them: "Why thus amuse yourselves, says he, in searching after an inconsiderable booty, when in three hours you may reach Atuatica, where all the baggage, all the wealth of the Roman army is left? Cæsar is far off; the small garrison scarce suffices to man the ramparts; and is so timidly cautious that no one has yet dared to stir out of the intrenchments." This advice was greatly approved; and the Sicambri immediately turn off to Atuatica.

It was now the seventh day since Cæsar's departure, and that on which he had fixed his return. Till then Q. Cicero had punctually obeyed his General's orders; and had never suffered even a servant to go out of the camp. But at last, hearing



hearing nothing from Cæsar who he knew was far advanced into the enemy's country, and doubting his exact return at the appointed time, tired out besides by the importunity of many who were uneasy at being shut up as if besieged, thinking it also proper to fetch corn into the camp that he might be able to give the allowance due that day to the soldiers, he sent five cohorts into a field only three miles distant to cut down the corn.

In that very instant the Sicambri arrive. The alarm in the Roman camp was great. It had now but half its complement; an assault was what was least expected; the Barbarians seemed to fall out of the sky; and the soldiers doubted not that Cæsar's army was ruined, or they should not have been insulted. Some even apprehended the ill-luck, necessarily annexed as they thought to the place; and had continually before their eyes the unhappy catastrophe of the forces of Sabinus.

There were those among them however who stood their ground at the gate at which the enemies presented themselves. Cæsar has particularized an old Captain, named Sextius Baculus, who had in his time performed many gallant actions; and who, though he was sick and had eat nothing for five days, made a shift to drag himself to the place that was threatened; where, encouraging by his example the Officers of the cohort on guard, he put a stop to the first fury of the Barbarians. Weak as he was, the wounds he received presently disabled him; and he fell\*, either dead, or in a swoon, and was with difficulty carried off. However his courageous de-

D 2

fence

\* Cæsar's expression seems capable of either construction: *relinquit animus Sextium.*



A. R. 699.  
Ant. C. 53.

fence gave the soldiers time to recover from their fright. The Sicambri were not able to force the gates of the camp; and the intrenchments defended themselves sufficiently against those who were ignorant of the manner of attacking them.

Mean-time the Roman foragers return. The Sicambri took them at first for Cæsar's army, and desisted from the attack of the camp; but soon, observing how few they were, pour upon them, and endeavour to surround them. The veterans that were in that body cut their way through the enemy, and got into the camp. The new levies, who had never been in such circumstances before, doubt, waver, and make contrary motions: many of these were slain. The rest, animated by their Officers who were men of courage and experience selected by Cæsar out of old corps, gained at last the intrenchments. The Sicambri, despairing then to storm the camp, went off, retook their booty which they had deposited in the woods, and repassed the Rhine quietly.

Such was the consternation in the Roman camp, even after the retreat of the Barbarians, that Volusenus, arriving in the night with the cavalry, could not persuade the soldiers that Cæsar was following. They persisted in their fancy, that the infantry was destroyed, and the cavalry alone had escaped. Nor did they recover their spirits till they saw their General in person returning at the head of the army.

Cæsar, having examined into every thing, could not but complain of the non-observance of his orders. For the rest, he admired the whimsical turn of fortune, which had caused those who came on purpose to prejudice Ambiorix



to be as serviceable to him as if he had invited them to his assistance. A. R. 699.  
Ant. C. 53.

The rest of the campaign he continued to lay waste, by his own troops and the neighbouring nations, the country of the Eburones. Every thing was pillaged and destroyed; so that even those, who by hiding themselves escaped the sword, were necessarily reduced to perish by famine. But he was never able to execute his intended vengeance on Ambiorix himself. Often that fugitive was on the point of being taken, or killed; he was often seen, and thought to be secured; but he as often escaped. Shifting perpetually his abode; and trusting himself with no more than four faithful horsemen; he rendered ineffectual the efforts of a multitude of enemies, whom personal hatred, the desire of paying court to Cæsar, and the hopes of reward, animated to pursue him. *The country of the Eburones is ravaged; but Ambiorix makes his escape from Cæsar.*

This expedition ended, Cæsar brought back his army to Durocortorum, the capital of the Rhemi. He there held a general Assembly of Gaul; in which he proceeded against those who had excited the Senones and Carnutes to revolt. Acco, having been convicted of being the chief promoter of it, was capitally condemned and executed. Many more, who apprehended the same fate, absconded; against whom Cæsar pronounced sentence of banishment. *Cæsar causes Acco, Chief of the Senones, to be condemned and executed.*

He then put his legions into winter-quarters; two on the frontiers of the Treviri, two in the country of the Lingones, and six with the Senones. After which he went to Italy, to visit Cisalpine Gaul, and hold the Assemblies according to the custom of the Roman Magistrates. *He goes to Italy, to pass there the winter.*



A. R. 619.  
A. U. C. 55

The order of facts obliges us to interrupt here the account of Cæsar's wars in Gaul. We are now going into the East, to treat of a General of very different capacity, and no less different success.

## S E C T. V.

*Origin of the Parthians. Arsaces Founder of that Empire; which is extended under the successors of that Prince. Their manners at first savage, afterwards softened by luxury. Their manner of fighting. They were always on horse-back. Their armies composed of nothing almost but slaves. Character of their genius. Parricide very common in the house of the Arsacidæ. The contempt Crassus had for vulgar superstitions prejudicial to him. The war he waged with the Parthians was altogether unjust. Saying of Dejotarus to Crassus upon his age. Crassus enters Mesopotamia; and, having subdued some towns, returns to pass the winter in Syria. His avarice. He plunders the temple of Hierapolis, and that of Jerusalem. Pompey and Crassus always unfortunate after they had profaned the temple of the true God. Pretended presages of the misfortune of Crassus. Young Crassus comes from Gaul to join his father. Excessive confidence of Crassus. Disheartening of his army by what they hear of the valour of the Parthians. Artabazus, King of Armenia, ally of the Romans. The Parthian King goes in person against Artabazus; and sends Surenæ against Crassus. Birth, riches, character, of Surenæ. Crassus passes the Euphrates, and re-enters Mesopotamia. Abgarus, King of Edessa, betrays Crassus. Crassus prepares to fight the Parthians. Battle. Young Crassus, after extraordinary proofs of valour given, be-  
ing*



*ing overcome, causes himself to be killed by his Esquire. Heroic constancy of Crassus his father. Night puts an end to the fight. Grief and discouragement of the Roman soldiers and their General. They retire by favour of the night to the city of Carræ. The Parthians pursue them. Crassus leaves Carræ in the night, and trusts again to a traitor. Cassius, his Quæstor, separates from the army; and saves himself in Syria. Crassus is like to escape from the Parthians. Perjidy of Surena, who fraudulently invites him to a conference. The mutiny of the Roman soldiers compels him to go to it. He is slain there. Crassus was a man of small capacity, and great presumption. Surena's insolence after his victory. Crassus's head is carried to the King of the Parthians in Armenia.*

**B**Efore we relate the unfortunate expedition of Crassus against the Parthians, I believe it will be proper to give an account of their origin and manners; and a summary of the History of that people, who were an unsurmountable barrier to the Roman Empire, and always put a stop to their conquests on the side of the East. We have already had occasion to name the Parthians more than once; but it is here properly that their History begins to make an important part of that of the Romans.

The Parthians came originally from Scythia; whence being expelled, they were obliged to seek elsewhere a quiet establishment. Their very name proved their origin, and contained in some manner their History; if it is true, as Trogius Pompeius says, that it signifies in the Scythian language Banished or Exiled. And the conformity of the manners of the two Nations



confirms to that opinion all the probability that facts so ancient and remote will allow of.

The country they possessed lies to the South of Hyrcania, and joins to Media on the West; a small tract of ground, and very unpleasant, as it consists chiefly of sterile mountains and sandy plains: so that you are exposed to the rigour of both extremes of weather; a piercing cold on the hills, and an excessive heat in the plains. This is doubtless a disagreeable habitation, but very proper to harden the constitutions of its inhabitants, and make them capable of supporting the fatigues of war.

For many ages the Parthians remained altogether obscure and unknown. Under the Assyrians and Medes, under the Persians, under the first Macedonian Kings of Syria, scarce any mention is made of this people. It was in the year of Rome 502, 250 years before Jesus Christ, when Antiochus surnamed the God was King of Syria, that Arsaces headed the revolt of the Parthians, who were tired out with the injustice and tyranny of their Macedonian Governors. Authors do not agree who Arsaces was; but it is certain that he was always considered by the Parthians as the Founder of their Empire, and that his memory was in such veneration among them that all his successors took his name.

Arsaces, having given to his Nation its liberty, did not confine himself in the limits of Parthia; he extended his conquests; which were carried further by his successors, who were almost all warlike and ambitious: so that by the success they had in all wars, with the Kings of Syria, whose power was continually decreasing; with the Seleucids, with the Bactrians, and with the Arme-



Armenians ; they had at last so enlarged their dominions, that in Craſſus's time they included almost all the countries between the Oxus and Euphrates. Their royal Cities were Ctesiphon Strabo. l. 16. p. 743. upon the Tygris, and Ecbatana in Media. The Parthian Kings spent the winter in the first ; and the summer in the other, or in Hyrcania.

The manners of this nation favoured at first Their man-  
ners at first  
savage, af-  
terwards  
softened by  
luxury. of their savage origin, and rough climate. But, after they had made conquests in delicious coun-tries, wealth and pleasure softened them. They gave into luxury of dress, and excessive incon-Plut. Craſſ. tinence. Of this we may judge by Surena the conqueror of Craſſus. His baggage loaded a thou-Justin. sand camels ; and he carried with him two hundred chariots filled with concubines. The seraglio of the King was doubtless much more numerous, composed of women of all nations, whose beauty was their sole merit. So that these haughty Arfacidæ, whose descent on the fathers side so much elated them, came often from mothers whose birth and conduct might well have covered them with blushes. The condition of the wo-Justin. men was indeed much the same then as it is now in those Eastern countries. They were strictly confined, and absolutely debarred the sight of men.

Their armour, and manner of fighting, was Their man-  
ner of fight-  
ing. the same they had received from the Scythians ; excepting only their compleatly-armed horsemen, whom they borrowed, I believe from the Persians, their neighbours, and for a long time their masters. Their other troops had scarce any other offensive weapon than the bow and arrow ; and fought always on horseback. Every one knows that they were no less formidable in flight (b),

(b) Versis animosum equis Parthum. *Hor. Od. I. 19.*  
Sagittas & celerem fugam Parthi. *Id. ibid. II. 13.*



than when they faced their enemies. For they had the art of shooting their arrows extremely well as they fled ; and their pursuers were the more liable to be wounded as they the less expected it.

*They were always on horseback.* Horses were universally used by them, not only in war, but at all other times also. If they went to a feast, or to a visit ; in public and private affairs, in town and country, in their markets and conversations ; they were always on horseback : in a word, the distinction between the slaves and their masters was, that the last every where appeared on horseback, and the others walked on foot.

*Their armies composed of nothing almost but slaves.* This difference however only took place in time of peace. For their armies, which were all cavalry, were composed almost entirely of slaves. Of these they had prodigious numbers, which were continually increasing, as the masters had no power to enfranchise their bondmen. They also took as much care of them as of their children. They taught them to ride and shoot. The great, and wealthy, piqued themselves who should furnish the King in his wars with the greatest number of horsemen. So that, when Anthony fought the Parthians, out of fifty thousand horsemen there were, says Trogus Pompeius, but four thousand freemen.

*Character of their genius.* The genius of this nation is depicted by the same author in but disadvantageous colours. (c) Haughty, seditious, perfidious, and insolent ;

(c) Ingentia genti tumida, seditiosa, fraudulenta, procacia : quippe violentiam viris, mansuetudinem mulieribus assignant. Semper aut in externos, aut in domesticos, motus inquieti : natura taciti, ad faciendum quam dicendum

promptiores, proinde secunda adversaque silentio tegunt. Principibus metu, non pudore, parent. In libidinem projecti, in cibum parci. Fides dictis promissisque nulla, nisi quatenus expedit.



lent ; they considered mildness as fit only for women ; violence was according to them the glory of men. They were always restless, and therefore continually engaging in foreign or civil wars. Properer for action, than speech ; neither prosperity nor adversity could break their gloomy silence. They obeyed their Kings, not out of loyalty, but fear : were moderate in eating, but immoderate in venery ; and had no regard to their words or promises, any further than they found it agreeable to their interest.

We may add, that the lust of Empire in the royal family was productive of the most horrible crimes. Nothing is more frequent in the history of the Arsacidæ than to read of Kings dethroned, and murdered, by their relations, their brothers, their children. Orodes, who was on the throne, when Crassus invaded the Parthians, had first caused his father Phrahates to be killed, as we have elsewhere observed, in concert with Mithridates, one of his brothers ; and afterwards, war breaking out between those two ambitious paricides, after various events Mithridates fell into the hands of Orodes ; who treated him not as a brother, but as an enemy.

L. DOMITIUS AHENOBARBUS.

A. R. 698.

AP. CLAUDIUS PULCHER.

Ant. C. 54.

Crassus set out from Rome, and even from Brundisium, in the midst of pretended ill-omens ; and loaded with the imprecations of many Romans. He had the utmost contempt for vulgar superstitions, which was prejudicial to him.

\* Antiquity gives us instances of Generals who suffered

*The contempt Crassus had for vulgar superstitions prejudicial to him.*  
Plut. Crass.  
Dio. l. XL.

\* Witness Nicias ; upon which we may consult The Ancient History Vol. III. p. 484.



A. R. 693.  
Ant. C. 54.

suffered much from a weak credulity. Here we have an example of the contrary. Crassus, whose understanding was improved by philosophic researches, so heartily despised all these imaginary signs of celestial anger, that he seemed to suppose that all the world thought like him on those subjects. His soldiers notwithstanding were very susceptible of these superstitious fears; and he, giving no manner of attention to them, nor providing any remedy against their bad consequences, suffered discouragement and despair to spread and increase to a great height among his troops.

*The war he  
waged  
with the  
Parthians  
was alto-  
gether un-  
just.*

This attention however was so much the more necessary, as the war he waged with the Parthians was altogether unjust: which inclined people to believe that the Gods declared against him. He had neither a lawful cause, nor orders from any body, to colour his invading them. But I have observed after Plutarch, that Crassus in his private conduct did not trouble his head about truth or falsehood, justice or injustice. He did not so much as save appearances on those subjects. He carried that manner of thinking into an enterprize in which he engaged the whole Commonwealth, and which might be attended with fatal consequences. He cared not that the Parthians were in peace with the Romans, and had given them no cause of complaint; it was sufficient for him to think that he should by attacking them gain riches and honour. And Divine Providence, which often punishes the unjust in this life, caused him to meet with a dishonourable death there where he thought to acquire an increase of glory and power.

He



He appeared throughout as a man struck with blind-<sup>A. R. 698.</sup>ness, and who made no reflection on him-<sup>Ant. C. 54.</sup>self. His age alone ought to have been a suf-<sup>Saying of</sup>ficient reason to have diverted him from throw-<sup>Dejotarus</sup>ing himself into dangers and fatigues, to which<sup>to Crassus</sup> he was no longer equal. For he was above sixty ;<sup>upon his</sup> and appeared much older. He even brought age.  
upon himself on that head a cautionary hint from Dejotarus. For in crossing Galatia, where that Prince who was advanced in years was building a new city, Crassus had a mind to rally him upon it. “ King of Galatia, says he, you begin  
“ to build when you have but an hour of day  
“ left.” Dejotarus answered him very *à propos* :  
“ You too, Crassus, are not over-early in setting  
“ out on your expedition against the Parthians.” It is not said that Crassus was offended at the repartee : but he did not for that the less go on with what he had undertook.

Being arrived in Syria, he lost no time ; and, <sup>Crassus en-</sup>having thrown a bridge over the Euphrates, he<sup>ters Mesopo-</sup>had at first some success : because the Parthi-<sup>tamia, and,</sup>ans were not prepared against so sudden and un-<sup>having</sup>foreseen an irruption. He took several towns<sup>subdued</sup> in Mesopotamia, or rather received their volun-<sup>some towns,</sup>tary submission. For they were almost all Græ-<sup>returns to</sup>cian colonies, who obeyed with regret Barbarians,<sup>pass the</sup> that had been slaves of their ancestors ; and they<sup>winter in</sup>put themselves willingly under the protection of the Romans, whom they knew to be lovers of their nation. <sup>Syria.</sup>

He met then with no resistance but from a Parthian Officer, named Sillaces, who with a handful of cavalry met him near the town of Ichnæ ; and who, being vanquished and wounded, carried to his master the news of the entry of the Romans into Mesopotamia. Crassus had also



A. R. 693.  
Ant. C. 54.

occasion to draw the sword against the inhabitants of Zenodotium ; who had massacred about an hundred Romans, after having received them into their city. This perfidy was revenged by the taking of the town ; which was plundered, and its inhabitants put to the sword, or sold. Crassus, having suffered his army to proclaim him Imperator for these trifling advantages, made himself be considered as a man of no extraordinary courage or hopes.

But the greatest fault he committed, after the enterprize itself, which, Plutarch says, was the greatest of all faults ; was that instead of advancing, and pushing on to Babylon and Seleucia, cities that were always ill-affected to the Parthians, he would return, and winter in Syria ; and left on the other side of the Euphrates, in the places he had subdued, only seven thousand foot and a thousand horse. By which he gave the enemy time to recover, and prepare for the next campaign.

*His avarice. He plundered the temple of Hierapolis, and that of Jerusalem.*

His employment during the winter was no less blameable. For he took no care to collect quantities of provisions and ammunition, or to exercise his troops. Directed by his unhappy bias, money was almost the only thing he thought of. He took an exact account of the revenues of the cities, without doubt to tax them as high as possible. He ordered them to raise a certain number of soldiers, which he afterwards dispensed with for sums of money. He plundered the temples ; and particularly that of the Syrian Goddess, greatly honoured in the city of Hierapolis, tempted him by its rich offerings ; which he examined curiously several days, and weighed in scales. That Goddess, who was represented in many places by a monstrous image half-woman,  
half-



half-fish, seems to be the same as the God Dagon A. R. 698.  
Ant. C. 54. mentioned in holy writ, and whose name signifies a Fish.

Crassus spared no more the temple of the true Jos. Ant. XIV. 12. God, whom he had the misfortune not to know. He took from thence \* two thousand talents, \* Three hundred and seventy which had been there ever since Pompey's time, and which he had left there. There was kept five thou- there besides eight thousand talents †, which sand pounds were the deposits of all the Jews throughout sterling. the universe. Eleazar, who had the custody of † One mil- the treasures of the temple, was willing to save lion four at least these deposits; and to redeem them he hundred thought he might sacrifice a piece of immense thousand value. It was a beam of gold, as Josephus calls it, weighing seven hundred and fifty Roman pounds, and inclosed in a beam of wood, to which were tied the magnificent veils that separated the sanctuary from the outward part called the holy place. Eleazar alone knew of this precious ingot; and, before he delivered it to the Roman General, he insisted on his oath; by which he engaged to rest satisfied with that, and to take out of the temple nothing more of its riches. Crassus swore, took the beam; but spared not therefore the eight thousand talents.

It is very proper to observe the unhappy fate Pompey and of the two Roman Generals, who first, and Crassus al- alone to the time we speak of, durst violate the ways un- respect due to the temple of Jerusalem. Pompey, fortunate from the time he was rash enough to look into after they that awful place where no profane person had profaned yet entered, succeeded in nothing; and termi- the temple nated at last miserably a life till then made up of the true of triumphs. Crassus, yet more criminal, met God. with more speedy punishment; and perished that very year.

I hope



A. R. 698.

Ant. C. 54.

*Pretended**presages of**the misfor-**tune of**Crassus.*

I hope the judicious reader will not confound this observation, which is agreeable to the principles of Christianity and the belief of a Providence, with the pretended ill-omens that happened to Crassus according to the vulgar opinion and the accounts of historians. I would not even deign to give place in a serious work to those accidents of no consequence, if they did not help us to know the way of thinking of the Ancients ; of which perhaps there are still those among us who are not quite cured. It is observed, for example, that Crassus and his son, as they were going out of the temple of Hierapolis, fell one upon the other ; which was a presage of their approaching death ; and the son fell first, because he was to be killed before his father. Every one is sensible how frivolous this is. I shall mention hereafter other facts of this kind, of which the same judgment will be easily made.

*Young**Crassus**comes from**Gaul to join**his father.**Cic. Brut.**221. 232.*

Young Crassus was come from Gaul to join his father in Syria, with a thousand Gaulish cavalry. History praises him, as having given proofs of capacity and courage ; but Cicero taxes him with temerity and presumption. “ Because  
 “ he had served, says he, under a great Gene-  
 “ ral, (that is Cæsar) he immediately thought  
 “ himself capable of conducting an army. He  
 “ had nothing in his head less than the models  
 “ of Alexander and Cyrus. In running thus  
 “ rashly after greatness and glory, he fell in  
 “ a deplorable manner.”



CN. DOMITIUS CALVINUS.

M. VALERIUS MESSALLA.

Crassus the father, whom age should doubtless *Excessive* have rendered more moderate, shewed through- *confidence* out his whole conduct an unwarrantable confi- *of Crassus.* dence. When he assembled his troops out of their quarters, in order to re-enter Mesopotamia, there arrived an ambassy from the Parthian King; with instructions pacific enough, but couched in terms that were very haughty, and insulting as to Crassus. “ If it is Rome, said the Ambassadors, that has sent you and your army here ; “ the enmity will be irreconcilable. But if it “ is without the orders of your Republic, as “ we are informed, and through the desire of “ enriching yourself, that you have attacked “ the Parthians, and invaded their territories ; “ \* Arfaces would willingly use moderation : “ he pities your age, and permits you to with- “ draw the Roman soldiers, who are rather pri- “ soners in the cities of Mesopotamia, than “ able to keep them for you.” Crassus did not shew any resentment of such contemptuous language ; but, full of his project, told them, he would return an answer to the King of Parthia in Seleucia. Vagises, Chief of the ambassy, laughed ; and shewing with the fingers of his right-hand the palm of his left ; “ hairs will “ grow here,” replies he, “ before Crassus sees “ Seleucia.” So both sides prepared for war.

But the Roman army began to be disheart- *Disheart-* ened, even before they had seen the enemy. No- *ening of his* thing could be more terrifying than the accounts *array by* what they

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E

*of hear of the*  
*valour of*  
*the Par-*  
*thians.*

\* The Parthians gave this name to all their Kings.



A. R. 699. of them, given by some of those who had been  
 Ant. C. 55' left in garrison by Crassus in the towns on the  
 other side of the Euphrates ; and who, dispatched  
 probably by their Commanders, with much  
 trouble and hazard had got into the camp. They  
 exaggerated, as is usual with those who are  
 frightened, the greatness of the danger, the  
 number of the enemy, and the difficulty of re-  
 sisting them. “ They are people, said they,  
 “ whom it is impossible to escape when they  
 “ pursue, or to take when they fly. Their  
 “ arrows are too swift for the sight, so that their  
 “ adversaries find themselves wounded ’ere they  
 “ see the archer. The defensive, and offensive,  
 “ arms of their cuirassiers are equally advan-  
 “ tageous ; the first are impenetrable, and the  
 “ others pierce whatever is opposed to them.”  
 Crassus’s soldiers were the more dismayed at  
 this relation, as they had formed a quite diffe-  
 rent notion of the Parthians. They thought them  
 the same in all respects as the Armenians and Cap-  
 padocians, whom Lucullus had beat with so much  
 ease ; and had imagined that the chief trouble  
 they should have in this war would consist in  
 long marches, and in the difficulty of coming  
 up with enemies who would decline fighting.  
 The danger they least expected, being found  
 real, made great impression on their minds.

Even some of the principal Officers were af-  
 fected by it ; and among others Cassius, who  
 afterwards made himself so famous by killing  
 Cæsar, and who was then Quæstor to Crassus.  
 Courageous, yet cautious, he had a mind, and  
 many others with him, to refer the undertaking  
 the war to a new deliberation, and to examine  
 whether it was seasonable to engage in it. They  
 were seconded by the diviners and aruspices, who  
 pre-



pretended the omens were all bad. But Crassus <sup>A. R. 699.</sup> would hear nothing but what flattered the incre- <sup>Ant. C. 53.</sup> dible eagerness he had to advance.

He was confirmed in this resolution by the *Artabazus* arrival of Artabazus, King of Armenia, who <sup>King of</sup> had succeeded old Tigranes, his father. This <sup>Armenia</sup> Prince came into the Roman camp with six <sup>ally of the</sup> thousand horse, which composed his guard. He <sup>Romans.</sup> promised besides a corps of ten thousand cuirassiers, and thirty thousand foot which he would subsist at his own expence. He gave at the same time a piece of advice, which, if it had been followed, would probably have prevented the ruin of the Roman army. It was to enter the territories of the Parthians by the way of Armenia; by which means the Romans would have had plenty of provisions in a friendly country; and the Parthian cavalry, which was their whole strength, could not have acted among the mountains with which Armenia abounds. Crassus gave a tolerable reception to Artabazus, on account of the succours he brought and promised; but absolutely rejected his advice, because he had left in Mesopotamia some good troops whom he could not abandon. The Armenian Prince went away little satisfied with Crassus, and probably foresaw that he should be soon employed in defending his own dominions. In fact the King of Parthia, finding <sup>The Par-</sup> he had two enemies to deal with, Crassus and <sup>thian King</sup> Artabazus, prudently endeavoured to prevent <sup>goes in per-</sup> their junction. With this view he divided his <sup>son against</sup> forces; and as, notwithstanding his bravadoes <sup>Artaba-</sup> and haughty airs, he much feared the Romans, <sup>zus, and</sup> he went in person where he thought there was <sup>sends Sur-</sup> least danger, that is, into Armenia; and sent a <sup>na against</sup> <sup>Crassus.</sup>



A. R. 699  
Ann. C. 33.

numerous army into Mesopotamia under the command of Surena.

*First,  
richness  
raiser, of  
Surena.*

That name is not the name of a person, but of a dignity; and belonged to the second person in the Empire, and as it were the Vizir of the King of Parthia. He who was then in possession of that high post, and whom we shall always call by the name of Surena, as we know no other name, was of the first nobility. His family claimed a right, in the ceremony of inaugurating the Parthian Kings, to place the crown on their heads. His wealth equalled his birth. I have given a hint of his equipage, and luxury, in the army he commanded. But, what was much more to the purpose, he had with him a thousand cuirassiers, and a much greater number of light-armed horse, raised on his estate; and his retinue, including his troops, servants, and dependents, amounted to more than ten thousand men. He was a man of great personal courage, and had thereby been greatly serviceable to Orodes who then reigned; having restored him from banishment to the throne, and having stormed the city of Seleucia, in the siege of which he signalized himself so far as first to mount the wall and kill with his own hand those who opposed him. To valour he joined, tho' not yet thirty years old, ability and address, which he extended without scruple to fraud and perfidy: and it was chiefly by these sinister means that he triumphed over Crassus; whom a rash confidence at first, and afterwards the despair inspired by his misfortunes, disposed to give into all the snares laid for him. Such was the General whom Orodes opposed to the Romans.

*Crassus  
passes the  
Euphrates  
and re-enters  
Mesopotamia.*

Crassus passed the Euphrates at the city of Zeugma, where there was a bridge over that river,



river, from whence it took its name. For <sup>A. R. 699.</sup> Zeugma signifies a Bridge in Greek. <sup>Ant. C. 53;</sup> During the passage there happened a terrible storm, with thunder and lightning, a heavy rain, and violent wind ; in short the hurricane was so furious that it broke down part of the bridge which was but of wood. The superstitious soldiery was above all terrified by the last accident, which seemed to intimate the impossibility of a return. Crassus endeavoured to dispel that fear, by assuring them with oaths, that he had always designed to bring his army back by Armenia ; and his harangue had a good effect. But as he insisted much on it, and added, “ Yes, you may de-  
 “ pend on what I tell you ; none of us shall come  
 “ back this way ; ” the double sense of these words renewed all the fears that had seized on the troops. And Crassus, who perceived it, would not correct his expression.

There happened soon after another fact of the same nature. When the army had passed the river, Crassus reviewed it. It was usual on those occasions to have a solemn sacrifice. The priest who killed the victim, having according to custom put the entrails into the General's hands, he let them fall. This was a fresh cause of terror to the army. Crassus only laughed at it ; “ this is, says he, the effect of old-age,  
 “ but my arms shall not fall out of my hands.” He could have said nothing better. Notwithstanding his troops retained an impression of fear in consequence of these accidents, and some others which I purposely omit, which they still considered as bad omens.

Crassus had under him a fine army ; seven legions, four thousand horse, and the same number of light-armed troops. It advanced at first



A. R. 699.  
 Ant. C. 53.

along the river to seek out the enemy. The scouts brought word that they saw no men, but the foot-steps of a great number of horses that retreated. Crassus from thence concluded that the Parthians fled before him, and resolved to pursue them. However Cassius, and those of his opinion, again made representations to their General ; and proposed to him either to let the army stay in some of the cities that had Roman garrisons, or to get to Seleucia by coasting the Euphrates. The march would indeed have been long, but they would have reaped from thence great advantages. They could not have wanted provisions, as barks might have accompanied the army by means of the river ; and besides the river would have prevented them from being surrounded. Crassus was in doubt what to do, and might perhaps have followed this salutary advice ; but a traitor hindered him.

*Abgarus  
 King of  
 Edessa be-  
 trays Cras-  
 sus.*

\* Abgarus, King of Edessa in Osroene, according to the practice of petty Princes, who are always obliged to submit to the laws of their too-potent neighbours, had appeared a friend to the Romans, while Pompey's arms awed the East ; and afterwards, upon the departure of that General, had renewed his alliance with the Parthians. Had he discovered his sentiments, he could not have done Crassus much harm. But, by agreement with Surena, he comes to the Roman camp ; hiding the blackest perfidy under the mask of friendship ; and as he was a plausible speaker ; and besides, knowing the foible of

\* *This name, which was common to all the Kings of Edessa, is derived from the Arabic, and signifies Great, Powerful.*



of Crassus, had brought him considerable presents ; he got his entire confidence.

A. R. 699.  
Ant. C. 53.

Abgarus's commission was to persuade the Roman General to engage himself in the vast plains of Mesopotamia, where heavy-armed troops could not defend themselves against an innumerable cavalry. After he had then insinuated himself into the favour of Crassus, by protestations of gratitude for the services done him by Pompey, and by the high opinion he expressed of the Roman army : “ You do not  
“ sure, says he, rightly consider it, with such  
“ an army as yours to lose time in making tedious preparations. You have no occasion  
“ for arms against those who think of nothing  
“ but flight ; you want only swift feet to over-  
“ take them, and hands to seize and carry off  
“ their riches. And even supposing it necessary  
“ to fight ; which is most eligible, to have to  
“ do with Surena alone ; or to give Orodes,  
“ whom fear now compels to hide, time to recover his courage, and unite against you the  
“ whole force of his Empire ? ” Crassus knew not then that the Parthian King was gone to wage war in Armenia ; and took for indisputable truths all the lyes which the treacherous Osroenian thought proper to put off. So he leaves the Euphrates ; and, according to Surena's wishes, takes the route of the plains.

The way was at first pleasant and easy enough. But soon they met with burning sands and boundless deserts. So that not only thirst and the inconveniences of a painful march fatigued the Romans ; but the prospect of an immense solitude added greatly to their dejection. For they saw neither tree, nor plant, nor rivulet, nor hill, nor grass ; but as it were a vast sea of sand which



A. R. 697.  
Act. C. 55.

surrounded them on all sides. Meanwhile Crassus had news from Artabazus which ought to have opened his eyes, and to have convinced him that Abgarus imposed on him. The King of Armenia acquainted him that he was actually attacked by Orodes, and for that reason could not send the succours he had promised. He desired him therefore to come and join him; if not, he advised him to avoid at least places where cavalry could act to advantage, to gain the mountains and intrench himself there. This was good advice, and well-intended by Artabazus. Crassus, who was a small genius and full of prejudices, while he blindly trusted the traitorous Abgarus, suspected treachery where there was none. He sent no answer in writing to Artabazus, but contented himself with telling his deputy, that he was not then at leisure to go and punish the Armenians, but would soon revenge himself of their perfidy.

Cassius was now disconsolate; and, not daring to make any more remonstrances to his General who began to be offended with him, he attacked the Osroenian in private. “Wretch, says he, “what evil genius has sent you among us? By “what delusions, by what enchantments, have “you bewitched Crassus to lead his army into “immense deserts; and to undertake marches “fitter for a leader of Arabian robbers, than “a Roman General?”

The cunning Barbarian, who could take all shapes, behaved humbly to Cassius; and desired him only to have patience a little longer. To the soldiers he acted in another manner; he made a jest of it to them. “You imagine “sure, says he, that you travel in Campania, “and you expect the springs, the baths, the “shades,



“ shades, and the commodious inns, of that  
 “ delicious country. You forget that you tra-  
 “ verse the confines of Assyria and Arabia.”

A. R. 699.  
 Ant. C. 53.

At last however, lest his perfidy might be discovered, he left the army; and that not by stealth; but in order, as he persuaded Crassus, to do him service, and trouble the affairs and counsels of the enemy. On the contrary he went to inform the Parthians that it was now time to attack the Romans, who were come to deliver themselves up to them.

In fact it was not long before Crassus heard from them. While he was making forced marches, fearing nothing but that the enemy should escape from him, his scouts come back full-speed and inform him, that the greatest part of their comrades were killed, that they themselves had escaped with difficulty, and that the Parthians followed them in great numbers, and good order, and with much confidence and audacity. This report, so different from what Crassus expected, began to disconcert him. There had happened to him that very day two pretended ill-omens, which it was to be wished had had no more effect on his troops than on himself. In dressing he put on by mistake a black surtout instead of a purple one: and some of the colours were not pulled out of the ground without difficulty. These things made no impression on Crassus. He only changed his dress, but was not the less confident, nor even presumptuous.

The arrival of the enemy, however, disturbed him; and caused him in a great measure to lose the presence of mind so necessary to a General in time of danger. At first, following the advice of Cassius, he formed his infantry into a column;



A. R. 699. column ; to give the enemy less hold, and pre-  
 Ant. C. 53. vent his rear's being surrounded. Afterwards  
 he altered his mind, and formed a square batta-  
 lion, having twelve cohorts on every side ; and  
 he flanked each cohort with a squadron ; that,  
 as the enemies strength lay in their horse, every  
 part of his battle might be supported by cavalry.  
 He placed himself in the center, gave the com-  
 mand of the two wings to his son and Cassius ; and  
 marched in this order to the place where he was  
 told the enemy was ; they not being yet in fight.

The Roman army in advancing came to a ri-  
 vulet, the sight of whose water, tho' not very  
 abundant, comforted and rejoiced the soldiers in  
 that dry torrid country. The greatest part of  
 the Officers were inclined to encamp and pass  
 the night in that place ; and in the mean time  
 to get more exact information of the number  
 of the enemy, their dispositions, and manner of  
 fighting. But young Crassus, full of ardour  
 and confidence, persuaded his father to advance.  
 So that they only made a short halt, to give  
 those who chose it time to refresh and eat ; and,  
 before they had all finished, Crassus resumed his  
 march ; not gently, and with frequent stops, that  
 the troops might not come fatigued to the enemy ;  
 but with great haste and precipitation.

*Battle.*

Presently the Parthians appeared ; and their  
 countenance had nothing so terrible as had been  
 reported. The first ranks concealed those be-  
 hind, so that their number seemed inconsider-  
 able ; besides, their arms were covered with lea-  
 ther, which prevented their glittering. Surena  
 was willing to hearten somewhat the Romans  
 at first, that their surprize might be the greater  
 afterwards, and increase their terror. Which  
 happened accordingly, when, at the signal given  
 by



by him, all the plain ecchoed with the sound, not of trumpets and horns which were the instruments the Romans used, but of a sort of drums accompanied with bells, which together made a mixture of hollow and shrill sounds capable of scaring those who were unused to them. At the same instant the Parthians uncovered their arms, and appeared men, and horses, all resplendent with iron and steel; an unexpected sight, and no less proper to trouble the eye, than the noise of their drums was to terrify the ear.

A. R. 699.  
Ant. C. 531

Surena shewed himself at their head, tall and handsome; but effeminately adorned, and in a manner ill-answering his valour. For, following the fashion of the Medes, he put on red; and curled and perfumed his hair; whereas the Parthians retained even at that time the negligent, and I may say savage, air of the Scythians, their ancestors.

When the two armies were near enough to engage, the Parthians, who had long pikes, endeavoured to break the Romans with them. But they soon perceived that such close battalions, composed of soldiers accustomed to fight hand to hand, were impenetrable. They retreated then, and made believe they would disperse; but at the same time extended themselves, and endeavoured to encompass the Romans. Crassus detached after them the light-armed troops; who went not far. For, being surprized with a shower of arrows, they fell back on the legions; whom they disordered a little, and frightened more. The Roman soldiers considered with fear and astonishment the violence of those arrows, whom no defensive arms could withstand. And indeed the bows of the Parthians were very large and strong, and vigorously bent; and the dry-



A. R. 6:9.  
Act. C. 53.

dryness of a hot climate, enabling the strings to bear an extraordinary tension, made that kind of weapon yet more formidable.

Already the Parthians, having separated and placed themselves at a distance, shot their arrows on the Roman legions; and, close as the Romans stood together, could scarce ever miss. Nor could the Romans take any measures that would answer. If they kept their ground, they received the enemies discharge without even the consolation of revenge. If they advanced, the Parthians fled; and did not therefore discontinue shooting; a practice, with reason applauded by Plutarch; as it reconciled safety and glory, which commonly are at variance.

The Romans flattered themselves for some time that the Parthians would at last exhaust their stock of arrows; and then would be obliged to retire, or fight hand to hand. But when they learnt that these hopes were ill-grounded, as the Parthians had in their rear a great number of camels laden with these terrible arrows, which they fetched thence as they had occasion; despair seized these gallant men, whose valour was now become useless.

Young  
Crassus,  
after ex-  
traordi-  
nary proofs  
of valour  
given, be-  
ing over-  
come,  
causes him-  
self to be  
killed by  
his Esquire

Young Crassus, however, by his father's order, endeavoured to join the enemy; who had approached nearer to the wing he commanded, and prepared to surround it. He takes then the thousand Gaulish cavalry he had brought with him, three hundred other horse, five hundred archers, and eight legionary cohorts; and, separating from the army, advanced to the attack. The Parthians gave ground, and even fled before him; designing probably to cut him off from his father. The young warrior thought himself victorious; and pursued them, accom-  
panied



panied by two of his friends, Censorinus and  
 \* Megabacchus. All the horse followed them ; and the foot shewed not less ardour and courage, being persuaded that they were victors, and that the enemy fled. They followed them thus a great way ; but on a sudden the pretended runaways stop ; and, joining themselves to other troops, return all together upon the Romans. These stood, supposing their small number would be a bait that would allure the Parthians, who were much more numerous, to engage them hand to hand. But they were mistaken. The Parthian cuirassiers placed themselves in front ; and the rest of the horse scoured the country, riding about the Romans without order, and thereby raised such a terrible dust as took away at once both sight and respiration. Crouding one another in a small space, the Romans stood as butts to the Parthian arrows ; unable to defend themselves against enemies whom they even saw not. They perished then in great numbers ; and by a slow, painful, death. They tried to pull out the arrows that pierced them, but their iron was armed with hooks ; so that they tore their veins and nerves ; and expired in great torment. And those who remained alive were in no condition to fight. Their Commander having exhorted them to go and attack the Parthian cuirassiers, they shewed him their hands nailed to their shields, and their feet fixed to the ground ; so that they could neither fight, nor fly.

In this extremity young Crassus, who manifested throughout the engagement a valour worthy of

\* *This is not a Roman name, and is perhaps corrupted. The old Latin translator, according to Xylander, had Cn. Plancus.*



A. R. 699. of a different fate, had recourse to his cavalry  
 Ant. C. 53. as his last hope ; and managed so well, that with them he at last joined the enemies cuirassiers. But the conflict was very unequal. The Gaulish half-pikes had little effect on horsemen covered from head to foot with armour ; whereas the long stout lances of the Parthians gave terrible blows to the Gauls ; whose defensive armour, according to the custom of their nation, was very slight, if they had any at all. However, the Gauls did wonders. They seized with their hands their adversaries lances ; and then, laying hold of them, tumbled them from their horses ; which put them out of all manner of condition of fighting ; because the weight of their armour prevented their getting up again, or making any motion. Sometimes the Gauls dismounted, and, getting under their opponents horses, stabbed them. The wounded steed flounced ; and threw his rider ; treading to pieces at once the victor and vanquished. But heat, and thirst, overcame these brave Gauls, acting in a climate so different from their own. Besides, most of their horses were killed, being transfixcd by the long lances of the Parthian cuirassiers. Thus, after an obstinate engagement, they were obliged to retreat to their infantry ; carrying with them young Crassus dangerously wounded.

A small sandy eminence, which the Romans perceived near them, seemed to offer them some shelter. They posted themselves there ; placed their horses in the middle, and formed themselves into a circle, making a rampart of their shields ; by which means they hoped to be able to repulse the Barbarians. But the contrary happened. For on even ground the first protected at least those behind ; whereas, on an ascent, the



the hindmost stood necessarily higher than those before ; so that all of them were equally exposed to the enemies arrows ; and they found themselves, with grief, reduced to the necessity of perishing without glory, without almost resistance.

A. R. 699.  
Ant. C. 53.

These unhappy troops had now no glimmering of hope left ; and two Greeks, who were settled in that country, advised young Crassus to save himself in the city of Ichnæ, which was not far off, and had admitted a Roman garrison. He answered like a Hero, that no death could be terrible enough to make him resolve to abandon brave men, who were butchering on his account. He exhorted the two Greeks to make use themselves of the counsel they gave him ; and, making them a sign of friendship, sent them away. As for himself, being wounded in the hand, and unable to use it, he presented his body to his Esquire, and commanded him to stab him. Censorinus did the same : Megabacchus, and many Officers of distinction, killed themselves. The soldiers, deprived of their Commanders ; and pressed by the enemies, who thrust their lances into their bodies, at last surrendered ; there being no more than five hundred left out of seven thousand. The Parthians cut off the head of young Crassus ; and, fixing it on a pike, carried it to his father.

He had reason to expect that misfortune. For, after a glimpse of joy which the flight of the Parthians from his son had given for a small time, he had received couriers from him, who informed him of the great distress he was in, and the pressing need he had of a considerable and speedy succour. As Crassus was now superior in number to the part of the enemies army opposed to



A. R. 693.  
Ant. C. 55.

to him, he took the advantage, and put himself in motion, to go and disengage his son, if not yet too late ; when he saw the Parthian victors arrive, who brandished in the air his pale, bloody, head ; shewing it to the Romans, and asking insultingly, whose son that young Hero was : “ For it is not possible, said they, intrepid warrior as he was, that he should spring from so cowardly a father as Crassus.” This sight, and discourse, far from inspiring the Romans with a desire of vengeance, threw them into an inexpressible dejection and consternation.

*Heroic-  
fian: of  
Crassus his  
father.*

This is the finest passage in the life of Crassus. That unhappy father, instead of being unmanned by grief, endeavoured to comfort himself, and encourage his army. “ This is a loss, cries he, that affects me only. The fortune, and glory, of Rome still survives in you ; and has received neither defeat, nor diminution ; since you are alive, and in condition to act. But if compassion for my misfortune touch you, if you share in my affliction for the death of the best of sons, shew it by your just resentment against the enemy ; turn their joy into mourning, punish their cruelty. Let not what has happened discourage you. Great success is not bought cheaply. This our ancestors have often experienced it. It is not by an uninterrupted series of success ; but by patience, and a fortitude invincible by the injuries of fortune ; that Rome has rose to the height of grandeur she now enjoys.”

*Night puts  
an end to  
the fight.*

These generous words were not able to revive the Roman courage. And Crassus, having ordered his soldiers to give a shout, only thereby manifested their fright and dejection ; so weak it was, discordant, and ill-supported ; whereas that



that of the Barbarians proclaimed joy and confidence. The battle continued till night with the same disadvantage to the Romans. The Parthians then retired ; saying they would grant Crassus a night to mourn his son ; and would return the next day and complete their victory : unless he wisely chose to deliver himself voluntarily up to Arsaces, rather than be carried to him by force. It was the custom of the Parthians never to pass the night near their enemies ; because they did not fortify their camps ; and in the dark could not use either their horse, or arrows, to advantage.

It is easy to imagine what a night the Romans had. No body took care to bury the dead, or dress the wounded ; every one was taken up with lamenting himself. For their destruction seemed inevitable, whether they staid till day where they were, or advanced during night in an infinite plain where there was no shelter. The wounded too were an objection, as to the last. To carry them with them would retard their progress ; and if they left them behind, besides the inhumanity of such a conduct, they exposed themselves to a discovery from their cries. And in this mournful situation the General did not appear. Tho' he was the cause of all their calamities, they would have been glad to have seen him, and heard his voice. But he had not the courage to shew himself. He was naturally timid ; he had made an extraordinary effort during the fight ; the success not answering, he was cast down by grief and fear, and kept himself hid in obscurity. \* Great example, says Plutarch, to the vulgar of the

A. R. 609.  
Ant. C. 53.

*Grief and discouragement of the Roman soldiers, and their General.*

VOL. XIII.

F

in-

\* Παραδειγμα τοις πολλοις  
τυχης τοις δ'εν φρονεσιν αδελφιας  
και φιλοτιμιας, δι'ων εκ ηγαπα  
μη περ τοσ αν και μεγιστος εν

μυριασιν ανθρωπων τασαυταις,  
αλλ'οτι δυοιν μογιον ανδρων ιερεος  
εκρινετο, το πατος ακωδιν ιφ-  
μιζων.



A. R. 699. inconstancy of fortune ; but to the wise a great  
 Ant. C. 53. lesson of the misfortunes that spring from a mad  
 and boundless ambition ; which suggested to him  
 that he ought not to be satisfied till he was the  
 first and greatest man in the world ; and that  
 to have two above him was an humiliation that  
 annihilated him.

*They retire  
 by favour  
 of the night  
 to the city  
 of Carræ.* Octavius, a Lieutenant-general, and Cassius,  
 having in vain endeavoured to recover him  
 from his dejection, took upon themselves to  
 call a Council of war. It was therein resolved  
 to retire immediately. Upon which the army de-  
 camped without noise, and without the trumpets  
 giving the signal to depart. But, when those who  
 were disabled from marching perceived them-  
 selves abandoned, they by their affecting cries  
 and lamentations troubled and disordered the  
 march. Besides, the apprehensions of being pur-  
 sued and overtaken by the enemy ; the drawing  
 often into battalia on false alarms ; the care of  
 such of the wounded who having some strength  
 left dragged themselves after the army ; made  
 them advance very slowly.

Only an Officer, named Egnatius, having  
 separated from the main army with three hun-  
 dred horse, came to the foot of the walls of  
 the city of \* Carræ about midnight : and, calling  
 to the centinel in Latin, desired him to tell Co-  
 ponius the Governor, that there had been a  
 great battle between Crassus and the Parthians.  
 He added nothing more, and did not even dis-  
 cover himself ; and then pursued his route to  
 Zeugma.

\* Many authors, both an-      where Abraham sojourned some  
 cient and modern, think this      time with his father Tharex.  
 city is the same as Haran ;



Zeugma. Thus he saved himself and his troops, A. R. 699.  
Ant. C. 53. but was blamed for abandoning his General.

However, the advice he gave Coponius was serviceable to Crassus and his army. The haste with which Egnatius passed on, and the vague expressions he used without entering into particulars, made the Governor of Carræ conclude that the news was bad. He therefore ordered his whole garrison to take arms, went out to meet Crassus, and conducted him and his army into the city.

The Parthians were not ignorant of the retreat The Par-  
thians pur-  
sue them. of the Romans : but waited for day according to their custom. They then came into the Roman camp ; where they butchered about four thousand sick and wounded, who were left there. They killed also many Roman soldiers, as they overtook them here and there in the plain. Besides these, four cohorts, having lost their way, were surrounded by them and cut in pieces, to the number of twenty ; who continuing to defend themselves with invincible courage, struck their adversaries with such admiration, that they opened, and gave them a free passage to Carræ.

Surena, as he approached that city, received a false piece of intelligence. He was told that Crassus and the principal Romans had escaped ; and that there was only an inconsiderable body of troops in the city. The Parthian General was afraid he had lost the chief fruit of his victory ; and, to know the truth, he sent near the walls one of his people who spoke both languages ; with orders to invite with a loud voice Crassus, or Cassius, to an interview with Surena. This man was attended by some Arabians, who, having served in the Roman army before the action, well knew Crassus and Cassius.



A. R. 699.  
Ann. C. 55.

The last appeared on the walls ; and was told that Surena consented to make peace with the Romans, provided they evacuated Mesopotamia. The proposal was advantageous in the then circumstances of the Roman army. Cassius promised to report it to his General, who would be glad to treat on those terms with the Parthian Commander. Surena, having thus got at the knowledge of what he wanted, laughed at the credulity of the Romans ; and the next day, while he was preparing to attack the place, he by proclamation acquainted them, that, if they had a mind to retire in safety, they must deliver up to him Crassus and Cassius bound hand and foot. The Romans, extremely mortified to find themselves thus imposed on, thought of nothing now but running away in the night.

*Crassus  
leaves  
Carræ in  
the night,  
and trusts  
again to a  
traitor.*

It was necessary to keep such a resolution concealed from the inhabitants of Carræ till its execution. Crassus always imposed on, always blind, imparted it to a traitor ; whom he even took for his guide in the march. That wretch, named Andromachus, immediately informed the Parthians of what passed ; and, that he might deliver the Romans up to them, he made them march and countermarch so as to get no ground ; and at last brought them into a country full of morasses and ditches, where every thing stopped and fatigued them.

*Cassius, his  
superior  
judgement  
from the  
army, and  
saves him-  
self in Sy-  
ria.*

Many suspected the treachery ; and above all Cassius, who returned to Carræ ; and, taking some Arabian guides, ordered them to conduct him by another route into Syria. The Arabians were superstitious about the moon, and pretended that they ought to stay till she had passed Scorpio. “ I am more afraid of Sagittarius,” says Cassius to them, alluding to the Parthian

arrows ;



arrows ; and without losing time got safe into Syria with five hundred horse. The Lieutenant-general Octavius, a man of sense, was also aware of the perfidy of Andromachus ; and, being conducted by faithful guides, gained with five thousand men who followed him an eminence called Sinnaca, where he had no longer reason to fear the enemies cavalry.

The day surprized Crassus, accompanied by his betrayer, yet engaged in those difficult, untoward, places I spoke of. Tho' pressed by the Parthians, who came up with great dispatch he nevertheless found time to get to a small hill, half a league distant from that which Octavius occupied ; but these two eminences communicated by a defile which crossed the valley. Octavius saw the danger of Crassus. He goes to him ; and his men, animated by his example, follow. They place themselves round Crassus ; and, making a rampart of their shields and bodies, encourage one another to defend him ; and vow that no arrow shall reach their General, till they have all lost their lives in his defence.

Surena, perceiving that the Parthians had no more the same superiority or courage as in the plains, and apprehending that the Romans would escape when the night was come by means of the mountains, had recourse according to his character to cunning and perfidy. He suffered some prisoners to escape, before whom the Barbarians discoursing with one another had said on purpose that their King did not design to wage an implacable war with the Romans ; and would be glad to regain their friendship by treating Crassus with generosity. Besides, he ceased hostilities : and at last advanced himself with great calmness towards the hill, with the principal

A. R. 699.  
Ant. C. 53.

*Crassus is like to escape from the Parthians*

*Perfidy of Surena, who fraudulently invites him to a conference.*



A. R. 699.  
Ant. C. 53

principal Officers of his army, having his bow unbent, and holding out his hand as a friend ; and invited Crassus to enter into a negotiation with him. “ Arfaces, says he, is sorry to have been  
“ obliged to give the Romans proofs of his  
“ power, and the valour of his people ; but  
“ will be glad to give them marks of his mild-  
“ nefs and goodness.”

*The mutiny  
of the Ro-  
man sol-  
diers com-  
pels  
him to go to  
it.*

This discourse made no impression on Crassus. Too often imposed on by the Parthians, and seeing no reason for so sudden a change, he would not hear his proposals. The Roman soldiers would not permit him to act as he thought proper ; they complained seditiously, that he should expose them to the danger of fighting with those people who frightened him even unarmed. Crassus tried all methods to bring his soldiers to reason. He represented to them, that, if they would but have patience the rest of the day, they should all escape into the mountains by favour of the night. He pointed out the route with his hand ; and conjured them not to renounce the means of safety, which were certain, and near at hand. But an unsuccessful General has little authority with his army. Crassus, perceiving his soldiers grew angry, and clashed their javelins against their shields with indignation and threats, was afraid to exasperate them too much. He therefore generously resolved to go to certain death : and nothing can be more laudable than the sentiments he manifested in that fatal moment. He turned to Octavius, and some other General-officers who followed him : “ You see, says he, the necessity I  
“ am under of taking this step ; and you are  
“ witnesses that I am treated unworthily and  
“ with violence. But, in whatever place a  
“ better



“ better fortune conducts you, report that Cras-  
 “ sus perished deceived by his enemies ; not  
 “ delivered up by his soldiers.” Octavius, and  
 those who accompanied him, would not abandon  
 their General : but Crassus sent back his  
 lictors.

He saw first come to meet him two sorts of *He is slain*  
 Deputies, or Heralds, half Greeks, half Bar-*there.*  
 barians ; who, as soon as they perceived him,  
 quitted their horses, prostrated themselves be-  
 fore him, and besought him in Greek, to send  
 some of his people who might satisfy him that  
 Surena and all his retinue were unarmed. Cras-  
 sus answered, that, if he had the least regard  
 for his life, he should not have trusted himself  
 in the hands of the Parthians. However, he  
 sent two Romans, brothers, called the Roscii ; to  
 learn the conditions of the interview, and the  
 number of those Surena was to bring to it. The  
 Roscii were stopped ; and immediately Surena  
 himself advances on horseback with his retinue ;  
 and, keeping up to his character, he exclaims  
 on Crassus’s being on foot. “ How, says he,  
 “ the Roman General on foot, and we, we are  
 “ on horseback ! ” Crassus answered him coldly,  
 that they were neither to blame, since they  
 both followed the custom of their country.

Surena then entered on business ; and, as if  
 he had been in earnest, said that from that mo-  
 ment peace was concluded between the King of  
 Parthia and the Romans ; but that they must  
 write. “ For, adds he, you Romans have not  
 “ given us reason to rely much on the good-  
 “ nefs of your memories, with regard to treaties.”  
 He then proposed to Crassus, to go towards the  
 river, to prepare and sign the articles. The  
 Roman General, determined to comply in all  
 things,



A. R. 609.  
A.D. C. 53.

things, ordered a horse to be brought him.  
“ It is not necessary, replies Surena, here is one  
“ of which the King desires your acceptance.”  
At the same time he presented Crassus with a  
horse, with rich trappings; and the equerries  
set him on, and began to whip the horse to  
make him go fast.

Surena's design became now manifest; he  
wanted to take Crassus alive. The Romans  
perceived it; and Octavius immediately seized  
the bridle of Crassus's horse. Petronius, a military  
Tribune, and the other Officers surround their  
General, force the horse backwards, and dis-  
perse the Barbarians who crouded about Crassus.  
This was not done without noise and tumult;  
and they soon came to blows. Octavius kills  
the groom of one of the Barbarians; and is him-  
self slain, being run thro' the back with a lance.  
Petronius is thrown off his horse. Crassus too  
defended himself with vigour, to prevent his be-  
ing taken alive. He succeeded; and was killed,  
either by the Parthians; or by some of his own  
people, who, entering into his views, had a mind  
to spare him the shame of becoming a priso-  
ner to the Barbarians. The Parthians cut off  
his head and right-hand, to carry in triumph to  
Orodes. However, the circumstances of Cra-  
sus's death are not absolutely certain, as Plu-  
tarch informs us, for ocular testimony is want-  
ing. Of those that accompanied that unfortu-  
nate General into the plain, some were slain on  
the spot; the rest, when they saw their danger,  
retreated speedily towards the hill.

Lib. Epist.  
CVI  
Dio.

After the slaughter of the Generalissimo,  
and the principal Commanders; the soldiers,  
who by their mutiny had occasioned this last  
disaster, were soon involved in it. The per-  
fidious



fidious Surena came again, and endeavoured to decoy them with his fine promises. He told them, that the vengeance of Arsaces was satisfied by the death of the guilty person; and that now the innocent soldiers might descend into the plain with safety. Many believed him, and, putting themselves into his hands, were made prisoners. Those who had the most courage, and sense, waited for night to disperse. But few of these got off; for the Arabians scoured the country, and pursued them so diligently, that they killed, or took, the greatest part of them. It is computed that the whole loss of the Romans in the several actions amounted to twenty thousand killed, and ten thousand made prisoners.

Thus perished a powerful army, which had made the East tremble; and which the incapacity and blindness of its General made a prey to adversaries, never indeed easily conquered by the Romans, but who were certainly inferior to them.

Crassus was indeed very unfit to head a great enterprize. This appeared throughout his whole conduct: and, generally speaking, a person infected with the shameful vice of avarice must be a low man, and incapable of any elevation; or at best only so by sallies and intervals. Crassus was a small genius, altogether unacquainted with himself. Tho' adroit in flattering others, he was the dupe of flatterers himself; and, tho' justly reproachable for his excessive avarice, he rallied those who had the same fault. This vain, jeering, character is perfectly compatible with a presumptuous confidence; and that presumption was the principal cause of Crassus's ruin. For he always heartily despised

A. R. 699.  
Ant. C. 53.

*Crassus was a man of small capacity, and great presumption.*



A. R. 699. spised the Parthians till the very instant that he  
 Ant. C. 53. found himself crushed by them; far from prac-  
 tising, or even knowing, that maxim of great  
 Captains, \* that you should fear your enemy  
 at a distance, that you may not fear him when  
 near.

*Surena's  
 insolence  
 after his  
 victory.*  
 Val. Max.  
 I. 6.  
 Plot.

Surena, after the victory, shewed all the  
 insolence of a Barbarian. He left the body of  
 Crassus exposed, with the rest, to dogs and  
 birds of prey. He sent his head and hand, as  
 I said before, to Orodes, who was then in Ar-  
 menia: and, as for himself, he made his entry  
 into Seleucia with a comic pomp, to which he  
 gave the title of Triumph to insult the Romans.  
 Having sent an express to the inhabitants of  
 that city to acquaint them, that he brought with  
 him Crassus alive; he took from among the pri-  
 soners him who most resembled him, dressed him  
 in the Barbarian manner, and even, according  
 to the text of Appian, as a Barbarian woman.  
 In this equipage they set him on a horse, and  
 all those about him called him Crassus, and  
 treated him as the General; he too was obliged  
 to act his part in the farce, by answer-  
 ing as if he had really been Crassus. Before him  
 went trumpeters, and a sort of lictors mounted  
 on camels. To the fasces of these mock lictors  
 hung purses; and by the axes were seen many  
 bloody Roman heads. The procession was  
 closed by some courtesans and musick girls of  
 Seleucia, who vyed with one another in sing-  
 ing songs full of raillery and satire on the cow-  
 ardice and effeminacy of Crassus.

Such was the spectacle which the Parthian Ge-  
 neral exhibited to the city of Seleucia. In the  
 Senate,

\*. *It was the maxim of the great Condé.* Or *Fun. de M.  
 le Prince par Bossuet.*



Senate, he flourished about the Milesian tales, which did not quite square with decency, that were found among the baggage of a Roman Officer : and censured with great severity that taste for loose writings, carried even into the army, and the enemies presence. The reflection was just in itself ; but by no means became him who made it : and called to mind to the Seleucians, says Plutarch, the fable of the wallet. It seemed that Æsop in that apologue had Surena in view ; who put into the pouch before some free tales read by an enemy ; and carried in that behind his own debauches, more extravagant than all reproached to the Sybaritæ ; and the licentiousness of a seraglio where he reckoned his concubines by hundreds : so that, adds the historian, nothing could worse agree than the head and tail of the Parthian army. The front of it was terrible ; lances, arrows, horses in complete steel : and its rear consisted of tabors, dissolute dances, and a groupe of shameless women.

I have already mentioned that Orodes was gone into Armenia. It was there Crassus's head was brought him. Peace had been just concluded between Orodes and Artabazus ; and cemented by the marriage of a sister of the King of Armenia with Pacorus, the eldest son of the Parthian King. These nuptials were then actually celebrating ; and the tragedy of the Mænades of Euripides was then acting before the two Kings. For those Princes understood, and were fond of, the Greek tongue ; and Artabazus was even able to write it, and compose in it in verse and prose. The Parthian Officer, who had the head of Crassus in charge, having presented it to the King during the entertainment ; one of the actors took it ; and, acting the

A. R. 699.  
Ant. C. 53.

Crassus's  
head is car-  
ried to the  
King of the  
Parthians,  
in Arme-  
nia.



A. R. 699. the part of Argave carrying the head of Pen-  
 Ant. C. 53. theus, repeated the verses which Euripides puts  
 into the mouth of that frantic mother: “ I  
 “ bring, from the mountains to the palace, some  
 “ game just killed; fortunate and noble chace.”  
 This application gave great pleasure to the Par-  
 Dio. Flor. thian King, and the whole assembly. Some  
 Ill. 2. authors have moreover reported, that Orodes  
 caused melted gold to be poured into Crassus’s  
 mouth; thereby insulting his insatiable avarice.



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BOOK THE FORTY-SECOND.

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THE  
ROMAN HISTORY.

**D**OMESTIC troubles. Clodius's death. Pompey's third Consulship. Condemnation of Milo. Seventh and eighth Campaigns of Cæsar in Gaul. Cicero's Proconsulship in Cilicia. Years of Rome 698,—702.

S E C T. I.

*The death of Crassus fatal to the Roman liberty. Death of Julia, Cæsar's daughter and Pompey's wife. She is interred in the Campus Martius. Plancius accused. Cicero's gratitude. Three old Tribunes accused; and one of them condemned. Scaurus accused, and acquitted. Cato Prætor. Singularity of his dress. Extravagant caballing of the Candidates. Cato opposes this disorder; and, being in consequence of it insulted by the populace, quiets them authoritatively. Compromise of the Candidates for the Tribuneship, under the guarantee of Cato. Intrigues*



trigues for the Consulship. Infamous agreement between the Candidates and the Consuls. Pontinius's triumph. Long Interregnum, occasioned principally by Pompey's ambition. The Tribunes also contribute thereto. Consuls named at last with Pompey's assistance. Fruitless endeavours of the Consuls to appoint successors. *Ædileship* of Favonius, Cato's imitator. Cato regulates the expence of Favonius's shews, with much simplicity; which is notwithstanding relished by the people. Furious cabals of the Candidates for the Consulship, Milo, Hypseus, and Metellus Scipio. The wishes of the best Romans for Milo. His Competitors bad for them Pompey and Clodius. Clodius killed by Milo. Great disturbance at Rome on account of Clodius's death and funeral. Nomination of an Interrex. Milo returns to Rome, and continues to solicit for the Consulship. Continuation of the troubles. Sallust, then Tribune, personal enemy of Milo. Cælius on the contrary protects him. Extraordinary zeal of Cicero in Milo's defence. Pompey is created Consul alone. Pompey's satisfaction. His thanks to Cato, who answers him harshly. Pompey marries Cornelia, daughter of Metellus Scipio. Pompey's new laws against force and corruption. He reforms and abridges judicial proceedings. Milo accused. Cicero is disconcerted in his defence of him. General idea of the oration we have of Cicero for Milo. Address of the orator in handling what regarded Pompey. He substitutes his own intreaties and tears in the room of those that Milo disdained to employ. Milo is condemned. He retires to Marseille. His saying about the oration which Cicero composed after his trial. Other judgments in consequence of this affair. Metellus Scipio, being accused of corruption, is saved by Pompey;



*Pompey; who on the contrary refuses his assistance to Hypseus and Scaurus. Pompey names for his Collegue Metellus Scipio. Laudable passages in Pompey's conduct during his third Consulship. He commits a great fault in dispensing with Cæsar's asking for the Consulship in person. Motive to this compliance in Pompey. Metellus Scipio re-establishes the Censorship in its ancient rights. Horrible debauch of this restorer of the Censorship. Cato Candidate for the Consulship with Sulpicius and Marcellus. He is refused. His constancy after this refusal. He renounces the Consulship for ever.*

**T**HE defeat and death of Crassus were not only fatal to the glory of Rome, but also to its repose and liberty. It is probable that, so long as Crassus lived, the rupture between Pompey and Cæsar would not have broke out. For he kept them in order, and made them afraid of one another; because, which way so ever he inclined, he would have turned the scale. When he was gone, Pompey and Cæsar were in a condition to push their pretensions and disputes to extremities; as there was no umpire between them, nor any one to make a counter-balance. From that time they both prepared for action. “(d) So insufficient, says Plutarch, “ is the highest fortune to satisfy the heart of “ man. Such a vast Empire, such an immense “ extent

(d) Οὕτως ἡ τύχη μικρὸν ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν. ὃ γὰρ ἀποπιμπλῇ αὐτῆς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, ὅπως τοσούτον ἔαδος ἡγεμονίας καὶ μεγέθος εὐρυχωρίας δοῖεν ἀνδρῶν ὃς ἐπεῖγειν. ἀλλ' ἀκρόντες καὶ ἀνα-  
γινώσκοντες ὅτι τριχθα δε πάντα δεδασαί τοις θεοῖς, ἕκαστος δ' ἐμμορε τιμῆς, ἑαυτοῖς ὃς ἐνομίζον ἀρκεῖν δύσιν ὅσι τὴν Ρωμαίων ἀρχὴν.

\* A learned English Editor, instead of this word which makes an obscurity, reads ἐπ' ἐξουσίᾳ, justified.



“ extent of land and sea, was not enough for  
 “ two men. They had heard, and read in  
 Il. l. XV. “ Homer, that the Gods divided the universe  
 v. 189. “ into three parts, and had each their peculiar  
 “ allotment; yet they thought the Roman Em-  
 “ pire too small for them two.”

A. R. 698. Another bond of amity between these two  
 Ant. C. 4. famous Rivals was just cancelled by the death  
*Death of*  
*Julia, Cæ-*  
*sar's daugh-*  
*ter and*  
*Pompey's*  
*wife.*  
 of Julia, the daughter of one and wife of the  
 other. This lady was tenderly beloved both by  
 her father and spouse, and therefore was a strong  
 tie between the father and son-in-law. When  
 Pompey, tired out with the insolence of Clo-  
 dius after Cicero's banishment, was seeking  
 means to reconcile himself to the Senate and  
 aristocratic party, one of his friends advised him  
 to divorce Julia. But his tenderness for her  
 would not let him follow that counsel. No-  
 thing but death was able to divide him from  
 a wife so loved, and so worthy of love. Julia  
 died in childbed; and her infant followed her  
 in a few days. So that no pledge, no trace,  
 remained of an affinity, which, tho' it could  
 not hinder ambition from growing in the hearts  
 of Cæsar and Pompey, yet suspended its effects.

*She is in-*  
*terred in*  
*the Campus*  
*Martius*  
 Julia, instead of being deposited in her fa-  
 mily vault, was interred in the Campus Martius;  
 the people having a mind to do an extraordi-  
 nary honour to Cæsar's daughter. Pompey had  
 made preparations for burying her near his house  
 at Alba, and the Tribunes opposed the desire of  
 the multitude; but every thing was obliged to  
 give way to a people used to give law, and who  
 were extremely desirous to shew their zeal both  
 for the father and the daughter. This happened in  
 the Consulship of Domitius and Ap. Claudius.



L. DOMITIUS AHENOBARBUS:

AP. CLAUDIUS PULCHER.

I have related what happened out of Rome under this Consulship, and during the following year. The domestic events, the accusations of great men, the intrigues, the cabals, the disorders of the Government, is what I must now lay before the reader.

I shall begin with the affair of Plancius, who *Plancius* was accused of obtaining corruptly the Curule *accused.* Ædileship; and defended by Cicero. His Com- *Cicero's* petitor was M. Juventius Laterensis, a man of *gratitude.* birth and merit; from whom he had carried it, *Cic. pro* tho' only son of a Roman Knight. Laterensis, *Plancio.* who reckoned Consuls among his ancestors on both sides, and who besides knew himself personally superior to his rival in every thing, was extremely mortified at that preference; and accused Plancius of having supplanted him by intrigues and bribery. It is difficult, and immaterial to us, to know exactly how the affair was. But the warm gratitude of Cicero to a benefactor is a circumstance very interesting.

We have seen with what cordiality Plancius, when Quæstor in Macedonia, had received and protected Cicero in his exile. Our Orator remembered it, when Plancius stood in need of his eloquence: and, notwithstanding he had some engagement with Laterensis, took warmly the part of the accused. As he had great weight, not only on account of his great abilities, but also by his interest, by the general opinion of his probity, and by the remembrance of his services to his country for which he had been so ill rewarded, Laterensis was aware how great



A. R. 698. a recommendation it was to his antagonist to  
 Ant. C. 54 be defended by Cicero, as one from whom he had  
 received essential service. He therefore insisted,  
 that Cicero exaggerated what Plancius had done  
 for him, and magnified in his favour some little  
 things that had cost Plancius no great matter.  
 Cicero answers this reproach in a manner worthy  
 of admiration. He begins by proving the reality  
 of Plancius's services; he then adds, that, after  
 all, the reproach made him is too great a com-  
 pliment for him to wish heartily to refute it.  
 (e) " For, says he, I would willingly be adorned  
 " with every virtue, but there is none I am so  
 " ambitious of as that of Gratitude. That vir-  
 " tue, in my mind, is, not only the greatest,  
 " but the mother of all the others. What is filial  
 " piety,

(e) Etenim, quum omni-  
 bus virtutibus me affectum  
 esse cupiam, tamen nihil est  
 quod malim, quam me &  
 Gratum esse, & videri. Hæc  
 est enim una virtus non solum  
 maxima, sed etiam mater vir-  
 tutum omnium reliquarum.  
 Quid pietas, nisi voluntas grata  
 in parentes? Qui sunt boni  
 cives, qui belli, qui domi de  
 patria bene merentes, nisi qui  
 patriæ beneficia meminerunt?  
 Qui sancti, qui religionem co-  
 lentes, nisi qui meritam diis  
 immortalibus gratiam justis  
 honoribus & memori mente  
 persolvunt? Quæ potest esse  
 incredulitas vitæ sublati ami-  
 citiæ? quæ porro amicitia po-  
 test esse inter ingratos? Quis  
 est non tam liberaliter educa-  
 tus, cui non educatores, cui  
 non magistri atque doctores,  
 cui non locus ille mutus ubi  
 in e alius aut doctus est, cum  
 gratia recordatione in mente

versatur? Cujus opes tantæ  
 esse possunt, aut unquam fue-  
 runt, quæ sine multorum ami-  
 corum officiis stare possint?  
 quæ certè, sublatâ memoriâ  
 & gratiâ, nulla exstare possunt.  
 Equidem nil tam proprium  
 hominis existimo, quam non  
 modo beneficio, sed etiam be-  
 nevolentiae significatione al-  
 ligari: nihil porro tam inhu-  
 manum, tam immane, tam  
 ferum, quam committere, ut  
 beneficio non dicam indig-  
 nus, sed victus, esse videare.  
 Quæ quum ita sint, jam suc-  
 cumbam, Laterensis, isti tuo  
 crimini: meque in eo ipso in  
 quo nihil potest esse nimium,  
 quoniam ita tu vis, nimium  
 gratum esse concedam: pe-  
 tamque a vobis, judices, ut  
 eum beneficio complectamini,  
 quem qui reprehendit, in eo  
 reprehendit quod gratum præ-  
 ter modum dicat esse. Cic.  
*pro Plancio*, 80—82.



“ piety, but an attachment arising from a grate- A. R. 698  
Ant. C. 54  
 “ ful sense of the benefits received from our  
 “ parents? What are good members of the So-  
 “ ciety, ready to do it service in peace and  
 “ war, but such as chearfully cherish the re-  
 “ membrance of what they owe their country?  
 “ Who religious men but those that endeavour to  
 “ repay what they are indebted to the Deity by  
 “ adoration and thanks? What pleasure would  
 “ there be in life, if friendship was excluded;  
 “ and can friendship subsist with Ingratitude?  
 “ Which of us, who has had a liberal educa-  
 “ tion, does not frequently recollect with grate-  
 “ ful tenderness those who took care of his  
 “ childhood, his tutors, his masters, nay the  
 “ place itself where he was brought up and  
 “ instructed? Was there ever, or can there be, a  
 “ man so potent, as to stand alone without the  
 “ services of many friends? And services imply  
 “ Gratitude, nor continue without it. As for  
 “ me, I think nothing so worthy of a man, as  
 “ to be affected, not only by a benefit received,  
 “ but even by a good intention shewn: and on  
 “ the contrary nothing seems to me so opposite  
 “ to humanity, so brutish, as to be deservedly  
 “ reckoned, I say not as one unworthy of an  
 “ obligation, but even as one who does not en-  
 “ deavour to return it. Wherefore, Laterensis,  
 “ I admit your accusation. Gratitude, in my  
 “ opinion, cannot be too extensive; but, since  
 “ you will have it so, I own I have been Grate-  
 “ ful to an excess. And I beg you, Judges,  
 “ to lay under an obligation a man, who is  
 “ accused of nothing but being Over-grateful.”

Who can refuse his esteem and affection to  
 a man that expresses such sentiments? I fancy  
 Laterensis repented of his criticising on, and



A. R. 698. even attempting to ridicule, Cicero's sensibility  
 Ant. C. 54- for his benefactors. There is reason to believe that Plancius was acquitted, and was actually Ædile this year.

*Three old  
 Tribunes  
 accused;  
 and one of  
 them con-  
 demned.*

The three Tribunes who two years before had hindered the election of Magistrates, and occasioned an Interregnum, could not be brought to justice under the Consulship of Pompey and Crassus, as they in some sort owed to them their nomination. But they were accused this year; tho' Pompey's interest saved them all except Procilius, who being convicted of a murder could not escape condemnation. "It appears by this sentence, says Cicero to Atticus with an irony  
 " full of indignation, that our Judges are severer  
 " than those of the Areopagus; Judges, who  
 " reckon as nothing corruption, the illegal nomination of Magistrates, the Interregnum,  
 " the offended majesty of the State, in a word,  
 " the total confusion of the Republic; only we  
 " must take care not to murder a man in his  
 " own house. And then we are not infallibly  
 " lost; for Procilius had two and twenty favourable voices, against eight and twenty that  
 " condemned him."

*Scaurus accused, and acquitted.  
 Afcon. in  
 Cic. pro  
 Scauro.*

Cicero was not concerned in this affair. But he had without that business enough on his hands, on account of the great number of accused persons whose defence he undertook. Besides Gabinius and Vatinius, of whom we have elsewhere spoke, and some others, he pleaded for M. Scaurus; who having governed Sardinia the last year, and being returned to Rome to make interest for the Consulship, was accused by Triarius of Extortion and Oppression, committed on the people subjected to his authority.

This



This was a great cause. The name and family of the accused ; his connexion with Pompey, whose children were brothers to his children, for he had married Mucia, after she was divorced by Pompey ; the popularity he had acquired by his excessive expences in his Ædileship ; the reputation of his Council, to the number of six, namely, Clodius, M. Marcellus, M. Calidius, Cicero, M. Messala, and Hortensius ; the recommendation of nine Consular persons, of whom some praised him *viva voce*, and the rest sent their encomiums in writing which were read to the audience ; all these circumstances united made this cause one of the most famous and important that had appeared for a long time.

Scaurus indeed had occasion for all this external assistance to defend himself against accusations but too well founded. We have seen, from the time he served in Syria under Pompey, he had given proofs of avarice and injustice. The bad condition, to which the extravagancy of his Ædileship had brought his private affairs, was a new motive to plundering the unhappy Sardinians. His prosecutor made him this challenge : \* “ The law allows me to examine six score witnesses. If you can produce the same number of the Sardinians, from whom you have took nothing, I consent to your being acquitted.” And Scaurus durst not lay hold of so fair an offer.

G 3

We

\* We may conjecture that the law, in causes about Extortion and Oppression, had limited the number of witnesses to six score ; that the prosecutor, thro' too much warmth and eagerness, might not examine an extravagant number : which would have lengthened the proceedings, unpeopled for a time the oppressed province, and incommoded Rome with a multitude of foreigners.

A. R. 698.  
Ant. C. 54.

Val. Max.  
VIII. 1.



A. R. 69<sup>r</sup>.  
Ant. C. 54.

We should be able to give a more particular account of this affair, had we the oration of Cicero ; but it is lost. All we know is, that Scaurus employed every kind of intreaty and humiliation to soften his Judges. He pleaded himself his cause after all his Council, and wept much. When it was put to the vote, he divided into two bands his relations who solicited for him ; and he himself being at the head of one ; and Faustus Sylla, his brother by the mother, at the head of the other ; they threw themselves at the feet of the Judges, and continued thus prostrate all the time of the deliberation. He was acquitted ; and even with honour. For, of sixty-eight voters, there were but eight against him.

*Cato Prætor. Singularity of his dress. Plut. Cat.*

Cato presided at this Judgment : which would sufficiently answer for its integrity, were we as sure of the virtue of the Judges as of that of the President. He was that year Prætor ; and, by a singularity that I can not approve, he appeared in public, and in the functions of his office, without a tunic under his gown ; and instead of shoes he had only soles tied to his feet. He pretended in this to restore the ancient manner ; and defended it by the statues of Romulus and Camillus, which had only a toga without a tunic. But surely in indifferent things the present custom is the best rule.

That which does him real honour, is the constancy with which he opposed corruption ; and the respect which his virtue procured him from those whom all the laws could not restrain.

*Petrarcha-  
gent ca-  
baline of  
the Candi-  
datus.*

Corruption was an old evil in the Roman constitution, which acquired every day new strength. All authors who have wrote of these times have accounted one of the most fatal disorders,



orders, and one of the principal causes of the civil war, \* “ the Consular fasces extorted by

A. R. 698.  
Ant. C. 54.

“ by illicit bounty, the people’s selling themselves their interest, and a detestable cabaling that occasioned every year furious battles in the Campus Martius, where money alone determined the votes of a venal multitude.”

This bribery was transacted openly, as if permitted by the laws ; and was to many people a profession, and their main support.

Cato, determined to attack this disorder with so much the more vigour, as it was the deeper rooted and more universal, engaged the Senate to make a decree, that all who were elected to offices should be obliged, tho’ not accused, to come before the Judges and give an account how they came to be nominated. This ordinance much displeased the Candidates ; and yet more the People, who had been used to make an advantage of their votes. In the morning then, Cato, being come to his tribunal, was presently surrounded by a seditious mob, who by their clamours followed by blows put to flight those who accompanied him. He himself, being pushed and jostled about, with great difficulty reached the Rostra. But, when he was once there, by his very looks, and that air of authority which virtue gives, he stilled the tumult and made silence ; and his bold, generous, harangue entirely pacified the people. He was much commended in the Senate for his resolution and constancy : “ but I, answered he with his usual freedom, “ cannot commend you for not assisting a Prætor “ in so imminent danger.”

*Cato opposes this disorder ; and, being in consequence of it insulted by the populace, quiets them authoritatively.*

G 4

Altho’

\* Hinc rapti pretio fasces, sectorque favoris  
Ipse sui populus, lethalisque ambitus urbi  
Annua venali referens certamina campo, Luc. I. 178.



A. R. 69<sup>th</sup>. Altho' it does not appear that this decree of the  
 Ant. C. 14 Senate concerning the Candidates was carried  
 Com. 122 into execution; nevertheless it much embarrass-  
 ed them. If they made interest in the usual  
 manner, they apprehended they should arm  
 against them the severe virtue of Cato: if they  
 did not, they feared they should be distanced  
 by some less scrupulous Competitor. The Can-  
 didates for the Tribuneship came to an agree-  
 ment under Cato's guarantee, acknowledging  
 him for Umpire and Judge of their conduct, and  
 submitting each of them, in case of corrup-  
 tion, to pay five hundred thousand sesterces to  
 the others. They would even have deposi-  
 ted these sums with him, but he declined it; and

Cicero & A. contented himself with taking security. Cicero,  
 IV. 5 & writing this piece of news to his brother and At-  
 ad C. Fr ticus, was at a loss what to conjecture about the  
 H. 25 event. "But if things, said he, go on in this  
 "manner, Cato alone will have more power  
 "than all the Laws and all the Judges together."  
 Plutarch informs us, that, the day for electing  
 Tribunes being come, Cato went to the assem-  
 bly; examined strictly all that past, and pro-  
 nounced sentence of condemnation against one  
 of the Candidates. The others dispented with  
 the payment of the forfeit, esteeming themselves  
 sufficiently avenged by the infamy he underwent,  
 and by his exclusion from the office.

This deference paid to Cato's virtue is cer-  
 tainly very extraordinary; and is a fact scarce  
 to be paralleled in history. But Plutarch  
 observes, that it procured him great envy; and  
 that many endeavoured to make it pass for a  
 sort of crime; as if he had usurped the power  
 of the Senate, the Judges, and the Magistrates.  
 This malice ought not to surprize us. "For,  
 "adds



“ \* adds the sage historian, there is no reputa- A. R. 698.  
 “ tion more subject to envy than that arising Ant. C. 54.  
 “ from probity and justice, because there is none  
 “ more likely to give a man power and credit  
 “ with the generality of people. The brave  
 “ man is admired, but he is feared also; the  
 “ prudent is esteemed, but he is suspected;  
 “ we are very differently disposed towards the  
 “ just man; we love him, we trust to his word,  
 “ we give ourselves up to him without reserve.”

So that lovers of power and glory cannot help being jealous of the splendor inseparable from so beneficent a virtue as justice. This then is the treatment that the good man must expect in this world. Happy is he who knows, and loves, another country, where envy has no more place!

The Candidates for the Consulship were far Intrigues  
 from imitating the conduct of those for the for the  
 Tribuneship. They bribed so high, and bor- Consulship.  
 rowed so much to purchase votes, that the in- Cic. ad At.  
 terest of money doubled upon it, and rose on IV. 4. 15.  
 a sudden from four to eight *per Cent.* 16. 17. 18. These  
 Candidates were four in number; two Patricians,  
 Messala and Scaurus, who had been lately ac-  
 cused of Extortion and acquitted; and two Ple-  
 beians, Domitius Calvinus and Memmius.  
 This last was supported by Cæsar. Pompey  
 espoused Scaurus's interest, rather in appearance  
 than fact; for, tho' they were in some sort re-  
 lated, the children of one being, as I said, bro-  
 thers

\* Ουδέμιας γὰρ ἀρετῆς δόξα  
 καὶ πίστις ἐπιφθόνους ποιεῖ μάλλον  
 ἢ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ὅτι δὲ δύ-  
 ναμιν αὐτῇ καὶ πίστις ἐπιταί  
 μάλιστα παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν· ὁ  
 γὰρ τιμᾷσι μόνον, ὡς τὰς ἀν-

δρείας, οὐδὲ θαυμάζουσιν, ὥς τὰς  
 φρονίμους, ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλοῦσι τὰς  
 δίκαιας, καὶ θαρρῶσιν αὐτοῖς καὶ  
 πιστεύουσιν. ἐκείνων δὲ τὰς μὲν  
 φοβέσθεται, τοῖς δὲ ἀπιστοῦν.



A. R. 698.  
Art. C. 54

thers of those of the other, Pompey was but little influenced by this kind of affinity ; being rather displeased that Scaurus set so little value on his judgment as to marry a woman divorced by him for her ill-conduct. Domitius, and Messala, too wanted not their friends and parties. But after all no one of the Candidates had a visible superiority over his rivals. Money alone decided, and made every other distinction vanish.

The struggle lasted long. Some new accident continually retarded the election ; and at last the four Candidates were all accused of Bribery. Cicero, supposing he should have all these bad causes to defend, jests thereupon with Atticus. (*f*) “ You will ask me doubtless, says “ he, what I can say for such people. Let me “ die, if I can tell. At least I find nothing to “ the purpose in those books I have composed “ about Rhetoric, that you are so pleased with.”

*Infamous  
agreement  
between the  
Candi-  
dates and  
Consuls.*

He was not embarrassed without reason. For things were pushed to that excess of indecence, that there was an agreement made between the Consuls and two of the Candidates, Domitius and Memmius, not merely verbal, but in writing and gauranteed by several friends of the contracting parties ; by which these two Candidates engaged to pay, in case they were chose, to each of the Consuls four hundred thousand sesterces ; unless the Consuls chose to have provided for them three Augurs and two Consular Persons, who should authorize for them, by a solemn authentic declaration, a false law and a false *Senatus consultum*, which they wanted, concern-

(*f*) Quid poteris, inquires, pro iis dicere? Ne vivam, scio. In illis quidem libris, quos tu dilaudas, nihil reperio. IV. *ad Att.* 16.



concerning the Governments they were to have, when they quitted their office. This agreement was read by Memmius himself in full Senate; but he suppressed all the names except those of the contracting parties. This seems enough to have made the Consuls die with shame. And in fact Ahenobarbus, who had always affected the reputation of an honest man, was horribly confounded. Appius, who had no character to lose, was not at all disconcerted. But nothing more was done in this infamous affair, which is not I believe to be paralleled in history. All this complication of iniquity so retarded the elections, that the year expired before Consuls were appointed.

In this confusion Pontinius's triumph gave fresh trouble. This General, having had some success against the Allobroges, before Cæsar took the command of the army in Gaul, was returned, with an ambition for, and hopes of, a triumph; and had been five years at the gates of Rome, without having been able to obtain it: probably because the small advantages he had gained did not deserve so great honour. However he at last got over the principal difficulties, chiefly by Galba's assistance who was then Prætor, and had been Cæsar's Lieutenant. But he had Cato still to conquer; who had protested that Pontinius should never triumph, while he was alive. Cato had said too much. The Consul Appius and the major part of the Prætors and Tribunes supported Pontinius. There was some disturbance; and even some blood shed; but at length Pontinius entered the city in triumph on the third of November.



A. R. 590.  
 Ant. C. 53.  
*Long Inter-*  
*regnum ac-*  
*caused*  
*principally*  
*by Pompey's*  
*ambition*  
 Dio, l. XL.  
 Plat. Pom.  
 Cic. ad Q.  
 Fr. III. 8  
 9.

The Republic was without Consuls on the first of January ; and was obliged to have recourse to an Interrex. The same causes, which had hitherto hindered the election of the ordinary Magistrates, retarded it still a long time. The principal of these, and that which gave force to the rest, was Pompey's ambition. He alone had then more power than the whole Republic ; and could easily, had he so pleased, have put a stop to the caballing, and enforced the execution of the laws. But he let the disorder increase on purpose, that it might come to such an excess as to make a recourse to him absolutely necessary.

It is more than probable that his plan was to get himself appointed Dictator. But he concealed his intention ; and dissembling always, and attaining his ends by uncommon methods, he took in this, as in every thing else, an oblique way ; and had a mind to appear forced to that which he passionately desired. Besides, he respected, to a certain degree, public order ; was an enemy to open force ; and had not, like Cæsar, a daring spirit that broke down every barrier, and carried with a high hand what he could not obtain by favour, and paid no regard to laws and decency. He should, however, have pursued this plan to arrive at the Dictatorship. The very name was become detestable since Sylla's time ; and the whole Aristocratic party, which, tho' humbled, was not annihilated, would have opposed to their utmost the re-establishment of that odious magistrate. Pompey hazarded the experiment by a desperado Tribune of the People. (For the Tribuneship depended not on the election of Consuls, and sub-



subsisted even during an Interregnum.) This Tribune, named C. Lucceius Hirrus, having dropped some hints leading to a Dictatorship, was handled so roughly by Cato, that he was almost reduced to throw up his office.

Another thing that contributed to delay the nomination of Consuls was, that it was the interest of the Tribunes to hinder it. While the other Magistracies were vacant, theirs was much more important ; and \* some of them took upon them this year to exhibit to the People the spectacles, which was the proper business of the Prætors. They proposed also, if we may credit Dio, to place at the head of the Republic, as had been done formerly, not Consuls, but military Tribunes with Consular authority, whose number had been often augmented to six. This increase of Magistrates would have satisfied the ambition of more Candidates, and seemed to agree with the immense extent of the Empire. But, if this proposal was ever made, it was not relished, nor carried into execution.

These intrigues lasted full six months ; some part of which time Pompey was absent from Rome, the better to disguise the share he had in the troubles that afflicted the city. Being returned

*The Tribunes also contribute thereto.*

*Consuls elected at length with Pompey's assistance.*

\* Among the Tribunes who hindered the election of Consuls, Dio names Q. Pompeius Rufus ; and adds that the Senate sent him to prison. This is a fact I can scarce believe, as it is not to be paralleled in all the history of the Roman Republic. The persons of the Tribunes were sacred ; and it was not lawful to touch them.

so haughty and audacious. Besides, it is clear, from the testimony of Asconius Pedianus, that this Pompeius Rufus was Tribune the year after. Now it was no longer the custom to continue the Magistrates several years ; and, if there had been an exception in favour of Pompeius, Asconius should have took notice of it.



**A. R. 699.** turned at length, and commended by Cato for  
**Ant. C. 53.** his seeming refusal of the Dictatorship, shame prevented his falsifying the panegyric. He condescended to protect order and law; and the Republic, with the assistance of one of its members, was able to give give itself Magistrates. Domitius and Messala were elected Consuls in the month of July.

CN. DOMITIUS CALVINUS,  
 M. VALERIUS MESSALLA.

*Fruitless  
 endeavours  
 of the Con-  
 suls to ap-  
 point suc-  
 cessors.*

These Consuls had scarce took possession of their office, before it was time to appoint their successors; and the old difficulties were renewed. So that all their administration may be reduced to some unsuccessful endeavours to elect Consuls for the ensuing year; except, that at their request a *Senatus consultum* passed, by which the Consuls and Prætors were not for the future to have Governments conferred on them, till five years after the expiration of their respective offices. As the Government of Provinces was the great object of the ambition of the principal Romans, it was imagined, that, by procrastinating them, the boundless ardor, with which those places that gave a title to them were pursued, would be somewhat abated. A poor remedy, far from diving to the bottom of the Cure!

Besides this specious, public, reason, ostentatiously given, Cæsar informs us there was also a private, concealed, one, for this new regulation. He says it was levelled at him; to the intent that, the Governments being no longer appropriated to the actual Consuls and Prætors, a few people, namely, Pompey and his partizans, might have the disposal of those impor-

tant



tant employments, and thus keep all the provinces under their influence. We shall see in fact, that what was here only ordered by a decree of the Senate, will next year be authorized by a solemn law, proposed by Pompey to the People.

Dio \* places in this year the Ædileship of Favonius; which authorizes me to speak of it in this place. Favonius set up for an imitator of Cato; but, as he had a hot head that ran in to extremes, he even went beyond his model, who was, as I have elsewhere observed, extravagant enough himself. Cato, however, esteemed and patronized him; and was very serviceable to him in his pursuit of the Ædileship. For Favonius had like to have been excluded by the intrigues of his Competitor; but Cato discovered their unfair proceedings, and broke up the assembly by the authority of the Tribunes, whose assistance he implored.

As Favonius was obliged to Cato for his office, so he conducted himself in it by his advice; and transferred in a manner to him all its power and honour. Particularly, the public shews, the exhibition of which was one of the most honourable functions of the Ædileship, were ordered by Cato: he presided at them, and regulated their expence, but after his own taste and manner. He retrenched all pomp and extravagance, and affected to restore the simplicity of antient times. Instead of crowns of gold,

\* This Historian relates, that the Ædile Favonius was put in prison by the Tribune Q. Pompeius Rufus, who had himself been imprisoned before by order of the Senate. As I much suspect the fact of the imprison-

ment of the Tribune, and even greatly doubt whether Q. Pompeius was Tribune that year, the date of Favonius's Ædileship, according to Dio, seems to me very uncertain. But it is an affair of small importance.

A. R. 699.  
Ant. C. 53.

Ædileship  
of Favoni-  
us, Cato's  
imitator.  
Plut. Cat.

Cato regulates the  
expence of  
Favonius's  
games,  
with great  
simplicity.



A. R. 699. gold, he gave for prizes to the actors and mu-  
 Ant. C. 53. sicians wreaths of olive, as practised at the  
 Olympic games. It was customary to give  
 much money at these spectacles. Cato distribu-  
 ted only cheap things ; to the Greeks herbs and  
 fruits, as beet, lettuce, radishes, pears ; to the  
 Romans wine, pork, figs, cucumbers, and  
 milk.

*Which is  
 nevertheless  
 less relished  
 by the mul-  
 titude.*

This simplicity was by many accounted stin-  
 giness ; nor is it surprizing. The same thing  
 had happened formerly to Tubero, on occasion  
 of the treat he gave the People, at the decease  
 of Scipio Africanus. But what demonstrates  
 that, even in times of general corruption, there  
 is in the people a discernment of virtue ; and  
 that the Great have it in their power to form the  
 taste of the multitude, had they the courage to  
 attempt it, instead of suffering themselves to be  
 carried away by the torrent ; is that, generally  
 speaking, the Romans were satisfied with Ca-  
 to's shews. They left those of Favonius's Col-  
 league, which were extremely magnificent, to go  
 and see Cato unbend himself, and share in the  
 public diversion. Favonius, who should have  
 presided, mixed with the croud, applauded, and  
 invited the spectators to applaud, Cato, who  
 was in the seat of honour. The whole was  
 conducted with that simple uniform gaiety,  
 which is rarely to be found in superb entertain-  
 ments. Cato was much pleased to have shewn  
 with how much ease, and how small expence,  
 those shews might be exhibited, which usually  
 cost so great sums and care. To others they  
 were an expensive, serious, affair ; to him, a  
 cheap diversion.

The assemblies for the election of Consuls  
 were often held, without coming to any conclu-  
 sion ;



sion; nor have we any thing remarkable to relate of them, except that in one of the scuffles the Consul Domitius was hurt. The year thus elapsed, and another Interregnum became necessary.

A. R. 699.  
Ant. C. 53.

Dio.

INTERREGNUM.

The first days of January passed without even an Interrex in Rome. This total anarchy was occasioned by the caballing and violence of those who aspired to the Consulship. Milo, Hypseus, and Metellus Scipio, disputed this important office not with passion, but fury; and all the disorders and excesses yet seen on such occasions fell extremely short of those committed by these Competitors. Each of them had his little army, and every day exhibited bloody battles.

A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.

*Furious caballing of the Candidates for the Consulship, Milo, Hypseus, and Metellus Scipio.*  
Ascon in Cic. pro.

Amidst the common blame they all deserved by a conduct so repugnant to the laws of all Society, there was still some distinction to be made in Milo's favour. We may remember that, next to Pompey, he had the greatest share in recalling Cicero from banishment. From that time he had never warped. Steadily adhering to the better party, he had stickled courageously for the authority of the Senate, and the maintaining public order, against the fury of Clodius. Therefore most of the better people had declared for him. He had also gained the multitude by his excessive generosity; and by games and shews, whose extravagance had absorbed three rich inheritances. Depending on these advantages, and being naturally sanguine, he accelerated as much as possible the election; not doubting of success. And his rivals seemed

Mil.  
*The wishest of the best Romans for Milo.*



A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.

*His Competitors  
bad on  
their side  
Pompey  
and Clodius*  
Cic pro  
M. l. 24,  
25  
Aicon.

to acknowledge his superiority, by their aiming on the contrary at delay and procrastination.

They were however supported by Pompey, whose Quæstor Hypseus had been, and whose Father-in-law Metellus Scipio was soon to be. They had on their side too Clodius, who was Candidate for the Prætorship, and who dreaded nothing so much as to have Milo Consul when he was Prætor ; and therefore employed in opposing him all his credit and power ; all the craft, and force, he was master of. Yet, thus powerfully seconded, they judged the best thing they could do was to prevent the Patricians from assembling and appointing an Interrex. Pompey, who had always the Dictatorship in view, and for that reason chose to increase the confusion, served them with all his might ; and T. Munatius Plancus Burfa, Tribune of the People, who had been bought by them, stopped by an opposition in form the nomination of an Interrex, which was a necessary preliminary to the election of Consuls.

*Clodius  
killed by  
Ant. l.*

Things went on thus to the eighteenth of January ; on which day Milo had occasion to go to Lanuvium, a little town not far from Rome. His family either came originally from this town, or perhaps he was himself born there, and was then its first Magistrate. On that account he was to preside at the election of a Priest of Juno, the tutelar Divinity of Lanuvium. He sets out then in his coach, with his wife Fausta, daughter of the Dictator Sylla, and a friend ; escorted by a great retinue, and particularly by many gladiators that belonged to him. Clodius was also gone out of town that day on horseback, attended by thirty slaves well armed : and on his return fell in with Milo's train. As the two masters

were



were enemies, their people, used to skirmish with one another, presently quarrelled. Clodius comes up, and, mingling in the fray, receives a considerable wound in the shoulder from one of Milo's gladiators. He thereupon orders his servants to carry him to an inn just by. But Milo, who was before, being informed of what had happened, immediately resolved to dispatch Clodius; apprehending he ran no less risque for the wound, than he should for the murder; and willing, if he was to perish, to have at least the consolation of having got rid of his enemy. He sends therefore his slaves, headed by one M. Scaevius, to force the inn. This they perform; drag Clodius out; cut his throat; and leave his corpse in the high-way: after which Milo continues his journey; and goes, as he at first intended, to Lanuvium. All the precaution he took was to make free those of his slaves who had wounded, and killed, Clodius; that he might not be compelled to deliver them up to the torture. For by the Roman laws free persons could not be racked.

A Senator, named Sex. Tadius, returning out of the country, came by chance by the place where Clodius's corpse lay; took it into his carriage, and brought it to Rome. Fulvia, Clodius's widow, (the same Fulvia, whom afterwards her marriage with Anthony, and fury against Cicero, made so famous;) an haughty ambitious woman, who in boldness and action equalled the most determined men, exposed to public view in her hall the bloody corpse of her husband; and standing by it herself, melting in tears, shewed to all, whom that spectacle brought together, the wounds he had received. There



A. R. 700. numbers of that vile mob to whom Clodius had  
 AEL. C. 52 been so dear, and of whom he had made so good  
 use in all his seditious enterprizes. The croud  
 was so great that many people of distinction were  
 stifled, and among others a Senator called C.  
 Vibienus.

There wanted only Tribunes to authorize the  
 commission of the greatest excesses. Plancus  
 Bursa and Q. Pompeius Rufus came and per-  
 formed that dishonourable office. By their au-  
 thority the body of Clodius, half-naked, in the  
 pickle it then was, is carried to the Rostra. There  
 the two Tribunes inveigh against Milo like mad-  
 men. The mob, inflamed more than ever by  
 these harangues, and headed by Sex. Clodius,  
 (who had been the ringleader and firebrand in  
 all his Patron's seditions,) transport the corpse into  
 the Hostilian palace; and erect a funeral pile  
 with all the wood they can come at, Prætors  
 tribunals, Judges benches and those of Senators,  
 counters and shelves of the booksellers shops  
 that surrounded the place. Such was their fury  
 that the Hostilian palace and many private  
 houses were burnt; and the Porcian court of  
 justice, built by Cato the Censor, very much  
 damaged by the fire. At the same time many  
 of the populace ran with lighted torches, and  
 firebrands, to fire Milo's house. But it was  
 provided with those who could defend it; and  
 who easily repulsed the mob. Others took the  
 fasces of the funeral bed, and carried them to  
 the houses of Scipio and Hypseus; as it were  
 to appoint them Consuls; and afterwards ran  
 with the same fasces to Pompey's gardens, pro-  
 claiming him sometimes Consul, sometimes Dic-  
 tator.

The



The Senate, alarmed by so terrible a tumult, assembled that very evening; and took efficacious measures for the nomination of an Interrex. M. Lepidus was elected in a moment by the Patricians; and a *Senatus consultum* passed, which ordered the Interrex, the Tribunes of the People, and Pompey in quality of Proconsul, to take care of the Republic. The same decree gave Pompey power to raise forces throughout Italy.

Milo's enemies had done him good service in bringing on themselves the public indignation by their excesses, and consequently diminishing the ill-will that the murder of Clodius had at first raised against its author, and above all, the burning the Hostilian Palace, a place set apart from all antiquity for the meeting of the Senate, appeared with reason an horrible outrage. Cicero, in pleading for Milo, well exposed the heinousness of it by these few words: (a) "We have seen the Temple where presided the sanctity of ancient maxims, and the majesty of the Empire; the sanctuary of policy, and public counsel; the chief place of the city; the Asylum of our allies; the port of all nations; we have seen this venerable place profaned by an impure corpse, given a prey to the flames, and so destroyed that no traces of it remain."

Milo, who was an understanding courageous man, took advantage of his enemies error. His journey to Lanuvium, founded on warrantable reasons, afforded him a good pretence to be absent at

H 3

first,

(a) Templum sanctitatis, amplitudinis, mentis, consilii publici; caput urbis; aram sociorum; portam omnium

gentium; inflammari, excindi, funestari! Cic. *pro Mil.*

A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.  
*Nomina-  
tion of an  
Interrex.*

*Milo re-  
turns to  
Rome, and  
continues  
to solicit  
for the Con-  
sulship.*



A. R. 700. first, and gave him time to see what turn his  
Ann. C. 50. affair would take. When he knew that Clo-  
dius's Partizans behaved so as to make them-  
selves odious, he thought it was time for him  
to re-appear at Rome. He returned the very  
instant the Hostilian palace was fired ; ap-  
peared with his wonted confidence and haughti-  
ness ; and continued to solicit for the Consul-  
ship ; and, to recover the affection of the Peo-  
ple, he presented every citizen with a thousand  
aſſes\*.

His Competitors were alarmed at this ; and  
thought it their interest to hasten the election,  
before he could have time to appease, and re-  
gain, the People. However according to rule  
they were obliged to stay some days. For it was  
not customary for the first Interrex to proceed  
to the election of Consuls, and for that reason  
Lepidus refused to assemble the People. Scipio  
and Hypseus undertook to compel him. Dur-  
ing the five days his office lasted, their troops  
constantly besieged his house ; and made sever-  
al attacks on it, in one of which they forced the  
doors, and got into the apartments, where they  
committed all sort of disorders, and even demo-  
lished the bed of Cornelia, wife of the Interrex,  
a lady of great virtue. There would have proba-  
bly been an end of Lepidus, if Milo's forces  
had not unexpectedly arrived. The adversary  
factions then turned against each other ; and  
thus Lepidus's house escaped.

Nevertheless the Tribunes, who from the first  
declared against Milo, continued to inflame the  
multitude with their furious invectives. To the  
two I have named we must add Sallust ;  
whose strong reasons, tho' dishonourable to him,  
made Milo's personal enemy. Milo, having  
surprized him with his wife Fausta, had him se-



severely whipped ; and obliged him also to pay A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52. very dear for leave to retire. The thirst of revenge was therefore great in Sallust ; and yet he was not the most implacable. He and Pompeius Rufus suffered themselves at last to be persuaded to hold their tongues. But Plancus Bursa pushed things to extremities with an obstinacy that nothing could overcome.

Milo, however, had one protector among the Cælius on  
the contra-  
ry protects  
him. Tribunes. It was the Orator Cælius ; a young man of wit and courage, as I have before had occasion to observe, whose talents would have made a figure in the Commonwealth, if he had joined to them a good conduct. In this affair however he got reputation. He warmly espoused the interest of his friend Milo ; he accompanied him in public ; and it was by his advice that Milo then gave to his affair the turn that Cicero followed in his pleadings. In reality the skirmish between Clodius's and Milo's people was, as I have related, accidental. But as Clodius was on horseback, without any impediment, escorted by slaves well-armed ; and Milo on the contrary was in a coach, with his wife, attended by his domestics in his usual manner ; Cælius and he laid hold of these circumstances, and imputed to Clodius an intention to assassinate Milo ; whence it followed that Milo had killed him in his own defence.

Friendship alone actuated Cælius, but gratitude also animated the zeal of Cicero ; who Extraor-  
dinary zeal  
of Cicero  
for Milo's  
defence. shewed on this occasion that his speculative notions of that amiable virtue were to him rules of action, by which he conceived himself strictly bound. Nothing was able to disunite him from Milo ; and, in this faithful adherence to him, he faced great dangers with admirable courage.



A. R. 700.  
A. L. C. 52.

The Tribunes, who were Milo's enemies, de-claimed with equal fury against Cicero; they pretended that he was the chief contriver of Clodius's murder, and that Milo had only lent him his hand; and at last they even threatened more than once to accuse him in form, and summon him to appear before the People. Part of the multitude were of the same opinion; and Cicero had reason to apprehend another popular storm, not inferior to that which had before overwhelmed him. But what was most capable of intimidating him, if on this occasion any thing could, was that he knew his extraordinary zeal for Milo was displeasing to Pompey.

Cic. ad  
Fam. III.  
10.

Pompey had been lately reconciled to Clodius, and was grown extremely cold to Milo; nay even then feared, or pretended to fear, him. He authorized reports equally false and injurious concerning Milo. He seemed to apprehend he should be assassinated by him; and, as if he thought himself in danger, kept a numerous guard about his person and house. Afterwards he filled Rome with armed persons; and those who by his order had raised them said publicly, that his intention in it was to be able to oppose the violent designs of Milo; whose enemies imputed to him nothing less than a scheme to fire the city, and renew the frenzy of Cataline. So that, altho' Pompey by a laudable moderation continued Cicero's friend and even protected him from the fury of the populace, our Orator could not doubt but that he paid his court to him very ill in defending Milo; and consequently, in the discharge of what he accounted his duty to his benefactor, he had reason to fear the Tribunes, the People, and Pompey. On the contrary he might with ease have regained them all, if he would



would have moderated the activity of his zeal: A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52. but he preferred Gratitude to every other consideration. He solicited every one from whom he could expect any assistance to his friend; he spoke for him in the Senate as often as an opportunity offered; he took pains to refute the odious charges on him, tho' sometimes patronized by Pompey himself; in a word there was no service in his power that he did not to the last persist to do Milo, with a constancy that seems to me to make this transaction one of the most glorious passages in his life.

The troubles continued in Rome near two Pompey is  
created  
Consul  
alone. months after Clodius's death before they could be remedied. Several Interreges succeeded one another, from five to five days according to custom. But those Magistrates, whose authority was of so short duration, were not able to put a stop to the cabals, the battles between the Candidates, and the tumultuous quarrels on account of Milo's affair. The Tribunes added fuel to the fire, instead of extinguishing it: and Pompey, pursuing steadily his plan, gave himself no trouble about quelling a disorder which would at last oblige the Republic to throw itself into his arms. It was probably with that view that he rejected Milo's submission, who offered to desist, if he thought proper, from the pursuit of the Consulship. As soon as Milo had declined, Scipio and Hypseus would infallibly have been elected Consuls; and Pompey's secret designs were not to be so accomplished. He would not give up the flattering prospect; as the number of those who were for making him Dictator increased daily. Some Dio.  
Cæf. de B.  
G. VII. 1. indeed had a mind to make Cæsar Consul, who was then in Cisalpine Gaul, near enough to watch



A. R. - 60.  
Ant. C. 52.

Plut. Pom.  
& Cat.

watch all that passed in Rome, and busied in raising forces, as it were to conform to the *Senatus consultum* which had ordered levies throughout Italy. The Senate were as afraid of having Cæsar made Consul, as Pompey Dictator. They therefore agreed to yield to the necessity of the times : and, at the end of the intercalary month, the principal Senators having concerted matters together, Bibulus opened in the Senate the scheme for making Pompey Consul alone. “ For by  
“ this means, added he, either the Republic  
“ will be enabled to extricate itself from the  
“ evils that oppress it ; or, if we must be en-  
“ slaved, we shall have the best Master we can  
“ hope for.” This opinion appeared the more extraordinary, coming from Bibulus, who had always shewed himself Pompey’s enemy.

Cato increased the surprize. He rose ; and every one expected he would oppose a proposal so contrary to his maxims. He had lately manifested his steady adherence to aristocratic and republican principles ; for, some Senators desiring that Pompey might have the care of the elections, he opposed the motion, saying, “ that Pom-  
“ pey ought to be protected by the Laws, not  
“ the Laws by Pompey.” But he now conformed to circumstances, and said ; “ that he  
“ could never have prevailed on himself to make  
“ such a motion as Bibulus had made : that  
“ nevertheless, now another had broke the ice,  
“ he should agree to it ; satisfied that any form  
“ of government was preferable to anarchy, and  
“ persuaded that Pompey would make no ill  
“ use of the exorbitant power that the necessity  
“ of affairs obliged them to entrust him with.”

This was indeed the hope of all the zealous Constitutionists, when they consented to this  
new



new regulation. They thought Pompey, pleased <sup>A. R. 700.</sup> to see the Senate do that for him which they had <sup>Ant. C. 52.</sup> never done for any body, would be thereby heartily reconciled to aristocracy, and break with Cæsar and the popular party. They judged right. Pompey had already entertained suspicions of Cæsar, and from this time seriously espoused the cause of the Senate.

Bibulus's proposal passed then without difficulty ; and on the twenty-fifth of February, Ser. Sulpicius being Interrex, Pompey was created Consul for the third time, without a Colleague ; with power however to give himself one, if he thought proper, so it was not within two months.

CN. POMPEIUS MAGNUS III. Consul alone.

Pompey's ambition was satisfied by this extraordinary, unexampled, distinction of being made <sup>Pompey's</sup> Consul without a Colleague ; and put thus alone <sup>satisfaction,</sup> at the head of the Commonwealth. This supreme degree of grandeur pleased him so much the more, as he had attained it by means agreeable to him ; not by force and the terror of arms, but by the voluntary deference of his countrymen.

He returned thanks with great politeness to Cato ; and at the same time desired him to assist <sup>His thanks</sup> him with his advice. Cato answered, with a <sup>to Cato,</sup> Stoic freedom, somewhat rudely : “ You are <sup>who an-</sup> “ not at all obliged to me ; for in what I said, <sup>sivers him</sup> “ and did, I intended to do service to the Re- <sup>harshly,</sup> “ public, not to you. As to my advice, you “ shall have it with all my heart in private, “ when you desire it ; but, when you do not, you “ shall have it in public, in the Senate.”

It



A. R. 700.  
 Ant. C. 52.  
*Pompey  
 marries  
 Cornelia,  
 daughter  
 of Metellus  
 Scipio.*  
 Plut. Pom.

It was at this time that Pompey celebrated his marriage with Cornelia, daughter of Metellus Scipio, and widow of young Crassus, who lately perished in the Parthian war. Cornelia was still in her prime ; and, besides the peculiar graces of her sex, had her mind well cultivated. She not only understood music, but was also a proficient in literature, geometry, philosophy ; and to these acquirements she joined, what was yet more valuable, a virtuous, regular, conduct, free from arrogance and curiosity ; vices, which learning, says Plutarch, is apt to instil into young ladies. This wedding, however, made Pompey be censured. Some exaggerated the disproportion of their ages ; for really, in that respect, Cornelia was a properer match for his son than him. And those who laid a stress on decorum thought it indecent in Pompey, at a time when his distressed Country implored his protection, to crown himself with flowers, and gaily celebrate his nuptials ; whereas he ought to have considered as a misfortune his Consulship itself, which he would not have had in so irregular a manner, had not the Republic been plunged in misfortune and afflictions.

*Pompey's  
 new laws  
 against  
 force and  
 corruption.*  
 Aicon.

This reflection may seem too severe to many readers ; so much the more as Pompey neglected not the object of his promotion. The third day after he took possession of his office, he assembled the Senate, and proposed to deliberate on the remedies necessary to be applied to the public disorders. His design was to make new laws against corruption, and acts of violence that had of late been frequent ; and to erect an extraordinary court, to enquire strictly into the skirmish on the Appian high-way, wherein  
 Clodius



Clodius was killed ; into the burning of the Hostilian palace ; and the breaking open the house of M. Lepidus, the first Interrex. A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.

If we may believe Cicero, the inclination of the Senate was not to have recourse to new laws, and the constituting extraordinary judicatures, at least with respect to the acts of violence specified : but that, resting on the laws already provided against such crimes, the Prætor appointed to put them in execution should be ordered to put those causes that turned on these late facts the first in the list, that they might be determined before all others of the same sort. But the Tribunes, who wanted to ruin Milo, prevented the effect of the good-will the Senate shewed him. Cic. pro  
Mil. n. 13.

Cælius, on the contrary, who protected him, undertook to oppose Pompey's law ; saying, with reason enough, that it was not a law but a kind of personal Proscription. Pompey, upon this grew very angry ; and declared, that, if he was compelled to it, he would employ the force of arms in defence of the Republic. Thus the law passed ; the court was established ; and L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, a Consular person, made President of it. Ascon.

Pompey met also with opposition to the law he made against corruption. He increased the punishment of that crime ; and also ordered all those to be accused who had been guilty of it from the time of his first Consulship, which was almost twenty years backwards. Now Cato thought it unjust that even criminals should be punished by a law *ex post facto*. The friends of Cæsar represented too that his Consulship was included in that space ; and that it looked like a design to give him trouble. Pompey answered Appian.  
Civ. l. 2.  
Plut. Cat.



A. R. -co.  
Ant. C. 52.

answered these, that they injured Cæsar by their suspicions, whose conduct, being out of the reach of censure, secured him consequently from any danger.

He gave no attention neither to Cato's remonstrance, and maintained that he could not heal the disorders of the State, if he did not make examples of severity with regard to what was past. So he proposed, and passed, his law against corruption, according to the original plan. But it does not appear that for the execution of this law he issued any extraordinary commission.

He re-  
forms, and  
abridges,  
judicial  
proceedings.  
Pom. & Cat.  
Ascen.

He reformed also in many things, and abridged, judicial proceedings. He reduced the great number of Council employed in the same cause, who served only to confound the Judges. He forbade the use of those panegyrics which the accused often obtained from the most powerful persons in the State. He allowed but three days to examine witnesses : after which the accuser and accused were obliged to plead the same day ; confining themselves within the compass, one of two hours, the other of three : then the judgment was immediately to follow. An author has complained that this regulation was a great check on eloquence ; but it favoured expedition, a thing of more importance in the administration of justice. Lastly, Pompey was very careful in the choice of the Judges ; and in particular the Tribunal that sat on Milo was composed of the best and most reputable citizens in Rome.

Acst de  
Cor.  
E. 2.  
35.

Ascen

37  
38

As soon as every thing was regulated, two nephews of P. Clodius, sons of one of his brothers, accused Milo before Comitus, by virtue of Pompey's new law, wherein Clodius's death was expressly mentioned. At the same time three other actions, which turned upon the same fact



fact or corruption, were also brought against Milo at other tribunals. For, when a man is under misfortunes, every one falls on him. The affair before Domitius, as the most important, and that whose event would probably decide of the others, was first heard. Milo appeared on the fourth of April ; bold and haughty as usual. He would not put on mourning, as customary for all accused ; he disdained to stoop to prayers and intreaties ; he pretended he had done nothing he was ashamed of, and consequently that he ought only to shew contempt for the accusations of his enemies.

The danger was however great, had he even had none to fear but the mob attached to Clodius's memory. The first day the witnesses were examined, while M. Marcellus (that Marcellus for whom Cicero returned thanks to Cæsar, by the well-known discourse that bears his name) a person respectable on account of his birth, virtue, and eloquence, and who then assisted Cicero in defending Milo ; while this worthy Senator was interrogating C. Cassinius Schola, a friend and companion of Clodius, that vile mob set up so hideous a noise that Marcellus thought his life in danger, and retired to the President. Pompey himself, who was sitting near, was disturbed at it ; and, at the request of Domitius and Marcellus, who did not think themselves safe, he brought, the two following days, troops with him, and posted them all about the place. By means of which precaution the witnesses were examined, and heard, peaceably. Fulvia came the last, and by her tears greatly affected the whole assembly.

All the interrogatories being finished the third day, the Tribune Plancus Bursa that very evening



A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.

ing assembled the People, and exhorted them to come the next day in great numbers to the judgment, and “not suffer Milo to escape”; these were his words. His advice was punctually followed. The eleventh of April, the day that was to close this grand affair, all the shops in the city were shut; and the crowd was so great, that the very windows and tops of the houses in the place were filled with spectators. Pompey assisted at the hearing, still attended by the military; some of whom he stationed round his person, and the rest in all the posts of consequence.

*Cicero is  
disconcerted  
in his  
defence of  
him.*

Cic. de  
Or. l. 121.

Plat. Cic.

Dio Asc.

*General  
idea of the  
oration at  
the trial of  
Cicero, 57  
B.C.*

The accusers spoke two hours according to Pompey's new regulation. Cicero alone was to answer them; but he did not speak with his usual eloquence. He was timid, as all the world knows, and describes himself under the name of L. Crassus, when he makes that Orator say, that often, when he began to speak, he turned pale, and trembled all over. Milo, who knew the foible of his Advocate, advised him to come in a close chair, that he might not see the soldiers, and furious mob. But when Cicero got out of his chair, and perceived Pompey seated on high, surrounded with guards; and the whole place full of soldiers; he began to be disordered: and was entirely disconcerted by the furious outcries of Clodius's Partizans, when he was going to plead. He lost then irrecoverably his presence of mind; and spoke very ill. For that oration we have of his for Milo, which is a master-piece, is not the same he really delivered, but a discourse composed afterwards in his closet.

I have already mentioned on what foot Cicero defended Milo. He pretended there had been no accidental rencountre, much less an ambush laid by



by Milo ; but that, on the contrary, Clodius had premeditated the assassination of the man he equally hated and feared, but had happily met with the due punishment of his injustice and violence. Some were for giving another turn to the affair ; and for his maintaining that, Clodius, having been a bad member of the Commonwealth, his death was a benefit to it. But as a private person may not kill, of his own authority, even one who deserves death ; to lay the whole stress on that, was to own Milo guilty : and Brutus, who, according to Asconius, had made by way of exercise a plea for Milo, in which he used no other method of defence, seems rather to have followed, in that, the bold maxims of Stoicism, than those of a regular jurisprudence.

However, that method used auxilarly might have been serviceable to the cause. For some of the Judges, and Cato among others, thought it was less their business to examine scrupulously into the truth of the fact, than to enquire into the good resulting to the State from its deliverance from Clodius. Cicero would not altogether deprive himself of this advantage ; for, after endeavouring in the first part of his oration to clear Milo's innocence, as having killed Clodius in his own defence ; he adds a second, wherein he exerts the whole force of his eloquence in inveighing against Clodius ; and in proving, that if Milo was to own (what was not the fact) that he had killed Clodius premeditatedly ; he ought to expect, for such a service done the Commonwealth, rather a reward, than banishment. This is the general plan of Cicero's defence of Milo ; and it is composed with all the address necessary in so delicate an affair,



A. R. 70.  
 Ann. C. 62.  
*Address of  
 the Orator  
 in hand-  
 ling what  
 regarded  
 Pompey*

Vol. II.  
 47.

But, besides the difficulties arising out of the cause itself, Cicero had a terrible one to encounter in the unfavourable disposition of Pompey with regard to the accused. Pompey, then Consul alone, armed with the whole public authority, shewed plainly, by every step, that he thought he should do a second service to the Common-wealth in getting rid of Milo, who had delivered it from Clodius. There was great reason to apprehend that such an influence would make a deep impression on the Judges ; and this indeed was the principal cause of Milo's condemnation.

Cicero endeavours by every art to prevent this fatal effect, and to eradicate the notion that Pompey was averse to Milo. He lays hold of every thing susceptible of a favourable interpretation ; he flurs over all that has a disadvantageous appearance. He combats the suspicions Pompey had entertained with regard to his personal safety ; but he does it with so much discretion, in such terms of friendship and respect, even that which is so displeasing is so intermixed with panegyric, that, at the same time the Advocate does justice to his Client, he gives Pompey no room to be offended. At last he intimates to him his own interest ; and he does it in a manner the more remarkable, as we therein find a plain prophecy of the rupture between Pompey and Cæsar, at a time when they seemed on very good terms.

“ If Milo, says Cicero to Pompey, could  
 “ not eradicate the suspicions and alarms you  
 “ seem to incline to about him, he would not  
 “ refuse to quit his country voluntarily. But  
 “ he would first make, as he now does by my  
 “ mouth,



“ mouth, this important observation. (a) See, A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52  
 “ says he, by what befalls me, to what various  
 “ events human life is subject ; how uncertain  
 “ and unstable fortune is ; what ingratitude we  
 “ experience from friends ; under what differ-  
 “ ent masks double-dealing conceals itself ; how  
 “ forsaken men are in times of danger ; how  
 “ every thing trembles round him whom the  
 “ lightning strikes. It will come, the time  
 “ will come, sooner or later we shall see the  
 “ day, when your fortune, superior I hope to  
 “ the shock, yet endangered somewhat perhaps  
 “ by public commotions, to which of late ex-  
 “ perience has but too well accustomed us ;  
 “ when I say your fortune and situation may  
 “ make you regret the kindness of a friend,  
 “ the fidelity of a man of honour, and the va-  
 “ lour of the most courageous of mortals.”

This reflection merited Pompey's attention ; but he had long shut his ears to salutary counsels.

Another obstacle Cicero had to combat came *He substi-*  
 from Milo himself, whose confidence and haugh- *tutes his*  
 tiness were enough to prejudice many of his *own in-*  
 Judges against him, as thinking themselves in *treaties*  
 a manner bullied by a man whose fate was in *and fears*  
 their hands. Cicero takes therefore upon him- *in the room*  
 self the suppliant that Milo disdained. *of those*  
 He em- *which*  
 ploys *Milo dis-*  
                     I 2                      *dained to*  
   *stoop to.*

(a) Vide quam fit varia vitæ commutabilisque ratio ; quam vaga volubilisque fortuna ; quantæ infidelitates in amicis ; quum ad tempus aptæ simulationes ; quantæ in periculis fugæ proximorum, quantæ timiditates. Erit, erit illud profecto tempus, & illucescet liquando ille dies, quum tu, salutaribus ut

spero rebus tuis, sed fortasse motu aliquo communium temporum immutatis, qui quam crebro accidat experti debemus scire, & amicissimi benevolentiam, & gravissimi hominis fidem, & unius post homines natos fortissimi viri magnitudinem animi deside- res. *Cic. pro Mil. 69.*



A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.

employs all that is affecting and submissive, with an excess of grief, the more capable of softening the Judges, as they were, as I have mentioned, all of them men of worth, and consequently Cicero's friends ; for whom they had signalized their zeal in his recall from exile. (a) “ If I  
“ lose Milo, says he to them, I shall not even  
“ have the consolation of resentment against  
“ those who have so cruelly afflicted me. For  
“ my quarrel will not be with my enemies, but  
“ with my best friends ; not with those who  
“ have occasionally injured me, but those who  
“ have at all times deserved every thing of me.  
“ No, Gentlemen, no affliction you can lay on  
“ me, and this I now deprecate is the greatest  
“ can possibly befall me ; yet even this, all-  
“ piercing as it is, will not make me forget  
“ what I owe you, and what you have done  
“ for me. If you yourselves have forgot it ;  
“ if any thing in me has displeased you ; let  
“ your resentment fall on my head, rather than  
“ on Milo's. For I shall have happily finished  
“ my course, if I live not to see the misfortune  
“ that now threatens me.”

Cic. pro  
Mil. 93.  
98.

Cicero even finds means to make Milo say the most affecting things, at the same time that he maintains all the dignity of his character.

These

(a) Nec vero. si mihi eriperis. reliqua est illa saltem ad consolandum querela, ut his irasci possim à quibus tantum vulnus accepero. Non enim inimici mei te mihi eripient, sed amicissimi ; non male aliquando de me meriti, sed semper optime. Nullum unquam, judices, mihi tantum dolorem inuretis, etiam

quis potest esse tantus ? sed ne hunc quidem ipsum, ut obliviscar quanti me semper feceritis. Quæ si vos cepit oblivio, aut si aliquid in me offenditis, cur non id meo capite, potius luitur, quam Milonis ? Præclare enim vixero, si quid mihi acciderit prius quam tantum mali videro. Cic. pro Mil. 99.



These opposites, so difficultly reconciled, are blended with wondrous art, and produce both pity and respect. But I fear I shall seem to have forgot that I am writing an history, not making an abstract of a most eloquent oration. I proceed then to the event of the cause, which was fatal to Milo. Eighty-one Judges heard it : before they collected the votes, the accuser and accused challenged each fifteen ; so that their number was reduced to fifty-one. Out of these Milo had but thirteen favourable voices : but he had one that did him great honour, and which alone might be almost considered as equivalent to all the others together. If I might use here a celebrated thought which Lucan \* has misapplied, I would say, that the party who got their cause had thirty-eight voices for them ; but that he who lost it had the suffrage of Cato.

Milo's misfortune was complete. This first condemnation was followed in a few days by three more at other tribunals, before whom he did not appear. His effects were sold ; yet, rich as they were, proved insufficient to pay his debts ; which amounted to † seventy millions of sesterces ; a prodigious sum, yet less by near a third than Cæsar owed after his Prætorship.

## I 3

## Milo

\* Every one knows this verse of Lucan,

Victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni :

“ The victorious faction was approved of by the gods, but the vanquished party by Cato : ” and it has been justly observed, that this thought is impious, if Lucan's gods mean any thing ; and frivolous, if they mean nothing.

† Five hundred and forty-six thousand eight hundred and seventy-five pounds sterling.



A. R. 700. Milo retired to Marseille ; and maintained,  
 Ann. C. 52. outwardly at least, the haughtiness he had shewn  
*He retires* in his prosperity. For when Cicero sent him  
*to Mar-* his oration, as he had wrote it after his trial ;  
*seille. His* “ I am glad, said he in his answer, that you  
*jaying a-* “ did not speak thus : if you had, I should not  
*bout the* “ eat such excellent fish as I now do at Mar-  
*oration* “ seille.” He made however afterwards, as  
*that Cicero* we shall see, some efforts towards the re-esta-  
*composed* lishment of his affairs ; but perished in the at-  
*after his* tempt : having had the singular misfortune, to  
*trial.* be equally odious to Pompey and Cæsar.  
 Dio.

*Other* . What evinces that Pompey’s enmity did him  
*judgments* more harm than any thing else, is, that Sau-  
*in conse-* feius, who had a worse cause to defend than  
*quence of* him, escaped condemnation. This Sauseius had  
*this affair.* headed Milo’s gladiators in forcing the inn,  
 Alcon. whither Clodius was carried after he had been  
 wounded. Notwithstanding, when he was ac-  
 cused both at the same tribunal which con-  
 demned Milo, and afterwards at the ordinary  
 tribunal that took cognizance of acts of violence,  
 he was acquitted. On the other side, Sex.  
 Clodius was condemned to banishment for firing  
 the Hostilian palace ; and many others of the  
 same party shared the same fate. The most re-  
 markable among them were the Tribunes  
 Q. Pompeius and T. Plancus Bursa ; who, as  
 soon as out of office, were prosecuted, and suf-  
 fered the punishment their seditious conduct de-  
 served.

Val. Max. The person who accused Q. Pompeius was  
 4. 2. 7. Cælius, who had been his Collegue ; a man of  
 a disorderly behaviour ; as I have more than once  
 observed, but capable of generosity ; and who,  
 far from insulting an unhappy enemy, contri-  
 buted to alleviate his misfortune. For Pom-  
 peius’s



peius's mother, taking an unfair advantage of his banishment, detained part of his fortune: whereupon Pompeius implored the assistance of his accuser; and Cælius served him with such fidelity and vigour, that he compelled the rapacious mother to refund and do her son justice. A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.

As to Plancus Bursa, Pompey essayed every method to save him. He went so far as even to debase himself in favour of that wretch. I have said that he had abolished by an express Law the practice of procuring recommendations of the accused from persons that had an influence on the Judges; yet he was not ashamed to send himself one of these to Plancus's Judges. While it was reading, Cato, who was one of them, stopped his ears; and was therefore objected to by Plancus. But it was a bad sign in any one accused to refuse Cato for his Judge. Plancus was condemned, to the great satisfaction of Cicero, who exults thereupon in one of his letters, and thinks that the Judges had a mind to revenge his quarrel on a low fellow, who seemed to make it his business to brave him. Plut Rom.  
& Cat.  
Cic. ad  
Fam. VII.  
2.

Plancus's affair is not the only one, nor indeed the first, in which Pompey merited the appellation given him by Tacitus (a) of Violator of his own Laws. He had made a new Law against corruption, more severe than all the former ones. By virtue of that Law Metellus Scipio, his father-in-law, was accused; and was manifestly guilty. Pompey made interest for him with such earnestness, as even to put on mourning; which occasioned some of his Judges to do the same; a step contrary to all decency and custom. Upon this the accuser desisted; but Metellus  
Scipio, being  
accused of  
corruption,  
is saved by  
Pompey.  
Plut Pom.  
Dio, Ap-  
pian.

I 4

not

(a) Cn. Pompeius tertium Consul——suarum legum auctor idem ac subversor. Tac. Ann. III. 28.



A. R. -cc.  
Ant. C. 52. not without inveighing against the partiality of the Consul and Judges.

*Who on the contrary refuses his assistance to Hypseus and Scaurus.* Such a conduct necessarily causes an unequal procedure, according to the difference of persons: for the course of justice cannot be always impeded. Pompey accordingly fell also into this inconvenience, so unbecoming a supreme Magistrate. Hypseus, who had been his Quæstor and was in the same circumstances as Metellus Scipio, had recourse to him for protection, and threw himself at his feet, as he was sitting down to supper; but Pompey repulsed him rudely, telling him, that he only spoiled his supper.

He was not more favourable to Scaurus, who was accused of bribery and corruption in his pursuit of the Consulship the preceding year, tho' he failed of success. The People interested themselves for him, so far as to disturb the hearing by their clamours. Pompey suppressed this tumult, not only by a severe ordinance, but also by force; ordering the soldiers about him to silence and disperse the multitude. Some of the People, being killed, served for example to the rest: the cause was heard quietly; and Scaurus condemned. All these affairs took up a considerable time. In the month of August, Pompey took for Colleague his father-in-law Metellus Scipio.

*Pompey names for his Colleague Metellus Scipio.*

CN. POMPEIUS MAGNUS III.

Q. CÆCILIUS METELLUS PIUS SCIPIO.

*Laudable passages in Pompey's conduct in his third Consulship.* Notwithstanding the irregularity, and inconsistency, of Pompey's conduct; it must be confessed to his glory, that he re-established order in Rome: that he made the Laws, which were

no



no longer minded there, again respected : and expelled thence confusion and anarchy. It is also from this æra we ought to date his sincere and hearty attachment to the Senate, to whose interest he ever after strictly adhered. It is for this reason that Cicero extols often with great energy Pompey's third Consulship, even so far as to call it divine. It were to be wished that to these truly laudable actions he had added some precaution against Cæsar. But he committed, with respect to that formidable rival, another fault, which filled up the measure of the rest, and gave Cæsar a plausible pretext for turning his arms against his native country.

We have seen that there were those who had thoughts of making Cæsar Consul this year. But that was not his plan. He intended to complete the conquest of Gaul, which was far from being subdued yet : and, knowing that he had four years still to continue at the head of the army, would not give up such an advantage, and so fine an opportunity of strengthening his interest before he returned to Rome. He chose therefore that his friends, instead of making him actually Consul, should obtain leave for him to solicit, at a proper time, for the Consulship by proxy. His design herein is clear enough. It, according to Law, Cæsar had been obliged to solicit for the Consulship in person ; he must have left his Government, and appeared in the Campus Martius : on the contrary, by means of this dispensation, he might obtain the Consulship while he remained in Gaul at the head of his troops ; and go immediately from his Command to a second Consulship, or rather join them both together, that the authority of Consul, backed by ten legions that continued under his

A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.  
Cæf. de B.  
G. VII. 6.

Cic ad At.  
VII. 1.

*He commits a great fault in dispensing with Cæsar's demanding the Consulship in person.*

Suet. Cæf. 26, 28.  
Plut. Dio.  
Appian.

Com-



A. R. 700. Command, might enable him to execute the  
Ant. C. 52. vastest projects that boundless ambition could suggest.

Pompey was aware of this ; and endeavoured to parry the blow. He carried a law, which renewed the prohibition of electing absent persons for Magistrates. Cæsar's friends made upon this a great stir ; and, tho' the Law was already engraved on brass, and deposited among the public archives, Pompey was weak enough to alter it, by adding this proviso, " unless any  
" one has been excused by name from asking  
" in person."

The business now was to obtain this Dispensation ; and the Tribunes, gained by Cæsar, were preparing to propose it to the People. The affair being first debated in Senate, Cato warmly opposed such a dangerous step ; and Pompey shewed on this occasion what he thought of it. For after he had faintly defended Cæsar's cause, and represented that so great a man well deserved to have the rigour of Law relaxed in his favour ; upon Cato's returning to the charge with fresh vehemence, Pompey held his tongue ; and seemed to yield to the force of the arguments brought against it.

Cic. Phil. Cicero was of the same opinion ; and tho' the  
Q. 24. terms he then kept with Cæsar did not permit him to explain in public ; in private however he encouraged Pompey to hold out. But constancy ought not to be expected from the ambitious. Pompey not only gave way himself, but even engaged Cicero to obtain from his  
Cic. ad Ar. VII. 1, 3. friend Cælius, then Tribune, that he would not oppose the proposal of his Collegues, but concur with them in obliging Cæsar. Thus the ten  
Tri-



Tribunes with one accord proposed the Dispensation; and it passed without difficulty.

A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.

I can see but one motive that could determine Pompey to this condescension, in which he consented in a manner to his own ruin and death. The five years of his Command in Spain expired a year before the ten that Cæsar was to govern Gaul. For this reason it was of the utmost concern to him to get continued in the Government of Spain, lest he should find himself disarmed at a time when his antagonist would be yet in arms. This was a point he was endeavouring to carry. He wanted an addition of five years to his Command, with an appointment of \* twenty-four millions of sesterces a year out of the public treasure. He was apprehensive doubtless of an opposition from Cæsar and his party. And truly Cæsar would have had a fine opening, had he attacked Pompey on this head, who had just ratified by a Law a *Senatus consultum* of the last year, by which the Consuls and Prætors were incapacitated from being appointed Governors of Provinces, till five years had elapsed from the expiration of their offices. Pompey therefore openly violated a Law he had lately made: and it is easy to imagine what such an advantage would have been worth to Cæsar. This it was in my opinion (for I find this observation no where) that obliged Pompey to consent to his rival's desire, in order to obtain what he himself wanted. They mutually conceded to each other the means of defence; they made a sort of exchange, of which the abler made an advantage.

*Motive to to this condescension in Pompey.*

*\* One hundred eighty-seven thousand four hundred and eighty-eight pounds.*

Metellus Scipio had a mind to share with his Collegue the glory of reforming the State, by re-

*Metellus Scipio re-establishes the Censorship in its ancient rights. Dio.*

establishing the Censorship in all its rights. I have



A. R. 706.  
Ant. C. 52.

have related how this Magistracy had been in a manner suppressed by a law of Clodius, which took from the Censors the power of stigmatizing any citizen, unless accused in form, and convicted of some scandalous action, before them. The Consul Metellus restored to them the free exercise of an arbitrary jurisdiction, such as they had enjoyed from all antiquity. But this re-establishment served less to extirpate disorders, than to shame the Censors. For, had Clodius's law continued in force, their hands being tied, they consequently would not have been responsible for the impunity of vice; whereas now their full power was restored, their inactivity was inexcusable, and yet severity seemed impracticable, on account of the number and power of the vicious. Prudent people therefore no longer stood for the Censorship; and we shall see it fall into the hands of such as were fitter to be objects of its power, than its ministers.

*Horrible  
debauch  
of this re-  
storer of  
the Cen-  
sorship.  
Val. Max  
9. 1.*

Metellus himself, its restorer, gave great openings to it in his own conduct. He was, while Consul, at an infamous entertainment; which I would not even mention, were it not to shew to what excess luxury can carry corruption. This entertainment was made for the Consul, and some of the Tribunes, by a wretched tipstaff; who brought to it two women of illustrious birth, and a young man of condition, to gratify the brutal lust of his guests. The bare relation of such an extinction of all modesty, and respect for the laws of nature itself, is shocking; but vice knows no bounds; and the only way not to be drawn into its last excesses, is to resist its first approaches.



The assemblies for the election of Consuls for the ensuing year gave room to some debates, but they were of a very different kind from those that had thrown the whole city into confusion the two preceding years. All was conducted now with tranquillity ; owing partly to Pompey's laws, and partly to the prudence and moderation of the Candidates. These were Cato ; Ser. Sulpicius the famous Lawyer, who had missed of the Consulship some years before in concurrence with Murena ; and M. Marcellus, whom we have already spoken of in Milo's affair.

*A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.  
Cato de-  
mands the  
Consulship.  
with Sul-  
picius and  
Marcellus.  
Plut. Cat.  
Dio.*

Nothing could be juster, or greater, than Cato's intention. He found all power was shared between Pompey and Cæsar, who by uniting would annihilate the Republic, or by dividing rend it. Cato proposed, if he obtained the Consulship, to rescue the public authority out of the hands of two private men, and to restore it to the Senate and People, to whom it belonged. Sulpicius's views were not so elevated ; he was a quiet man who espoused no party warmly. Marcellus hated Cæsar. So that, whatever was the choice of the People among these Candidates, Cæsar was sure of having one at least of the two Consuls against him ; but the two last suited best the interest of Pompey.

This was a great matter towards their succeeding ; and Cato assisted them, by setting the People against him, by an ill-timed severity. For he obtained from the Senate a decree, which ordered the Candidates to make interest for themselves, and not by their friends. The People were much angered, that, after having contributed more than any one to deprive them of the money they used to have for their votes, he should

*He is re-  
fused.*



A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.

should also bereave them of the satisfaction of being courted and caressed ; so that he took from them in a manner both honour and profit. Besides, he solicited with state, and not in the submissive, insinuating, manner, usual with other Candidates. “ He chose, \* says Plutarch, to “ preserve the dignity of his character, rather “ than to acquire the dignity of Consul.” It is not surprizing that these reasons for his exclusion prevailed over his merit. Sulpicius and Marcellus were elected.

*His con-  
stance af-  
ter this  
refusal.*

Cato, thus rejected, shewed a resolution worthy of the moderation with which he had solicited the office. For when some found fault with Sulpicius, who had obligations to him, for opposing him : “ It is no wonder, replied he, “ that a man should not tamely yield to ano- “ ther what is accounted the greatest good.” After this event he preserved the same equality of temper. Commonly the day, on which a Candidate lost an election, was a day of mourning for him, his relations, and friends. Often grief and shame made them even abscond for a long time. Cato made no alteration in his usual procedure. He was seen that very day playing at tennis in the Campus Martius ; and afterwards walking there with his friends, with as much serenity as if nothing disagreeable had happened.

*He re-  
nounces the  
Consulship  
or ever.*

However, he resolved never more to apply for the Consulship. He said, that an honest man, and good citizen, should not decline the administration of public affairs, when thought fit to be employed ; but that he ought not to court it immoderately. Cicero, whose maxims were

\* Εἰ κῆν το τε εἰς πολλοὺς ἀξίωμα ἐβλοπύθη φυλαττοῖν, ἢ προσλαβεῖν το τῆς ἀρχῆς.



were not near so severe, blamed him for not having done all in his power to attain the Consulship, at a time when the Republic much wanted his service: and even thought his conduct inconsistent, because, tho' he had been once refused the Prætorship too, he nevertheless made a second application. But Cato replied, that there was an essential difference: that, when he missed the Prætorship, it was against the consent of the People, part of whom were corrupted, and part awed by force; but that here every thing had been regular, and consequently he could not doubt but his character and manner of acting was displeasing to the People. "Now," added he, I certainly shall not alter my conduct; and therefore shall not act like a man of sense in seeking wantonly a second refusal, while I continue the same behaviour that occasioned the first."

Scarce any thing material happened at Rome in the Consulship of Sulpicius and Marcellus, and the following year, but the preparatives to the civil war, and the preliminaries to the rupture between Cæsar and Pompey. I shall therefore defer the relation of these intrigues and domestic quarrels, until I have given an account of Cæsar's last exploits in Gaul, and of Cicero's Proconsulship in Cilicia, which was preceded, and accompanied, by some motions of the Parthians in the East.



## S E C T. II.

*The Gauls prepare for a general revolt. The Carnutes give the signal, by massacring the Roman citizens in Genabum. Gaulish method of conveying news speedily. Vercingetorix causes the Arverni to rebel. The revolt breaks out over almost all Gaul. Cæsar returns to Gaul, and is much embarrassed how to rejoin his legions. He crosses the Cebenna in the midst of winter. He gets to his legions. Cæsar's march from the country of the Senones to that of the Bituriges. Genabum surprized and burnt. Vercingetorix, in order to starve Cæsar's army, lays waste the country of the Bituriges; and fires their towns. Avaricum is spared. Cæsar besieges it. The Romans suffer greatly. Cæsar proposes to his soldiers to raise the siege. They request him to continue it. Cæsar's care of his troops. Vercingetorix, suspected by the Gauls, justifies himself. Vigorous and skilful defence of the besieged. Structure of the Gaulish walls. Last effort of the besieged. Remarkable instance of the intrepidity of the Gauls. They endeavour in vain to abandon the town, which is stormed. Address of Vercingetorix in comforting his people. He persuades the Gauls to fortify their camp, which they had never yet done. Cæsar sends Labienus with four legions against the Senones. He passes the Allier with the six others, and besieges Gergovia. Vercingetorix follows him, and encamps on the neighbouring heights. The Ædui break their alliance with the Romans. Cæsar has thoughts of raising the siege of Gergovia. Combat in which the imprudent heat of his*



his troops occasions a considerable loss. Cæsar blames his soldiers rashness. He raises the siege. The revolt of the Ædui breaks out. Cæsar fords over the Loire, and goes to join Labienus. Labienus, after an attempt on Lutetia, returns to Agendicum; and from thence to Cæsar's camp. Vercingetorix is confirmed Generalissimo of the league. His plan of war. Cæsar procures from Germany horse, and light-armed foot. Vercingetorix's cavalry engages that of Cæsar. Singular circumstances of that fight with respect to Cæsar. Vercingetorix, being worsted, retires under the walls of Alesia. Siege of Alesia, a great and memorable event. Cæsar's works. An army assembles from all parts of Gaul to relieve that city. Famine in Alesia. One of the Chiefs proposes to eat human flesh. Arrival of the Gaulish army. Three successive battles, in all which Cæsar has the advantage. The Gaulish army is dispersed. The besieged surrender. Vercingetorix made prisoner. Cæsar passes the winter in Gaul. Cæsar's commentaries continued by a friend. New plan of the Gauls for continuing the war. Cæsar during the winter subdues the Bituriges; and disperses the Carnutes. War of the Bellovaci; conducted by them with equal skill and courage. They are vanquished, and submit. Comius, determined never to trust a Roman, retires into Germany. Reason of his distrust. Cæsar's endeavours to pacify Gaul, by adding mildness and clemency to the force of arms. Exploits of Caninius and Fabius between the Loire and the Garonne. Siege of Uxellodunum. Cæsar goes to it in person, and compels the besieged to surrender at discretion. Comius, by an extraordinary artifice, deceives Volusenus who pursued him. He wounds

VOL. XIII. K Volu-



*Volusenus in an engagement, and afterwards makes his peace. Gaul entirely pacified. Cæsar employs the whole ninth year of his command in quieting the Gauls, and gaining them by mildness.*

A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.

CN. POMPEIUS MAGNUS III.

Q. CÆCILIUS METELLUS PIUS SCIPIO.

*The Gauls  
prepare  
for a gene-  
ral revolt.  
Cæf. de  
B. G. l. 7.*

WHILE Cæsar was beyond the Alpes on the side of Italy ; and all his ten legions had their winter-quarters in the northern and eastern parts of Gaul, in the Senonois, the Langrois, and the country of Treves ; the Gauls plot a general revolt ; and make a more vigorous effort than they had ever yet done to shake off the yoke of their unjust oppressors. The execution of Acco, Chief of the Senones, had irritated, and alarmed them all ; each thinking himself liable to the same treatment. Besides, the troubles in Rome, occasioned by Clodius's death, seemed to the Gauls, who heard of them, to present a favourable opportunity ; because they thought these intestine seditions would detain Cæsar long in Italy. The situation too of the Roman legions, all stationed at one of the extremities of Gaul, gave them hopes to be able, if the intermediate country revolted, to cut off all communication between Cæsar and his legions ; and hinder the General from joining his army.

*The Carn-  
utes give  
the signal  
to revolt.  
Roman  
ambassadors  
at Carnuntum.*

The Carnutes declared the first. It had been thus agreed, and the time fixed, in an Assembly of the Chiefs of almost all the Gaulish nations ; in which the Deputies of the Carnutes undertook to give the signal of the revolt. provided they might depend on being seconded by the other nations.



nations. And as the confederates durst not exchange hostages, for fear of discovering their league; they bound themselves by the most solemn and sacred oath in use among the Gauls; which was, consonant to the taste of that warlike nation, took on the military ensigns collected together.

On the appointed day the Carnutes rise; and coming armed from all sides to Genabum \*, \* *Océant*: one of their principal cities, massacre the Roman citizens who had settled there on account of trade, and among the rest a Roman Knight of eminence, whom Cæsar had appointed to supply his army with provisions.

The news of this massacre spread quickly all over Gaul. The Gaulish method of expediting an expected piece of news was, to station men from place to place, who informed one another thereof by their successive outcries. In this manner, what had happened at Genabum at sunrise was known on the frontiers of the Arverni, a distance of one hundred and sixty miles, before the end of the first watch of the night.

Vercingetorix waited only for this signal to head the revolt of the Arverni. He was a young Nobleman of great power and interest, whose father Celtillus had presided over all Celtic Gaul; but, endeavouring to make himself its sovereign, had been killed by his countrymen. The son, who probably was no less ambitious, was no sooner informed of the rising of the Carnutes, but he immediately took up arms in Auvergne, and seized on Gergovia †, spite of his uncle, who dreaded the consequences of

K 2

so

† A city of Auvergne, whose ruins are visible two leagues south east of Clermont. The mountain is still called Gergoie.



A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.

so rash a step. He is upon this proclaimed King by his followers ; and soon after acknowledged Generalissimo of the league which then revealed itself ; to which the Senones, the Parisii, those of Poitou, Querci, Touraine, the Aulerci \*, the Lemovices, those of Anjou, and all the provinces of Celtic Gaul near the ocean, acceded.

Vercingetorix was very diligent in setting on foot a numerous army ; demanding for that purpose, of every nation, a certain proportion of men, arms, and horses, and he exacted obedience with great rigour, or rather cruelty, since those who committed great faults were, after having been tortured, burnt alive ; and for small offences he either cut off the ears, or put out an eye, and returned the mutilated home as an example to others. By the terror of such punishments he soon formed a large army ; with which he undertook to bring over to the league those nations who were yet undetermined. He trusted part of his troops to Luterius of Querci, and sent him into Rouergue, and the territories of the Nitiobriges † and Gabali ‡ ; to compel these nations to take up arms. Luterius, if he found an opportunity, was also to invade the Roman province. As for Vercingetorix himself, he marched to Berri at the head of the grand army, and made its inhabitants join him.

*Cæsar returns to Gaul, and is much embarrassed how to regain his legions.*

These motions required Cæsar's presence. He had hitherto remained in Cisalpine Gaul ; waiting probably the event of the troubles in Rome, and hoping to reap some advantage from them. When he found that Pompey's wis-

\* They inhabited the Maine and the country of Eureux.

† The Agenois.  
‡ The Gervandais.



wisdom and fortitude, as he says himself, had quieted the city ; and consequently, that he was to expect nothing from that quarter ; he made haste to repass the Alpes, that he might suppress the insurrection in Gaul. When this was done, he was not a little embarrassed how to get to his army. If he ordered his forces to come to him to the Roman province, he exposed them to be attacked on their march in his absence : if he went to them, he hazarded greatly his person by going through countries on whose fidelity he could not depend.

He ran, however, where the danger was most pressing : and first to Narbonne, threw strong garrisons into that, and the neighbouring cities ; and put the whole country into a condition of defence against the invasion, with which Luterius threatened it. He then prepared to enter the country of the Arverni ; and for that purpose assembled at the foot of the mountain Cebenna part of the Provincial forces, and the new Italian levies. It was in the midst of winter, and the snow was six feet deep on the mountain ; which was to be cleared before he could move. Cæsar's soldiers, animated by their General, overcame all difficulties ; and the Arverni, who thought themselves sufficiently defended by the Cebenna, as by an impenetrable barrier, were strangely surprized to see an army coming to them by ways reckoned impassable at that season even to single men. The Romans ravaged all the open country ; and obliged Vercingetorix to leave Berri, and come to the assistance of the Arverni.

Cæsar foresaw this ; and his scheme was to amuse the enemy on that side, while he stole off to his legions. Having therefore staid but two



A. R. 707.  
Ant. C. 52. days in Auvergne, he set out, leaving the troops he had brought with him, under the command of D. Brutus. His pretence was to go and fetch a reinforcement; and he promised to be absent but three days, deceiving the Romans themselves, the better to impose on the Gauls. He went then to Vienne, where he found a body of horse, who had waited there according to his orders several days. With this fresh corps, marching day and night, he crossed the country of the Ædui, whom he began to distrust; and, preventing by his expedition the obstacles and ambuscades he had reason to apprehend from them, arrived happily in the Langrois where two of his legions wintered; and presently got the others about him, before the Arverni had the least intimation of it.

Cæsar's  
march  
from the  
country of  
the Senones  
to that of  
the Bitu-  
riges.  
Gergonium  
surprized  
and burnt. Winter was not yet over; and, had Vercingetorix continued quiet, Cæsar, it seems, would have waited for the fine weather. But the Gaulish General sat down before a city of the Boii, whom Cæsar in his first campaign had settled among the Ædui. This town named Gergovia (and which should not be confounded with the city of the same name in the country of the Arverni, must have been situated \* in that part of the Bourbonnois which is between the Loire and the Allier. This enterprize of Vercingetorix reduced Cæsar to the hard alternative, of either abandoning his allies, or of risking the want of provisions and forage, by taking the field at a time when there was nothing on the ground. But before all things Cæsar judged it expedient to protect those who confided in him, and to avoid

\* I speak after Mr. d'Anville, whose superior light in Geography, I am proud to follow.



avoid giving room to new defections by neglecting his allies in their distress. He wrote therefore to the Ædui, desiring them to supply the besieged with provisions; and to the Boii themselves, to encourage them to hold out till he could come and succour them in person. At the same time he set out, leaving at Agendicum\*<sup>Ant. C. 52.</sup> two legions with the baggage of the whole army. <sup>A. R. 700.</sup>

He did not however take the shortest rout, relying doubtless on the ignorance of the Gauls in the attack of towns. He had much at heart to revenge the Roman Citizens assassinated by the Carnutes in Genabum. He marched then to that city; took in his way Vallaunodunum†, † *Beaune in Gati-* an important post, which stopped him but three *nois.* days; and from thence came in two days to Genabum: and, as that town had then a bridge over the Loire, and he had reason to believe the inhabitants would endeavour to get off by means thereof in the night, in order to prevent it he posted two legions in ambush on that side. And in fact at midnight the inhabitants of Genabum fled in crouds over the bridge; but they almost all fell into the snare; the city was plundered, and then burnt.

After taking Genabum, Cæsar continued his march; entered into Berri; and being come to Noviodunum, now Nouan, four or five leagues south-east of Bourges, as his custom was to leave nothing behind that might incommode him, attacked that city. It had just capitulated when the scouts of Vercingetorix's army appeared; for on Cæsar's approach he had raised the siege of Gergovia. The inhabitants of Noviodunum had a mind to take advantage of the unexpected succour; tho' they had already admitted into the



A. R. 702.  
Ant. C. 52.

town some Roman Officers ; who, perceiving what they were at, thought proper to retire. But Vercingetorix's cavalry having been beat by Cæsar's, which was strengthened by six hundred Germans ; the town was obliged to have recourse to the clemency of the Conqueror, and appease his anger by delivering up those who had broke the capitulation. Cæsar, not satisfied with having took three towns on his march ; and relieved the Boii by the very terror of his approach ; resolved to besiege Avaricum\* the capital of the Bituriges, persuaded that by reducing that place he should subdue the whole nation.

\* *Bourges.*

*Vercingetorix, in order to starve Cæsar's army, laid sieg to the Bituriges, and fires their towns.*

Before he sat down before Avaricum, Vercingetorix called a great Council ; in which he proposed a new plan of war, disagreeable indeed to the country, but well-judged as to the Romans. He said they ought by no means to engage the Romans, but only to aim at cutting off their provisions and forage ; which was very practicable, as there was nothing on the ground yet ; and as the numerous cavalry of the Gauls could easily hinder any small body of infantry from leaving their main army, in order to get in the villages the necessary subsistence for them and the horse ; by which means Cæsar's army, being in want of every thing, must either retreat in disorder, or perish by famine. He added, that it was necessary to carry this precaution yet farther, and burn all the towns that were not capable of defence, from whence the Romans might get subsistence. “ I am sensible, says he, “ that what I propose is grievous ; but it is yet “ more grievous to see our wives and children “ carried into captivity, and to lose our own lives ; “ which is however the inevitable lot of the “ conquered.” This proposal was approved, and



and above twenty towns of the Bituriges were burnt and destroyed in one day. The neighbouring nations followed their example; nothing but conflagrations were to be seen on all sides; the hopes of Liberty consoled them for their losses.

The city of Avaricum was comprehended in Vercingetorix's project; he was for burning that with the rest. The Bituriges prostrate themselves before the Council, and beg mercy for their capital, one of the finest cities in Gaul, fortified by nature and art; of which they themselves undertook the defence. Their entreaties prevailed; and a good garrison was put into Avaricum. This was the state of affairs when Cæsar sat down before that city. Vercingetorix followed him, and encamped at the distance of fifteen miles. Thus Cæsar found himself obliged to besiege a strong, well-provided place, in sight of an adversary army at least as numerous as his own.

It is almost incredible how much the Romans suffered in this siege. The country about them was laid waste; and, when any of them went out off their camp to seek for provisions, they were insulted by Vercingetorix's parties of horse. Their whole reliance was on the Ædui and Boii, to whom Cæsar was continually writing for convoys. But the first of these people, tho' able, were ill-disposed; and the latter, tho' well-disposed, were unable. So that the Roman soldiers for many days were without bread, and had nothing to eat but the cattle they could pick up in the fields.

Cæsar grew apprehensive that his troops would despond; and, as he visited the quarters, proposed to the soldiers to raise the siege, if they found the scarcity of provisions insupportable.

A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.

*Avaricum is spared. Cæsar besieges it.*

*The Romans suffer greatly.*

*Cæsar proposes to his soldiers to raise the siege. They request him to continue it.*



A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.

But they unanimously requested him not to do it. They told him, and represented by their Officers, “ that the many years they had served  
“ under him they had never suffered any dis-  
“ grace, nor undertook any thing in which they  
“ had not succeeded. That they could not but  
“ think it inglorious to raise a siege they had  
“ began ; and had rather undergo the greatest  
“ hardships, than leave unrevenged the blood  
“ of the Roman Citizens perfidiously massacred  
“ by the Gauls at Genabum.” What is there impracticable to a General who can inspire his troops with such sentiments ?

*Cæsar's  
care of his  
troops.*

Mean time Cæsar had intelligence, that Ver-  
cingetorix, having eat up the country he first  
encamped in, was come nearer to the town ;  
and had left his new camp at the head of his  
whole cavalry, to dress an ambush for the Ro-  
man foragers the next day. This was a fine  
opportunity of attacking the Gaulish camp in  
the absence of the General. Cæsar resolved not  
to neglect it ; and, setting out at midnight, came  
in sight of the enemy the next morning. But  
he found them drawn up in good order on a hill,  
with a morass in front ; so that he should in-  
fallibly lose many men in the attack. The Ro-  
man soldiers were for fighting, and even thought  
it disgraceful that the Gauls should dare face them.  
But Cæsar moderated their fire. He made them  
observe the posture of the enemy ; the danger  
of attacking them ; the inevitable destruction  
of many brave men ; and then added these words  
full of humanity and goodness : “ since you,  
“ fellow-soldiers, are willing to face every dan-  
“ ger for my glory ; I should be the most un-  
“ grateful of men not to be tender of the lives  
“ of those who ought to be so dear to me.” He  
then



then returned to his camp before Avaricum ; A. R. 700,  
Ant. C. 52. choosing rather to appear to retreat, than expose his soldiers to an unnecessary danger.

This event had like to have occasioned a di- *Vercingeto-*  
vision among the Gauls ; who, seeing how op- *rix, being*  
portunely the Romans had seized the moment of *suspected by*  
Vercingetorix's absence to come up to them, sus- *the Gauls,*  
pected some secret understanding between him *justifies*  
and Cæsar. Vercingetorix, every part of whose *himself.*  
conduct shews his sense and address, easily cleared himself of this ill-founded suspicion. But, being moreover desirous to encourage his army, he produced some Roman slaves, who had been made prisoners in foraging ; and who, broke by severity, repeated the lesson he had taught them. They said that they were legionary soldiers ; that, pressed by hunger, they had straggled in search of provisions ; and that the Roman army was in such want, that Cæsar had resolved to retire, if the town held out three days longer. On this report Vercingetorix triumphed ; and intimated to the Gauls how unworthily they had behaved in suspecting of treason a General who made them victorious without drawing the sword. Every one applauded his discourse ; striking, as their manner was, their lances against their swords ; and persuaded that they should soon be conquerors, and that they had nothing to do towards it but to enable Avaricum to hold out a little longer, they threw into it a reinforcement of ten thousand men ; which was easily effected, as Cæsar had not compleatly invested the place.

The defence of the besieged was not only vi- *Vigorous*  
gorous, but also skilful\*. The Gauls, says *and skilful*  
Cæsar, *defence of*  
*the be-*

\* Ut est summæ genus solertiæ, atque ad omnia imitanda *sieged.*  
atque efficienda, quæ ab quoque tradantur, aptissimum.



A. R. 700. Cæsar, are very ingenious ; easily learn, and perfectly imitate, any thing they see practised. A.D. C. 52. Consequently during the seven years the Romans had been at war with them, they had made great proficiency in the military art ; and turned against their adversaries the inventions they had learnt from them. The Bituriges employed all proper means to resist, and retard, the progress of the Romans. They seized the Roman scythes with running knots. and then drew them over the wall by a machine which was probably a sort of capstane. They raised on their walls wooden towers, as high as those of the Romans, and defended from fire by raw hides. They made frequent sallies, they undermined the besiegers mounts ; they counterworked their mines, and filled them up with great stones, or poured melted pitch into them, or repulsed the miners and soldiers with long stakes burnt and sharpened at the extremity.

*Structure  
of the  
Gaulish  
walls.*

The walls of the Gaulish cities were well contrived for resisting all the methods of attack then in use. They were composed of long massy beams of wood, and free-stones, alternately ranged. Cæsar commends this structure ; because the stone resisted the fire, and the wood the battering-ram.

*Last effort  
of the be-  
sieged.*

Spite of so many obstacles, spite of cold, rain, and dirt, the Romans, at the end of twenty-five days siege, had raised a mount, eighty feet high, and three hundred broad ; and had brought it close to the wall. But on a sudden in the middle of the night they perceived their mount smoke : for the besieged had undermined, and fired it. At the same time they made a sally ; bringing with them lighted torches, dry wood, pitch, and all sorts of combustibles. The Ro-

mans



mans defended themselves with the same vigour they were attacked with. The fight was long, and obstinate; and Cæsar has preserved a remarkable instance of the Gaulish intrepidity. A soldier, posted before the city-gate, threw into the fire balls of pitch and tallow to feed it. This man was exposed to a Roman battery, which presently dispatched him. The next man strides over his body, and takes his place. He is also killed in the same manner; and a third succeeds; to the third a fourth; in a word, this dangerous post was never vacant during the whole fight. At last the Romans conquered; beat the besieged back into the town; and extinguished the fire.

This was the last effort of the besieged. They were now convinced that it was impossible to save the town; and therefore resolved, in concert with Vercingetorix, to abandon it in the night. This they reckoned they should easily effect by means of a morass that covered their retreat; and the more so as Vercingetorix's camp was near. But the women, finding they were going to be deserted, conjured them with tears not to leave them and their children to the mercy of the victors. And perceiving their entreaties were ineffectual; for \* extreme fear, says Cæsar, excludes compassion; they grew desperate and furious, and informed the Romans from the walls, that the garrison prepared for flight: and thus that project was entirely disconcerted.

The next day, as Cæsar meditated an assault, there fell a heavy rain. This he was not sorry for, observing that it made the besieged less vigilant

\* In summo periculo timor misericordiam non recipit.



A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.

gilant than usual. To increase their security; he deferred the attack some moments, and ordered his troops to act purposely less vigorously. Then on a sudden, having promised rewards to those who should first mount the wall, he gives the signal. The walls are scaled in an instant. The besieged, finding the town took, got together in small bodies, and formed in battalia wherever they had room. But, after waiting in vain for the Romans to come down to them; observing that they were taking measures to get possession of the whole circuit of the walls; they began to fear they should have no outlet left to escape by, and ran all tumultuously to one end of the town. Then the slaughter began. Some, as they endeavoured to get out, were slain by the infantry; others, who had got out, were cut to pieces by the cavalry. The city was burnt, and the inhabitants put to the sword. The Roman soldiers, exasperated by the obstinate defence of the town, and eager to revenge the massacre of Genabum, gave no quarter: old men, women, children, all were slaughtered; so that out of forty thousand people that were in the place scarce eight hundred escaped, who, having took to flight at the first alarm, had the luck to reach the Gaulish camp.

*Address of  
Vercinge-  
torix in  
comforting  
his people.  
He per-  
suades the  
Gauls to  
fortify  
their camp,  
which they  
had never  
yet done*

Vercingetorix appeared here too a man of courage and invention. He assembled the Gauls, and represented, “ that the advantage “ the Romans had obtained was not the effect “ of their superiority, either in number or va- “ lour; but only of their greater skill in the art “ of attacking places. That, after all, he could “ not be reproached with the loss of Avaricum, “ as he had never advised them to hazard its “ defence. That however, as they had thereby “ suffered



“ suffered a considerable loss, he should spare  
 “ no pains to repair it. That he had great  
 “ hopes he should soon unite to the league those  
 “ nations who had hitherto refused to accede to  
 “ it ; and that, if all the Gauls could once be  
 “ brought to act in union, the whole Universe  
 “ confederated against them would not be able  
 “ to do them any hurt. That on their part  
 “ they ought not to omit any thing conducive  
 “ to their defence against the enemy, but sub-  
 “ mit to the fatigue of fortifying their camp.”

A. R. 700.  
 Ant. C. 52.

This was what the Gauls had never yet done ; bold in danger, lazy in work. This harangue of Vercingetorix revived the drooping courage of his troops, and gave them a high idea of their General. So that, although bad success usually (as Cæsar observes) sinks the reputation of a Commander, Vercingetorix by the loss of Avaricum acquired greater authority among his forces. He was obeyed more punctually than ever : the Gauls submitted to unusual labour, and according to his orders fortified their camp. He, on his side, took great pains to effect what he had promised. He laboured hard to bring all the Gaulish nations to his party ; and succeeded with some of them. He made new levies through all the countries that acknowledged his command, to replace the men he lost at the siege of Avaricum ; and Teutomatus, King of the Nitiobriges, joined him with a reinforcement of cavalry.

Cæsar found in Avaricum provisions enough. He staid there some time to refresh his troops, after the fatigue of a long and troublesome siege ; and, when the fine weather was come, he went in search of the enemy. As he had a mind to prevent the conjunction of the whole force of  
*Cæsar sends Labienus with four legions against the Senones. He passes the Allier*



A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.  
*with six  
others, and  
besieges  
Gergovia.*

the league, he divided his army. He sent Labienus with four legions against the Senones and Parisii; and resolved to attack himself with the remaining six the fort of the league, by carrying the war into the country of the Arverni. In order to do this, he was obliged to cross the Allier, which Vercingetorix undertook to hinder. But Cæsar deceived him, by marching off the greatest part of his army, while he remained behind himself with two legions screened by a wood from the sight of the enemy. Vercingetorix therefore having advanced to face the four legions, whom he mistook for the whole Roman army; Cæsar had time and opportunity to rebuild a bridge the Gauls had broke down, but whose piles were left in the river. He then ordered the four legions sent before to return with all expedition; passed the river; entered into the territories of the Arverni; and sat down before Gergovia.

*Vercingetorix follows him, and encamps on the neighbouring heights.*

Gergovia was a strong place, situated on a mountain whose approaches were difficult; and Vercingetorix was encamped near with a numerous army, covering several hills with his battalions and squadrons; a formidable prospect! He placed his troops in different stations, according to the different nations they were composed of; and every morning the Chiefs of each nation waited on the Generalissimo, to advise with him, or receive his orders. He harassed too the Romans almost every day by skirmishes; detaching some of his cavalry, intermixed with archers, who fell sometimes on one quarter, sometimes on another; and, if he did the besiegers no great damage, at least he exercised, and emboldened, his troops.

To



To compleat his difficulties and troubles, Cæsar saw the Ædui break their alliance with him, and accede to the league. This people, the most antient ally of the Romans, protected by Cæsar against Ariovistus, rescued by him from the oppression of the German Kings, restored to their former greatness, loaded with benefits and marks of confidence, forgot their obligations to their benefactor, and joined the general revolt of Gaul.

A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.  
*The Ædui  
break their  
alliance  
with the  
Romans.*

This was not done on a sudden. I have observed that Cæsar began to suspect them in the winter. They gave him afterwards slender assistance at the siege of Avaricum. He treated them however with great mildness; out of policy no doubt as much as clemency. Before he besieged Gergovia, having been acquainted with a dispute that had arose between two Candidates for the chief Magistracy, which divided the nation; as their laws permitted not the first Magistrate to go out of their country, Cæsar was complaisant enough to go to them himself, ordering the Competitors to meet him at Decize to have their difference decided. During the siege of Gergovia, the Ædui took off the mask; and even committed horrible outrages against the Romans. The Grandees of that nation, not excepting even him to whom Cæsar adjudged the supreme Magistracy, brought over by the sollicitation, and money, of Vercingetorix, used all sorts of means to make the people take arms; even so far as as to employ the blackest calumny, and to report falsely the death of two Æduan lords, who they said had been murdered by Cæsar's orders; though they were alive and well in the Roman camp, and even treated with distinction by Cæsar. This forged slander had a prodigious ef-



A. R. 707. fect upon the Æduan soldiers and burgesſes.  
 A. S. C. 52. The Roman citizens were every where ſeized,  
 and ill-treated ; ſome of them killed, all of  
 them plundered.

*Cæſar has  
thoughts of  
raising the  
ſiege of  
Gergovia.* Such outrages would, doubtleſs, at another  
 time, have been ſpeedily and ſeverely revenged  
 by Cæſar. But the troubles he was now in-  
 volved in compelled him to diſſemble. He en-  
 deavoured to appeaſe, and regain, the Ædui by  
 gentle means ; and he partly ſucceeded. But  
 they had advanced too far, to think of a retreat.  
 Cæſar had intelligence, that under a falſe ap-  
 pearance of reconciliation they prepared for an  
 open revolt ; and even ſollicited other nations to  
 follow their example. He feared he ſhould have  
 all the Gauliſh people on him, at a time when  
 he was engaged in a very difficult and hazardous  
 enterprize ; and entertained thoughts of raiſing  
 the ſiege, and rejoining Labienus, that he might  
 collect his whole force together.

*Cæſar is  
wary : he  
does not  
beat off his  
troops ac-  
cidentally  
by a  
conſiderable  
force.* He would not however ſeem to run away,  
 leſt he ſhould increaſe the confidence and pride  
 of the enemy. He therefore reſolved on ſome  
*coup d'eclat*, in order to retreat victorious : and  
 laid hold of an opportunity of attacking the  
 enemy to advantage. But, as he was apprehen-  
 ſive that the ardour of his troops might engage  
 them too far, he carefully recommended to his  
 Lieutenants who commanded each legion to re-  
 ſtrain their ſoldiers, and avoid advancing too  
 far into difficult places. “ This, ſays he to  
 “ them, is to be only a ſkirmiſh. Let us  
 “ make uſe of our advantage for a little while ;  
 “ but by no means prolong an engagement,  
 “ that would become too unequal.”

The attack ſucceeded to Cæſar's wiſh ; and  
 the Romans with ſurpriſing eaſe made them-  
 ſelves



selves masters of three different camps of the enemy. Cæsar then gave the signal for the retreat, having done all he intended ; and the tenth legion, which fought near his person, obeyed it. But the others, who were distant, not having heard it, could not be restrained by their Officers. The soldiers saw themselves near the town ; they were victorious ; the hopes of a booty like that they made at Avaricum animated them ; they thought nothing impracticable to their valour. They advance to the foot of the wall ; some of them find means to get up ; already they think themselves masters of the place. But the enemy, recovered from their first fright, rally ; and fall in their turn on these rash assailants. The Romans are repulsed, and obliged to fight on very disadvantageous ground : those who first got on the walls are killed, and many others with them.

A. R. 700.  
 Ant. C. 52.

A Centurion performed on this occasion a very generous action, which in some sort compensated for his rashness. “ It is I, says he to his soldiers, who, incited by an unwarrantable desire of glory, have brought you here : it is I, therefore, that must save you at the expence of my life. Take you care only of your retreat.” So saying, he advances to the enemy, and kills two of them. His soldiers run to his assistance : “ You trouble yourselves to no purpose, says he, I bleed, I die. Go, rejoin your legion.” Thus fighting, and securing his soldiers retreat, he fell.

The loss of the Romans was considerable ; and would have been much greater, had not the tenth legion sustained those who gave way, and given them time to rally. The Gauls upon that thought proper to retire. The Romans



A. R. 700. had near seven hundred soldiers killed on the  
Ant. C. 52. spot, and forty-six officers.

*Cæsar  
blames his  
soldiers  
rashness.  
He raises  
the siege*

Cæsar, who understood too well the nature of valour to misplace it, called the next day a general Assembly ; and therein extremely condemned the temerity, and greediness, of his soldiers ; who had taken upon themselves to judge how far they were to proceed, and what they were to undertake ; without obeying either the signal to retreat, or the orders of their Officers. To convince them the better of their fault, he reminded them of his own conduct at the siege of Avaricum ; when, having surprized the enemy without a General, and without Cavalry, he had chose to give up a certain victory, rather than hazard an inconsiderable loss. He mixed however some praise with his reprimand. He told them \*, that he could not but admire the astonishing courage of men whose ardour was not to be stopped, neither by the intrenchments of several camps, nor by the height of the mountain, nor the walls of the town. But, he added, that he no less blamed the licentiousness and arrogance of soldiers, who thought they knew more than their General, and could see better than him the way to conquest. “ Obedience, says he, and moderation in the pursuit of booty, are virtues no less essential to good soldiers than valour and magnanimity.” He concluded, by exhorting them not to

\* Quotopere eorum animi magnitudinem admiraretur, quæ non castrorum munitiones, non altitudo montis, non murus oppidi, tardare potuisset ; tantopere licentiam arrogantemque reprehendere, quod plus it,

quam imperatorem, de victoria atque exitu rerum sentire existimarent : nec minus se in milite modestiam & continentiam, quam virtutem atque animi magnitudinem, desiderare.



to be however discouraged by a repulse owing <sup>A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.</sup> to their disadvantageous situation, and not to the courage of the enemy.

The same day, and the following, Cæsar, pursuing the same plan, offered the Gauls battle ; but Vercingetorix did not think proper to descend into the plain to accept it. The first of these days, however, the cavalry had a skirmish, in which the Romans had the better. Cæsar, thinking he had done enough to abate the pride of the Gauls, and confirm the courage of his troops, raised the siege ; and began his march to the territories of the Ædui. The Gauls offered not to pursue him ; he re-established his bridge on the Allier, and passed over.

At this juncture the Ædui declared openly <sup>The revolt  
of the  
Ædui  
breaks out.</sup> against the Romans. They sent Deputies to enter into a negotiation with Vercingetorix ; an alliance was concluded, which they sealed by an horrible perfidy against the Romans. Cæsar had left in the city of Noviodunum, now Nevers, all the Gaulish hostages, his provisions, his military chest, and great part of his own and his army's baggage. He had also sent there many horses bought up in Italy and Spain for the service. The Ædui, to whom the city of Noviodunum belonged, massacred the guards Cæsar had left there, and all the Romans they could find ; divided amongst them the money and horses ; conducted to Bibracte \* the Gau- \* Autun.  
lish hostages ; and fired the city, not thinking themselves strong enough to defend it : as to the corn, they carried away as much as they could of it in so short a time in barks ; and burnt the rest, or threw it into the river. At the same time they lined the banks of the Loire



A. R. 700.  
Ann. C. 52.

with horse and foot, hoping to defend its passage with the more ease, as it was considerably swelled by the melting of the snow ; and proposing, to oblige Cæsar to return into the Roman province \*.

*Cæsar  
first, over  
the Loire,  
and then to  
join Labie-  
nus.*

Cæsar was doubtless in an untoward situation. To retreat into the Roman province was inglorious ; and, had he so intended, the badness of the ways, and the mountain Cebenna, were almost insuperable obstacles. His reputation, and interest, equally counselled him to rejoin Labienus : but, in order thereto, he was to cross the Loire. If he attempted to re-establish the bridges on that river, beside, that it was in itself no easy matter to do in sight of the enemy, he gave them time to increase their forces. He determined therefore to look out for a ford ; and having found one, which however took the soldiers up to their shoulders, he placed his cavalry higher, in the broadest part of the river, to break its impetuosity. The enemy, terrified by such boldness, forsook the banks ; the Romans happily passed over ; and, having got plenty of provisions, marched towards the Senones.

*Labienus,  
after an  
action on  
the river,  
crossed to  
Agendicum ;  
and then  
marched to  
Lutetia  
Cæsar's  
camp.*

Labienus had performed no great exploits ; and thought himself happy in preserving the four legions he commanded. Leaving Agendicum †, where he deposited his baggage, under the care of the new Italian recruits ; he advanced, coasting the Yonne and the Seine, as far as Lutetia ; with an intention of taking that capital of the Parisii, which at that time was accounted an important place, though shut up in

\* Cæsar's text seems corrupted in this place. I fancy I have hit on the right.  
† See



in the island now called *l'isle du Palais*. On advice of his approach, the neighbouring countries assembled a numerous army, and put at the head of it Camulogenus, a very old man, but who was reputed a very able General. And indeed he acted as such; he avoided an engagement; he laid hold of the advantage of ground; and, as there was then, on the left of the Seine above Lutetia, a great morass \*, whose water ran into that river, he covered himself with it, and stopped the Romans. Labienus attempted to force a passage, but, not succeeding, returned towards Melodunum ||; and having surprized || Melun. that town, most of whose inhabitants were in Camulogenus's army, he crossed the Seine there; and marched back to Lutetia; following the right bank of the river. The Gaulish General, being unwilling he should seize, and fortify, Lutetia, set it on fire; broke down its bridges; and, covered † by the before-mentioned morass, kept in his camp opposite to the Romans, with the river between them: whilst the Bellovaci, being informed of the revolt of the Ædui, were assembling their forces with all expedition; so that Labienus was in danger of being put between two fires.

The news he received at the same time of the raising of the siege of Gergovia, and of the new accessions to the Gaulish league, increased his apprehensions. He even heard that Cæsar had been compelled to retake the route of the Roman province; and was uneasy to find himself separated by a great river from the baggage of the

L 4

whole

\* This morass was made probably by the river *Eure*.

† I read in Cæsar's text "protecti" palude, accord-

ing to the conjecture of a learned interpreter, instead of "pro-  
"fecti."



A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.

whole army, which had been left at Agendicum. He concluded, it was proper to think of a safe retreat, rather than of making conquests. And this was the method he took to effect it.

He had brought from Melodunum fifty boats, of which he gave the command to as many Roman Knights, and ordered them to fall down the river at night, without noise, four miles below Lutetia (that is pretty near the place where now is the village of Auteuil) and there to wait quietly for him. His design was to cross there. But, in order to deceive the enemy, he sent to the opposite side (that is towards the place where now is Conflans near Charenton) five cohorts, who escorted the baggage, and began their march with much bustle; and who were attended by some barks that Labienus had got together, which made a great noise with their oars. He left five other cohorts for a camp-guard; and taking with him the rest of the army, that is, three legions, he advanced silently to the boats that waited for him.

The enemy were not apprized of this motion until a little before day. They came immediately with the greatest part of their forces and attacked Labienus, whose cavalry and infantry had now gained the left bank of the river. The battle was fought in the plain where are now the villages of Issi and Vaugirard. It was sharp and obstinate. The Gauls behaved well. Camulogenus animated them by his example, and, notwithstanding his age, performed the duty of General and Soldier; he went where the danger was greatest; threw himself into the thickest of the engagement; and at last fell sword in hand. The victory of the Romans was compleat; and Labie-



Labienus retreated without difficulty to Agendicum; from whence he marched his four legions to Cæsar.

A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.

The revolt of the Ædui had brought over to the league several other Gaulish people. Besides the great authority they had all over the country, the hostages they had seized at Nevers gave them power to compel even those to follow their steps who would otherwise have continued quiet. Their ardour for war was such that they sacrificed to it even their national interest, and the jealousy of command. They at first insisted on being at the head of the league, and there was an Assembly held on that occasion of the Deputies of all the confederated nations; but the majority being for Vercingetorix, and having confirmed to him the title of Generalissimo, the Ædui submitted to the decision; and consented, with regret, to take orders from an Arvernian.

*Vercingetorix is confirmed Generalissimo of the league. His plan of war.*

Vercingetorix, tho' at the head of all the Celtic, and part of the Belgic Gaul, was not overset by the power of so formidable a league. He forgot not that the Romans were invincible by fair fighting; and determined to prosecute the war according to the plan that had hitherto succeeded. He ordered therefore the nations that obeyed him to lay waste their countries about Cæsar's army; and in order to starve him, by cutting off his provisions and forage, he augmented his cavalry to the number of fifteen thousand.

He thought himself however strong enough to act offensively against the Roman province; and invaded it accordingly in three places. Ten thousand foot and eight thousand horse, partly Ædui, partly Segusiani \*, marched by his

\* *Those of order Lyonnais.*



A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.

† *Those of*  
*Gervan-*  
*dan.*

*Cæsar pro-*  
*cures from*  
*Germany*  
*horse and*  
*light-*  
*armed foot.*

*Vercingeto-*  
*rix's ca-*  
*valry en-*  
*gages that*  
*of Cæsar.*

order against the Allobrogi; with whom he at the same began a negotiation, flattering them with the hopes of being at the head of the whole province. The Gabali† and some of the Arverni made an irruption into the territories of the Helvii, who possessed the Vivarais: and those of Rouergue and Querci, into the dominions of the Volsci Arecomici, whose capital was Nismes. This diversion was well-concerted; but the main success depended on what was done against Cæsar himself.

That General was aware of the advantage the Gauls had over him by their superiority in horse; and not having it in his power to procure any either from the Roman province, or Italy; his communication with these countries being cut off: he had recourse to the German nations he had subdued in the preceding campaigns. And he got from the other side of the Rhine some horsemen, and some light-armed foot who use to fight with them; but, as they were ill-mounted, he distributed among them the horses of the Roman Knights and Officers. This reinforcement proved very serviceable to Cæsar.

He intended to get into the territories of the Sequani, by crossing the country of the Lingones, who had continued faithful to him. His design was, as he says, to be the better able to succour the Roman province; perhaps he had thoughts of retiring there for his own security: Vercingetorix at least fancied so; and, persuaded that the Romans fled, deviated unluckily from the plan he had till then strictly adhered to.

He assembled the Officers of the cavalry, and told them, that the hour of victory was come:  
“ if,



“ if, adds he, we had no further view than a  
 “ present advantage, we might let the Romans  
 “ run away into their province. But who  
 “ doubts but they will soon return with more  
 “ numerous forces to re-attack our liberty? You  
 “ must therefore engage them now, while they  
 “ march encumbered with baggage. Their  
 “ cavalry will not venture to face you: and as  
 “ to their infantry, if they defend their baggage,  
 “ they will not be able to advance; if (which  
 “ I think more probable) they abandon it, it  
 “ will be such an infamy and loss as will damp  
 “ any future inclination in them to revisit our  
 “ country. To encourage you to do your duty,  
 “ I will have the whole army under arms before  
 “ the camp.” These words were followed by  
 a general acclamation: and the Officers in their  
 transport swore, and afterwards made the private  
 men swear, never to return to their homes, nor  
 revisit their parents, wives, and children, if  
 they did not twice pierce through the Roman  
 army from one end to the other.

The next day the Gaulish General executed  
 his project. He drew out his whole army; and  
 detached his cavalry into three bodies, with or-  
 ders to attack the Romans at the same time in  
 front and flank. Cæsar conformed to the enemies  
 disposition: he also divided his horse into three  
 corps; that he might at once make head on  
 all sides: ordered his infantry to keep quietly  
 under arms: and placed his baggage in the  
 center.

If we form our notions of this engagement  
 merely from the account of it in Cæsar's Com-  
 mentaries, it appears plainly to have been a sharp  
 one. But we learn elsewhere some circumstances

*Singular*  
*circum-*  
*stances of*  
*that fight*  
*with re-*  
*spect to Cæ-*  
*sar.*  
 Plut. Cæs.



A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.

Ser. ad  
Vir. Æn.  
II. 745.

*Vercingeto-  
rix, being  
wounded  
retires un-  
der the  
walls of  
Alesia.*

that prove it to have been at first very dangerous for the Romans, and that Cæsar himself had like to have been made prisoner in it. Plutarch relates that he lost his sword ; and that the Arverni hung it up as a trophy in one of their temples. He adds, that Cæsar, as he passed thro' the country afterwards, saw that sword ; and, being advised by his friends to take it down, would not, because he looked on it as sacred ; or rather (for Cæsar certainly was not so scrupulous) because he well knew that nothing could impeach his glory ; and that he should pay it but a bad compliment in supposing it might suffer from such a monument. In his Journal (which ought it seems to be distinguished from his Commentaries, and which has been lost several ages) he himself related, as the ancient commentator on Virgil says, that he had been took prisoner in the engagement, and was carrying off, armed as he was, by a Gaul on his horse ; when another Gaul, who was doubtless a superior Officer, seeing him in that condition, cried out by way of insult, “ Cæsar, Cæsar ;” the ambiguity of which word, it signifying in the Celtic language, “ release him, let him go,” saved him, and occasioned him whose prisoner he was to set him at liberty.

This last fact seems improbable, and I doubt whether the authority of the Grammarian I have quoted is sufficient to give it credit. But so much is certain from Cæsar's own confession in his Commentaries, that the Roman cavalry gave way, and that it was the Germans who procured him the victory. It was they routed the Gaulish cavalry ; and afterwards cut most of it to pieces. Vercingetorix, discouraged by such bad success, retreated to Alesia ; and encamped under



under the walls of that city. Cæsar followed him, and undertook to besiege him there. A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.

The siege of Alesia is the most extraordinary event in all Cæsar's wars with the Gauls; and that wherein, according to Plutarch, that incomparable General gave the greatest proofs of a valour and skill, worthy of the highest admiration. And indeed it seems scarce credible, that with ten legions, which could not exceed sixty thousand foot; and perhaps ten or twelve thousand horse, the foreign cavalry included; a General should be able to inclose in his lines eighty thousand enemies; and make head at the same time against an army of above two hundred and forty thousand from without, that came to the relief of the besieged town. Therefore Paterculus, with his usual exaggeration and flattery, assures us \*, that it is scarce conceivable that a man should undertake such an enterprize; but that a God alone could accomplish it. But let us stick to the more modest and sensible expression of Plutarch: and let us join thereto the judgment of a great Captain of the last age, I mean the Duke of Rohan, whose words follow:

“ Cæsar is not less to be admired for his conduct in sieges than for his other military exploits. For all that the best modern Generals practise is drawn from his actions; and all that we wonder at about Ostend, Breda, Bolduc, and other sieges of the late Prince Maurice; who excelled in this particular; is infinitely short of the two circumvallations of Alesia: the industry, labour, and expedition, whereof greatly surpasses all that has been ever done elsewhere. I know that the invention of  
“ gun-

\* Circa Alesim tantæ res gestæ, quantas audere vix hominis; perituræ: pene nullo non deo. *Fall* 2. 47.



A. R. 700. “ gun-powder and artillery has altered the me-  
 Ant. C. 52. “ thod of fortification, and of the attack and  
 “ defence of places ; yet not so much but that  
 “ their principles appear to be took particularly  
 “ from Cæsar, who excelled in this matter all the  
 “ Roman Generals.”

This was the opinion of the Duke of Rohan sixty years ago. As since that time the military art has been extremely improved, I dare not extend his reflection to our days. But, as far as I may judge of an art so much above my capacity, I imagine that the principles are still the same, however the manner of their execution may vary.

Such of my readers as are curious to know the detail of the siege of Alesia, and of Cæsar's works about this town, may find it in a piece at the end of the *Eclaircissements Geographiques sur la Gaule* of M. d'Anville. That piece very judiciously explains Cæsar's text ; and has annexed to it a topographical map of the country round Alesia, which much illustrates the account of the siege. If I intended to describe it circumstantially, I could not do better than insert this learned piece. But, following my prescribed plan, I shall abridge it ; minding more what may gave an insight into human nature, than what particularly regards the military art. Cæsar observed that the Gauls, as I said, were terrified by the defeat of their cavalry ; which was the part of their forces they most depended on. This determined him the sooner to undertake so hazardous an enterprize as that of besieging a great strong city, that had actually under its walls an army of eighty thousand men. For Alesia was situated on the summit of a mountain, called now Mont-Auxois, and Vercingetorix  
 was



was encamped half way up it. Cæsar there-  
 fore set about a line of contravallation in which  
 he inclosed both the town and the Gaulish camp,  
 whose circuit was eleven miles. Before this work  
 was perfected, Vercingetorix ventured on ano-  
 ther engagement of the horse, but with no better  
 success; for the Germans again made the Ro-  
 man cavalry victorious.

*A. R. 700.  
 Ant. C. 52.  
 Cæsar's  
 works. An  
 army as-  
 sembles  
 from all  
 parts of  
 Gaul to re-  
 lieve this  
 city.*

The Gaulish General then saw he had no  
 other chance, but that of being disengaged by  
 a powerful army. He dismissed his cavalry,  
 ordering each of them to repair home, and en-  
 gage their countrymen to enlist every one able  
 to bear arms. He recommended to them above  
 all things dispatch; representing, that he had  
 bread but for thirty days, or somewhat longer with  
 the utmost œconomy; that therefore a mo-  
 ment was not to be lost, since on the celerity  
 of the succours depended the liberty of Gaul, and  
 the preservation of the flower of its youth.  
 When the horse were gone, he entered into the  
 town with his whole army; took possession of  
 all the corn and provisions, which he distributed  
 by measure; and thus waited for the expected  
 succours.

Meanwhile Cæsar carried on his works, and  
 compleated their circuit, spite of the frequent  
 sallies of the besieged. But as his lines included  
 a great space, and consequently were the more  
 difficult to defend; he added thereto new fosses,  
 strengthened by palissades, and wells filled with  
 pointed stakes but four inches above ground;  
 and strewed also all about caltrops: so that  
 the enemy should meet at every step with snares  
 and obstacles to hinder their advancing. When  
 the lines of contravallation were perfected, and  
 the town consequently compleatly invested; Cæ-  
 sar



A. R. 700. far made a line of circumvallation of the same  
 Ant. C. 52. fort towards the country, fourteen miles in compass. These last lines were to defend his army from the succours Vercingetorix expected.

All Gaul, both Celtic and Belgic, was in motion ; preparing these succours. It was not however thought proper to assemble all that were able to bear arms, as Vercingetorix desired. It was held sufficient to order each nation to furnish a contingent ; all which together made an army of two hundred and forty thousand foot, and eight thousand horse. Among the Commanders of this numerous army, Comius King of the Atrebates was conspicuous ; he had till then seemed greatly attached to the Roman interest, and had been well-rewarded for it : but his zeal for the common liberty of Gaul, and the glory of his nation, got the better of all other motives, and effaced the remembrance of every thing else. The country of the Ædui was the general rendezvous of this prodigious army. It was reviewed there ; and four Commanders in chief, and a Council, appointed. After which they all advanced towards Alesia, full of courage and confidence ; and satisfied that the Romans would not bear the sight of such multitudinous forces, who were to attack them on one side, while the besieged were to make a vigorous sally on the other.

*Famine in Alesia.*  
*One of the Chiefs proposes to eat human flesh.*  
 However expeditious the Gaulish Chiefs and nations had been, they were not able to come at the appointed time ; and there began to be an extreme want of provisions in Alesia. As they had no means of receiving information from without, the uncertainty they were in added to their misery : and, Vercingetorix having called a Council, some were for surrendering ;



ing ; others for making a general sally on the  
 besiegers, to have at least the consolation of dy-  
 ing sword in hand. An Arvernian of great  
 quality and authority, named Critognatus, made  
 another proposal ; horrible indeed and inhu-  
 man ; but which shews how far the Gauls carried  
 the desire of preserving their liberty.

A. R. 700.  
 Ant. C. 521

“ I disdain, says he, even to mention the  
 “ opinion of those who are resolved on a cow-  
 “ ardly, shameful, servitude ; such should nei-  
 “ ther be reckoned Gauls, nor suffered to come  
 “ to this Council. But I must refute those who  
 “ are for making a general sally, and dying  
 “ bravely sword in hand. For this indeed seems  
 “ at first sight worthy of our antient virtue.  
 “ But I am not afraid to say \* that it is at the  
 “ bottom weakness, not courage, that inspires  
 “ such thoughts, and renders us unable to sup-  
 “ port want a few days. It is easier to find  
 “ those who will fight to death, than those who  
 “ can patiently endure pain. However I should  
 “ approve of this proposal, which I confess has  
 “ something generous in it, if no more than  
 “ our own lives was concerned. But, in this  
 “ deliberation, we must keep all Gaul in view,  
 “ whom we have called to our assistance.  
 “ Eighty thousand men slaughtered must not  
 “ a little dispirit and amaze their relations and  
 “ friends ; who will be obliged to fight in the  
 “ midst of their dead bodies. Deprive not  
 “ then of your assistance those, who, to save  
 “ you, expose themselves to the greatest dan-  
 “ gers ; and ruin not by an inconsiderate te-  
 Vol. XIII. M “ merity”

\* Animi est ista mollities,  
 non virtus, inopiam paulisper  
 ferre non posse. Qui se ultro

morti offerant facilius repe-  
 riuntur, quam qui dolorem  
 patienter ferant.



A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.

merity and false valour the remaining hopes  
 of Gaul ; nor condemn her to an eternal slavery. If the expected succours are not arrived exactly at the appointed time, ought you therefore to suspect the fidelity and constancy of your countrymen ? And can you think that it is for amusement that the Romans labour on those lines towards the country ? Though you hear not from your friends, because all communication is hindered ; yet you may learn the approach of the succours from your enemies themselves ; who, through fear of them, work day and night without ceasing on those fortifications. What then should I propose ? What but to do, as our ancestors did, in a much less-interesting war, than this we are now engaged in ? Compelled by the Cimbri and Teutoni to shut themselves up in their towns, and reduced to a distress equal to that we now experience, rather than surrender to their enemies, they chose to sacrifice to their subsistence the bodies of such, as age incapacitated from being otherwise serviceable to their country. Here is a precedent for us. But, supposing we had none, we ought to give one to posterity. The motives that animate us, the interest of our common liberty, would abundantly justify us in so doing. What difference is there not between this war and that of the Cimbri ! The Cimbri, after they had ravaged Gaul, quitted it, to go and plunder other countries ; leaving us our customs, our laws, our lands, our liberties. But what is it the Romans aim at, what intend ? You too well know. Jealous of the people whose military reputation rivals theirs, they intend to establish themselves



“ selves in their countries and cities, and re-  
 “ duce them to perpetual servitude. This is  
 “ the object of all their wars. And, if you are  
 “ unacquainted with what passes in remote coun-  
 “ tries, cast your eyes on that part of Gaul,  
 “ which, reduced to a Roman province, has  
 “ lost all its privileges ; is no longer governed  
 “ by its antient laws ; but, subjected to the  
 “ fasces, groans under all the hardships and in-  
 “ dignities of the most abject slavery.” This  
 inhuman proposal shocked not the audience.  
 They resolved to embrace it, if necessary, ra-  
 ther than surrender. Mean time, they tried ano-  
 ther resource, less unnatural indeed, but no less  
 cruel ; which was to turn out of the town all  
 useless mouths. The Mandubii, to whom the  
 city belonged, were driven thence ; they, their  
 wives, and children. Cæsar would not receive  
 them ; and they perished miserably between the  
 Roman camp and the walls of their own city.

At last the long-expected succours arrive, and  
 encamp on a hill five hundred paces off the Ro-  
 man lines. The next day the Gaulish cavalry  
 covered a plain about three miles long, that was  
 seen from the town. This filled the besieged  
 with inexpressible joy ; they thought the time  
 of their deliverance was come ; and, not to be  
 wanting on their side, they come out of the  
 place, and prepared to second vigorously those  
 who were come to their assistance. But their  
 hopes were frustrated. They did nothing ex-  
 traordinary themselves ; and the cavalry of the  
 Gaulish army, after an engagement that lasted  
 till night, were repulsed, principally, by the  
 Germans, and retreated with loss.

After the interval of a day, the Gauls return-  
 ed to the charge ; and attempted at midnight to



A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.

force the Roman lines on the side of the plain. At the same time Vercingetorix, advertised by their cries, made a sally. The Romans, who were on their guard, and had all their posts appointed, turn out at the noise, and put themselves every where in a state of defence. The assault was brisk on the side of the plain. The Gauls assisted their bravery, by all sorts of inventions, to fill ditches and pull down ramparts ; as fascines, iron hooks, and the like. The Romans defended themselves with equal courage ; and indeed Cæsar's fortifications fought for themselves. All approach to them had been rendered so difficult by those wells, stakes, and caltrops, I spoke of ; that most of the assailants either fell, or wounded themselves in getting at them. When day appeared, they had not forced any part of the lines ; and, fearing to be taken in flank by some Roman troops posted on an eminence on their left, they abandoned the enterprize. The besieged, who with much pains had done yet less, returned on their side into the town.

Two unsuccessful attempts damped not the Gaulish courage. They sought for the foible of the Roman works, and found it. North of the town was a hill of too great a compass to be took into the circumvallation ; so that the Romans were posted on its ascent, and consequently commanded by its summit. Here two legions encamped, under the command of two Lieutenant-generals, Antistius Rheginus and Caninius Rebilus. The Gauls, informed of these circumstances by the country people, detach fifty-five thousand of their best troops ; who having marched during night, and kept all the morning behind the hill to recover themselves, appeared



appeared on a sudden towards noon, and furiously attacked the quarters of the two legions. A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.

At the same time their cavalry advanced into the plain ; the whole army drew out before the camp ; and Vercingetorix, who from the citadel of Alesia observed these motions, made another sally more vigorous than the preceding.

The Romans, attacked in so many places at once, scarce sufficed for the defence of them all. What disturbed them the most, was not the enemy which every one saw before him, but the cries of the combatants behind ; which informed them that their safety depended on another's valour. Besides, as imagination often aggrandizes absent things, they thought the places out of sight were in the greatest danger. Cæsar chose a post from whence he could see every thing ; and from thence he gave his orders, and sent reinforcements where necessary.

Vercingetorix, and those who attacked the camp of Antistius and Rebilus, performed wonders that day. They were near forcing the lines in two places. But Cæsar prevented it ; he sent several times fresh troops to sustain those that were tired ; he went from one side to the other, and his presence always brought victory. The route of the Gaulish detachment was compleat. *The Gaulish army is dispersed.* Its Commander was made prisoner ; another General-officer was killed on the spot ; seventy-four colours were took and brought to Cæsar ; and out of such a multitude very few regained the Gaulish camp. They too carried with them terror and confusion. Every body took to their heels ; and, had not the fatigue of so obstinate a fight incapacitated the victors from pursuing these runaways, this prodigious army might have been entirely exterminated. At midnight Cæsar



A. R. 700. attached his cavalry, who overtook the hind-  
 Ann. C. 52. most, slew many, took some prisoners, and so  
 well dispersed the rest, that not a single platoon  
 durst keep the field.

*The besieged  
 surrender.  
 Vercinge-  
 torix made  
 prisoner.* The besieged had no other refuge, and conse-  
 quently nothing to do but surrender at discretion.  
 Vercingetorix assembled the Council, and spoke  
 like a Hero. He said, that it was not his private  
 interest, but the common cause of the Gaulish  
 liberty, which had been the motive in all he  
 had done : and that, since there was a necessity  
 of yielding to fortune, he proffered himself as a  
 victim for them ; whether they should think  
 proper to appease the anger of the conqueror by  
 his death, or to deliver him up alive. A de-  
 putation immediately waited on Cæsar to receive  
 his orders ; who insisted on having their arms,  
 and all their Commanders, delivered up directly.  
 The besieged could refuse nothing ; they  
 threw their arms into the fosse ; and brought  
 their Chiefs to Cæsar, who was at the head of  
 his lines. Vercingetorix, as Plutarch reports,  
 affected pomp and grandeur, even in that hour  
 of humiliation. Armed completely, and mount-  
 ed on a horse richly caparisoned, he advanced  
 to Cæsar ; and, having pranced about, dis-  
 mounted, quitted his arms, and prostrated him-  
 self before him. If he had hopes of pardon, as  
 Dio says, he deceived himself : for he was de-  
 tained prisoner, and kept to grace the victor's  
 triumph.

All those in Alesia were made prisoners of  
 war and slaves. Cæsar divided them among his  
 soldiers, to each one. Only he reserved twen-  
 ty thousand Ædui and Arverni, as a means to  
 recover those two potent nations. And he suc-  
 ceeded : they had both recourse to his cle-  
 mency,



mency, obtained peace, and had their coun-  
trymen restored.

A. R. 700.  
Ant. C. 52.

Thus ended this campaign ; the most difficult  
and dangerous of all that exercised the valour  
and skill of Cæsar in Gaul. However great  
and glorious his victory was, he did not think  
he had yet entirely subdued the haughty Gauls ;  
and he judged well. He determined therefore  
not to go far from his army in the winter ; and  
took up his residence at Bibracte, the capital  
of the Ædui ; having sent his legions into quar-  
ters in different countries, yet near enough mostly  
to be able to assist one another on occasion.

*Cæsar  
passes the  
winter in  
Gaul.*

SER. SULPICIUS RUFUS.

M. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS.

Hitherto we have been guided by Cæsar him-  
self in the relation of his exploits. But he had  
never leisure to digest the two last campaigns in  
Gaul. A friend of his, either Hirtius or Oppius,  
or some other, has supplied them, and wrote  
an eighth book, which serves for a continuation  
and completion of the seven composed by  
Cæsar.

A. R. 701.  
Ant. C. 51.  
*Cæsar's  
Commenta-  
ries conti-  
nued by a  
friend.  
De B Gal.  
VIII.*

This writer in a short preface addressed to  
Balbus, who was as well as himself firmly attached  
to Cæsar, makes a panegyric on the Commenta-  
ries of his General, which the reader, I hope,  
will be obliged to me for inserting here. \* “ It

M 4

“ is

\* Constat inter omnes  
nihil tam operose ab aliis esse  
perfectum, quod non horum  
elegantia Commentariorum  
superetur ; qui sunt editi, ne  
scientia tantarum rerum scrip-  
toribus deesset ; adeoque pro-  
bantur omnium judicio, ut

prærepta, non præbita, fa-  
cultas scriptoribus videatur.  
Cujus tamen rei major nostra  
quam reliquorum est admi-  
ratio. Ceteri enim quam be-  
ne atque emendate, nos etiam  
quam facile atque celeriter,  
confecerit scimus.



A. R. 701. " is agreed, says he, that the most laboured pieces  
 Ann. C. 51. " are not comparable to the elegant simplicity  
 " of Cæsar's Commentaries. \* He only intended  
 " them as memoirs for future historians But  
 " they are so much approved and esteemed by  
 " every body, that, far from being serviceable  
 " to those who would write history, they on the  
 " contrary discourage them from the attempt.  
 " And this we have more reason to admire  
 " than others, who can only know the excel-  
 " lence of the work ; whereas we know besides  
 " with what ease and dispatch it was wrote."

It is no wonder that the writer of the continua-  
 tion, having so high an idea of the work he was  
 about to finish, should dread a comparison, and  
 even suspect his inability to keep up to its spi-  
 rit. And indeed he falls short of his model in  
 its inimitable perspicuity of expression ; and its  
 ingenuous, or at least seemingly ingenuous, sim-  
 plicity, which affects, not to prejudice the reader,  
 but to submit everything to his judgment. There  
 appears in this eighth book, what is not in the  
 seven preceding, a care to extol Cæsar's meri-  
 torious, and to excuse his blameable, actions.  
 But an author may be inferior to Cæsar, and yet  
 have

\* This is exactly the same judgment as Cicero has made of  
 Cæsar's Commentaries: " Nothing, says he, can be more ele-  
 " gant, nothing more simple. Cæsar's relation is quite divested  
 " of ornament, being intended only as materials for an history  
 " But he has laid a stumbling-block for weak men only, who  
 " may attempt to improve and heighten his charming simplicity:  
 " judicious people will take care how they set about it For in  
 " history nothing is to be preferred to an elegant perspicuous bre-  
 " vity." *Nudi sunt (commentarii Cæsariis) recti, & venusti:*  
*omni ornata orationis, tanquam veste, detractio. Sed dum*  
*alios voluit habere parata undesumerent qui vellent scribere*  
*historiam, ineptus gratum fortasse fecit, qui volunt illa calamistris*  
*inurere: sanctos quidem homines a scribendo deterruit. Nihil*  
*enim est in historia pura & illustri brevitate dulcius. Cic. Brute,*  
*n. 202.*



have considerable merit. This is the case of the piece I speak of; and after which I am going to write: and we may think ourselves happy to have from the same hand memoirs of Cæsar's Alexandrian, and African, wars. The Greek writers have given us nothing near equal to them concerning these great events.

Cæsar's precaution to winter in Gaul was not unuseful. The Gauls could not relish the yoke; and, perceiving that the last campaign the re-union of their forces had not succeeded, they proceeded on another system. This was to set on foot as many different wars, and to raise as many different armies, as there were considerable nations among them. They thought the Romans would neither have forces, nor time, enough to reduce them all, one after another; and that those, who happened to be the sufferers, would have no reason to complain, as they would purchase with their particular loss the common liberty of the whole nation.

Cæsar, who got information of their design, did not give them time to execute it. He marched in the midst of winter with two legions against the Bituriges; subdued them in forty days; and compelled them to give him hostages. On his return to Bibracte he learned that the Carnutes were in motion. Immediately he sets out, and with two other legions enters the rebel country; lays it waste; and scatters the troops who began to assemble. Such as escaped from the sword of the conqueror, had no other resource than to disperse among the neighbouring nations. These two expeditions took Cæsar up during the winter.

In the beginning of the spring, the Bellovaci found him more serious employment. This nation, *War of the Bellovaci, conducted by them with equal skill and courage.*

A. R. 701.  
Ant. C. 51.

*New plan of the Gauls for continuing the war.*

*Cæsar during the winter subdues the Bituriges, and disperses the Carnutes.*

*War of the Bellovaci, conducted by them with equal skill and courage.*



A. R. 701.  
Ant. C. 51.

nation, the fiercest and most warlike of the Belgæ, would not send their contingent to the army that went to the assistance of Vercingetorix ; pretending to wage war by themselves, and to take orders from no body. Only the pressing sollicitation of Comius the Atrebatian prevailed on them to furnish two thousand men to the league. As therefore they had but little share in the disgrace of the Gauls before Alesia, they had preserved all their haughtiness, as well as forces ; and, uniting with some neighbouring nations, set on foot a numerous army, and prepared to invade the Soissonois, which was dependent on the Rhemi who were allies of the Romans. The Generals of the confederate army were Correus, of the Bellovaci, and Comius. On hearing this, Cæsar leads against them four legions, taking such as were freshest. For\* tho' he spared not himself, running continually from danger to danger, and from fatigue to fatigue ; he took great great care to save his soldiers, and make them take their turns in the fatigues and dangers of his expeditions.

I shall not enter into the detail of the operations of this war, which was conducted by the Bellovaci and their allies with as much skill, as courage. Here is an instance of their address and cunning. The armies had long lain near one another, and skirmishes had happened almost every day, in which the Gauls had often had the advantage. Cæsar, not thinking himself strong enough, sent for three legions more, which were brought to him by Trebonius. On the arrival of this reinforcement the Bellovaci knew it was proper to

\* Perpetuo suo labore, in vicem legionibus expeditionum opus injungebat.



to retreat. But a retreat was not easily made A. R. 701.  
Ant. C. 51. before such an enemy as Cæsar. They had therefore recourse to a stratagem: which was to collect and place at the head of their line all the fascines they had in the camp. When they had raised the pile, they fired it at night. And, under favour of this blaze which hid them from the Romans, they decamped with all diligence; and having got out of Cæsar's reach (who suspected their design, but was hindered from pursuing them by the fire, and was even apprehensive of some ambuscade) they went and encamped on an advantageous spot, ten miles from the place they had quitted.

As to the valour of the Bellovaci, it is extolled on all occasions in Cæsar's Commentaries. But I ought not to omit the signal example of it given by their General. In the last action, wherein they were entirely defeated; when their affairs were desperate, and no body thought of any thing but flight; no danger could force Coreus to quit the fight, no offer from the Romans allure him to accept of quarter. He fought to the last with an invincible courage; and, as he wounded many Romans, constrained them at last to transfix him with their javelins.

The Commander of the Rhemi, who were on Cæsar's side, and had sent him a body of horse, manifested equal courage. His name was Vertiscus, and he was one of the most considerable persons in the nation, and so old that he could scarce sit on his horse: yet, according to the Gaulish maxims, he did not think his age a dispensation either from accepting the offered command, or from fighting when necessary. He died in the bed of honour; fighting at the  
head



A. R. 701.  
Ant. C. 51.

*They are  
vanquish-  
ed, and  
submit.*

*Comius,  
determined  
never to  
trust a Ro-  
man, re-  
tires into  
Germany.  
Reason of  
his distrust.*

head of his cavalry, which had fell into an ambushcade of the Bellovaci.

I have said already that the engagement in which Correus lost his life put an end to the war. The vanquished had no worse conditions imposed, than to give hostages to Cæsar, and promise him fidelity. Comius alone would not hear of submitting, having a particular reason for distrusting the Romans. The fact is as follows. We have seen this Atrebatian constantly attached to Cæsar, and even doing him signal service, particularly in his expedition against Great-Britain. He afterwards changed his system, allured by the desire of restoring to the Gauls their liberty. In the winter that preceded the general revolt of the Gauls, he laboured to engage the people of his canton to accede to the general league. Cæsar was then in Cisalpine Gaul: and Labienus, informed of Comius's secret practices, thought himself at liberty to use perfidy towards the perfidious. He would not send for him, in order to secure him; apprehending he might not obey; and that he should thereby give him a hint to be on his guard. But he sent Volusenus Quadratus, with orders to entice him to an interview, in which some Roman Centurions should kill him. Comius came to the interview; and, Volusenus having took him by the hand, a Centurion cut him over the head with his sword. Upon this the Gauls who accompanied Comius drew; and the Romans did the same: however they did not engage, aiming at nothing on both sides but to retire; the Romans, because they concluded that Comius's wound was mortal; and the Gauls, because they apprehended an ambushcade. From that time Comius determined never to be in the same place with any Roman: and for this reason,

when



when the Bellovaci made their peace, he went A. R. 701.  
Ant. C. 51. into Germany to seek a retreat.

Cæsar employed the rest of the campaign in Cæsar en-  
deavours completing the pacification of Gaul, by him-  
self or his Lieutenant-generals. It was now to pacify  
Gaul, by  
adding  
mildness  
and cle-  
mency to the  
force of  
arms. the eighth year of his command, and he made  
it a point to leave the province perfectly subdued,  
when he should quit his Government. He  
would therefore omit nothing that might con-  
tribute to extinguish, in the different parts of  
Gaul, the sparks of the great fire that broke  
out the preceding year; and to compel all  
those who yet persisted in rebellion to lay down  
their arms.

While his Lieutenant-generals were acting  
in divers places according to this plan, he took  
on himself to revenge anew the the fifteen co-  
horts exterminated by Ambiorix in the coun-  
try of the Eburones. He was extremely vexed at  
not having been able to lay hold of that per-  
fidious Gaul. He endeavoured, by the terrible  
havock he renewed in his country, at least to  
render him so odious to his countrymen who  
suffered so much on his account, that he should  
have no chance of regaining their friendship,  
or of being restored to his possessions.

This expedition did not take up much time.  
At his return, he left Mark Anthony, his  
Quæstor, with fifteen cohorts in the country  
of the Bellovaci, to awe the Belgæ. He went  
himself among the other nations, where tranquil-  
lity was not thoroughly re-established; and, at  
the same time that he exacted hostages from  
them to insure their fidelity, he consoled them  
by his obliging behaviour; and endeavoured  
to dissipate those fears that might have been  
productive of a fresh revolt.



A. R. 701.  
Ant. C. 51.

In particular, he visited the Carnutes, who had given the signal for the general rebellion, and had also massacred in Genabum a great number of Romans. The heinousness of their crimes made them apprehend a rigorous national punishment. Cæsar promised them pardon, provided they delivered up to him Guturvatus, who was the ringleader of the revolt, and author of the massacre. Though this wretch hid himself carefully, he could not escape the search of a whole people, whose interest was so much concerned in discovering him. He was given up to Cæsar; who, says his continuator, was constrained by his soldiers to do violence to his natural clemency. The Romans imputed to Guturvatus all the dangers they had been exposed to, all the losses they had sustained. He was therefore scourged and beheaded. Cæsar's policy, which thought proper to mix some severity with his mildness, was, I believe, at least as much the occasion of this execution, as his soldiers clamours. He more than once made use of the artifice of making his army demand, what he thought was too odious to come from himself.

*Exploits  
of Caninius  
and Fabius  
between the  
Loire and  
the Garonne.  
Siege  
of Uxellodunum.*

While he was in this country he was informed, that the obstinate resistance of the inhabitants of Uxellodunum \* in Querci stopped the progress of the Roman arms, commanded in those parts by Caninius Rebilus and C. Fabius. These Lieutenant-generals, one of whom had two legions, and the other twenty-five cohorts, under him; had easily dispersed a numerous army that assembled in Poitou, out of the remains

\* The situation of this city is uncertain. Several think that the mountain on which it stood is le Puech d'Usselou, on the confines of Querci and Limosin, near Martel.



mains of the grand rebellion ; under the com-  
 mand of Dumnacus of Anjou, and Drapes a  
 Senonois. Dumnacus retired to an extremity of  
 Gaul : Drapes joined Luterius, Prince, or at least  
 one of the principal Lords, of Querci ; who  
 was an irreconcilable enemy to the Romans,  
 and had by order of Vercingetorix attempted to  
 invade the Roman province ; and who after-  
 wards, being shut up in Alesia, and having by  
 some means escaped from thence, had conti-  
 nued ever since in arms, and could not bring  
 himself to submit to the conqueror. As they  
 found they were not strong enough to keep the  
 field in presence of Caninius, who was in per-  
 suit of Drapes ; they threw themselves into Ux-  
 ellodunum, a strong town, surrounded by steep  
 rocks, that made it difficult of access to troops,  
 even when they had no opposers. Caninius not-  
 withstanding encamped before the city, and pre-  
 pared to besiege it.

The siege of Alesia had taught Luterius in  
 what manner the Romans could invest and block-  
 ade towns. He therefore knew, and repre-  
 sented, the necessity of providing Uxellodunum  
 with all necessaries, before the enemy had com-  
 pleted their formidable lines. And accordingly  
 he went out of the town with Drapes at the head  
 of the greatest part of their forces, to fetch a great  
 convoy. But, on their return, Caninius fell on  
 them, plundered the convoy, and defeated the  
 escorte. Drapes was took prisoner, and Luterius  
 escaped with difficulty. The garrison left in Uxel-  
 lodunum did not exceed two thousand : but the  
 inhabitants were brave. So that, though Cani-  
 nius had began a line of contravallation, and was  
 joined by Fabius, they would not surrender  
 their town.

Cæsar,

A. R. 701.  
 Ant. C. 51.



A. R. 701.  
Ant. C. 51.  
*Cæsar goes  
to it in  
person, and  
compels the  
besieged to  
surrender  
at discre-  
tion.*

Cæsar, informed of the state of affairs, thought his presence was necessary at this siege ; and went to it in haste with his cavalry, ordering two legions to follow him. He came there in full resolution to make an example of the Uxellodunians ; lest, if their resistance went unpunished, the other places that were advantageously situated should be tempted to imitate them ; which was more likely to happen, as all the Gauls knew that he had but one campaign more to stay in his province, so that they had only to hold out another year, in order to free themselves from all future fears.

The town had provisions sufficient for those who were in it : therefore to starve them into compliance would have been a work of time. Cæsar resolved to cut off the water of the besieged. They were supplied, partly by a river, which almost surrounded the mountain on which the city stood ; and partly by a plentiful spring at the foot of their walls. Cæsar began by hindering them from watering at the river ; posting archers and slingers, and even machines, to gall all who appeared on the other side.

The fountain remained, which was a good way up the mountain, and commanded by the town. Every body in the Roman camp wished to deprive them of it ; but Cæsar was the only person knew how to effect it. He raised a terrace sixty feet high, on which he erected a tower of ten stories ; and, at the same time, ordered a mine to be dug to the very source of the spring. The terrace was first finished, and as the tower that was on it, and the batteries thereon, commanded the fountain, the besieged were much incommoded, as they could not water without great danger ; so that not only the beasts, but  
many



many men, perished with thirst. They therefore resolved to make an extraordinary effort to ruin this work of the besiegers.

A. R. 701.  
Ant. C. 51.

They fill casks with tallow, pitch, and chips ; and, having fired them, roll them towards the work. At the same time, to hinder the besiegers from extinguishing the fire, they make a vigorous sally. They had the advantage of the ground : so that the Romans had enough to do, being forced to fight and protect their work at once. Cæsar upon this makes a false attack, as if he intended to scale the walls. This obliged the besieged to retire into the town ; and the Romans extinguished easily the fire, which had done but small damage to their work.

The besieged still held out. But the Romans having at last undermined the spring, and the fountain consequently having disappeared on a sudden ; despair seized the Uxellodunians, who considered that event, not as the effect of human industry, but of divine power. They lost their courage, and surrendered at discretion.

Cæsar treated them with uncommon severity, which his continuator endeavours to excuse and justify, by saying, that Cæsar had given so many proofs of his indulgence and mildness, as to be above any apprehension of being thought inclined to cruelty ; but that he found there would be no end of the wars and rebellions of the Gauls, if his usual clemency did not on this occasion give place to severity. He cut off the hands of all who had bore arms in Uxellodunum ; leaving them alive, that they might be standing examples of his rigour, and serve to intimidate others. Drapes, frightened probably by this conduct, starved himself to death in prison. Some time after Luterius, who had wandered about,



A. R. 701  
A. D. C. 51.

not daring to stay long in any place, but frequently changing his asylum, was delivered up to Cæsar by Epasnactus, an Arvernian. Surus, an Æduan, and the only one of that nation who had continued until then in arms, was made prisoner too about the same time in an engagement of cavalry, in the country of the Treviri, with Labienus, who was victorious.

*Comius.*

*by an extraordinary artifice, deceives Volusenus who pursued him.*

Of all the Chiefs in the last rebellion, Comius alone remained untaken. Yet the Atrebates had deserted him, and submitted to the conqueror. He had with him only a small body of cavalry, composed of such as had a personal attachment to him, with which he made incursions; and often carried off the convoys that were going to the Roman winter-quarters. Anthony commanded in those parts; and doubtless, thinking it beneath him to pursue a fugitive, sent after him that same Volusenus, who, having been commissioned to kill him, had not been able to do more than to get him wounded by a Centurion. Volusenus, incited by hatred and rage at having once missed his blow, set about the pursuit with great diligence. However, \* he suffered himself to be deceived by the Atrebatian by an extraordinary stratagem, which is not altogether unpleasant. Comius had some barks with him, which were to transport him to Great-Britain, if he was closely pressed. He found himself obliged to use this recourse at a time when the wind was favourable, but the water so low as to leave his vessels

\* According to Frontinus, author of this fact, it was Comius himself that was thus deceived by the Atrebatian. But, being that it seems improbable that Cæsar should be deceived by such an artifice; I

find nothing in his Commentaries that shows that he ever went in pursuit of that Gaul. For these reasons I have reformed the relation of Frontinus, by substituting Volusenus in the room of Cæsar.



vessels on dry ground. He was undone, if his enemy came near the shore. Comius to prevent it unfurled his sails ; and, as the wind filled them, Volusenus, who saw them from afar, thought the Gaul was already at sea, and turned back.

There were several engagements between them. And in one of the last, as Comius fled, the Roman heated by the pursuit ran upon him but ill-accompanied. Comius perceiving it ; and, turning short upon him, drove his lance through Volusenus's thigh. He could not dispatch him ; and his troop was even disordered by the Roman horsemen, who re-assembled about their Commander. The Atrebatian got off, leaving his enemy in such a condition that his life was almost despaired of. After this fight, whether he was satisfied with the revenge he had took, or was apprehensive that he must at last be ruined, as he continually lost some of his men, he sent a deputation to Anthony ; offering to submit to whatever should be imposed on him, and to retire wherever he should be ordered : he only begged that so much regard might be shewn to his just fears, as not to have it insisted on that he should appear before any Roman. Anthony, who was naturally humane and generous, excused him, took hostages, and granted him peace. This happened in the beginning of the winter.

Cæsar, after taking Uxellodunum, spent the remainder of the campaign in visiting Aquitaine, where he had never been before in person. All the people of that country received his laws, and gave hostages. Having thus perfected the pacification of Gaul, he went to Narbonne ; sent all his legions into winter-quarters, presided at the Assemblies of the Roman province, and re-

A. R. 701.  
Ant. C. 51.

*He wounds  
Volusenus  
in an en-  
gagement,  
and after-  
wards  
makes his  
peace.*

*Gaul en-  
tirely paci-  
fied.*



A. R. -61.  
Ant. C. 51.

warded those cities who had distinguished themselves by their zeal and fidelity at the time of the general revolt ; he then went among the Belgæ to pass the winter at Nemotocenna. In going there he was informed of Comius's submission.

A. R. -62.  
Ant. C. 50.

L. ÆMILIUS PAULUS.

P. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS.

*Cæsar employs the whole ninth year of his command in calming the Gauls, and gaining them by kindness.*

The ninth and last year that Cæsar spent in Gaul was quite pacific. He had two reasons for continuing quiet. He found himself obliged to fix his chief attention on Rome, where the negotiations for and against him were carried on with the utmost warmth. Besides, he had proposed, from the close of the last campaign, to aim at pacifying the Gauls, and calming by gentleness that violent fermentation, which fear rather increases than quiets. He had a mind to accustom them to live peaceably under the government of the Romans, the force of whose arms he had made them feel.

He studied, therefore, not only to avoid whatever might rekindle a fire scarce extinct, but also to suppress all animosities by exciting sentiments of affection and attachment ; treating the nations with respect, bestowing rewards on their Chiefs, imposing no new burthens : so that Gaul, wearied and exhausted by long unsuccessful wars, willingly embraced the ease and quiet that she found attendant on her submission. He insisted, however, on the payment of an annual tribute : but the sum was very moderate : and forty \* millions of sesterces may be rather considered as an

\* One million three hundred and twelve thousand five hundred pounds sterling.



an homage paid by Gaul to the superiority of Rome, than as a burthensome tax.

A. R. 702.  
Ant. C. 59.

As soon as the weather permitted, he made a journey into Cisalpine Gaul ; to keep alive and augment the zeal, that the municipal towns and colonies of those cantons had always expressed for him ; as they influenced considerably the affairs at Rome. For his intention was, if he found no difficulty, to solicit for the Consulship the following year (the seven hundred and third from the foundation of the city) so as to officiate in seven hundred and four. He was received every where with incredible honours. The gates of the cities were adorned with triumphant arches, the ways strewed with flowers ; nothing was spared to decorate all the places he was to pass through. The people met him in crowds ; the rich displayed their magnificence, the poor shewed their affection and zeal. They made sacrifices ; they feasted in the public places and temples. Nothing could come nearer to the pomp of a triumph ; and Cisalpine Gaul seemed to anticipate that which Rome could not avoid decreeing him.

Cæsar, after making a tour through the country, returned expeditiously to his winter-quarters, and assembled his army in the country of the Treviri. He employed the campaign in visiting the various Gaulish nations ; regulating his marches by the wants of his troops, whom he did not suffer to remain too long in a place, that he might keep them in a motion, both healthy to their bodies, and proper to prevent the bad consequences of a total idleness.

When winter came on, he sent them into quarters ; part among the Belgæ, part among the Ædui. These two nations were the most



A. R. 702  
Ant. C. 50.

likely to lead the others ; the Belgæ on account of their valour, and the Ædui on account of the authority and credit they enjoyed. Cæsar therefore reckoned that in keeping them quiet he insured the tranquillity of all Gaul.

### S E C T. III.

*The Parthians invade Syria, and are repulsed by Cassius. Bibulus, Proconsul of Syria, does nothing considerable against the Parthians. Constancy of Bibulus on the death of his sons. Cicero, Proconsul of Cilicia. Reasons that determined him to accept that employment. His military exploits. He is proclaimed Imperator. That title does not make him vain. He demands, and obtains, the honour of supplications ; against Cato's opinion, whose favour he had in vain solicited. Cicero's justice, mildness, and disinterestedness, in the exercise of his office. Moderation and wisdom of his conduct, with regard to his predecessor. He resolutely refuses an unjust request of Brutus. He rescues from great danger Ariobarzanes, King of Cappadocia. He impatiently desires the end of his employment. Last instance of his disinterestedness and resolution. He sets out on his journey, and receives the news of Hortensius's death. Triumph of Lentulus Spinther. Appius accused by Dolabella, and acquitted. He is created Censor with Piso. He makes himself ridiculous by a severity which ill-agreed with the rest of his conduct.*

### MOTIONS of the PARTHIANS.

**B**EFORE I enter into the particulars of the violent contests, which at last brought on the civil war between Cæsar and Pompey, I shall



I shall introduce here some facts that are independent of them.

The Parthians, after the defeat and death of Crassus, were at first satisfied with retaking all that General had took from them in Mesopotamia. But the next year they passed the Euphrates in their turn, and entered Syria, but with no great army, as they expected to have found that province unprovided and defenceless. In this they were mistaken; for Cassius, who had escaped the general calamity, as I have related, having got about him the remains of Crassus's unfortunate host, formed them into a corps, with which he easily repulsed troops fitter for making incursions and plundering, than fighting. This bad success informed the Parthians, that it was not so easy to over-run Syria as they imagined; yet their loss was not so considerable as to damp their hopes. They returned therefore the subsequent year in greater numbers, having at their head Pacorus, son of their King Orodes; and Osaces, an experienced General, who had been joined with the young Prince as a counsellor and moderator. They flattered themselves with succeeding the easier, as they thought they were sure of the affections of the people; who, having little reason to be pleased with their new Governors, they supposed would be inclined to throw themselves into the arms of a neighbouring nation, with whom they had long had a commercial intercourse.

The news of the irruption of the Parthians into Syria very much alarmed the people at Rome. Some immediately talked of sending Pompey or Cæsar against those terrible enemies. Others were for having the Consuls set out in

*The Parthians invaded Syria, and are repulsed by Cassius.*  
Dio, l. 40.  
A. R. 700.

A. R. 701.

Cæsar ad  
Cic. l. 8.  
ep. 10.



all haste. But Cassius's resolution and prudence dissipated these terrors.

The Parthians had pushed on to Antioch, which they undertook to besiege. Cassius, who was in the town, making a stout defence ; as they knew nothing of the art of besieging, they desisted : and went to another city named Antigonion \*. Cassius followed them ; and when, after a fruitless attempt on this town, he found they were preparing to march off, he laid an ambuscade for them on their route, into which they fell ; slew many of them ; and among others their General Osaces. After this loss, Pacorus did not think it safe to continue on the Roman territories. Thus Cassius, who was then very young, and had exercised no other office than the Quæstorship, had the glory of preserving Syria from the Parthian invasion.

A. R. 700.

Ant. C. 100.

Bibulus,

Proconsul

of Syria,

does nothing

considerable

against the

Parthians.

1. 1.

Att. ep. 8.

Cæsar de B.

Civ. 3. 51.

L. ÆMILIUS PAULUS.

C. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS.

During these transactions, Bibulus arrived, who had been lately appointed Governor of that province. Bibulus was no warrior ; and, during the year of his administration, the Parthians having returned to the charge, this Proconsul of Syria

\* I speak after Dio. Nevertheless Strabo, l. 16. and Diodorus Siculus, l. 20. say, that the city of Antigonion in Syria, founded by Antigonus, subsisted but a very small time, and was destroyed by Seleucus. What increases my suspicions against the exactness of Dio, is that Cicero, speaking of Cassius's exploits (l. 2. ad Fam.

ep. 10. & ad Att. 5. 20.) makes no mention of Antigonion : and his expression inclines me to think that it was before Antioch that the battle was fought in which Osaces was killed. I fancy that it was under Antioch that Cassius beat the Parthians ; but that there were two engagements, the last of which was decisive.



Syria (if we may believe Cicero) never set his foot out of the gates of Antioch, so long as the enemy kept the field. A passage in Cæsar informs us, that he even suffered himself to be besieged by them. Dio reports, that he found the Parthians employment at home, by fomenting the rebellion of a Satrap against their King Orodes. We have but slender accounts of these affairs. But I think it is clear enough, that, during the Proconsulship of Bibulus, nothing extraordinary passed in Syria between the Romans and Parthians.

All that history has transmitted to us capable of doing honour to Bibulus, during these times, is the example he gave of constancy, and respect for the laws, in the most afflicting circumstances for a father. His two sons, youths of great expectation, having been killed at Alexandria by some Roman deserters, who had continued in that country from the time of Gabinus's expedition ; so sad a piece of news did not interrupt his public functions above one day ; and Cleopatra, who jointly with her brother reigned then in Ægypt, having sent the murderers to him for punishment ; Bibulus, instead of satiating his revenge with the blood of these wretches, ordered them to be carried to Rome ; saying, it belonged to the Senate, and not to him, to enquire into, and punish, their crime.

At the same time that Bibulus was made Governor of Syria, the Proconsul of Cilicia, which comprehended a considerable part of Asia Minor with the island of Cyprus, fell to Cicero. This was in consequence of the *Senatus consultum* passed in Pompey's third Consulship, which ordered that the Consuls and Prætors should not have

A. R. 702.  
Ant. C. 50.

*Constancy  
of Bibulus  
on the  
death of  
his sons.*

Val. Max.  
4.  
Sen. Con-  
sol. ad  
Marc.  
n. 14.

*Cicero,  
Proconsul  
of Cilicia.  
Reasons  
that deter-  
mined him  
to accept  
that em-  
ployment.*



A. R. 722. have any Government conferred on them until  
 Ant. C. 50. five years after they were out of office : which  
 made it necessary to go back to the oldest Con-  
 sular persons, who had never yet any Govern-  
 ment.

Cic. ad  
 Fam. 2. 5. Cicero had always shunned these employ-  
 15. & ad ments. He says that he would not have accept-  
 Ant. 5. ed this, if he could possibly have avoided it.  
 & 6. It is very probable that the new way of think-  
 ing he had fell into, since his banishment, con-  
 tributed to this determination. He thought he  
 ought to endeavour to aggrandize himself, as  
 much as his enemies had endeavoured to humble  
 him. It is for this reason he desired to be named  
 Augur ; and he was actually appointed such in  
 the room of Crassus's son who fell in the Par-  
 thian war. In consequence of these principles  
 he was probably well-pleased to have a province,  
 which gave an opportunity of meriting a tri-  
 umph. In fact, he was very fond of all mili-  
 tary honours, as we shall see hereafter, and par-  
 ticularly of that which crowned the rest.

His mili- His conduct in war was not despicable ; and  
 tary ex- many men, that had much greater experience in  
 plicits. He military affairs, would not have got so much  
 is pro- honour. True it is, and it is a proof of his wis-  
 claimed dom and judgment, that he took care to sup-  
 Imperator. ply his own defects by providing able Lieutenant-  
 generals. Those we are best acquainted with  
 are, Q. Cicero his brother, who had had oppor-  
 tunities of forming himself and acquiring skill by  
 making several campaigns under Cæsar ; and  
 C. Pontinius, who had triumphed over the  
 Allobroges.

Cicero's army was not strong. Plutarch  
 makes it amount to twelve thousand foot, and  
 two thousand six hundred horse. This number



probably was not complete, since Cicero complains that he had only the name and appearance of two legions. It is true, indeed, that he was joined by some auxiliary forces. But Lycians, Pisidians, and Galatians, had never the reputation of good soldiers. With this army, however, on some rumours of the Parthians being in motion, Cicero very gallantly took the field, in order to defend his province. And, when the danger was over, he attacked a nation of Banditti, who from the mountain Amanus, which they were in possession of, made inroads into the open country. He took several places from them; and particularly Pindenissus, which cost him a siege of fifty-seven days: and for this success he was proclaimed Imperator by his army.

A. R. 702.  
Ant. C. 50.

This was a glorious title, as I have several times observed. But what, in my opinion, conferred on Cicero more true and solid glory, was his not suffering himself to be dazzled by its splendor, and his speaking of it with indifference as a trifle. I love to hear him jest with his friends on his Generalship. \* “I encamped, “ says he to Atticus, near the city of Issus, in “ the very place where Alexander formerly encamped; who truly was a better General “ than either you or me.” To Cælius he writes, † “I have an army tolerably well “ provided with auxiliaries; and my name too “ gives

*That title does not make him vain.*

\* Castra habuimus est ipsa quæ contra Darcium habuerat apud Issum Alexander, Imperator haud paulo melior quam aut tu, aut ego. *Cic. ad Att. 5. 20.*

† Ad Amanum exercitum duxi, satis probe ornatum

auxiliis, & quadam auctoritate, apud eos qui me non norunt, nominis nostri. Multum est enim in his locis, *Hicne est ille qui urbem, quem Senatus?* nosti cetera. *Cic. ad Fam. 2. 10.*



A. R. 702. " gives it some credit with those who don't  
 Ant. C. 50. " know me. For I am much admired here :  
 " and they say to one another, Is this the man  
 " who saved Rome ; is this he, whom the Sa-  
 " nate regards as the Saviour of his country ? "  
 This surely is not the language of one who con-  
 founds himself with his place ; and who, be-  
 cause he is appointed General, thinks he there-  
 fore possesses the requisite talents.

*He de-  
 mands and  
 obtains  
 the honour  
 of supplica-  
 tions ; a-  
 gainst Ca-  
 to's opini-  
 on, whose  
 favour he  
 had in vain  
 solicited.* He did not, however, as I have already ob-  
 served, neglect the honours usually conferred on  
 those who succeeded in war : and it must be al-  
 lowed that many obtained them for exploits of  
 no greater importance than his. He demand-  
 ed, that solemn thanksgivings to the Gods  
 might be ordered, on account of the advantages  
 he had gained over the enemies of the Repub-  
 lic : and as he well knew Cato's severity, and  
 feared his opposition ; he wrote him a very long  
 and pressing letter, in which he endeavou-  
 red to gain his favour. After having given  
 him a very circumstantial account of his ex-  
 ploits, he adds a consideration seemingly ca-  
 pable of making an impression on Cato. \* " I  
 " think I have observed, says he, (for you  
 " know how attentively I always hear you) that,  
 " when the granting, or refusing, honours, to  
 " Gene-

\* Equidem etiam mihi il-  
 lud animum advertisse videor,  
 (scis enim quam attente te  
 audire soleam) te non tam  
 res gestas, quam mores, in-  
 stituta, atque vitam, Impera-  
 torum spectare solere, in ha-  
 bendis aut non habendis ho-  
 noribus. Quod si in mea  
 causa considerabis, reperi-  
 me, exercitu imbecillo, con-  
 tra metum maximi belli fir-

missimum præsidium habuisse  
 æquitatem & continentiam.  
 His ego subsidiis ea sum con-  
 secutus, quæ nullis legionibus  
 consequi potuissem ; ut ex  
 alienissimis sociis amicissimos,  
 ex infidelissimis firmissimos  
 redderem ; animosque nova-  
 rum rerum expectatione sus-  
 pensos ad veteris imperii be-  
 nevolentiam traducerem. *Cic.  
 ad Fam. 15. 4.*



“ Generals is in debate ; you do not merely A. R. 702.  
Ant. C. 50.  
 “ weigh their military actions, but also their  
 “ manners, conduct, and integrity. Now, if  
 “ you follow this rule with respect to me, you  
 “ will perceive, that, having but a weak army,  
 “ I placed my greatest confidence in justice,  
 “ and temperance, during the danger of a for-  
 “ midable war. By these I have acquired  
 “ what no army could have acquired. I have  
 “ recovered the affections of those people, who  
 “ were alienated from us ; from unfaithful, I  
 “ have made them faithful, allies ; and,  
 “ whereas they were before desirous of a change  
 “ of government, I have revived in them the  
 “ sentiments of love and attachment to our  
 “ Empire.”

This studied, insinuating, solicitation had no  
 effect on the inflexible austerity of Cato ; who  
 did not think that Cicero's exploits were deserv-  
 ing of the honour he demanded. To make in  
 some sort amends, he extolled the wisdom, the  
 justice, and mild government, of the Proconsul  
 of Cilicia. Cicero \* politely tells him, that he  
 was overjoyed at being praised, by one who  
 deserved all praise. But at the bottom he was Cic. ad  
Att. 7. 2.  
 much dissatisfied, as appears by one of his let-  
 ters to Atticus, with Cato's behaviour, who  
 did what he was not desired to do, and refused  
 to do what he was desired. The rest of the Se-  
 nators were not so strict ; so that it was ordered  
 by the majority, that thanks should be returned  
 the Gods for the success of the Roman arms un-  
 der the Command of Cicero : happy presage of  
 a future triumph !

We

\* Lxtus sum laudari me abs te laudato viro. Ep 6.



A. R. 722.  
Ant. C. 50.  
*Cicero's  
judice,  
modest,  
and dis-  
interestedness,  
in the exer-  
cise of his  
office.*

We have seen that Cicero boasted of the wisdom of his administration ; and that Cato publicly acknowledged it. This deserves our examination. Cicero acquired some reputation, as a General ; but, as a Magistrate, he deserves the highest encomium : and his Proconsulship, viewed in that light, is one of the finest parts of his life.

He did not think it enough, not to follow the bad example then almost universal among the Romans, and to abstain from plundering his province. Far from endeavouring to enrich himself by injustice, he was so perfectly disinterested as not to take the advantage of the privileges established by custom, and allowed him by the laws themselves. He would not permit the cities, or private persons, to put themselves to the least expence on his account ; or for the Officers who accompanied, and served under, him. Only one of his Lieutenant-generals transgressed this rule, without however exceeding the bounds prescribed by law, and Cicero resented it. All the others thought it glorious to imitate the disinterestedness of the Proconsul ; and it was little less than a miracle, that excited at once the love and admiration of the nations, to see a Governor of a province go from place to place with his whole retinue, without being a burthen or expence to any one. On the contrary, he used to entertain the principal inhabitants of the cities ; and his table, though not sumptuous, was decent.

There was a famine in Asia when he crossed it, on account of a very bad season. This misfortune of the province turned to the glory of our Proconsul ; who, without rigorous enquiries, without even using his authority, merely by



by his exhortations and obliging behaviour, prevailed on both the Greeks and Romans, who had locked up their corn, to open their granaries and relieve the people.

A. R. 702.  
Ant. C. 501

In the administration of justice, Cicero was a model of perfection, for equity, clemency, and easiness of access. He presided at the Assemblies in all the chief cities of his province ; during which time, every body was admitted to his presence. There was even no need of being introduced. He walked in his house early in the morning, and gave audience to all who had any business with him, as they came.

He discovered that the Magistrates had often oppressed their towns. He sent for all those of the last ten years ; and, on their confessing their rapines, he did not stigmatize them by formal judgments, but persuaded them to refund voluntarily what they had unjustly seized.

Every body is aware how difficult it is to reconcile the interests of the people and the tax-farmers. Yet Cicero found the means to do it. He took such a well-judged medium, that the Publicans were paid even what had been many years owing to them, without oppressing or obliging the province. By these means he made himself be equally beloved, by those who levied the taxes, and by those who paid them.

His equity and goodness appeared also in this ; that instead of taking upon himself the judgment of all things, he permitted the Greeks, in the disputes that arose among themselves, to have the satisfaction of being tried by their countrymen, and by their own laws. And, in those things he judged himself, he shewed such clemency, that we are assured, that, during the whole year of his administration he had no  
body



A. R. 702. body whipped, gave no harsh language to any  
Ant. C. 50. one, and imposed no ignominious punishment.

Cic ad Att.  
VI. 1.

I do not know whether it is possible to add any thing to a conduct so perfect in all respects. Peace and order were so well-established in his province; that he ventures to affirm, that no private house could be better regulated or disciplined. Force and fraud were banished out of it; which gave him an opportunity of jesting very agreeably with Cælius. For that young Orator, who was then *Ædilis Curulis*, and in that quality was to exhibit the public games, being desirous of entertaining the people with battles of Panthers; and having requested of Cicero a number of those animals; the Proconsul answers him thus: \* “ I have given orders  
“ to get the panthers. But there are but few  
“ of them; and those we have complain much;  
“ they say that they are the only things in my  
“ Province for whom snares and ambushes are  
“ laid. Therefore they have come to a reso-  
“ lution to leave the country, and retire into  
“ Caria.”

He triumphs more seriously in a letter to Atticus; who had exhorted him, when set out, to maintain the honour of letters, philosophy, and his own virtue †. “ You will be satisfied,  
“ says

\* De pantheris,——agitur mandato meo diligenter. Sed mira paucitas est: & eas quæ sunt valde aiunt queri, quod nihil cuiquam infidiarum in mea Provincia, nisi sibi, fiat. Itaque constituiſſe dicuntur in Cariam ex nostra provincia decedere *Cic. ad Fam. 2. 11.*

† Moriar, si quidquam fieri potest elegantius. Nec jam ego hanc continentiam ap-

pello, quæ virtus voluptati resistere videtur. Ego in vitâ mea nunquam voluptate tanta sum affectus, quanta afficior hac integritate. Nec me tam fama, quæ summa est, quam res ipsa delectat. Quid quæris? Fuit tanti: me ipse non noram, nec sciebam quid in hoc genere facere possem. *Cic. ad Att. V. 20.*



“ says he, with my conduct. May I die, if A. R. 702.  
 “ things do not go on very well. However, Ant. C. 50.  
 “ I will not boast of having sacrificed my plea-  
 “ sure to my duty. For I find in faithfully  
 “ fulfilling my duty the greatest pleasure I  
 “ ever yet felt. Nor is it so much glory that  
 “ delights me, tho’ that too much delights  
 “ me, as the practice of Virtue in itself. In  
 “ a word ; the trouble I am at in this employ-  
 “ ment is not lost. For I did not know my-  
 “ self before, nor of what I was capable.” Such  
 was the candour with which Cicero opened his  
 heart to his friend ; and triumphed in a species  
 of glory that was wise, humane, sweet, and  
 doubtless preferable to that acquired by Cæsar in  
 the conquest of all Gaul.

He spoke what he thought, when he declared  
 to Atticus, that virtue seemed to him to be her  
 own reward. For he refused all vain-glorious  
 acknowledgements ; statues, temples, triumphal  
 cars. The cities, who enjoyed thro’ him such  
 happiness and tranquillity, were forced to be  
 content with only making decrees in his honour.  
 He forbid every thing that might shock his  
 modesty, and be expensive to them.

This conduct of Cicero charmed the province *Moderation and*  
 so much the more, as his predecessor had be- *wisdom of*  
 haved very differently. He was Appius, brother *his conduct*  
 to Clodius Cicero’s enemy, who was Consul in *with re-*  
 fix hundred and ninety-eight ; and after the ex- *gard to his*  
 piration of his Consulship had replaced in Cilicia *predecessor.*  
 Lentulus Spinther, principal author with Milo  
 and Pompey of Cicero’s recall. Appius, tho’  
 not so wicked as his brother, because less auda-  
 cious, respected no more than he the laws of  
 honour and honesty. He made his province  
 unhappy : and Cicero makes a frightful picture



A. R. 702.  
A.D. C. 50.

of the condition he found it in. “ I hear of  
 “ nothing, says he to Atticus, but capitations,  
 “ too heavy to be borne; of revenues of cities  
 “ mortgaged and alienated; I meet every where  
 “ with tears and lamentations; \* with mon-  
 “ strous proceedings befitting a brute more than  
 “ a man. The people are so oppressed that  
 “ they are weary of their lives.” Those who  
 were in authority under Appius had followed  
 his example, as it always happens. The Go-  
 vernor and his Subalterns had in concert ex-  
 hausted and distressed the province, by all sorts  
 of extortions and rapines, outrages and violences.  
 Cicero, in doing these unhappy people service,  
 was obliged to act with caution as to Appius.  
 He was a reconciled enemy; and consequently  
 there was reason to fear, that, if any deference  
 he might justly pretend to was omitted, the re-  
 conciliation would on Cicero’s side be thought  
 insincere. Besides, he had a daughter married  
 to Pompey’s eldest son; and another married  
 to Brutus; affinities which Cicero equally loved  
 and respected. These reasons did not prevent  
 his easing the subjects of the Empire, who had  
 been ill used by his predecessor: but he avoided  
 all unnecessary affronts. He omitted nothing  
 that the good of the people and his own glory  
 required; and on the other hand he behaved  
 to Appius with all possible decency and polite-  
 nefs.

He could not however prevent some com-  
 plaints: and, at first setting out, Appius took  
 it very ill that Cicero, when he entered into  
 the province, did not come to meet him. As  
 he was proud of his family, he even expressed  
 him-

\* *Monstra quædam, non hominis, sed feræ nescio cujus  
 humanis. Cic. ad Att. V. 16.*



himself on this occasion in terms offensive enough. “How, said he, Appius went to “meet Lentulus;” (that is, the Lentulus Spather we just now mentioned, a man of great family;) “Lentulus went to meet Appius; “and Cicero has not shewn that respect to “Appius?”

We must see what Cicero says to this reproach. He begins by justifying himself as to the fact; and proves that he had acted according to rule; and that it was not his fault, if that which he knew was his predecessor’s due was omitted. But to the haughty, contemptuous, speech of Appius he opposes a proper and noble spirit. \* “What, “says he, do you mind these trifles? you, who “are a man of great prudence, of uncommon “learning, and of consummate knowledge of “the world; to which I may add, and of “great politeness; which the most austere “philosophers account a virtue! Do you imagine that I have more regard for the names “of Appius or Lentulus, than for the glory “of Virtue? Even before I had attained what “is reckoned the height of human grandeur, I “was never dazzled by your great names; I  
O 2 “only

\* Quæso etiamne tu has ineptias? homo (mea sententia) summa prudentia, multa etiam doctrina, plurimo rerum usu, addo urbanitate, quæ est virtus, ut Stoici rectissime putant! Ullam Appietatem aut Lentulitatem valere apud me plus, quam ornamenta Virtutis, existimas! Quum ea consecutus nondum eram, quæ sunt hominum opinionibus amplissima, ta-

men ista vestra nomina nunquam sum admiratus: viros esse, qui ea vobis reliquissent, magnos arbitrabar. Postea vero quam ita & cepi & gessi maxima imperia, ut mihi nihil neque ad gloriam, neque ad honorem acquirendum \* putarem; superiorem quidem nunquam, sed parem vobis me speravi esse factum. Cic. ad Fam. III. 7.

\* I had rather read reliquum or reliqui: unless requi.e: dum may be thought preferable.



A. R. 702. “ only thought that those from whom you in-  
 Ant. C. 50. “ herited them were great men. But now that  
 “ I have obtained and exercised the first offices  
 “ of the Commonwealth, in a manner that has  
 “ left me nothing to wish either as to fortune or  
 “ reputation; if I think not myself superior  
 “ to you or Lentulus, I must own I flatter my-  
 “ self that I am your equal.”

Appius renewed his complaints with more bitterness, when he found that Cicero reformed his abuses, and cancelled many of his ordinances. Cicero paid no more regard to them than they deserved. \* He compares Appius's language to that of a physician, who, when his patient has got into other hands, is angry at the alteration of the prescriptions. “ He has, says he, bled  
 “ the province almost to death; and now he is  
 “ offended at my using a mild regimen, in or-  
 “ der to restore it to its pristine vigour.” Thus Cicero expressed himself in a letter to Atticus. But as in all public occurrences he was very tender of his predecessor's reputation, and always made honourable mention of him; Appius, tho' touched to the quick, had patience; and the correspondence of friendship, or at least of civility, between them was not interrupted.

*Interdictum*  
*prohibet*  
*ut quis*  
*prohibet*  
*ut quis*  
*prohibet*  
*ut quis*  
 Cicero's zeal for the people committed to his care suffered another attack from another sort of man, from whom one should little expect it, I mean Brutus. I have I believe already observed that the Romans, even the very best of them, used to make great advantage of their money,

\* Ut si medicus, quum ægrotus alii medico traditus sit, irasci velit ei medico qui sibi successerit, si. quæ ipse in curando constituerit, mutet ille: sic Appius, quum

ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως provinciam curarit, sanguinem miserit, quidquid potuit detraxerit, mihi tradiderit enecetiam, προσπαύειν eam a me non libenter videt. Cic. ad Att. VI. 1.



money, and get extravagant interest for it. A. R. 702.  
Ant. C. 50. Brutus did as the rest ; and had some concerns of this sort with two merchants, Scaptius and Matinius, who had lent considerable sums to the Salaminians in Cyprus. That island was, as I have said, dependent on Cicero's Government. When therefore he set out for his province, Brutus recommended these two merchants to him, as persons of his acquaintance ; without telling him that his interest had any connexion with theirs. Cicero had presently occasion to know that Scaptius was unworthy of his protection. For, when he came to Ephesus, he was waited on by a deputation from the Salaminians, who implored his justice against that merchant ; whose avarice and violence was such, that he wanted to extort from them enormous usury ; and, to force them to it, had obtained from Appius some troops, with whom he came to Salamis, and blocked up their Senate so long, that five Senators were starved to death. Cicero immediately sent orders to those troops to quit the island.

When he was in the province, Scaptius presented himself to him. The Proconsul, not forgetting Brutus's recommendation, enquired into the affair, and regulated it in a manner that ought to have satisfied the least tractable usurer. For he ordered interest to be paid Scaptius for the principal at the rate of twelve *per Cent.* (that was the rate of interest among the Romans) and also the interest of the arrears. The Salaminians were satisfied ; and even complimented Cicero, telling him, “ we shall discharge our debts with your money : For we shall employ for that purpose the sums we used to present your predecessors with.” But



A. R. 702  
Ant. C. 50.

Scaptius had the insolence to demand, that interest shou'd be allowed him at the rate of forty-eight *per Cent.* Cicero rejected this impudent demand; and expected the thanks of Brutus for his behaviour in this affair. But on the contrary Brutus wrote to him in a haughty, harsh, manner; he then discovered to him that he was himself concerned in the loan to the Salaminians: and he engaged Atticus to desire Cicero to give Scaptius fifty horsemen, that he might go and compel his debtors to pay him on his own terms.

Nothing can be finer than Cicero's answer to his friend on this subject \*. “What, says he, “Atticus, you who are the panegyrist of the integrity and delicacy of my conduct, have you “dared to mention such a thing; and to propose “my giving horsemen to Scaptius to get in his “debts with? You sometimes write, that you “are sorry you are not here with me. If you “was with me, and I should be inclined to “do such a thing, would you suffer it? I ask “but for fifty horsemen, say you. And do “not you remember, that Spartacus had not so “many men with him at first? What mischief “might not fifty horsemen do in an island whose “inhabitants are so effeminate! But what need “is there of horsemen at all? The Salamini-  
“ans

\* Ain? tandem, Attice, laudator integritatis & elegantie nostræ, “ausus es hoc “ex ore tuo?” inquit Ennius: ut equites Scaptio ad cogendam pecuniam darem, me rogare? An tu, si mecum esses, qui scribis morderi te interdum, quod non simul sis, patere me id facere, si vellem? Non amplius, inquit, quinquaginta Cum Spar-

taco minus multi primo fuerunt. Quid tandem isti mali in tam tenera insula non fecissent! — Sed quid jam opus equitatu? Solvunt enim Salaminii. Nisi forte id volumus armis efficere, ut scenus quaternis centesimis ducant. — Nimis, nimis inquam, in isto Brutum amasti, dulcissime Attice: nos vereor ne parum. *Cic. ad Att. VI. 2.*



“ans are ready to pay their creditor. Unless  
 “we ought to employ force to extort interest  
 “at forty-eight *per Cent.* My dear Atticus,  
 “you have in this affair listened too much to  
 “your friendship for Brutus ; and not enough  
 “to that you profess for me.” What resolu-  
 tion, and what sweetness! Such a remonstrance  
 admitted of no reply. Nor indeed does it  
 appear that Atticus any more pressed his request.  
 As to Brutus, it cost not Cicero much to resist  
 his importunities ; they were haughty and harsh,  
 and consequently more likely to irritate, than  
 seduce.

Every body that came near Cicero partici-  
 pated of his goodness and justice. Ariobarzanes  
 King of Cappadocia, a poor weak Prince, had  
 been recommended to his care by the Senate.  
 Cicero came into Cappadocia, at a time when  
 a conspiracy to dethrone him was on the point  
 of breaking out. Many of his most loyal  
 subjects were informed of it ; but durst not  
 discover it, lest they should be ruined by the  
 power of the conspirators. When they saw  
 among them a Roman Proconsul well-affected  
 to the King, and well-accompanied by troops,  
 their fear vanished ; and they discovered all  
 they knew. The secret thus divulged, Ario-  
 barzanes could easily guard against the at-  
 tempts of his enemies. Cicero encouraged  
 those who were in his interest to defend him  
 zealously : and the conspirators had no hopes  
 to gain the Proconsul by presents, as he even  
 would not allow them access to him. Thus,  
 by his wisdom and the authority of his name  
 alone, he saved the life and crown of the King  
 of Cappadocia.



A. R. 77.  
Ant. C. 50.  
*He impatiently desires the end of his employment.*

As Cicero did not make the power of Proconsul serviceable either to ambition, or avarice ; he had not the same reason, as the generality of Governors of provinces, to desire its continuance. On the contrary, he dreaded nothing so much, as being obliged to keep his place longer than a year. This he acquainted all his friends with, when he set out for his Government ; and, in all the letters he wrote them from thence, he renewed his instances, and begged them, at all events, to prevent any prolongation. His reasons for this are expressed very naturally in one of his epistles to Atticus. “ The very first day, says he, I set foot in my  
“ province, I was sufficiently weary of my  
“ employment. This is not a theatre to display my talents on. I administer justice at  
“ Laodicea, and A. Plotius at Rome : what a  
“ contrast ! my army is very weak. — \* In  
“ a word, this is not the life I like. I regret  
“ public life, the forum, the capital, my house,  
“ the converse of my friends : these are what I  
“ like.” He did himself justice. His eloquence, his extensive knowledge, his elevated views as to government, his pacific disposition ; all these things pointed out his proper place to be at the head of the Senate, not of an army ; his merit was conspicuous in the seat of empire, but buried in a province.

His impatience to be eased of his burthen increased, as the time of his deliverance approached. Two new motives were added to the old ones. He had acquired so much glory by his wise administration, that he thought he could  
not

\* *Denique hic non desidero locum, ne um, urbem, sed munus, vos desidero.* Cic. ad Att. v. 15.



not increase it : and he apprehended that the war with the Parthians would become serious, and find him more employment than he desired.

His wishes had their accomplishment. His Command was not prolonged ; and, though the troubles of the Commonwealth (which were now at the crisis of the most violent contests between Pompey and Cæsar) did not afford leisure enough to provide him a successor ; yet he prepared to depart, recommending to his Quæstor the care of the province.

He maintained to the last the glory of a wise œconomy, and perfect disinterestedness. For finding, that, out of the allowance made him by the State for the year's expence, he had saved a considerable sum ; he would not keep it : but shared it between his Quæstor, whom he left in his place, and the public treasury, to which he returned † a million of sesterces. Upon this occasion the generosity of his partizans failed. They expected to have had all that money distributed among them ; and complained aloud, when they found themselves disappointed. || “ The practice of virtue, says Cicero, on this subject, is difficult ; and when it comes not from the heart, but is only affected, it never fails to betray itself at last.” Cicero had no regard for their complaints. He thought, that, after having husbanded the finances of the Phrygians and Cilicians, it would ill-become him to neglect those of the Roman people. Besides, he had more concern for his own glory, than the

† Seven thousand eight hundred and twelve pounds ten shillings.

|| Quam non est facilis virtus ! quam vero difficilis ejus diuturna simulatio ! Cic. ad Att. vii, 1.

A. R. 702.  
Ant. C. 50.

In August  
702.

Last in-  
stance of  
his disin-  
terestedness  
and reso-  
lution.



A. R. 702. the avarice of his Officers. However, he al-  
 Ant. C. 50. ways behaved well to them, and gave them  
 every mark of consideration and esteem.

*He sets out on his journey, and receives the news of Hortensius's death.* He left his province satisfied with his personal situation; but greatly uneasy on account of the divisions in the Republic, and of the civil war with it was threatened. In the island of Rhodes he heard of Hortensius's death, and was extremely affected by it. The small differences, that had formerly somewhat abated their friendship, by time were expunged; and in a letter to Atticus, before Hortensius's death, he expressly says, that he had determined to live for the future in the strictest union with him. Nothing can be more pathetic than the grief he expresses for the loss of that noble friend in the preface to his book of illustrious Orators, composed three years after. But the calamities, which the Republic suffered in that interval, in which Cicero himself had so large a share, make him envy the lot of a man; \* who, after having enjoyed an uninterrupted felicity, died luckily for himself, though unluckily for his fellow-citizens; as he left the world at a time, which, had he survived, he might have lamented over his Country, but could not have assisted her: and who had lived just as long as it was possible to live in Rome with honour and quiet. Cicero arrived at Brundisium in December; that is, a little before the war between Cæsar and Pompey broke out. He returned in hopes of a triumph; and probably would have obtained it, had not the troubles

\* Perpetua quadam felicitate usus ille cessit à vita suo magis, quam suorum civium tempore; & tum occidit, quam legere facilius Rem-

publicam posset, si viveret, quam juvare: vixitque tamdiu, quam licuit in civitate bene beateque vivere. *Cic. Bruto, n. 4.*



troubles of the Republic prevented it, and turned the thoughts of the Romans on more important subjects. Lentulus Spinther, whose actions in Cilicia must have been very considerable, since history is quite silent about them, had nevertheless triumphed in Cicero's absence. Ap. Claudius also made interest for the same honour ; and, if he missed of it, it was not because he was thought undeserving of it, but on account of the accusation brought against him by Dolabella.

A. R. 702.  
Ant. C. 50.

*Triumph  
of Lentulus  
Spinther.*

Dolabella was a young Gentleman of illustrious birth, being a Patrician of the Cornelian family. He had spirit, industry, and parts : but the love of pleasure had been predominant in him, as it too often happens, in his youth ; and ambition afterwards made him commit many faults, and at last fall its victim. It is not known whether he had any other motive for accusing Appius, than that of getting a name, as the custom then was, and of which we have already given several instances. This event involved Cicero in new difficulties with respect to Appius. At the time he was endeavouring, by all methods, to convince him of his friendship for him, he on a sudden became the father-in-law of his accuser. Tullia had been some time separated from her second husband Furius Crassipes. Dolabella courted her at the very same time that he entered upon the accusation of Appius ; and, as the party was agreeable to Terentia, she concluded the affair without waiting for her husband's consent. Cicero was not displeased with the match in itself, though he had himself other views, and received proposals from Ti. Nero, who afterwards married Livia, and was father of the Emperor Tiberius. But

*Appius  
accused by  
Dolabella,  
and ac-  
quitted.  
He is cre-  
ated Cen-  
sor with  
Piso.*



A. R. 702.  
Ant. C. 50.

he found himself embarrassed as to Appius, with whom he was willing to keep a good understanding. He wrote him letters of excuse ; he even interested himself for him in the process carrying on against him ; and so far succeeded as to prevent a rupture. What doubtless made Appius more tractable, was his being honourably acquitted.

As soon as he was accused, he gave up his claim to the triumph, and came into the city to stand trial. He was accused, whether justly or unjustly I know not, of high-treason. His innocence, or Pompey's influence, saved him. After that he was accused of corruption, and acquitted likewise. So that he was not disqualified from standing for Censor ; and he was appointed such jointly with L. Piso, Cæsar's father-in-law.

Dio, l. 40.

These two Censors, the last the Commonwealth saw, were by no means proper persons to do honour to the expiring Censorship. One of them was a lazy Epicurean, who had been forced as it were to accept the office. Every thing to him was indifferent but his beloved ease and quiet, which he was not inclined to disturb by making enemies by a proper severity. Besides, as he was Cæsar's father-in-law, he endeavoured to gain him creatures and friends by his indulgence.

*He makes himself ridiculous by a severity, which ill-agreed with the rest of his conduct.*

As to Appius, we have painted him after Cicero in colours very unbecoming a Reformer. He acted however with severity, and obliged his Colleague to join with him in stigmatizing many Roman Knights and Senators ; in doing of which, contrary to his intention, he rendered service to Cæsar, whom he hated : for it was making him so many partizans.

In



In the brands he inflicted he followed various views. Full of the privileges of the Nobility, like his ancestors, who were all proud and haughty, he thought it his duty to remove out of the Senate all those who were sons of freedmen. Other Senators he punished for their bad lives. It was for the last reason, that Sallust, the historian, was degraded from the rank of Senator. He indeed deserved it on account of his open debauchery, which he was not ashamed to avow in full Senate, using only this scandalous excuse, that he did not intrigue with women of condition, but with those of the lowest order. Ateius, that Tribune of the People, who vented some imprecations on Crassus, at his setting out from Rome on the Parthian expedition, was disgraced by Appius, as having drawn on the Republic one of the greatest calamities she ever experienced. This surely was mistaking the thing. Ateius had been guilty of imprudence and passion ; but was very innocent of Crassus's defeat. Superstition dictated this judgment to Appius. Narrow-minded as he was, he gave into all such idle fancies ; though the age he lived in had for the most part got the better of them. He even valued himself for his skill in the art of augury, which he had made his particular study ; and he retained this weakness to the last moments of his life, as Lucan Luc. l. 5. informs us. This Censor attacked too, but without success, Curio, then Tribune of the People. I shall speak of that fact in another place.

All these acts of severity very ill became him. But nothing made him more ridiculous, than his attempt to suppress luxury, into which he gave himself greatly. Let us hear the witty Cælius



A. R. 702. Cælius banter on this subject with Cicero.  
Ant. C. 50.

\* “ Do you know, says he to him, that our  
“ Cenfor Appius does wonders here? His zeal  
“ against statues and pictures, against immo-  
“ derate purchases and debts, deserves the high-  
“ est admiration. He imagines the Censorship  
“ to be fullers-earth for every thing. But he  
“ is mistaken. For, by these extravagant en-  
“ deavours to wash out his stains, he flays and  
“ kills himself. Come quickly, in the name  
“ of gods and men, come and laugh with us  
“ at this sight: come and see Appius reform  
“ the luxury of pictures and statues.”

The advantages accruing to the Republic from this last Censorship were, as we perceive, very slender. It rather served to inflame the distempers of the State; which the civil war between Pompey and Cæsar entirely subverted. This is the great event that I am now going to lay before my readers.—It was preceded by sharp contests, which employed the Senate two years; by an account of which I must begin.

\* Scis Appium Censorem hic ostenta facere? de signis & tabulis, de agri modo, de ære alieno, acerrime agere? Persuasum est ei Censuram lomentum aut nitrum esse. Errare mihi videtur. Dum

fordes eluere vult, venas sibi omnes & viscera aperit. Cur- re, per deos atque homines, & quamprimum hæc risum veni. — Appium de tabulis & signis agere. *Cæl. ad Cic. ep. 14.*



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BOOK THE FORTY-THIRD.

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THE  
ROMAN HISTORY.

**P**Reliminaries to the civil war between Cæsar and Pompey. First campaign of that war. Years of Rome 701,—703.

S E C T. I.

*The true cause of the war between Cæsar and Pompey was their ambition. Pompey, from his third Consulship, enjoyed an almost absolute authority in Rome. Cæsar's policy to prevent laying down his Command, when he had once got possession of it. He makes creatures every where. It was no longer time to attack him, when Pompey resolved upon it. Saying of Cicero upon that subject. The Consul M. Marcellus proposes to recall Cæsar. Some Tribunes, and the Consul Sulpicius, oppose it. Cæsar gains to his party L. Paulus and Curio, one designed Consul, and the other Tribune, for the next year. Divers resolutions of the Senate, which are opposed by the Tribunes in Cæsar's interest. Two*  
remark-



*remarkable sayings of Pompey upon these oppositions. True point from whence to view Cæsar's cause. Subtle conduct of Curio. When it is proposed to divest Cæsar of his Command, he demands that Pompey should be also divested of his Command at the same time. Affected moderation of Pompey. Curio pushes him home. The Censor Appius endeavours to stigmatize Curio, but fails. Pompey's sickness. Rejoicings all over Italy on his recovery. Two legions took from Cæsar, and delivered over to Pompey. Pompey's presumption. Cæsar, on the contrary, takes prudent measures. The Consuls elect enemies to Cæsar. He writes to the Senate. Curio's address in bringing the Senate to what Cæsar wanted. The Consul Marcellus orders Pompey to defend the Republic against Cæsar. Curio retires from Rome, and goes to Cæsar. Mark Anthony, being made Tribune, replaces Curio. Cæsar makes proposals for an accommodation. No agreement could possibly take place between Cæsar and Pompey, because they both wanted a war. Other letters from Cæsar to the Senate. The Consul Lentulus animates the Senate against Cæsar. Decree of the Senate, by which Cæsar is ordered to disband his troops. Anthony opposes it. Violent debate. The Senatus consultum, used in the greatest extremities, is issued. Anthony makes off. Cæsar exorts his soldiers to revenge the violated rights of the Tribuneship. With a single legion he begins the war. Passage of the Rubicon. Cæsar makes himself master of Rimini. Terrible consternation at Rome. Pompey is universally reproached, and quite disconcerted. Pompey leaves Rome; and is followed by the Magistrates, and the whole Senate. The partizans of Pompey and Cæsar*



*Cæsar compared. Cato alone a friend to the Republic. Pretended presages. Death of Perperna. Pompey raises forces throughout Italy. Different Chiefs who act under him. Insincere and fruitless negotiation between Pompey and Cæsar. Labienus goes over to Pompey. Cæsar's progress. He besieges Domitius in Corfinium. Domitius's troops promise to deliver him into Cæsar's hands. Lentulus Spinther, who was in Corfinium, obtains pardon. Domitius resolves to poison himself. His Physician, instead of poison, gives him a soporific. Cæsar pardons Domitius, and the other prisoners. Cæsar pursues Pompey, who shuts himself up in Brundisium. New steps taken by Cæsar towards a peace. He has sometimes disguised the truth of facts in his Commentaries. Cæsar besieges Pompey, who goes over to Epirus. Reflection on Pompey's flight. Cæsar, determined to go into Spain, sends Valerius into Sardinia; and Curio into Sicily. The Sardinians drive out Cotta, and receive Valerius. Cato retires out of Sicily, without staying for Curio. Cicero's perplexity and uncertainty. Cæsar wants Cicero to go with him to Rome, and appear in the Senate. Cicero refuses. Cicero, after much delay, at last goes to Pompey's camp. Cato justly blames that step. Cæsar comes to Rome, and affects great moderation in his speeches to the Senate and People. He is not able to do any thing he intended. He breaks open the public treasury, spite of the Tribune Metellus's opposition; and takes away all the gold and silver he finds there. His clemency is thought affected; but wrongfully.*



## ADVERTISEMENT,

*Concerning Cæsar's Commentaries on the civil war.*

**T**H E most complete and authentic account we have of the two first campaigns of the war between Cæsar and Pompey, is, without doubt, the work universally known under the title of “Commentaries of Cæsar concerning the civil war.” These Commentaries carry Cæsar’s name, they have for ages passed for his work, and Suetonius quotes them as wrote by him.

Suet. Cæs.  
n. 56. Notwithstanding, many learned men suspect they are not legitimate. The Grammarians, and those whose refined taste enters deep into the delicacy of the Latin tongue, pretend to find in them many incorrect expressions, or which at least come not up to the standard of elegance. This is one good way of detecting things that are spurious; and which, supposing the fact, is of great weight; since, it is certain, that nobody spoke purer Latin than Cæsar.

Julius Lipsius, a good judge in these matters, authorizes this reproach to the diction of the work we speak of. \* He observed, in this pretended Cæsar, he says, many passages unworthy of the true Cæsar. Besides, he attacks in general the style, and manner of the narration. “How cold, adds he, is the whole composition of this author, how unconnect-  
“ ed,

\* Males in Cæsare illo legi  
Cæsare veteri parum digni.  
Inusitata notavi: sed uni-  
versè quam frigida, aut inhi-  
ans & torpida, imò tota ser-  
mo est! quam conatur potius

aliquid dicere, quam dicit!  
Itaque obscuritas & intrica-  
tio.—Proprium in eo scrip-  
tore vitium, dicere multis,  
nec minus. *Lips. l. l. Po-  
llicet. Dial. 9.*



“ ed, how negligent ! He rather endeavours to  
 “ say something, than really says any thing :  
 “ and is consequently obscure, and intricate.  
 “ The proper fault of this writer is to say little  
 “ in many words.”

These conjectures are certainly not to be despised. And what adds to their force, is a passage in the third book, where the writer plainly distinguishes himself from Cæsar. He speaks Lib III. de of proposals made by Libo, a Lieutenant-general of Pompey, for a truce. B. civ. n. “ Cæsar (it follows) did not think proper to give any answer to Libo’s demands, nor do we now think it necessary to give an account of them to posterity. *Quibus rebus neque tunc respondendum Cæsar existimavit : neque nunc ut memoriæ prodatur satis causæ putamus.*” The persons, and times, are both distinguished : and I do not see how any one can doubt, but that the passage I quote is of another hand than Cæsar’s.

The expression itself, in the first person, is enough to create suspicion. For we find no such thing in the Commentaries on the Gallic wars ; where Cæsar always speaks of himself in the third person. And yet this suspicious turn is repeated, n. 92 of the same third book of the Commentaries on the civil war. Therefore it is, I think, clear, that this last work is not wholly Cæsar’s. I say not wholly : for I will not extend my suspicions beyond what is proved. After a prescription of ages, after the testimony of Suetonius, who lived so near the time of its composition, how can we wholly take it from Cæsar ? Without doubt he directed the work, he furnished the materials, he overlooked it ; but some body else held the pen. On this supposition,



position, I have made no difficulty to cite these Commentaries as Cæsar's, both in my text, and margin. Surely he may be called their author, since they were wrote in his name, on his memoirs, by his order, and according to his mind.

A. R. 701.  
Ann. C. 51.

SEP. SULPICIUS RUFUS.

M. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS.

*The true  
cause of  
the war  
between  
Cæsar and  
Pompey  
was their  
ambition.*

The true cause of the war between Cæsar and Pompey was, as every body knows, the ambition of these two rivals in power and glory. This is what Lucan \* meant, when he says, that Cæsar could not bear a superior, nor Pompey an equal. But this thought, like many others of this poet who was more ingenious than judicious, is not just and exact. Both these famous competitors, whose quarrel divided the universe, had in view the first rank. Pompey, who was in possession of it, would not part with it; and Cæsar wanted to despoil him of it. He was not a man to be satisfied with an equality, which indeed is in politics impracticable. He was endeavouring to make himself premier; nor can his sentiments on this head be doubted, after the explanation he gave of them himself, when in passing by a village of the Alpes he made that famous speech which I have mentioned in its place.

Pompey had attained that envied height, by trimming between the Senate and People. Without absolutely espousing either party, he had alternately made use of both, as best agreed with his own interest and elevation. His third  
Consul-

\* Nec quenquam jam ferre potest Cæsare priorem,  
Pompeiove parem. Luc. l. 125.



Consulship made some alteration in his conduct. A. R. 701. Ant. C. 51.  
 Pleased with the confidence the Senate had Pompey  
 shewn him, by putting the whole public au- from his  
 thority into his hands, he entered into a strict third Con-  
 union with that august body ; and endeavoured sulship en-  
 to merit their good opinion by making a proper joyed an  
 use of the entrusted power, and by taking ef- almost ab-  
 ficacious measures to restore peace and tranquil- solute au-  
 lity in Rome. When out of office, he pre- thority in  
 served an authority inherent as it were in his Rome.  
 person. Tho' he had no title of Magistracy,  
 and was obliged as Proconsul of Spain to keep  
 out of the city, yet he governed all affairs,  
 and influenced all deliberations. He reigned  
 indeed almost ; but it was by the voluntary  
 deference of his countrymen, not by force.

In these circumstances, if Cæsar had returned Cæsar's po-  
 to Rome a private man, as by right he should, he licy to pre-  
 must have been subjected with the rest to Pom- vent laying  
 pey's power, which was supported by the whole down his  
 Senate. He was feared and hated by that body, Command,  
 whom he had on all occasions industriously at- when he  
 tacked ; and whom in particular he had treated had once got  
 with the utmost contempt, when he was Consul. possession of  
it.  
 Besides, his conduct gave his enemies such hold, Suet. Cæf.  
 and he had so often violated the laws, that he c. 30.  
 was apprehensive of being prosecuted, and con-  
 demned. Cato threatened him with it publicly,  
 and Pompey perhaps had the same thoughts.  
 We have observed that his law against Corrup-  
 tion alarmed Cæsar's friends, who thought it  
 levelled at him. And indeed Cæsar's whole po-  
 licy aimed at keeping the forces he had. After  
 having obtained the Government of Gaul for five  
 years, he got it prolonged for five years more.  
 He proposed to return home Consul at the end  
 of ten years, which was the interval prescribed







“ that you had never united with Cæsar ; or A. R. 701.  
Ant. C. 51.  
 “ that you had never broke with him ! The first  
 “ became your dignity and probity ; the other  
 “ your prudence.”

However, Pompey acted at first very cautiously. It was was the Consul Marcellus, who The Consul  
M. Mar-  
 (doubtless in concert with him) commenced cellus pro-  
poses to re-  
call Cæ-  
 hostilities. This Magistrate, who was haughty far  
 and bold, published an ordinance ; by which  
 he declared, that he had something to propose Suet. Cæs.  
Appian.  
 of the utmost importance to the Commonwealth : Civ. l. II.  
Dio, l. 40.  
Plut. Cæs.  
& Pomp.  
 and in consequence of it proposed to the assem-  
 bled Senate to recall Cæsar, and to order him  
 to quit the Government of Gaul on the first of  
 March of the year they were then entering on ;  
 and also to oblige him to demand the Consul-  
 ship in person, and not by proxy. This was  
 pushing Cæsar home ; who would have been  
 ruined, if the two points proposed by the Con-  
 sul had been carried against him, and put in  
 execution. But it is plain he was able to make  
 a good defence under the safe-guard of two  
 laws, of whose benefit they endeavoured to de-  
 prive him. They cut off two years of his Com-  
 mand from the term enlarged by the law of  
 Trebonius ; and they took from him a privi-  
 lege granted by another law, made by the  
 whole college of the Tribunes, and with Pom-  
 pey's consent.

Under these favourable circumstances, it was Some Tri-  
bunes, and  
the Consul  
Sulpicius,  
oppose it.  
 not difficult for Cæsar to procure assistance from  
 many of the Magistrates. Not only some of the  
 Tribunes declared for him ; but even the Con-  
 sul Sulpicius, a peaceable man, who by his pro-  
 fession of a Lawyer was accustomed to respect  
 scrupulously whatever bore the name of a law,  
 opposed his Collegue. Pompey himself, inured



A. R. 701. to hypocrisy and tergiversation in what he most  
 Ant. C. 51. desired, affected to say, that Marcellus went too far; and that it was not proper to affront so grossly such a person as Cæsar, whose exploits had been so glorious and serviceable to the Republic. And truly Marcellus's zeal was extravagant; and sometimes favoured of animosity and hatred. Cæsar had granted to the city of Come in Cisalpine Gaul the freedom of Italy; by the means of which, those who had borne the office of first Magistrate among them, became Roman citizens. Marcellus had a mind to strip the inhabitants of Come of this privilege; pretending it had been given them without lawful cause, merely thro' Cæsar's ambition and desire to make creatures. Perhaps he was in the right. But he went so far as to cause a Burgess of that town, who had been its first Magistrate, to be scourged; bidding him go to Cæsar, and shew him the marks of the stripes. This was a punishment from which Roman citizens were always exempt: therefore by this action Marcellus annihilated the privileges of the colony Cæsar had founded. But he got nothing by so doing: it was only a wanton, fruitless, insult.

Pompey, who outwardly preserved more moderation, aimed at the same mark. Tho' he had seemingly disapproved the Consul's proposal, he laboured to get it passed the next year. In this view he got elected Consul C. Marcellus, cousin to Marcus, who was a man of the same principles. He thought he had carried a great point too in procuring the famous Curio, whom we have had occasion to mention several times, to be made Tribune: he was a young Gentleman



man of fire, one of the first Orators of his time, A. R. 701.  
Ant. C. 51. and had always acted as Cæsar's enemy.

Cæsar, who was at least as artful as his com- Cæsar petitor, opposed a counter-battery. He tried gains to his to gain over C. Marcellus, but, finding him in- party L. corruptible, he essayed L. Paulus, who had Paulus been appointed his Collegue; and bought his and Curio; silence for about three hundred thousand pounds one designed sterling. Paulus was paid this great sum for Consul, only not acting against Cæsar: and he em- and the ployed it in building a magnificent Hall at other Tri- Rome, as if he intended to eternize his venality bune, for and baseness. the next

Curio sold himself at a yet higher price. He Plut. & had never the public at heart, and had only joined Appian. Pompey, because he had been slighted by Cæsar. Cæl. ad It is surprizing that Cæsar should have made such Cic. 4 a mistake, contrary to his maxims; he who used all means to attach to his party even sometimes the lowest men. He perceived his error, and spared no cost to rectify it. Curio had hurt his fortune by his debauchery and prodigality; Val. Max. he owed then above six hundred thousand pounds IX. 1. sterling. Cæsar paid all his debts; and thus fixed in his interest a man who did him the greater service, as he affected (as we shall see) a sort of impartiality.

Mean while the Consul M. Marcellus pursued Divers re- his plan, which he had only moderated and qua- solutions of lified. He doubtless conformed in this to Pom- the Senate; pey's advice, who did not chuse that any reso- which are lution should be made about Cæsar, before the opposed by first day of March of the next year; after which the Tri- time he thought a successor might be sent him. I bunes in cannot see what foundation Pompey had to believe Cæsar's in- that he should be suffered to take one, any more terest. than two years, from Cæsar's Command. How- Cæl. ad ever Cic 4 & 8.



A. R. 707.  
A.U. C. 51. ever his will was so much the rule of all things, that, as he had a journey to make to Rimini, the Senate waited till his return; and on the last of September came, in his presence, to a resolution agreeable to his wishes.

In this resolution it was said, that the Consuls elect, L. Paulus and C. Marcellus, should on the first of March on the year then entering upon propose to the Senate, to deliberate on the affair of the Consular provinces. (Which was a studied expression, to avoid saying plainly that they were to deliberate on Cæsar's revocation.) It was also added, that, when the first of March was come, nothing should be proposed previous to, or in concurrence with, that of the Consular provinces. And as an opposition was apprehended to the decree, which was actually drawing; the Senate declared, that none of those who had a right to put a negative on its decrees ought to exert that privilege on this occasion: and, if any one did, he would be considered as guilty of an attempt on the tranquillity and safety of the Republic. That this resolution should be registered: and that the Senate should consider what course to take with its opposers. All these declarations, and menaces, did not hinder four Tribunes, among whom was Pansa who had long served under Cæsar, from making their formal opposition.

By a second resolution of the same day, the Senate endeavour to weaken Cæsar, by offering discharges to such of his soldiers whose time of service was compleated, or who for other reasons desired to be disbanded. And lastly, a third resolution, took into consideration the choice of Governors of the Proprætorial provinces, and conformed it to the regulations last made under the



the Consulship of Calvinus and Messala, and ratified the following year. Things were now in order. But we have elsewhere shewed what reason Cæsar pretended to have to complain of these new resolutions. The two last met with the same fate as the first; Panfa and another Tribune opposed them.

It was easy to foresee that these oppositions would prevent the effect of the deliberations projected for the next year with respect to Cæsar. Some body having made this objection to Pompey, he opened himself by this answer: *Two remarkable sayings of Pompey, upon these oppositions.*

“ I see no difference between Cæsar’s disobey-  
 “ ing the decrees of the Senate, and his hinder-  
 “ ing the Senate from making what decrees  
 “ they think necessary. What if he is deter-  
 “ mined, replied another, to be at the same  
 “ time Consul and have the Command of an  
 “ army? And what, returned Pompey briskly,  
 “ if my son was determined to beat me?”

These answers of Pompey, particularly the last, appeared harsh to Cælius; who mentions them in a letter to Cicero. But I will venture to affirm *True point from whence to view Cæsar’s cause.* that they fix the true point from whence we ought to view Cæsar’s conduct, in order to make a proper judgment of it. He aimed at the Sovereignty of the Commonwealth; the event proves it. He was then the son who intended to beat his father. But he skilfully conceals, as much as possible, the odious design. He covers himself by the laws he gets made by force or intrigue. He screens himself by the authority of venal Magistrates, corrupted by his bounty. By these means he throws a colour of legality over his ambitious proceedings. What is all this but the behaviour of an uncutiful son; who,  
 being



A. R. 701.  
Ant. C. 51.

being resolved to disobey his father, and willing also to avoid the imputation of disobedience, stops his mouth to prevent his speaking? It is by the light of these reflections that we ought to view all the chicanery by which Cæsar defended himself against the Senate above another year, before he proceeded to take up arms. And, that we may not be imposed on by specious appearances, it is sufficient to call to mind the favourite maxim he always had in his mouth, borrowed from Eteocles in Euripides: \* “ If justice may  
“ be violated, it is to acquire Sovereignty that  
“ it is glorious to violate it; in all other things  
“ act honestly.”

A. R. 702.  
Ant. C. 50.

L. ÆMILIUS PAULUS.

C. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS.

*Subtle conduct of Curio.*

Dio, Ap-  
pian. Plut.

Curio was the instrument Cæsar made use of to dispute the ground with, under the Consulship of Paulus and C. Marcellus. This Tribune, who was a man of sense, skilfully concealed his shameful desertion of his party. He was very quiet at the entrance into his office; speaking even occasionally against Cæsar; yet throwing out frequently untoward propositions, that could not but be displeasing to Pompey and the Aristocratic party. But soon after he sought occasions to break with them; and, in order thereto, proposed divers laws, which he knew they would not fail to oppose. One of these laws regarded the high-ways: another was a  
sort

\* Εἴτε γὰρ ἀδικεῖν ἔχη, τοῦ πατρὸς περὶ καλλίστου ἀδικεῖν. ἢ ἀλλὰ δ' εὐσεβεῖν ἔχων. These two Greek verses have been thus translated by Cicero. Nam

si violandum est ius, Regnandi gratia violandum est: aliis rebus pietatem colas. Cic. de Off. III. 82.



Port of Agrarian law, little different from that of Rullus which had been thrown out in Cicer-<sup>A. R. 702. Ant. C. 50.</sup>o's Consulship: and a third concerned corn and provisions. And, in the new regulations he projected on all these heads, he reserved to himself the chief management and authority. The Senate opposed these laws. This was what the Tribune wanted; he thought himself now freed from all consideration for a body, by which he pretended he was aggrieved.

He would not however appear an absolute partizan of Cæsar: wherefore when the first of March was come; and the Consul C. Marcellus, in conformity to the resolution of the last of the preceding September, had proposed to send a new Proconsul to Gaul; his Colleague Paulus, according to agreement, holding his peace; Curio spoke. He praised the proposal of the Consul Marcellus; but added, that they ought, at the same time that they recalled Cæsar, to order Pompey too to resign the Government of Spain and the Command of the legions in that province.

This was a specious, favourable, turn; it was the language of a zealous Republican. The dexterous Tribune represented, "that what he  
 " proposed was the only means left to insure  
 " the public liberty. That, if they disarmed  
 " Cæsar only, Pompey with the forces he had  
 " the Command of would become absolute master  
 " of the Empire: whereas, if they were  
 " both reduced to a private condition, the Republic  
 " would have nothing more to fear from  
 " either. But that, if they continued one in  
 " Command, they ought to leave the other  
 " wherewith to preserve the balance." These arguments, set in the strongest light by one  
 of



A. R. 722  
 Ant. C. 50.

of the most eloquent men Rome ever produced, made a deep impression. The People, among whom Pompey had lost ground by his laws against Corruption, approved and applauded Curio ; who thus did Cæsar the greatest service, by affecting to be neuter, and solely attached to the good of the Republic.

I say he did Cæsar the greatest service ; for he knew Pompey would never resign. This was neither his intention, nor that of the best heads in the Senate. And indeed the terms were not equal, as Pompey did not enter on the Government of Spain until four years after Cæsar had commanded in Gaul. But the chief and most essential difference arose from the diversity of their character and conduct. Every thing was to be feared from Cæsar's unbounded ambition ; whereas that of Pompey was more moderate, more circumspect, more capable of respecting the laws. Curio's proposal was accordingly rejected : but he hindered, by his authority as Tribune, that of the Consul from passing.

*Affected  
 moderation  
 of Pompey.  
 Curio  
 praises him  
 home.*

Pompey, on this attack of the Tribune, affected at first great moderation. As he was in Campania, he wrote to the Senate, “ that  
 “ whatever title, or power, he had, was the  
 “ effect of the good-will of his fellow-citizens ;  
 “ not of his own sollicitation. That, without  
 “ his seeking, they had offered him a third  
 “ Consulship, and a prolongation of his Com-  
 “ mand in Spain. That he was ready freely  
 “ and voluntarily to resign, what he had ac-  
 “ cepted against his inclination.” At his re-  
 turn to Rome, he talked in the same strain ;  
 and as if he, as the old friend and father-in-law  
 of Cæsar, was better acquainted with his dispo-  
 sition



sition than any one ; he affirmed, and made it a matter of honour to himself, that he too had the same way of thinking. He said that Cæsar, fatiated with war and victory, desired repose alone ; and wished for nothing more than to return to Rome, and enjoy in the bosom of his country the reward of his labours, and the honours he had merited.

A. R. 702.  
Ant. C. 50.

He spoke not what he thought either as to himself, or Cæsar. But he designed to render odious by his moderation the tenacity of Cæsar. He gave up five whole years of Command, and Cæsar refused to lay down his, though expiring, unless he entered directly on the Consulship. Curio was not to be thus imposed on. He called upon him to fulfil his promise by an immediate resignation. He renewed his former declaration about the only means of preserving the liberty of the Republic ; which was to take, at the same time, all Command both from Pompey and Cæsar. He exhorted the Senate to order them both to resign, under pain of disobedience ; and, in case of refusal, to declare them enemies to their country, and raise forces to reduce them. And, as he perceived his advice would not be followed, he broke up the assembly, without suffering any resolution to be taken as to Cæsar.

Pompey now repented heartily that he had raised the Tribuneship out of the state of humiliation to which Sylla had reduced it. But it was too late, and all he could do was to endeavour to revenge himself on the Tribune, by the ministry of the Censor Appius.

*The Censor  
Appius en-  
deavours*

For all circumstances induce a belief, that this Magistrate undertook by agreement with Pompey to stigmatize Curio. He had great open-  
*to stigmatize Curio,  
but fails.*  
Dio.



A. R. 702.  
Ant. C. 50.

openings, had he attacked him on account of the conduct of his youth, which had been wasted in luxury, extravagance, and debauchery. But Appius was stopped short by the opposition of his Colleague Piso, and of the Consul Paulus. The other Consul Marcellus, always ready to act against Cæsar and all his Partizans, resumed the affair; and pretended to bring it before the Senate. Curio opposed at first so unusual a proceeding. But afterwards, finding the generality inclined to favour him, he accepted the condition, and submitted himself to the animadversion of the Senate. He was not deceived. In vain the Consul Marcellus made a bitter invective against him; the majority of the Senators declared for Curio: and the Consul would not go through a deliberation that could not turn out to his honour.

*Pompey's  
sickness  
Rejoicings  
all over  
Italy on  
his reco-  
very.*

While the difference between Pompey and Cæsar increased every day, it had like to have been on a sudden terminated by an unforeseen accident; this was a dangerous illness that was near taking Pompey off: which, as Juvenal says, \* would have been very lucky for him, had it so happened, then when he was at the height of prosperity and glory; as it would have spared him the cruel misfortunes, which two years more of life made him experience. It was at Naples he fell ill; and, when he recovered, the Neapolitans shewed their joy by festivals and solemn thanksgivings to the Gods. No such thing had been done before to any Roman. But, the example once set, it ended not where

\* Provida Pompeio dederat Campania febres  
Optandas: sed multæ urbes & publica vota  
Vicerunt. Igitur fortuna ipsius & urbis  
Servatum victo caput abstulit. — *Juv. Sat. x.*



where it began. The neighbouring cities first followed it, and afterwards all Italy. Particularly on Pompey's route to Rome, when he returned, no place was large enough to hold the crowds that came to meet him. The roads, the villages, the ports, were filled with an incredible multitude of persons of all ages and conditions; who offered sacrifices, and amidst their wine and good cheer extolled him whom Heaven had restored to them. Many adorned with garlands, having flambeaux in their hands, met, and accompanied, him; throwing flowers on him with general applause: so that his whole progress was one of the finest sights that could be imagined. These rejoicings, which seemed to express the greatest esteem for, and attachment of all the Italian people to, Pompey, encouraged him much; and for that reason may be considered as one of the chief causes of the civil war. Until this time an extraordinary prudence, approaching sometimes to timidity, had guided, and secured, his steps. But now, dazzled with joy and confidence, he no more saw any reason to fear, or doubt. He thought himself strong enough to despise Cæsar; and flattered himself that he should be able to ruin him, as easily as he had raised him.

These notions, which took up his thoughts, were confirmed by the discourses of those who brought him two legions, that had served under Cæsar. The fact is this:

The Senate, taking advantage of the general apprehension of an irruption of the Parthians into Syria, ordered that Pompey and Cæsar should each of them furnish a legion to be sent into that province. This pretence was so well imagined and seemed so fair, that the decree passed

*Two legions took from Cæsar, and delivered over to Pompey.*



A. R. 712.  
Ann. C. 50.

without opposition or difficulty. But Pompey obeyed that decree, only by giving the legion he lent Cæsar after the disaster of Titurius and Cotta. Cæsar was obliged to give one of his own, so that this was in reality taking from him two legions. He was aware of it; yet he sent the two legions with that generosity which always gave him an air of superiority over his adversaries; having first presented the soldiers with about ten pounds each. The persons Pompey sent to conduct these legions to him reported, that Cæsar was extremely hated in his army: that his soldiers, tired out with a long, laborious, war, could not bear a General, who had never suffered them to enjoy any rest: that Pompey would not have occasion for any other forces than those of Cæsar to vanquish and ruin him; because they would certainly abandon him the moment they set foot in Italy. About the same time Labienus, the most experienced and best esteemed of Cæsar's Lieutenant-generals, listened to offers for changing sides, which he actually did afterwards.

Pompey's  
presump-  
tion

These various events made Pompey so presumptuous, that he took no care to assemble a force sufficient to make head against the enemy he had to deal with. He even laughed at those who were afraid of a war; and somebody telling him, that, if Cæsar took it in his head to march to Rome, there was nothing to hinder him; Pompey answered, "in whatever part of Italy I stamp with my foot, there will come up  
"legions."

Cæsar's conduct was very different. Without taking any glaring step which might be considered as an hostility, he prepared every thing so as to be able to act with vigour, when the  
time



time was come. Gaul was in a state of perfect tranquillity. His legions, in their several quarters, only waited his orders. He himself came into Cisalpine Gaul early in the spring, that he might be nearer Rome, and have an eye on what passed there ; but under pretence of assisting with his interest Mark Anthony, who had been his Quæstor, in his application for the office of Augur. For that country was full of municipal towns and colonies, whose inhabitants had the privilege of Roman citizens, and consequently influenced the nomination of Magistrates and Priests. Cæsar learnt on his way, that Anthony was appointed Augur. This pretence therefore failing, he substituted another ; which was to take that opportunity to engage the votes of the people of these cantons for himself, with respect to the Consulship ; for which he intended to be a Candidate the following year. He even sent to Rome many of his officers and soldiers, who had leave of absence from him as it were to look after their private affairs. And history mentions among others a Plat. Pom. Centurion, who being at the door of the Senate & Cæsar. while they were deliberating about Cæsar, and informed that they refused him the time he demanded ; put his hand to his sword, saying, “ this shall give him what the Senate denies.”

Cæsar was the more cautious, as the Consuls The Consuls elect were of the contrary party. Ser. Galla, his elect who had served under him as Lieutenant-general enemies to Cæsar. in Gaul, had made a fruitless effort ; and Pompey's interest had fixed the suffrages of the People De B. Gall. viii in favour of L. Lentulus and C. Marcellus, both enemies to Cæsar, but particularly the first ; who kept no terms with him, and shewed himself determined to carry things to extremi-



A. R. 702.  
Ant. C. 50.

ties. However, as Curio was a good check on every one, Cæsar thought he might return to Gaul. There he reviewed his army, and spent the remainder of the summer : and at the approach of winter, leaving in Gaul eight legions, (four in Belgium, and four in the country of the Ædui) he returned into Italy, where he distributed the thirteenth legion in all the important posts of Cisalpine Gaul.

*He writes  
to the Sen-  
ate.*

*See Cæsar  
c. 29.*

When he came there, he was informed, that the legions that had been took from him under pretence of sending them against the Parthians, had been detained in Italy, and transmitted to Pompey by the Consul Marcellus. This was little less than a declaration of war. He disguised however his resentment, and contented himself with writing to the Senate ; desiring that they would not deprive him of the benefit conferred on him by the People ; or that the other Generals, as well as he, might be obliged to disband their troops. This language, conformable to Curio's proposal, could not prejudice Cæsar, as we have observed ; and besides Suetonius remarks, that he hoped, if he was took at his word, to be able to reassemble his veterans, before Pompey could make new levies.

*Appian.*

It appears, that this letter from Cæsar gave occasion to a last deliberation of the Senate on the respective pretensions of the two rivals. Marcellus put the proposition in a light that was advantageous to his views ; and asked the opinions concerning Pompey and Cæsar separately. The majority were for sending Cæsar a successor ; and, when the question was put as to Pompey, the majority were for continuing him in Command.

*But*



But Curio, reuniting what the Consul had separated, insisted that the Senate should be asked, Whether it was their pleasure that Pompey and Cæsar should both at once resign? The question thus stated took another turn; and the Tribune had three hundred and seventy voices against twenty-two. This threw Marcellus into despair; who broke up the Assembly immediately, crying out aloud, “ay, triumph over us, and make Cæsar your Master.” The Tribune, on the other side, retired full of glory; and was received by the People with great acclamations. They even threw flowers on him, as a victorious champion who deserved garlands.

Marcellus, when he dismissed the Senate, told them, that it was no longer time to amuse themselves with vain harangues, when ten legions were ready to pass the Alpes; and that the Commonwealth wanted a protector able to resist such an attack. In consequence of this declaration, being accompanied by the Consuls elect (the better to authorize the important step he was going to take) he went to Pompey, who was in the suburbs, because, as Proconsul, he could not come into the city; and, giving him a sword, said, “We order you to use this sword in the defence of your Country against Cæsar: we invest you with the Command of all the forces in Italy, and give you power to raise what forces more you may think proper.” Pompey answered, he would obey the Consuls; adding however; “unless something better may be thought of.” This was a common expression with him, and was less a sign of irresolution, than of a sly caution that loved to save appearances, that feared engagements,

A. R. 702.  
Ant. C. 50.  
*Curio's address in bringing the Senate to what Cæsar wanted.*

*The Consul Marcellus orders Pompey to defend the Republic against Cæsar.*



A. R. 702.  
A. C. 50.

ments, and always chose to have a power of declining them, if necessary. There is no reason to doubt but that Pompey was on this occasion fully determined; and he declared himself to this purpose to Cicero, who was then just returned from Cilicia, and with whom he had two conferences in the month of December that year.

Cic. ad A.  
7. A. & S.  
Curio  
de off. pro-  
priet. lib.  
2. c. 20. &  
21. & 22.

Curio made some other attempts in Cæsar's favour, and endeavoured to hinder Pompey from raising forces. But he got nothing by these fresh efforts, and only incensed the Senate more and more against him; and as his Tribuneship was near expired, and he thought his person would be in danger as soon as he was out of office; he fled from Rome, and went to Cæsar at Ravenna; full of animosity, and importunate to have him immediately send for his legions and begin the war.

Cæsar, who was as determined as he, but more discreet, did not think it was yet time for action. He feared the odium of beginning a war, which to all the world could appear to have no other object than his personal interest. He waited for some event which might give a better colour to his hostilities against his Country; and chose to be thought to have tried every means of accommodation before he had recourse to force. He therefore negotiated on one hand; and, on the other, raised up against Pompey and the Senate a new Tribune, at least as violent and passionate as Curio.

Plutarch  
in Cæsar.  
Cicero  
de off. pro-  
priet. lib.  
2. c. 20. &  
21. & 22.

This Tribune was the famous Mark Anthony, who, at his return from Syria and Ægypt, had embraced Cæsar's party. Being nominated Quæstor, he set out immediately for Gaul; without staying for the Senate's decree, the People's



ple's order, or the decision of the lots. \* He knew, as Cicero has very justly observed, that Cæsar's camp was the only asylum for those, whom indigence, debauchery, and heavy debts, made discontented, and enemies of the public tranquillity. He behaved there gallantly; and we have had occasion to mention him several times in relating the Gaulish wars. Having this year obtained the Tribuneship by Cæsar's interest, and money, he employed all the authority of his office in the service of him to whom he was obliged for it.

A. R. 702.  
Ant. C. 57.

He began, by demanding that the two legions designed to be sent against the Parthians should be ordered to Bibulus in Syria; that Pompey should be forbid raising any forces; and that such as he enlisted should be freed from military obedience. On the twenty-first of December, that is, twelve days after he entered on his office, he made an harangue to the People; in which he insulted, and inveighed against, Pompey; reaping up his whole life, from his infancy. At the same time, he deplored the fate of those who had been condemned in consequence of the laws made by Pompey in his third Consulship. To all this he added plain menaces of a civil war. On occasion of which harangue Pompey, reasoning with Cicero, said very justly: † “What would not Cæsar himself do, if he was at the head of affairs; since his Quæstor, who has neither money nor credit, dares talk in this strain?”

Plut. Ant.

Q 4

In

\* Id enim unum in terris egestatis, aris alieni, nequitiæ,—per fugium esse ducebas. *Cic. Phil. II. n. 50.*

† Quid, centes facturum

esse ipsum, si in possessionem Reipublicæ venerit; quum hæc Quæstor ejus, infirmus & inops, audeat dicere?



A. R. 702.  
Ant. C. 10  
*Cæsar*  
*makes pro-*  
*posals for*  
*an accom-*  
*modation*  
P. Ant. Cæf.  
Appian.  
Cic. ad  
Tam. 16.  
12.

In the midst of this ill-blood, negotiations (as I have said, were set on foot. Cæsar offered to disband eight of his legions, and to quit Transalpine Gaul; provided he was left in possession of the other Gaul and Illyricum, with two legions, until he was appointed Consul. Afterwards, by the mediation of Cicero who ardently desired peace, Cæsar's friends made a further concession, and engaged he should be satisfied with Illyricum and one legion.

*No agree-*  
*ment*  
*could pos-*  
*sibly take*  
*place be-*  
*tween*  
*Cæsar and*  
*Pompey,*  
*because*  
*they both*  
*wanted*  
*a war.*  
Cic. ad  
Ant. 7. 9.

But what method could be found to make two men agree, who both chose a war? Cæsar's offers, by no means, evince a sincere intention for peace. If he had really desired it, there was a sure way to have obtained it; which was to have resigned his Command, on condition he was appointed Consul. Cicero expressly declares, that, if he had insisted on nothing more, he could not have been possibly refused. But Cæsar would never reduce his pretensions to these terms. Pompey on his side had as little inclination to leave Rome, and go to his province of Spain.

The disposition then of Pompey and Cæsar to war was equal; with this difference, that Pompey, who had with him all the majesty of the Republic, and doubted not of the goodness of his cause, pretended to give law, affected severity, and avowed his resolution to oblige Cæsar by force to submit to the Senate: whereas Cæsar, taking advantage of the known intention of his rival, made continually concessions which he was sure would be rejected; hoping by so doing to throw the blame on Pompey, and give to his own proceedings an air of moderation, which might in some sort compensate for their injustice.

C. CLAU.



C. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS.

A. R. 703.

L. CORNELIUS LENTULUS.

Ant. C. 49.

On the first of January Curio came to Rome, with letters from Cæsar addressed to the Senate, which contained \* very fair and moderate proposals, in the opinion of him who made them, and which were probably agreeable to the conditions of the accommodation last mentioned. These letters were so ill received, that the Consuls, not being able to suppress them, as Curio had delivered them in full Senate, had a mind to return them unopened : and the Tribunes Anthony and Q. Cassius were forced to exert their whole authority to procure them a reading. After they were read, the Consul Lentulus proposed to deliberate, not on their contents, but on the present state of affairs, and on the measures proper to be taken for the security of the Republic. He exhorted the Senators to speak their minds freely ; telling them, that, if they cooled, he knew what he had to do ; and doubted not but he could find means to make his peace with Cæsar.

*Other letters from Cæsar to the Senate.*

*Cæf. de B. Civ. I.*

*Dio. l. 41.*

*Appian.*

*Plut.*

*The Consul Lentulus ani-*

*mates the*

*Senate*

*against*

*Cæsar.*

He spoke the truth. Cæsar would have been well-pleased to have gained him over ; and prosecuted so obstinately his sollicitations and offers, that afterwards, when war had been declared, and the armies were in sight of one another in Epirus, Balbus still negotiated by Cæsar's order with Lentulus, and went on that account into Pompey's camp at the hazard of his liberty and life. Lentulus was not averse to listening to Cæsar's

*Vell. ii. 5.*

*far's*

\* (Cæsar) expectabat lenissimis suis postulatis responsa.  
*Cæf. de B. Civ. l. 5.*



A. R. 703  
Ant. C. 49.

far's promises. His ruined fortune, and heavy debts, were powerful incentives thereto. But he thought victory could not forsake Pompey; and that those on his side had the more certain prospect of riches and promotion. For this reason he was always untractable; and Cæsar names him as having contributed more than any one to the rupture. Metellus Scipio, Pompey's father-in-law, necessarily followed his steps. Cato would not hear of compromising the interest and dignity of the Republic. Thus, notwithstanding some cooler opinions which tended at least to temporizing, it passed by a majority of voices,

*Decree of  
the Senate,  
by which  
Cæsar is  
ordered to  
disband  
his troops.  
Anthony  
opposes it.  
Violent  
debate.*

“ That Cæsar should be ordered to disband his army before a certain day then fixed; and that, in case of disobedience, he should be declared an enemy to the Republic.”

Anthony and Q. Cassius oppose this decree. Upon this the quarrel recommences. The Consul proposes to deliberate, on the method to be taken to bring to reason the opposing Tribunes. The severest resolutions pass against them. The Tribunes intrench themselves in the inviolable right of their office. At last night parts the combatants. The contest was renewed the following days, and continued until the seventh of January. During this time Piso the Censor, father-in-law to Cæsar, and L. Roscius the Prætor, who had served under Cæsar in Gaul, offered to go to him, and inform him of the Senate's disposition. Their proffer was rejected; the Tribunes were extremely threatened; and the Senate had recourse to that decree which was never used but in the greatest extremities.

*The Sena-  
tus consultum  
passed  
in the  
greatest*

It was therein said, “ that the Consuls, the Prætors, the Tribunes of the People, and the Proconsuls that were near Rome (which  
“ took



“ took in Pompey and Cicero) were ordered to A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.  
“ be careful of the safety of the Republic.” extremi-  
ties is used.  
After this, Anthony and Cassius had every Anthony  
makes off.  
thing to fear. They therefore fled by night,  
disguised as slaves, in an hired carriage ; nor  
stopped until they got to Rimini. Curio and  
Cælius followed them. The Governors of the  
provinces were then appointed, which had been  
hindered above a year by the opposition of the  
Tribunes. Cæsar had two successors given  
him, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus for Transalpine  
Gaul, and M. Cœfidius for the Cisalpine. Me-  
tellus Scipio had the Government of Syria,  
which Bibulus quitted. Of the rest I shall speak,  
as occasion offers.

Cæsar’s enemies, by putting the Tribunes in Cæsar  
exhorts his  
soldiers to  
revenge  
the vio-  
lated  
rights of  
the Tri-  
bunship.  
danger, gave him the pretext he had long  
waited for. He was then at Ravenna, the last  
town in his province ; and he was no sooner in-  
formed of what had happened at Rome, but he  
assembled what soldiers he had about him,  
which were those of the thirteenth legion. In  
the harangue he made them, he insisted on no-  
thing so much as the violation of the Tribunitial  
privileges in the persons of Anthony and Cas-  
sius. He complained, as he himself relates, of  
the new precedent introduced into the Common-  
wealth by those who checked and hindered by  
the terror of arms the opposition of the Tribunes.  
He added, that Sylla, who made it his business  
to humble, and had almost annihilated, the  
Tribuneship, had yet left it the liberty of op-  
position ; but that Pompey, who valued him-  
self for having restored to that office all its pre-  
rogatives, deprived it now of that privilege,  
which it had always enjoyed,



A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

It is therefore, with great reason, that Cicero makes Anthony responsible for all the calamities of the civil war. He says to be sure too much, as Plutarch observes, when he accuses \* him of having been the cause of that unfortunate war, as much as Helen was of the Trojan. But it is strictly true, that Anthony furnished Cæsar with the most plausible pretext he could wish, and the most likely to impose on the People : a necessary pretext, without which perhaps Cæsar might have found it difficult to have come to extremities, or at least to have secured the assistance of all his troops.

He certainly apprehended great difficulty in persuading them to follow him ; since, as Suet. Cæs. c. 32. Suetonius relates, when he harangued them the next day at Rimini, he used the most submissive intreaties, had recourse to tears, tore his cloaths before, to shew his great concern, and the extreme danger he was exposed to. Cæsar says nothing like this in his relation of what passed at Ravenna, and entirely omits his harangue at Rimini. But it is certain that he suppresses many things ; and the passage of the Rubicon, so famous with all other historians, is not mentioned in his Commentaries.

With a  
single le-  
gion he be-  
gins the  
war.

When he had done speaking to the legion assembled by his orders at Ravenna, the officers and soldiers cried out, that they were determined to maintain the honour of their General, and to revenge the wrongs done to the Tribunes. He accepted their offers ; and, with five thousand foot and three hundred horse, undertook (ac-  
cording

\* Ut Helena Trojanis, sic exitii, fuit. Cic. Phil. II.  
iste belli reipublicæ, causa n. 55.  
belli ; causa peccis, atque



according to an expression of Livy, which Oro-  
sius has preserved) to attack the Universe. His A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.  
Oros. 6. maxim and constant practice, as we know, was  
to place his chief hopes of success in expedition ;  
and he was convinced, that, on this occasion, it  
would be easier for him to intimidate with a  
small force, by appearing when he was least ex-  
pected ; than to conquer, by staying the time  
necessary for great preparations. Contenting  
himself therefore with writing to his Lieutenant-  
generals in Gaul to bring up the legions left there,  
he determined to commence the war by the sur-  
prise of Rimini, which was the first city of Italy  
in the way from his province. In order to suc-  
ceed, secrecy was necessary. Wherefore he sent  
away, without noise, his ten cohorts under the  
Command of Hortensius's son. As for himself,  
he staid in the town ; went to a public specta-  
cle ; examined the plan of a gladiator's school,  
which he intended to build ; and in the evening  
sat down to supper with much company. But,  
when night was come, he stole away on pretence  
of illness ; went out of Ravenna, unperceived ;  
and, getting mules to put in his chaise from the  
first mill, took a by-way in which he lost him-  
self. At day-break he procured a guide, by  
whose assistance he overtook his cohorts near the  
Rubicon, a rivulet that bounded his province ;  
so that he could not pass it without transgres-  
sing the laws, and taking off the mask.

Determined, though he was, and with-  
out doubt the boldest of men ; the idea of Passage of  
the Rubi-  
con. the evils he was going to bring on the world,  
and of the dangers to which he was going to  
expose himself, struck him in that critical  
moment so forcibly, as to intimidate him in  
a manner, and for a while suspend his activity.  
He



A. R. 703  
Ant. C. 49.

He stopped short on the bank ; and turning towards his friends, among whom was the famous Asinius Pollio, said to them : \* “ We may yet  
“ go back : but, if we pass over this little  
“ bridge, we put every thing to the decision of  
“ arms.”

Suetonius relates a pretended omen that happened at that instant. A man of extraordinary size and shape appeared on a sudden, sitting in the neighbourhood, and playing on a rural flute. Not only the shepherds, but some of the soldiers and trumpeters, got about him to hear his music. This man snatches the trumpet from one near him, puts it to his mouth, sounds a charge, and passes to the other side of the river. If the fact is true, it was perhaps of Cæsar’s own contrivance, in order to hearten his troops. However that be, he immediately cried out, †  
“ Let us go where the Gods, and the injustice  
“ of our enemies, call us. The die is cast.” It was thus he made that decisive, dangerous, step ; stifling all reflections of its terrible consequences : || like a man, says Plutarch, who shuts his eyes, and muffles his head, to avoid seeing the abyss, into which he is going to precipitate himself.

Cæsar  
makes  
himself  
master of  
Rimini.

Cæsar, having passed the Rubicon, marched directly to Rimini, and made himself master of it. There he found the two Tribunes, Anthony and Cassius ; and he took care to shew them  
to

\* Etiam nunc regredi  
possimus : quod si pœni-  
cium transierimus, omnia  
armis agenda erunt. Suet.  
Cæs. 31.

† Hæc, quo decorum atten-

ta. & inimicorum iniquitas,  
volat ; jacta est alea.

|| Ὡςπερ οἱ περὶ τῆς  
αἰωνίου ἀρχῆς ἀπο κρίσεως  
τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ. μυστὰς τῶν λο-  
γιστῶν, καὶ παρακαλοῦμαι  
περὶ τοῦ θένον. Plut Pomp.



to his soldiers in the servile habit they had been obliged to put on for their security. This sight extremely exasperated the soldiery, who made fresh protestations to their General, that they would follow him wherever he should lead them.

What Cæsar foresaw fell out. When the surprize of Rimini was known at Rome, it threw the whole city into the greatest consternation. This was not proportioned to the reality of the evil, which indeed was considerable. They expected every minute to see Cæsar at the gates of Rome, with his ten legions, and crowds of Gauls and Germans. Pompey himself lost his presence of mind. He had more troops about him than his rival. But he was so harrassed and teased by the reproaches of every body, that he could not preserve the tranquillity necessary on extraordinary occasions, nor come to a resolution worthy of his courage and prudence. Every one complained of his conduct : that he should raise Cæsar to such a height of power as made him formidable to his Country ; and that, when he knew he was in no condition to make head against him, he should reject all means of accommodation. They demanded of him where the forces were that he ought to have assembled. For, as they thought Cæsar had with him his ten legions, they would have been glad that Pompey had at least as many ; and, as he had nothing like such a force, Favonius (alluding insultingly to the speech that escaped him some time before) advised him, to stamp on the ground and raise soldiers.

Pompey was, without doubt, much to blame on this account. He had told the Senate, that he had ten legions in readiness ; but, when they were

A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 48.

*Terrible  
consternation at  
Rome.*

*Pompey is  
universally  
reproach-  
ed, and  
quite dis-  
concerted.*



A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

were wanted, nothing appeared any wise proportionable to his promise : so that being interrogated on this head by Volcatius Tullus, a Consular person, he answered in confusion, that he had the two legions that came from Gaul ; and also about thirty thousand new levies, which only wanted marshalling. Upon which Tullus cried out, “ You have deceived us, “ Pompey ; ” and proposed sending Deputies to Cæsar.

Plut.  
Pom. and  
Cato.

Cato himself contributed to chagrin Pompey by an unseasonable reflection. For, when every body admired with what penetration and sagacity, that generous, and knowing, Republican had long foretold, what they at last saw fulfilled : “ Yes indeed, says he, if you had believed me, you would not be now reduced, “ either to fear one man ; or to put all your “ hopes in one man.” Cato indeed had always preached the necessity of guarding against Cæsar. And in particular, on occasion of a letter wrote by Cæsar to the Senate full of invectives against him ; after it had been read, Cato spoke ; and, having easily refuted a frivolous, ill-supported, accusation, he recriminated on Cæsar, and unfolded all his projects and his whole scheme with as much exactness as if he had been his confident and accomplice, not his enemy ; concluding, that it was not the Germans, nor the Celtæ, but Cæsar, that they ought to fear, and guard against. It was this reiterated advice that Cato now blamed Pompey for not having attended to. “ You have judged better than “ me, says Pompey to him, concerning futu- “ rity : and I have followed too much the im- “ pulse of friendship.” However, whatever aversion Cato had to all authority and command  
that



that was contrary to law ; he did not, on this occasion, shew an ill-timed inflexibility, but advised the investing Pompey with the whole power of the State ; saying, that such as did great mischief could best remedy it. His advice was followed ; and a decree passed, importing, that there was a “ Tumult ; ” that is, that a civil war was broke out ; and that the city was in danger ; and therefore, it was necessary, that all the citizens should take up arms.

The first use Pompey made of the supreme authority which had been conferred on him, or rather confirmed to him, was to abandon Rome ; and to order all the Senators to leave it, and follow him ; with express declaration, that he should consider those who staid behind as Cæsar’s partizans. This looked like a desperate resolution. He endeavoured in vain to justify it by the example of Themistocles, who did the same at Athens on the approach of the Persian army. In vain he laboured to establish the maxim, that certain walls and houses do not constitute one’s Country.—These reasons would not pass. However, at the same time they condemned the conduct of their General, they loved his person : and that day may be even considered as one of the most glorious of Pompey’s life ; since all the illustrious persons at Rome went out of it with him. Flight, and exile, in Pompey’s company was to them their Country ; and Rome without him, Cæsar’s Camp. I shall not describe here the tumult and disorder of this flight, as it is easily conceived. I shall take notice only of this singular circumstance, that, while those who were in Rome fled from thence with precipitation, the inhabitants

A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

Pompey  
leaves  
Rome, and  
is followed  
by the Ma-  
gistrates,  
and the  
whole Se-  
nate.  
Cic. ad  
Att. 7. 2.



A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49

of all the neighbouring cities hastened thither with equal earnestness, to get out of the way of Cæsar: and in all that part of Italy the roads were filled with an infinite number of men and women, who impeded, and ran against one another, by a sort of flux and reflux.

The Consuls went out of Rome, even before they had performed the sacrifices and ceremonies of religion, which the duty of their office required; a thing that never had happened before. The Prætors, the Tribunes of the People (at least the major part of them) the Consular persons, in a word, almost all the Senators, followed Pompey with such unanimity, that some of Cæsar's partizans were carried away by the torrent: even Piso, his father-in-law, went out of Rome with the rest.

*The parti-  
sans of  
Cæsar and  
Pompey  
compared  
Cato alone  
a friend to  
the Repub-  
lic.*

Cæsar. ad  
Cic. l. 8.  
Ad Fam.  
ep. 14.  
Suet. Cæsar.  
c. 27.

Thus all the majesty of the Republic was with Pompey, but all its strength was with Cæsar. I speak not merely of his legions. He had long been the patron of all who were guilty of crimes, or deeply in debt, and of all the debauched part of the youth. He assisted those with his protection and money, whose affairs were not irrecoverable. He frankly told others, whose wants and crimes were irremediable, that they wanted a civil war. By these means he had secured a vast number of creatures; all men fit for action, bold, and who depended absolutely on him. It is easy to conceive what strength and support a party may have from such a collection.

\* “Cæsar's cause, says Cicero, has no assistance from justice: every other assistance and advantage it has.”

\* Among

\* Causam solum illa causa non habet: ceteris rebus abundat. Cic. ad Att. vii. 3.



\* Among so many Romans, some partizans of Cæsar, some of Pompey, it is difficult to find any partizans of the Republic: and perhaps she had no other than Cato. I borrow this reflection from Seneca, who proves it sufficiently. “ If you would, says he, have a faithful representation of those times; you will see on one side the People, and all those the bad state of whose affairs made a change of government necessary; on the other, the Nobles, the Equestrian order, all that was illustrious and respectable in Rome; in the midst, Cato and the Republic, alone and abandoned of all.” For Cato was not in fact much more satisfied with Pompey than with Cæsar; since, if he had determined to kill himself, should the last be the conqueror; he had also resolved to go into exile, if the first was victorious.

This discovers another defect in the famous verse of Lucan, censured besides with reason for its impiety in putting in parallelism the approbation of the Gods, and that of a man. † “ The Gods, says he, approved of the Victor; but Cato of the Vanquished.” Cato was far from approving of the Vanquished; only, reduced to so wretched an alternative, he thought him the better of the two. For the rest, every thing afflicted and distressed him. His very exterior was declarative of his grief. For, from the day

Plut. Cat.

R 2

the

\* Quum alii ad Cæsarem inclinarent, alii ad Pompeium; solus Cato fecit aliquas & Reipublicæ partes. Si animo complecti volueris illius imaginem temporis; videbis illinc plebem, & omnem erectum ad res novas vul-

gum; hinc optimates, & equestrem ordinem, quidquid erat in civitate lecti & sancti; duos in medio relictos, Rempublicam & Catonem. *Sen. ep. 104.*

† Victrix causa Deis placuit, sed Victa Catoni.



A. R. 703. the war began to his death, he neither cut his  
 AEL. C. 49. hair nor beard ; nor ever wore a garland, as  
 was customary at their entertainments ; in a  
 word, he carried on his person all the marks of  
 deep mourning and extreme affliction.

*Pretended  
 presages.  
 Death of  
 Perperna.*

I shall not relate the pretended prodigies on  
 the approach of this cruel war, with which the  
 antient writers abound. I shall only observe,  
 that the minds of people being terrified, and  
 therefore more disposed to superstition, found  
 presages even in the most common and natural  
 events. Thus because Perperna died at this  
 time, at the age of ninety-eight, being the last  
 of all those who were Senators when he was  
 Consul, and leaving behind him only seven of  
 those whom thirty-seven years before (being  
 Censor with Philip) he had put on the list of  
 Senators ; they fancied that his death, so cir-  
 cumstanced, foretold the ruin of the Senate, and  
 a change of government.

*Pompey  
 raises  
 forces  
 throughout  
 Italy.  
 Different  
 Chiefs subs  
 as under  
 him.*

Pompey, when he left Rome, went towards  
 Campania ; designing to get into Apulia, where  
 were the two legions he had finessed from Cæ-  
 sar. He did not confide much in these legions,  
 fearing they had some attachment left for their  
 old General. His resource, therefore, was to  
 raise men all over Italy, and to endeavour to  
 maintain himself there, if possible ; or else, in case  
 of necessity, to cross the sea, that he might get  
 time enough to draw from the East a numerous,  
 well-affected, army. For his reputation was  
 great in those parts, where he had performed  
 many signal exploits. But he studiously con-  
 cealed the latter scheme, which would have dis-  
 credited his arms, and seemed to have no other  
 design than to defend Italy. Many subordi-  
 nate



nate Commanders were in possession of its provinces, and enlisted every one they could get. Cicero presided over the coast of Campania. But, desirous as he was of peace, he did not enter warmly into military operations. His intention was, to mediate between the two parties, as long as there remained any hopes of an accommodation. Lentulus Spinther, P. Attius Varus, Domitius Ahenobarbus, and some others, served their party with more spirit; but not with more success, as we shall soon have occasion to relate.

While Cæsar was yet at Rimini, a young Gentleman of the same family and name, and the Prætor Roscius, came to him with offers of peace. Though they were not formally deputed, yet Pompey had ordered them to make his compliments, and even in some sort excuses, to Cæsar. He told them, “ that he was not actuated by enmity to Cæsar; “ but purely by zeal for the Republic, whose “ interest he had ever preferred to any private “ engagement. That it was worthy of Cæsar “ to act conformably to this maxim; and not “ prejudice the Commonwealth, by pushing “ too far his revenge against his private enemies.” It is plain that Pompey, by taking this step, had a mind to enter into a negotiation, not with an intention to make peace, but doubtless to get time; as he had been surprized, and found his levies were not so easily made as he imagined.

Cæsar, who was not more disposed to peace, had a mind, however, to have the reputation of desiring it. He gave to young L. Cæsar and Roscius new proposals, which he thus recounts himself: “ Let Pompey go into Spain;



A. R. 703. " let \* all the armies be disbanded ; let every  
 Ant. C. 49. " body throughout Italy lay down their arms ;  
 " let every thing that participates of terror and  
 " force be removed ; let the elections of Magi-  
 " strates be made with perfect freedom ; and  
 " let the Republic be administered by the au-  
 " thority of the Senate and People." And, in  
 order to settle the particulars of the execution  
 of these articles, he demanded an interview with  
 Pompey.

Cic ad  
 Fam. 16.  
 12.

Cicero further explains some of these articles. According to him, Cæsar promised to resign Transalpine Gaul to Domitius, and Cisalpine Gaul to Considius. He relinquished the privilege he had obtained of demanding the Consulship by proxy, and declared that he would come and stand for it in person, according to strict form.

These proposals had an air of moderation, and Cicero entertained hopes of their success. He thought Cæsar began to be ashamed of his violent procedure ; and he knew Pompey was dissatisfied with the forces he had about him. But these hopes soon vanished. Pompey insisted, as a preliminary, that Cæsar should return to his obedience, and quit Rimini and the other posts he had seized on out of his province. For, during the negotiation, he had by no means discontinued the war. Cæsar, on the other side, wanted Pompey and the Consuls to set a good example, by suspending the levies they were making, and dismissing the forces they had already assembled. Besides, though Pompey promised to go into Spain, he fixed no time for his departure. And lastly, as to the interview desired

\* Cæsar's text is " ipsi exercitus dimittantur ; " which is plain, faulty. I read " cuncti," instead of " ipsi."



desired by Cæsar, he declined giving any answer about it. Cæsar therefore thought he had a right to discontinue the negotiation. He dispersed all over Italy a sort of manifesto, wherein he gave most specious reasons for his conduct, and even challenged Pompey, as one who broke his word, and was afraid of an eclaircissement. It is doubtless, in this piece, that (with his usual address and care to make friends) he declared, that he should consider all those, as his friends, who did not act against him. This policy was the better judged, as Pompey talked in the opposite stile, and protested, that he would treat as enemies all those who were wanting to the cause of the Republic, whose defender he was.

A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.  
Dio.

Suet. Cæf.  
c. 75.

Labienus had raised his spirits by coming over to his side, while the accommodation was on foot. He was, as we have seen, the most famous of Cæsar's Lieutenants, and him for whom that General had the greatest esteem, and most confided in. Pompey's party boasted much of the justice of their cause, which had procured them such a deserter, and reckoned much on his skill. But he brought them scarce any thing besides vain hopes, occasioned by his undervaluing in his discourse the forces of Cæsar. As for the rest, he was of little real service to them. \* Labienus had seemed an excellent Officer, while he acted under Cæsar ; from the time he left him, he performed nothing equal to the reputation he had acquired. Cæsar behaved to him with his wonted generosity, and sent after him his money and baggage.

Labienus  
goes over  
to Pompey.  
Cic. ad  
Att. 7. 9.

R 4

Mean

\* — Fortis in armis

Cæsareis Labienus erat, nunc transfuga vilis.

Lucan V. 345.



A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.  
Cæsar's  
progress.

Mean while, he carried on the war vigorously ; and, though he had yet only the thirteenth legion with him, he made himself master of Pesaro, Fano, Ancona, and Arezzo in Tuscany. At the same time he raised forces all over Picenum, and scouted every where Pompey's partizans. I shall not enter into the particulars of his less important expeditions. I shall content myself with saying, that without drawing the sword he compelled Thermus, who was then Prætor, to give up to him \* Iguvium ; Attius Varus, Osimo ; and Lentulus Spinther, Ascoli. But he was obliged to lay siege to Corfinium, into which Domitius Abenobarbus had thrown himself, with many illustrious persons and a good number of troops.

\* Eugubio.

He besieges  
Domitius  
in Corfinium.

This was a good capture for Cæsar, and he was obliged for it to the rashness of Domitius ; who, finding himself at the head of thirty cohorts, would needs act the man of importance. Pompey had wrote to him, to come and join him in Apulia ; representing, that they had no chance to dispute Italy but by the junction of all their forces ; and that, if he kept separate, he would be infallibly ruined. This was good advice ; but subordination and obedience are rare in civil wars. Domitius undertook to make head against Cæsar, and hinder his advancing. He had even thoughts of going into Gaul, the Government of which country had been given him by the Senate. But Cæsar allowed him no time. He marched against him ; and, at the first rencounter, his advanced parties routed five of Domitius's cohorts, who were breaking down a bridge about three miles off of Corfinium : after which he sat down with two legions before a town, whose garrison was more



more numerous than his army. It is true, that A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49. more of his troops soon came up ; which enabled him to form a second camp on the other side of the town, under the Command of Curio.

When Domitius saw himself besieged, he was very sensible of his danger. He wrote immediately to Pompey ; desiring him to come to his assistance, and not leave, to the mercy of Cæsar, thirty cohorts, and a great number of Senators and Roman Knights. While he waited for Pompey's answer, he made preparations for a vigorous defence, and endeavoured to encourage his troops by magnificent promises.

This was a most untoward affair for Pompey. To abandon so great a body of troops, and so many persons of distinction, would be a great loss and discredit to his party. On the other side, his army was weak ; except the two legions, we have mentioned several times, and on whose fidelity he could not depend, he had nothing but new-raised troops about him. To risque an engagement with such, against Cæsar's veterans, was to expose himself to immediate and irretrievable ruin. He came therefore to a resolution becoming a man of sense and skill ; and though he knew his conduct was condemned as timid, as appears by Cicero's letters (who I think in that has not done him justice) he answered Domitius ; that it was his business to extricate himself as well as he could out of the difficulties he had brought on himself, and that he ought to endeavour at all events to join him.

Domitius, inclosed in Cæsar's lines, was no longer able to execute what Pompey advised. His courage and haughtiness immediately left him, and he determined to save himself by flight. He put, however, as good a face on Domitius's  
troops promise to deliver him  
into Cæsar's  
hands. the



*A. R. 703.* the matter as he could, and promised his troops  
*Ant. C. 49.* speedy assistance from Pompey ; exhorting them to make a vigorous defence, and hold out until he could come up. But his trouble and confusion belied his words ; besides, he was observed to hold frequently little councils of his friends and intimates ; so that the truth transpired, and the troops learnt that they were not to expect any succour, and that their Commander was about to leave them and make off. Upon which they resolved to consult also their safety, and send a deputation to Cæsar. The burgesſes at firſt opposed this, not knowing the true ſtate of affairs ; but in a ſhort time they came to a good underſtanding with the garrifon, and jointly ſecured the perſon of Domitius ; ſending word to Cæſar, that they were ready to open their gates, receive his orders, and deliver up Domitius alive. Cæſar gladly accepted of the offer ; but, as it was near night, he would not take poſſeſſion of the town immediately, leſt it ſhould be plundered in the dark by his ſoldiers. He therefore ordered his troops to keep a ſtrict watch round the city, and prevent a ſingle perſon from eſcaping. Cæſar obſerves, that this was performed with the utmoſt care and vigilance ; and that his whole camp was in great expectation of his determination as to the fate of the burgeſſes, and illuſtrious perſons ſhut up in the town.

*Lentulus  
 Spinther,  
 who was  
 in Corfi-  
 nium, ob-  
 tains par-  
 don.*

Lentulus Spinther was one of theſe ; who, having been drove out of Aſcoli, as I have mentioned, had ſought ſhelter in Corfinium. More unfortunate in this place than in the firſt, he reſolved to eſſay the clemency of the Victor. Accordingly, about the fourth watch of the night, he called from the wall to the guard,  
 and



and desired to be conducted to Cæsar. He was <sup>A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.</sup> carried to him under a good escort, not of Cæsar's soldiers, but of those of Domitius; who were so fearful of the reproach of having broke their agreement, that they attended him until delivered into Cæsar's hands. Lentulus was not mistaken in the opinion he had entertained of his enemy's generosity. He had scarce began to implore his mercy, when Cæsar interrupted him by saying, "that he was not come out of  
" the bounds of his province with an intent to  
" injure any body; but to repel the injuries done  
" him by his enemies, to revenge the wrongs  
" of the Tribunes, and to restore to the Roman  
" People, who were oppressed by a small fac-  
" tion of the Nobles, their liberty and privi-  
" leges." When Lentulus found himself out of danger, he asked leave to return into the town, "where some, he said, were so terrified, that  
" they had took desperate resolutions." He meant Domitius, whose adventure is very singular.

We have seen Domitius acting for several <sup>Domitius</sup> years as a declared enemy to Cæsar. He had <sup>resolves to</sup> laboured to his utmost to get him recalled, and <sup>poison him-</sup> had lately obtained his Government from the <sup>self.</sup> Senate. Measuring therefore Cæsar's hatred for <sup>His Physi-</sup> him by his own for Cæsar, when he found he <sup>cian, in-</sup> should fall into his hands, he expected no quar- <sup>stead of</sup> ter; and, bold through desperation, determined <sup>poison,</sup> to kill himself, that he might not be killed by <sup>gives him</sup> his enemy. He accordingly ordered his Physi- <sup>a soporific.</sup> cian, who was one of his slaves, to give him a dose of poison, which he drank courageously, and threw himself on a bed. Some hours after, Lentulus arrives, and gives him an account of Cæsar's clemency. Domitius now deplores his desperate situation, and accuses himself of blindness and precipitation. His Physician comforts him:



A. R. 703. him : “ Be of good cheer, says he, I have  
Ant. C. 49. “ given you a soporific, and no poison : it  
“ will do you no manner of hurt.” Domi-  
tius, upon this, takes heart, and waits patiently  
for the time of his appearance before Cæsar.

*Cæsar  
pardons  
Domitius  
and the  
other pri-  
soners.*

At day-break Cæsar ordered before him all the Senators, Senators sons, military Tribunes, and Roman Knights. Besides Lentulus and Domitius, who were Consular persons, there were in the town three other Senators, one of whom was then Quæstor ; also Domitius’s son, and many young men of quality ; a great number of Roman Knights, and some Decurions, or Senators of the neighbouring municipal towns, who had been sent for by Domitius. Cæsar gave orders to secure them from the insults of the soldiery ; and, after reproaching them with their animosity to him, which he pretended he had not deserved, he set them all at liberty, without so much as requiring any sort of promise from them. He did more. Domitius had brought to Corfinium \* six millions of Sesterces, which had been given him by Pompey, to pay his forces with. This therefore was public money ; and Cæsar might very well have took it. He returned it however to Domitius ; † being willing, as he himself says, to shew himself generous, as well as merciful. As to Domitius’s troops, he took them into pay, and, soon after, sent them into Sicily.

Such was the plan of conduct, that Cæsar prescribed himself, on this first occasion, and which he pretty nearly adhered to, on every

\* *Forty-six thousand eight hundred and seventy-five pounds, sterling.*

† *Ne continentior in vita hominum, quam in pecunia fuisse videatur. Cæf. de B. Civ. l. l. n. 23.*



other : a conduct laudable on all accounts ; on account of his clemency to the Commanders, so unusual in civil wars ; on account of the great advantage it gave him of augmenting his forces, after every victory, by gaining to his party the vanquished soldiers ; and on account of the honour that his generosity conferred on his arms and cause, whose injustice it, to this day, covers, in the eyes of many.

Cæsar rejoices himself on this account, in a letter to Balbus and Oppius, two of his friends ; but he discovers, at the same time, the interested, ambitious, motive of his clemency. “ \* I am glad, says he, that you approve of my behaviour at Corfinium. — Let us endeavour to regain, if possible, by such means, the affection of every body ; and procure a long enjoyment of the fruits of victory. For the others, by their cruelty, made themselves odious, and reaped little benefit from their conquest ; Sylla excepted, whom I am resolved not to imitate. Let us set the example of a new method of conquering, and insure our fortune by clemency and generosity.” This letter manifests Cæsar’s settled determination at that time to seize on the Sovereignty, and keep possession of it : from whence it follows, that all his negotiations about peace were insincere, or only aimed at bring-

\*. Gaudeo mehercule vos significare literis, quam valde probetis ea quæ apud Corfinium gesta sunt . . . Tentemus hoc modo, si possumus, omnium voluntates recuperare, & diuturna victoria uti : quoniam reliqui crudelitate odium effugere non

potuerunt, neque victoriam diutius tenere, præter unum L. Syllam, quem imitaturus non sum. Hæc nova sit ratio vincendi, ut misericordia & liberalitate nos muniamus. *Ep. Cæs. apud Cic. ad Att. l. ix.*

ing



A. R. 703. ing Pompey to submit to him, with the rest of  
 Ant. C. 49. his countrymen ; which was scarce to be expected.

Cic. ad Domitius and Lentulus, when they left Cæsar's  
 Att. l. ix. camp, went to hide their disgrace in their country-houses ; where they shut themselves up some time, giving way to their melancholy reflections. Lentulus even said, that he had done enough for Pompey ; and that he thought himself obliged to give proofs of his gratitude to Cæsar. However, we shall soon see them both re-appear on Pompey's side, and distinguish themselves, by their inveteracy against him, to whom they owed their lives. It would not be surprizing to find Cæsar inclined to punish such ingratitude : But his haughty, generous soul, was above such thoughts : he explains himself, on this subject, in the noblest manner, in a letter to Cicero \*. “ It is no reason, says he, “ that I should repent of my clemency, because I am informed, that those I set at liberty at Corfinium are gone to war against me “ again. I am rather pleased to find them all “ of a piece, as it becomes me also to be.”

*Cæsar  
 pursues  
 Pompey,  
 who shuts  
 himself up  
 in Brundisium.*

Cæsar was detained but seven days before Corfinium ; and, as soon as he had brought that important affair to a conclusion, he decamped ; and, though the morning was far advanced, he made a whole day's march. He went in pursuit of Pompey, who had no other resource, but to retire into Brundisium. Tho' he was much nearer that town than his enemy,

\* Meum factum probari à te triumpho gaudeo. Neque illud me movet, quod n̄ qui qui à me dimissi sunt discessisse dicuntur, ut mihi

rursus bellum inferrent. Nihil enim malo, quam & me mei similem esse, & illos sui. *Ep. Cæs. ad Cic. l. ix. ad Att.*



yet Cicero was afraid that Cæsar would get there first \*. “ This man, says he, in a fright, “ is a monster, for activity, vigilance, and “ dispatch.” Pompey, however, had time to throw himself into Brundisium with what forces he had been able to save and assemble. These were not considerable, though he had not refused any sort of succours ; and had even armed, if we may believe Cæsar, the shepherds and slaves. Cæsar came before the town on the eighth of March, with six legions ; four of which were old troops, and two new-raised. It was no small work, surely, to have mastered all Italy, one city excepted, since the eighth or ninth of January.

On his march, he made prisoner Cn. Magius, Pompey’s † chief Engineer ; and, according to custom, immediately gave him his liberty, and sent him to his General ; charging him to ask and press for an interview, as a sure means to settle every thing. He says, in his Commentaries, that Magius brought him back no answer from Pompey. But we have a letter from Cæsar to Oppius and Balbus, which proves the contrary. “ Pompey, says he, has “ sent Magius to me, with overtures of peace ; “ and I have answered him what I thought “ proper.” It is difficult to reconcile these contradictions, but by supposing that Cæsar has not been scrupulously faithful, as to facts, in his Commentaries, particularly in what regards the civil war. Asinius Pollio, who accompa-

A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

*New steps taken by Cæsar towards a peace. He has sometimes disguised the truth of facts in his Commentaries. Ep. Cæs. apud Cic. ad Att. l. ix.*

\* Hoc tempore horribili vigilantia, celeritate, diligentia est. Cic. ad Att. viii. 9.

† I venture to translate, thus, “ Præfectus fabrum”,

which literally signifies “Commander of the workmen” who follow an army. D’ablan-court calls him, “ Intendant des machines.”



A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.  
Suet. Cæf.  
c. 56.

nied him in several expeditions, expressly accused him of it, as Suetonius relates. So that this great man, this generous, elevated soul, disdained not to dishonour himself by falsehood, and to suppress the truth, in a work destined for posterity : such are the fruits of ambition.

Pompey had no sooner got into Brundisium, but he dispatched from thence Metellus Scipio to his Government of Syria, and, with him, his eldest son, Cn. Pompeius ; ordering them both to assemble, from all parts of the East, powerful forces, by land and sea. He persuaded also the Consuls to go over to Dyrrachium \*, in Epirus, with thirty cohorts ; and prepared to follow them. He was suspicious of them both, but particularly of Lentulus, whom Cæsar, by Balbus, continually solicited ; making him the greatest promises, if he would return to Rome. The departure of the Consuls broke Cæsar's measures, in this respect ; and Caninius Rebilus, one of his Lieutenants, being ordered by him to enter into a negotiation with Scribonius Libo, father-in-law to Sextus, Pompey's youngest son, was answered, That it was impossible to treat with him, in the absence of the Consuls.

*Cæsar besieges Pompey, who goes over to Epirus.*

Cæsar therefore thought of nothing now but shutting up Pompey in Brundisium ; and, while he besieged the town by land, he endeavoured to construct a mole and staccado to block up the port. They fought vigorously on both sides about these works for nine days ; when, the vessels that had transported the Consuls being returned, before Cæsar's works were compleated, Pompey got every thing ready for the embarkation of the twenty cohorts he had with him.

But



But, fearing that Cæsar would enter the town, and attack him, while he was embark-<sup>A. R. 703:  
Ant. C. 49:</sup>ing, he walled up the gates, barricaded the streets, or cut ditches across them, filled with pointed stakes, covered with hurdles and earth; and fortified, with a double pallisado of very strong, well-sharpened stakes, the two streets left open to get at the port. When all was in readiness, while the soldiers embarked, he placed on the walls and towers some archers and slingers, who were to retire, at a certain signal, to embark on some small vessels that waited for them, and join the fleet.

He had forbid the inhabitants of Brundisium, whom he mistrusted, to stir out of their houses. They found means however to advertise Cæsar of Pompey's departure. Immediately the scaling-ladders are applied to the walls, and Cæsar enters the town. His soldiers had like to have fallen into the snares and ditches provided for them by the enemy. But the townsmen acquainted them with their danger; to avoid which, they were obliged to take a great circuit, which gave Pompey time enough to put to sea. Two transports only, impeded by Cæsar's mole, were taken, with the troops on board.

Thus fled Pompey from that port, where <sup>Reflection</sup> he landed a few years before, with so much <sup>on Pompey's</sup> glory, at the head of a victorious army, laden <sup>flight.</sup> with the spoils of the East. He set out by abandoning to his rival the capital of the Empire; he now abandoned to him all Italy: a timid conduct, had it been possible to have done otherwise; but a prudent one, if there was no other way to get time to strengthen his hands. Plutarch affirms, that many thought



A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

the scheme he formed at this conjuncture, and the manner in which he executed it, one of his most glorious military exploits : and, whoever considers what advantage and superiority Cæsar had then over him, will easily ( I imagine) come into the same opinion. No one, probably, would have dissented, had Pompey been victorious at Pharsalia.

His fault was, his not being prepared against the attack, and his having put his enemy on desperate terms, before he could make head against him. True it is, that Cæsar's situation was much more convenient than his, for commencing the war. Cæsar's province was contiguous to Italy ; it was but a little way from the Rubicon to Rome ; whereas the legions Pompey had in Spain could not get at him, but by crossing the southern part of Gaul, of which Cæsar was in possession. Whence it happened, that Pompey made no other use of the excellent troops under his Command, than to get time to raise others.

*Cæsar, determined to go into Spain, first into Sardinia, and then into Sicily.*

Cæsar would willingly have followed Pompey into Greece, and taken advantage of his confusion and weakness, to finish the war at a blow. But he had no ships ; and was also apprehensive, that, while he was beyond sea, Afranius and Petreius, Pompey's Lieutenants in Spain, might fall on Gaul, and, perhaps, on Italy itself, with their five legions. He determined therefore to begin by securing them ; and \* to go first into Spain, as he says, to fight an army, without a General ; and afterwards to go against a General, without an army. But

\* *Ita se ad exercitum sine ducem sine exercitu.* Suet. *Cæs. c. 34.*  
duce, & inde reversurum ad



first he took the necessary precautions to secure, A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49. during his absence, the coasts and environs of Italy. He ordered the Magistrates of those municipal towns that were sea-ports, to assemble all the vessels they could, and send them to Brundisium. He sent Valerius, one of his Lieutenants, into Sardinia, and Curio into Sicily, to subdue these two islands, from whence Rome drew her chief subsistence. Curio had also orders to pass over into Africa, when he had mastered Sicily. As for himself, he thought it necessary to appear at Rome.

Valerius had but one legion ; but that was The Sardinians more than he wanted, to execute his commis- drive out sion. On the first rumour of his approach, the Cotta, inhabitants of Cagliari drove out of their city and re- Cotta, who governed the island for the Senate ceive Va- and Pompey. All the other cities of Sardinia lerius. were of the same mind : so that Cotta was forced to abandon his province, and retire into Africa ; and Valerius had nothing to do, but to take possession of the vacant post.

Cato was Governor of Sicily, and acted with Cato re- his usual vigilance and diligence. He refitted tires out the old ships ; he built new ; he raised forces, of Sicily, not only all over his island, but also in Lucania, without and the country of the Brutii. When all these paying for preparations were in great forwardness, he was Curio. informed that Asinius Pollio was come to Mes- Plut. Cat. sina. He had been sent there by Curio, who Appian was hastening to follow him, with three legions. Dis. Cato, who was at Syracuse, dispatched an express to Pollio, to demand by whose order, and by what title, he entered in arms into his province. Pollio returned, for answer, that he did it by the order of him who was Master of Italy. This was the best account he could give.



A. R. 703.  
Ann. C. 49.

For nothing could be more irregular than a commission granted by a Proconsul of Gaul, to dispossess him, whom the Senate had appointed Governor of Sicily. Pollio also informed Cato's messenger of what had passed in Italy, with respect to Pompey's flight; and added, that Curio was to follow him. Cato, who abhorred civil wars; and who, besides, though he knew he was strong enough to drive Pollio out of Sicily, did not think himself in a condition to make head against Curio; assembled the inhabitants of Syracuse, and told them, that, as being unable to defend the island, he would not make it the theatre of war, to no purpose; that he had therefore resolved to retire; and that the best thing they could do was to submit to the Conqueror.

This manner of thinking and acting was undoubtedly very humane and laudable. I wish Cato had not thereto joined some disrespectful complaints against Providence; which, he said, had given Pompey success in a thousand unjust projects; and now, that he defended a just cause and the public liberty, deserted him. But triumphant injustice, and unfortunate virtue, are inconsistencies which nothing but the revelation of future rewards and punishments can reconcile.

If we believe Cæsar, Cato reproached Pompey also with having provoked a war he was in no condition to sustain. These reflections might as well have been omitted: But is the fact certain? Cæsar hated Cato; and was, perhaps, glad to put him in a ridiculous light. Cato went from Sicily into the island of Corcyra, and from thence into Pompey's camp.

Cæsar,



Cæsar, in his return from Brundisium to Rome, saw Cicero ; who, being, according to custom, irresolute, through seeing too much, had not yet chose his party. It is really curious to follow, and study, the flux and reflux of the contrary sentiments, which, by turns, agitated this great and sublime genius, without other effect, than tormenting him ; and without his being able to come to a final conclusion. To lay before the reader all that is interesting in this matter, it would be necessary to transcribe three books of his letters to Atticus. But I shall confine myself to what is most important.

A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

Cicero's  
plexity,  
and uncer-  
tainty.

Cic. ad  
Att. vii.

He left his Government of Cilicia, as I have already observed, exactly at the time that the difference between Cæsar and Pompey waxed warm, and threatened an approaching rupture. He was immediately struck, not only with the unhappy consequences of such a division, with respect to the Republic in general, but also with the personal difficulties it would lay him under, in particular. He thought he had been very polite in keeping on good terms with both of them. This was, to him, reconciling his duty and interest. Their authority sufficiently secured him from all danger ; and he was not afraid of being drawn into any bad measures, either by Pompey, who conformed then to the best maxims ; or by Cæsar, who was then in friendship with Pompey.

Nothing could have been better contrived, if the friendship of two ambitious men could have been lasting. Cicero was deceived in that particular ; and he saw the time was come, when he was to declare for one, against the other. They had both wrote to him ; and they both told him, that they relied on his friend-



A. R. friendship ; though Cæsar, at the bottom, mistrusted him a little. This threw Cicero into great perplexity. His choice was fixed, if they came to blows\*. “ In that case, says he to Atticus, “ I had rather be conquered with Pompey, than “ be victorious with Cæsar.” But things were not yet come to that. It was, at first, only a dispute, within the Senate, or, at least, within Rome. An accommodation was possible ; and Cicero was unwilling to make Cæsar his enemy, while he could avoid it, by a premature declaration. It would have been even indecent, in him, for a private reason : For he was actually in Cæsar’s debt. But he resolved to free himself from that tye, by paying him, and applying to that use the money he had set apart for his triumph.

Cic. ad  
Att. vii.  
5 & 6.

For he had pretensions to a triumph, as I have elsewhere said ; and those very pretensions offered him some relief in his perplexity ; which he did not neglect. It was natural for him to covet that honour, the object of the wishes of all those who had commanded an army. And, as the prosecution of his claim obliged him to keep out of Rome, he had a lawful excuse for not appearing in the Senate. Pompey himself was willing he should avoid displeasing, by a needless declaration, some Tribune, who might oppose his triumph. So that all the contests about Cæsar, between the Consuls and Senate, on one side, and the Tribunes, Curio and Anthony, on the other, passed over without Cicero’s being any wise concerned therein. He thus reserved to himself the part of

\* Si castris res geretur, victo cum altero vinci satis esse, quam cum altero vincere. Cic. ad Att. vii. 1.



peacemaker ; a glorious part, suitable to his character, talents, and situation ; and in which he had done well to have persevered to the last. But his heart and engagements were for Pompey. Him he exhorted in private to peace ; resolved nevertheless to follow him, if he chose war.

Not that he had a good opinion of Pompey's intentions. \* “ Victory, says he, will certainly give us a Tyrant. Neither the one, nor the other, aims at our good and advantage. They both want to reign. What an unhappy situation are we in, with respect to the war we are entering upon ! We expect to be proscribed, if we are conquered ; and to be slaves, if we are victorious. Pompey has always wished for such a power as Sylla had. He does not so much as conceal it. He commonly says, What Sylla could do, why should not I be able to do ? His heart and tongue approve Sylla and his proscriptions.”

But if Cicero was dissatisfied with Pompey, and apprehensive of the consequences of the victory ; he detested Cæsar, and abhorred his cause. He thought his demands impudent, he considered him as a profligate robber, and, when Cæsar had commenced hostilities by taking Rimini and some other towns, Cicero thus expresses his indignation : “ O wretched mad

S 4

“ of

\* Ex victoria tyrannus exisset. Neutri σκοπεῖσθαι est ille, ut nos beati simus : uterque regnare vult. Depugna, — ut quid ? Si victus eris proscribare ; si viceris, tamen servias. Mirandum in modum Cnæus nosse Sullani regni

similitudinem concupivit, εἰδώς τοι λέγω. Nihil ille unquam minus obscure tulit. Quam crebro illud ? Sulla potuit, ego non potero ? Sullaturit animus ejus & proscripserit. *Cic. ad Att.* vii. 5, viii. 2. vii. 7. ix. 7, & 10.







“ so unjust a desire.” Can there be any thing <sup>A. R. 703.</sup> more forcible than this invective ; any thing <sup>Ant. C. 49.</sup> more noble than these sentiments ?

If to this we add, that Cicero thought, at the beginning of the war, that Cæsar’s victory would be cruel ; that he would shed blood like Cinna ; that he would confiscate and plunder like Sylla ; in a word, that he would be a second Phalaris ; we may conceive what aversion our Orator had for Pompey’s rival : and if, on the other side, we recollect his opinion of Pompey ; we shall not be surprized at his writing to his friend, \* “ I know whom I ought “ to fly ; but I know not whom I ought to “ follow.”

However, his inclination, as I have observed, was for Pompey. It was not only gratitude for being recalled from exile ; it was love, it was tenderness. He often indeed blames the conduct, and steps, of that General in his letters to Atticus ; but it is always with bitter grief, with infinite regret. After Cæsar had shewn his clemency to the prisoners at Corfinium, which redounded so much to his honour, and by comparison to Pompey’s shame ; Cicero is afflicted at the parallel. † “ Is it not, says he, a most “ lamentable thing, that he, whose cause is de- “ testable, should gain applause ; and that the “ defender of the good cause should deserve “ blame and reproach ? That the first should “ be

\* Quem fugiam, habeo ; quem sequar, non habeo. *Cic. ad Att. viii. 7.*

† Quid hoc miserius, quam alterum plausus in scdissima causa quærere, alterum offensiones in optima ? alterum

existimari conservatorem inimicorum, alterum desertorem amicorum ? — Sed hæc omittamus : augemus enim dolorem retractando. *Cic. ad Att. viii. 9.*



A. R. 723. " be the preserver of his enemies, and the other  
Ant. C. 49. " the deserter of his friends ? " He adds some  
more reflections of the same sort ; then stop-  
ping short, " let us conclude, says he, for I  
" increase my affliction by reflecting who  
" causes it."

This tenderness is renewed at every untoward accident, at every danger, that threatened Pompey. † " O grief, cries he, we are told that  
" Cæsar is in pursuit of Pompey. Cæsar pur-  
" sues Pompey ! With what intention, good  
" Gods ! To kill him ? Ah wretched me !  
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" bodies as a rampart before him ! Your af-  
" fliction, doubtless, equals mine, my Atti-  
" cus. But what can we do ? We are con-  
" quered, oppressed, and reduced to perfect  
" impotence."

It was no easy matter for Cicero to follow Pompey in his retreat ; and he could not do it with a good-will, as all his steps displeased him. The abandoning of Rome, the neglect of Corfinium, and, above all, the design of quitting Italy, disgusted him greatly. And Pompey had took all these resolutions very mysteriously, of his own head, without communicating them to any body. Notwithstanding, when Cicero knew he was besieged in Brundisium, and also when he heard he was gone into Greece, he was in the utmost despair. He reproached himself bitterly for not having accompanied him every where ; he thought himself therein guilty

† Pompeium, o rem acer-  
bam ! persequi Cæsar dicitur.  
Persequi Cæsar Pompeium !  
quid ! ut interficiat ? O me  
miserum ! Et non omnes

corpora nostra opponimus ! In  
quo tu quoque ingemiscis.  
Sed quid faciamus ? Victi,  
oppressi, capti plane sumus.  
*Cic ad Att. vii. 23.*



ty of the most scandalous behaviour ; his grief <sup>A. R. 703.</sup>  
was immoderate. \* He compares himself in <sup>Ant. C. 49.</sup>  
this situation to a lover, who had been for a  
time disgusted by the disagreeable manners, neg-  
ligence, and indelicacy, of his mistress. “ In  
“ the same manner, says he, his shameful  
“ flight, and unpardonable negligence, had  
“ stifled my affection for him. I saw nothing  
“ in all Pompey did, that could invite me to  
“ accompany him in his retreat. But, now he  
“ he is gone, my love awakes ; I cannot bear  
“ to be at a distance from him ; nor books,  
“ nor letters, nor philosophy, can make me  
“ easy. I turn my eyes day and night to the  
“ sea, like a bird that is going to take its  
“ flight.” These impulses were very forcible,  
but afterwards divers reflections counter-balanced  
them. Cicero came to himself again, when he  
considered the strength and formidable activity  
of Cæsar ; and Pompey’s weakness, and the  
perpetual mistakes he thought he saw in his  
conduct. If he was not satisfied with the Gene-  
ralissimo, he heartily despised almost all his follow-  
ers. To begin with the Consuls, † he thought  
they deserved the least esteem of any men in the  
world. They were lighter than leaves, or fea- <sup>Cic. ad</sup>  
thers. He looked on L. Domitius as a brute ; <sup>Att. viii.</sup>  
and on Ap. Claudius as a weather-cock. On  
the

\* Sicut ex τοις σπυρτικοις  
alienant immundæ, insulsæ,  
indecoræ, sic me illius fugæ,  
negligentiæque, deformitas  
avertit ab amore. Nihil enim  
dignum faciebat quare ejus  
fugæ comitem me adjunge-  
rem. Nunc emergit amor ;  
nunc desiderium ferre non  
possum ; nunc nihil libri,

nihil litteræ, nihil doc-  
trina, prodest ; ita dies &  
noctes, tanquam avis illa,  
mare prospecto, evolare cu-  
pio ix. 10.

† Caves putes quidquam  
esse minoris his Consulibus.  
vii. 12.

Consules pluma aut folio  
facilius moventur. viii. 15.



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\* Sicut *ἐν τοῖς σπυρίκοις* alienant immundæ, insulsæ, indecoræ, sic me illius fugæ, negligentiaque, deformitas avertit ab amore. Nihil enim dignum faciebat quare ejus fugæ comitem me adjungerem. Nunc emergit amor ; nunc desiderium ferre non possum ; nunc nihil libri,

nihil litteræ, nihil doctrina, prodest ; ita dies & noctes, tanquam avis illa, mare prospecto, evolare cupio ix. 10.

† Caves putes quidquam esse minoris his Consulibus. vii. 12.

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A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

the other side, he was staggered by the example of Ser. Sulpicius, and some other weighty persons ; who, though they went out of Rome with Pompey, seemed to be getting nearer and nearer to Cæsar. Add the sollicitations of Cæsar himself, and of those friends Cicero had in his party. Yet all this could not surmount the invincible aversion he had to Cæsar ; but only somewhat weakened his attachment to Pompey.

viii. ad

Fam. 14,  
15, 16.

We have some letters from Cœlius to Cicero, about this important affair. Cœlius was a man of great genius, but wanted solidity, and was very deficient in moral principles. \* He wrote to Cicero very frankly, that in civil commotions, as long as the contest was merely verbal, it was right to take the justest side ; but, when the quarrel came to be decided by the longest sword, it was proper to take the strongest side ; and to think that best, that was safest. He had himself reduced this maxim to practice ; and, though he had always appeared zealous for the aristocratic party and the laws, he left Pompey and the Senate in the critical moment, and went over to Cæsar. Cicero was far from embracing such a system. † “ Cœlius, says he to Atticus, has “ not persuaded me to alter my way of think- “ ing : I rather pity him for having altered his.”

Cæsar

wants Ci-  
cero to go  
with him  
to Rome,  
and appear  
in the Se-  
nate.

Cicero re-  
fuses.

Neither Cæsar, nor any body for him, ever desired Cicero to bear arms against Pompey. It would have been an indecent proposal, which had no probability of success. But he had those who

\* Illud te non arbitror fu-  
gere, quin homines in dis-  
fensione domestica debeant,  
quamdiu civiliter sine armis  
ceteris, honestiorem sequi  
partem ; ubi ad bellum &  
castra ventum sit, firmiorem ;

& id melius statuere quod tu-  
tius sit. *Ep* 14.

† Tantum adest ut meam ille  
(Cœlius) sententiam moveat,  
ut valde ego ipsi, quod de  
sua sententia decesserit, pœ-  
nitendum putem. *Cic. ad  
Att. viii. 3.*



who wrote to him, and he wrote to him A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49. several times himself, to persuade him to go to Rome with him. This was his motive. He wanted much to decorate his party ; which, though strong, was void of splendor and dignity. The Consuls and all the Senators having retired with Pompey, there remained in the capital only the lower people, and a few persons of some rank, such as Atticus and some others. Cæsar therefore, though in possession of Rome, would have been there in a manner alone, or at least without wherewith to represent the form of a Commonwealth. To obviate this inconvenience, he took great pains to re-assemble at Rome all the titled persons he could, in order to do honour to his cause. It was with this view that he strongly solicited the Consul Lentulus ; but, as we have seen, without success. He was more lucky with respect to some of the Prætors, Tribunes of the People, and other inferior Magistrates. He succeeded also with Ser. Sulpicius, Volcatius Tullus, and M. Lepidus, all Consular persons. But Cicero would have given an incomparably greater lustre to the Senate ; which was going to be assembled by Cæsar's orders, and under his eyes. Cæsar thought it worth while to make an effort himself ; and to try if he could not obtain that by an interview, which had been refused to his letters. Accordingly, in his return from Brundisium, he went through Formiæ where Cicero was.

Our Orator was prepared for this shock, and sustained it nobly. Cæsar pressed him extremely to come to the Senate ; and went so far as to say, that he thought his honour concerned, and that Cicero's absence, in these circumstances, was a condemnation of his cause. When he found

Cic. ad  
Att. ix.  
18.



A. R. 703. found he got nothing by his importunity,  
 Ant. C. 49. “ well, adds he, come, if it is but to speak  
 “ about peace. Shall I be suffered, says Ci-  
 “ cero, to speak of it according to my real  
 “ sentiments? Can you doubt of it, replies  
 “ Cæsar, and do you think I shall attempt to  
 “ dictate to you what you are to speak? In  
 “ that case, answers Cicero, I shall say that the  
 “ Senate does not approve of invading Spain,  
 “ nor of transporting troops into Greece; and  
 “ I shall deplore the unhappy situation of Pom-  
 “ pey.” Cæsar hereupon interrupted him by  
 saying, that this was a language not to be suf-  
 fered. “ I knew that well, replies Cicero, and  
 “ that is the reason why I will not go to the  
 “ Senate; since I must either stay away, or  
 “ speak there in the stile you have heard.  
 Cæsar was extremely piqued, and dropped these  
 “ words, “ that, since those who could give  
 “ him advice would not, he would take ad-  
 “ vice of whoever would give it, and should  
 “ proceed to extremities.” However, to get  
 off decently, he advised Cicero to reconsider  
 the affair, before he made his final determina-  
 tion. This could not be refused; and Cæsar  
 went away, leaving Cicero well satisfied with  
 himself, with reason; for it required courage to  
 resist so formidable a man. However, we  
 cannot but applaud Cæsar’s moderation;  
 who, when he could have forced him, suffered  
 this resistance. It is true, he had no right to  
 compel Cicero to do what he desired. But there  
 is some merit in a man’s not doing all the ill he  
 is able to do.

Cæsar’s retinue alone would have been enough  
 to have hindered Cicero from joining him, if  
 he had not so many other reasons against it.  
 It



It consisted of people, infamous for debauchery, loaded with debts, contemners of law and religion, judicially branded, banished for crimes. Cicero knew them all, but had never seen them all together before. What a collection ! How could he have associated with such wretches ! Satisfied, however, that he had offended Cæsar by his obstinate refusal, he resolved to cross the sea, and go after Pompey.

He did not hurry himself in the execution of this resolution. The indifferent opinion he had of Pompey's proceedings, and of the conduct of the heads of his party ; the notion that crossed him of retiring to Malta, or some other neutral city ; the sollicitation of Cælius, who wrote him a kind, pathetic, letter, conjuring him not to run into destruction ; the intreaties of his wife Terentia and of his beloved daughter Tullia, who, by Atticus's advice, begged him to defer his departure, until the success of Cæsar's war in Spain against Pompey's Lieutenants was known ; all this delayed his voyage above two months, but altered not his resolution.

At last he embarked on the seventh of June, with his son, who a little before had put on the *toga virilis* at Arpinum ; and, having got into Pompey's camp, was received with open arms by every one, except Cato, who alone blamed him. “ I could not help, says he to him, acting agreeably to the system I have followed my whole life. But, as to you, you was not necessitated to declare yourself Cæsar's enemy, and expose yourself to danger. You ought to have continued neuter, that, if there had been at any time an opening for peace, you might have acted as a mediator.”

A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

*after much delay, at last goes to Pompey's camp.*

Cic. ad Att. x.  
Cœl. ad Cic.

viii. ad Fam. 16.

Cic. ad Fam. xiv. 7.

*Cato justly blames that step.*  
Plut. Cic.



A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

Cato's reflection was just, and Cicero soon became sensible of its truth. Unfit for war, and besides too clear-sighted to overlook any of the faults of his party, he could not help talking of them; and expressing his discontent, and repentance of the engagements he had entered into. In consequence of which Pompey grew very cool to him, and gave him no share in the management of affairs. Thus Cicero was of no advantage to the party for which he declared; and got nothing by it himself but vexation, trouble, and danger.

*Cæsar comes to Rome, and affects great moderation in his speeches to the Senate and People.*  
Cic. ad Att. 9. 12

We now return to Cæsar, who went directly from his interview with Cicero to Rome. That city was already, before his arrival, somewhat recovered from the trouble and horrible agitation it had been thrown into by the flight of Pompey and almost all the Senate. Several Prætors administered justice there; the Ædiles were making preparations for the public games; trade and private affairs were returned into the old channel. Cæsar's solicitations had also brought back some Senators of distinction; and, when he came to town, the Tribunes Anthony and Q. Cassius convoked the Senate in one of the suburbs, that Cæsar might be present without violation of the laws, which he pretended to respect in some degree.

*Cæsar de B. Civ. l. 32.* There Cæsar pleaded his cause, and endeavoured to throw all blame on his enemies and Pompey. After which he added these words, which in my mind are very remarkable: \*  
“ That he desired the Senators to undertake the  
“ admi-

\* Orat ac postulat, Rempublicam suscipiant atque una secum administrarent. Sin timore defugiant, illi se oneri

non defuturum, & per se Rempublicam administraturum.



“ administration of the Republic jointly with  
 “ him. But that, if they declined it through  
 “ fear, he would take upon himself the bur-  
 “ then, and govern alone.” This seems to me  
 almost a direct proposal to them to make him Dic-  
 tator. And indeed it was proper to have some ti-  
 tle to cloke his enterprizes with. For all he had  
 done since the passage of the Rubicon was abso-  
 lutely irregular, and wanted even the form of legal  
 authority. What confirms me in this opinion, ix. ad Atti.  
 is, that it appears by a letter of Cicero, that the  
 nomination of a Dictator was already bruited  
 about. But this was what could not be brought  
 to bear at this time. People probably were not  
 sufficiently prepared as yet. And Cæsar, who  
 was not scrupulous, continued to act as he had  
 began, by force alone.

He concluded his discourse to the Senate, by  
 saying, † “ That it would be proper to send a  
 “ deputation to Pompey, to treat of an ac-  
 “ commodation. That, for his part, he was  
 “ not frightened at the difficulty that Pompey  
 “ started some time before in the Senate; and  
 “ that he did not think, that to send Deputies  
 “ was to acknowledge the superiority of him  
 “ to whom they were sent, and a sign of timi-  
 “ dity in the sender. That this was a little,  
 “ low, way of thinking; and that, in the  
 “ same manner, as he had endeavoured at a su-  
 “ periority in action, he should also strive to  
 “ be superior in justice and equity.”

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T

Thus,

† Legatos ad Pompeium  
 de compositione mitti oportere.  
 Neque se reformidare quod in Senatu paulo ante  
 Pompeius dixisset, ad quos  
 legati mitterentur, eis aucto-  
 ritatem attribui, timoremque

eorum qui mitterent signifi-  
 cari. Tenuis atque infirmi  
 hæc animi videri. Se vero  
 ut operibus antea studuerit,  
 sic iustitia & æquitate velle  
 superare.



A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

Thus, such men as Cæsar make a jest of the most sacred opinions, the most venerable maxims. Justice was what he little troubled himself about; but he was glad to procure the appearance of it, by shewing an inclination for a peace, which he knew impracticable; and which he would have opposed, had he thought it feasible.

Dio.

He spoke in the same stile to the People, who assembled also out of the city to hear him. He promised them, besides, to take great care to keep up plenty in Rome, by sending corn from Sicily and Sardinia, and made a donative of \* three hundred sesterces a man. In consequence of these pacific discourses, the Romans resumed the habit of peace, which had been disused from the taking of Rimini. But they were far from being easy. The great number of Cæsar's soldiers in the city; the small confidence to be put in a language which the circumstances of affairs might dictate; the examples of Marius and Sylla, who had made as fair promises at first, however oppositely they acted afterwards; all these things created anxiety and terror.

Cæs.

What strengthened these suspicions was, that the deputation proposed by Cæsar was never sent. No Senator would undertake it; whether they were afraid of Pompey, as Cæsar says in his Commentaries, or were aware of the impossibility of projecting a peace between two enemies, who neither of them desired it.

*He is not  
able to do  
as things  
he intend-  
ed.*

Cæsar came to Rome with an intention to do many things, which he does not acquaint us with, but which we may in part guess at. The Dictatorship

\* *Two pounds six shillings and ten pence 1/2* also penny.



tatorship for himself, the recalling of those A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49. who had been banished in consequence of the laws made by Pompey in his third Consulship, were, probably, some of the most considerable. Without entering into particulars, he says in general, that the Tribune L. Metellus, suborned by his enemy, opposed and hindered him in every thing; and made him waste several days in Rome, to no purpose. But he entirely omits the most violent contest he had with that Tribune. The reason of which omission will sufficiently appear from the simple relation of the fact.

He wanted money; and resolved to take all He breaks he could find in the public Treasury. Metellus open the opposing this, Cæsar spoke to him with unusual public haughtiness. “It is not to the purpose, says Treasury, “he, to talk of law in the midst of arms. spite of “I am Master, not only of the Money, but the Tri- “of the Lives of all those I have conquered.” bune Me- These terrible words did not intimidate the tellus's op- Tribune; and, as it was necessary to break position; open the doors of the Treasury, the Consuls and takes having carried away the keys, he ran thither, away all to prevent, by the authority of his office, such the gold a violence. Cæsar, losing all patience, threat- and silver ened him with death, in express terms; and he finds added, “Young man, consider, that it costs there. “me more to say such a thing, than to do it.” Lucan. III.  
Plut. Cæsar.  
Appian.  
Dio. The Tribune hereupon, being terrified, retired.

Some people yet ventured to represent to Cæsar, that there was in the Treasury some money forbid to be meddled with, under the most horrible imprecations, unless in a war with the Gauls. “I have entirely removed, “says Cæsar, that scruple, by subduing Gaul,



A. R. 703; “ and putting it out of the power of the Gauls  
 Ant. C. 49 “ to make war on us for the future.” He  
 then commanded the doors and locks to be  
 broke open, and took away all he found there;  
 Plin which was, according to Pliny, twenty-five  
 xxxiii. thousand bars of gold, thirty-five thousand of  
 3. silver, and \* forty millions of sesterces.

The same Pliny reports, that Cæsar, at the  
 Idem, xix. same time, took out of the Treasury fifteen  
 3. hundred pounds of *Lasfer* of Cyrene, a drug  
 of great price among the ancients, and much  
 esteemed by them, not only for medicinal use,  
 GeoE:oi. but also for sauce. This drug is, however, ac-  
 Mat. Med. cording to the opinion of an author much to  
 T. II. be depended on in these matters, what we now  
 p 606. call *Affa-fœtida*, whose smell and taste is scarce  
 to be borne. Yet even at this time the Ori-  
 entals are very fond of it.

Cæsar doubtless was, with reason, ashamed  
 to transmit to posterity such an heinous outrage.  
 He seems to have had a mind to palliate it  
 somewhat, by slipping into his narration a fact,  
 Cæ de which, if true, would excuse the most odious  
 B. Civ. I. circumstance attending it. He relates, that  
 14 the Consul Lentulus, soon after he left Rome,  
 was sent back again, by Pompey, to take the  
 money out of the public Treasury; and that,  
 while he was there, he imagined, on a sudden  
 (on a false alarm) that the enemy was at the  
 city-gates; which frightened him so, that he  
 thought of nothing, but saving himself; and  
 made off, leaving the Treasury open. This  
 fact, in itself not very probable, is entirely de-  
 stroyed by the concurring testimony of all other

\* Above three hundred thousand pounds, sterling.



writers; who affirm, that Cæsar found the Treasury shut, and broke it open. A. R. 703: Ant. C. 49.

It is also certain, that this audacious action rendered him odious to the People, till then, devoted to him. This he so well knew, that he durst not harangue them, as he proposed, before his departure. Cicero observes \*, that he did himself hurt, destroying, by plundering the Treasury, the opinion he laboured to inculcate of his opulence; and, by his threats to Metellus, the affected clemency he so much valued himself upon. Cic. ad Att. X.

It was not his enemies only, who considered his clemency as affected: Curio talked in the same strain. He told Cicero, that Metellus's death, had he made himself be killed, would have been the signal for a general massacre; that Cæsar was not naturally merciful, but only affected it, to make himself popular; and that, if he once found he had lost the favour of the People, he would become cruel. But these discourses of Curio rather shew what he himself thought, than what Cæsar thought. In fact, all those who were about him, persuaded him to put his enemies to the sword. And it is this that makes the encomium of his clemency, and proves the glory thence resulting to be due to him alone, since he constantly adhered thereto, against the advice, and maugre the sollicitation of those who did him the greatest service. His clemency is thought affected; but wrongly. Cic. ibid.

\* Qui duarum rerum simulationem tam cito amiserit, mansuetudinis in Me-

tello, divitiarum in ærario. *Cic. ad Att. X. 8.*



## S E C T. II.

*Cæsar, before he sets out for Spain, appoints Commanders in his name in Italy, and several provinces. Marseilles shuts its gates against him; he besieges it. He cuts down a consecrated wood, to employ it in his works. He leaves the conduct of the siege to Trebonius, and continues his route to Spain. Pompey's forces in Spain. Afranius and Petreius encamp on the Segre, near Lerida. It appears, that Cæsar's army was strong and numerous. Gaulish cavalry. He straitens the enemy. Fight, in which he does not succeed. He is in great difficulties. He recovers his superiority. He obliges the enemy to leave their camp. He pursues them, and prevents their passing the Ebre. He spares his enemies, when he has it in his power to cut them to pieces; chusing to reduce them to lay down their arms. Treaty almost concluded between the soldiers of the two armies. Petreius prevents its execution. Cruelty of that Lieutenant of Pompey. Cæsar's clemency. The war renewed. Cæsar, by harassing and distressing his enemies, compels them to surrender. Interview of Afranius and Cæsar; who insist only on the disbanding of the adversary troops. That condition is agreed to, and executed. Cæsar easily subdues ulterior Spain; after which he goes before Marseilles. Account of what had passed at the siege of Marseilles, in Cæsar's absence. Persuay charged on the inhabitants of Marseilles, with little probability. Cæsar's severe, but not cruel, behaviour to them. Cæsar's party receives a check in Illyrium. The soldiers of one of Cæsar's cohorts kill*



## CLAUDIUS, CORNELIUS, Consuls.

*kill one another, rather than surrender Curio passes over into Africa, to wage war with Attius Varus, and Juba, King of Mauritania. Curio's success, at first. Varus endeavours to debauch his troops. Curio's constancy in that danger. His discourses to the Council of war, and the soldiery. The soldiers promise fidelity. He defeats Varus. Juba comes to the assistance of Varus. Curio's presumption. Battle, in which Curio's army is entirely routed. Curio makes himself be killed on the spot. Unhappy fate of almost all who were not slain in the battle. Juba's cruelty and arrogance. Reflection on the misfortune and rashness of Curio.*

**C**ÆSAR, before he set out for Spain, took A. R. 703. Ant. C. 43. proper measures to secure the possession of Cæsar, Italy, and the provinces he left behind. He before he gave the Government of Rome to Lepidus, sets out then Prætor; and who afterwards usurped the for Spain, Sovereign Power (with Anthony and young appoints Cæsar) under the title of Triumvir. Anthony, Command. who was then Tribune, had the care of Italy. ers in his His brother, C. Antonius, had the Government name in of Illyricum, and Crassus that of Cisalpine Gaul. Italy, and Cæsar also gave orders for building and equip- several ping two fleets; one on the Adriatic Sea, and Provinces. the other on the Tuscan. Dolabella, Cicero's son-in-law, had the Command of the first; and the son of the Orator Hortensius that of the second. We have seen, that Valerius had been sent into Sardinia, and Curio into Sicily, to go from thence into Africa. Cæsar's care extended even to Syria, and the East. He set J. F. xiv. at liberty the unfortunate Aristobulus, formerly 13. King of the Jews, that he might go into Judæa, and raise some commotions, if possible,



A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

*Marseilles  
shuts its  
gates a-  
gainst  
him: he  
besieges it.  
Cæsar de  
B. Civ.  
l. 34.*

\* Hist.  
Anc.  
T. IX.  
l. XX.  
Ann. II.  
§ 2.

and thwart Metellus Scipio, who was assembling forces in Syria, for Pompey's service. When he had made these dispositions, Cæsar thought he might give himself entirely to his Spanish expedition. The city of Marseilles occasioned a delay, which, I believe, he did not expect.

When he came near it, he found the gates shut; and was informed, the inhabitants made all sorts of preparations for a vigorous defence, in case they were besieged. The citizens of Marseilles thought they performed the duty of ancient and faithful allies of Rome, by espousing Pompey's party, with whom they saw the Senate and Consuls. I may even say, that, having the greatest veneration for the laws of probity and virtue (for \* such they are represented by ancient writers) they could not be well-affected to Cæsar. It is true, they had some obligations to him; but so they had to Pompey too, who had reminded their Deputies thereof, when constrained to leave Rome. For these reasons they had determined not to admit Cæsar into their city; and it appears, that they had even entered into engagements with Domitius; who, since the affair of Corfinium, had concealed himself at an estate he had on the coast of Tuscany, and had equipped seven barks, with which he had actually set sail for Marseilles.

Cæsar was not a man to put up the affront done him by the Marseillians, in refusing him admittance into their town. He sent for the Chiefs of the Public Council, and endeavoured to bring them over by gentle exhortations, pronounced however with the force of authority. These Deputies, having heard him, returned into the town, and brought back the answer of  
their



their Senate to this purpose : “ That they saw  
 “ the Romans divided into two parties ; and  
 “ that it did not belong to them to decide  
 “ such a quarrel. That at the head of these  
 “ parties were Pompey and Cæsar, both of  
 “ them patrons and protectors of their city.  
 “ That, in such a conjecture, it best became  
 “ them to be neuter ; and to refuse both of  
 “ the Competitors admittance, either into their  
 “ city, or port.” This language was specious, but insincere ; for, at the same time that they excluded Cæsar, they admitted Domitius ; who got by sea into the town, and took the military Command.

Cæsar was therefore necessitated either to retire ignominiously, or to besiege Marseilles. He chose the latter ; brought three legions before the town, and began to erect batteries. For the construction of the towers, galleries, and other works, then used in sieges, he ordered a neighbouring wood to be cut down. This wood was consecrated ; and the soldiers were scrupulous about it. Cæsar, who was not at all superstitious, or, to speak properly, not at all religious, but an absolute Epicurean, in speculation and practice ; takes himself an ax, cuts down a tree, and, by his example, overcomes the timid reluctance of his soldiers.

To deprive the besieged of the advantage of the sea, he built at Arles twelve gallies ; which were launched within thirty days from the cutting of the wood they were composed of. He gave the Command of this little fleet to D. Brutus ; and, having directed the siege, left the care of it to Trebonius ; and continued his route towards Spain, where he had sent before him C. Fabius, with three legions, that had wintered

A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

*He cuts down a consecrated wood, to employ it in his works.*  
Lucan, l. III.

*He leaves the conduct of the siege to Trebonius ; and continues his route to Spain.*



A. R. 703. wintered about Narbonne. His other legions,  
 Ant. C. 49. whose quarters were more remote, had orders to follow, as fast as they could.

*Pompey's  
 forces in  
 Spain  
 Afranius  
 and Pe-  
 treius en-  
 camp on  
 the Segre,  
 near  
 Lerida.*

Pompey had a considerable force in Spain. It consisted of seven legions, six of which had been raised in Italy, and the seventh in that country. These seven legions were distributed under three of Pompey's Lieutenants, Afranius, a Consular person, Petreius, who had been Prætor, and \* M. Varro. The first had three of them under him ; and his Government extended from the Pyrenæan mountains to the Guadalquivir. The other two had each two legions ; and commanded, the one in the country between the Guadalquivir and the Guadiana, and the other in Lusitania. Pompey having sent to them Vibullius Rufus, one of those who escaped at Corfinium, to acquaint them, that they must prepare to make head against Cæsar ; they consulted together, and agreed, that Petreius should join Afranius with his two legions ; and that Varro should stay and secure ulterior Spain. Petreius and Afranius, when united, found themselves at the head of five legions, and eighty Spanish cohorts, some light, some heavy, armed ; making, in all, above sixty thousand men. With this force they came and encamped near Lerida, on the Segre ; which they thought an advantageous post. Their camp was on an eminence : they had a communication with the town ; and the Segre in front, over which there was, at that place, a stone-bridge, which secured their pas-

\* I see no reason not to think, that this third Lieutenant of Pompey was the learned Varro ; who had already served under him in the Piratical war.



sage : and in their rear was a fertile plain, terminated by another river, called Cinca. In this situation they hoped to be able to stop Cæsar, and cover all Spain. Afranius had also took possession of the defiles of the Pyrenæan mountains ; but Fabius easily forced them, made long marches towards Lerida, and encamped over-against the enemy, on the other side of the river.

We do not know what number of legions and auxiliaries Cæsar's army consisted of, when it was complete ; not but he had informed us in his Commentaries, but the text is here defective. There is reason to believe it was numerous ; and we know, in particular, that a fine body of Gaulish horse contributed much to his victory.

A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

*It appears that Cæsar's army was strong and numerous.*

*Gaulish cavalry.*

One reason that made Cæsar particularly careful to strengthen his army, was a rumour, that Pompey was coming with his whole force through Mauritania into Spain. This it was too, perhaps, which made him take a singular precaution to secure the fidelity of his troops. He borrowed money of the officers ; which he distributed among the soldiers. And thus secured the first by interest, and the others by gratitude. The officers had entrusted him with part of their fortune ; and the soldiers loved him for his bounty.

Nothing of consequence happened in Spain, during Cæsar's absence ; except that, one of the two bridges Fabius had on the Segre broke down on a sudden, by the violence of the winds and floods, two of his legions were by that accident cut off, and separated from the rest of the army. Afranius laid hold of the opportunity, and attacked them ; and put them

*He straitened the enemy. Fight, in which he does not succeed.*



A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

them in some danger. But, Plancus, who commanded them, making a vigorous defence, Fabius had time to come to his assistance ; whereupon both armies returned to their camps, without much loss on either side.

Two days after this, Cæsar arrived, escorted by nine hundred horse, which he kept for a body-guard. He began by re-establishing, the night after his arrival, the broken bridge. The next day he crossed the Segre, and offered battle to Afranius ; who contented himself with drawing his forces out of the camp, and forming them in order of battle, half way down the hill, but would not descend into the plain. Cæsar, finding he declined an engagement, resolved to straiten him, and to encamp in the very place he had advanced to ; which was within four hundred paces of the hill on which Pompey's Lieutenants were encamped. In order to effect this, he made the third line of his army dig a ditch in front of the enemy, while the two first continued in battalia. This was done without any interruption from Petreius or Afranius, who had not the least suspicion of what he was about : and, when it was finished, Cæsar retreated, with his whole army, behind the ditch, and passed there the night. The following days he compleated the whole circuit, with its ramparts and parapets ; following throughout the same method, and keeping the greatest part of his troops under arms, to cover those who worked. He thus formed a camp, in the sight of the enemy, without loss, hazard, or inconvenience ; and brought into it all that remained in the old camp, which was six cohorts, with the baggage.

Between



Between the hill that Pompey's Lieutenants occupied, and the city of Lerida, was a plain of about three hundred paces ; in the midst of which was a rising ground, which Cæsar wanted to take possession of ; because, by that means, he could cut off Afranius's communication with the town where his magazines were, and also with the stone-bridge. Afranius, having found out his design, was aware of the consequences. There was a long and sharp combat about that hillock ; wherein Cæsar's troops had like to have been defeated ; and, at last, though they behaved well, Afranius had the advantage, as he kept the possession of the hillock. He then fortified it, and posted there a large body of troops.

Cæsar observes, that one reason for his not succeeding in this action was, that the enemy's manner of fighting was new to his soldiers. For, having been long in Spain, they had, as it is usual, given into the manners of the country. They fought almost like Barbarians ; advancing boldly, and then retiring ; neither taking care to keep their ranks, nor thinking it dishonourable to quit their post. This method is certainly inferior to that of fighting in a compact body, without stirring : but, as it was new and unexpected, it disordered Cæsar's soldiers.

This beginning of bad fortune to Cæsar was soon followed by other disasters. The Segre, being swelled in an extraordinary manner, broke down the two bridges Fabius had built over it : so that Cæsar found himself shut up between two rivers, the Segre and the Cinca, in a space of no more than ten leagues, in want of provisions, which he could not get from

*He is in great difficulties.*



A. R. 703. from the country itself, because Pompey's Lieu-  
Ant. C. 49. tenants had eat it up ; nor receive by convoys  
from Gaul and Italy, as he could not cross the  
river. Afranius, on the contrary, abounded in  
all things. He had large magazines ; and  
besides his bridge, as it was of stone, had with-  
stood the force of the water ; so that he was at  
liberty to extend himself, and secure the pas-  
sage of every thing that came to his camp.  
The Spaniards that were in his army did him  
great service, and incommoded Cæsar much.  
They were acquainted with the country, were  
active and alert, scoured about, and fell on all  
who straggled from Cæsar's camp in search of  
provisions and forage. The rivers themselves  
did not impede them ; they were accustomed  
to pass them on blown-up skins, which they  
always brought with them into the field. Thus  
was Cæsar in a manner besieged, and in danger  
of having his army ruined by want.

He endeavoured to re-establish his bridges,  
but could not get the better of the obstacles he  
met with from the water and enemy at once.  
A great convoy was come from Gaul, consist-  
ing of archers, Gaulish horse, with many carts  
and much baggage, and about six thousand  
men, of all sorts, without discipline or com-  
mander. The river stopped them short. Asra-  
nius, having intelligence of it, crossed the  
Segre with all his cavalry and three legions ;  
and attacked them, when they least expected  
it. The valour of the Gaulish horse saved  
them ; for, by their long resistance, they gave  
the others time to gain the mountains, where  
they were safe. They only lost two hundred  
archers, a few troopers, and some servants and  
baggage.

This,



This, however, was an additional misfortune to Cæsar. The price of provisions rose upon it in his camp ; and a bushel of corn, which was near a fourth less than ours, sold there for fifty denarii \*.

A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

This news having reached Rome, and being exaggerated, as usual, by common report, and the letters of Pompey's Lieutenants and their friends, Cæsar was thought to be undone ; and many illustrious Senators, who, till then, had doubted for whom to declare, went into Greece, thinking it a step in which they ran no risque, and which, notwithstanding, was not so late as to subject them to the reproach of having waited for the event of things. I do not know, whether Cicero is to be ranked with these, or whether he was gone some time before.

Cæsar well knew how to bring back fortune ; *He re-* and to prove that a great genius, though in- *covers his* volved in difficulties, is always superior to men *superiority,* of moderate capacities, to whom circumstances have given some advantage. And this is the expedient he thought of. He built some light barks, in imitation of some he had seen in Great-Britain, whose keel and ribs were of wood, and the rest of wicker, covered with leather. When he had got a sufficient number, he sent them by night, in waggons, twenty-two miles off his camp. In these he embarked a good number of soldiers, and sent them over the river ; took possession of a little hill on the other side ; threw up a fortification before the enemy thought of hindering him ; posted a legion in this fortification ; and then threw a bridge over the Segre in two days.

\* *Almost eight shillings.*



A. R. 703.  
AUL. C. 49.

The first use he made of his bridge, was to collect the great convoy that had been in such danger : the subsistence of the troops became hereupon easier ; and, the very day the bridge was finished, great part of his cavalry went over, and fell on the enemy's foragers, who expected nothing less ; cut to pieces a whole Spanish cohort, and returned to the camp with great booty. At the same time Cæsar had good news from the siege of Marseilles ; which heartened his army greatly : and, from this period, Cæsar acquired a superiority over Afranius, which continually increased, till his decisive victory. His cavalry, which was very fine and numerous, harrassed the enemy greatly. They no longer durst disperse for forage ; or, if they did, suffered for it. At last, they were reduced to forage in the night, contrary to the general custom of war.

As soon as Cæsar's affairs were in a good situation, the neighbouring nations eagerly sought his friendship ; and, in consequence of it, sent him provisions. Afranius lost every day some ally. The spirit of defection spread far and wide ; and some distant nations renounced their engagements with Pompey's Lieutenants, and entered into new ones with Cæsar.

*He obliges  
the enemy  
to leave  
their camp.*

Afranius began to be terrified. Cæsar increased his fright, by one of those enterprizes which shew in him both a genius fertile in expedients, and a courage equal to any attempt. His bridge was above seven leagues off his camp, and consequently his cavalry had a great way to go to cross the river. He bethought himself of draining the river, by turning some of its water into canals thirty feet deep, so as to  
make



## CLAUDIUS, CORNELIUS, Consuls.

make it fordable. Afranius and Petreius were apprehensive, that, when the work was finished, Cæsar's cavalry would entirely cut off their provisions and forage. They therefore thought proper to quit a post that was no longer tenable ; and to carry the war into Celtiberia, where Pompey was in great repute, on account of his exploits against Sertorius, whereas the name of Cæsar was little known. They reckoned to get from thence considerable reinforcements ; and, by taking the advantage of places, to spin out the war, and so gain the winter.

In order to execute this plan, they were to pass the Ebre. They therefore collected all the boats to be found on that river, designing to make a bridge of them at Octogesa, a city on the Ebre, at a small distance to the left of the Segre, and twenty miles from their camp. They perceived that Cæsar's work advanced. Already the water of the Segre was so diminished, that the cavalry could, with some difficulty, pass over, and it took the infantry no higher than the shoulders. Pompey's Lieutenants thought it now time to retreat, and, having first sent over the Segre two legions to mark out a camp, they followed them soon with the rest of their forces, leaving only two cohorts in garrison at Lerida.

Cæsar had a mind to pursue them, but was much embarrassed how to do it. If he went with the whole army over his bridge, he lengthened his march prodigiously, and gave Afranius time enough to get to the Ebre. To expose his infantry, by passing a river, whose height was still so considerable, was to risque much ; and, perhaps, he was afraid, that his soldiers were not disposed to undertake it. His cavalry

A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

*He pur-  
sues them,  
and pre-  
sents their  
post to the  
Ebre.*



A. R. 703.  
A.D. C. 49.

he could use, of which he sent a large detachment over the Segre; who overtake the enemy, harass them, fatigue them, and prevent their advancing. The combatants were seen from the hills near Cæsar's encampment. At this sight the legionary soldiers come of themselves into the sentiments he wished; they are enraged to see the enemy escape them, they address themselves to their Officers, and desire them to beg of their General not to spare them; they declare, that they fear neither danger nor fatigue, and that they are ready to pass the river as the horse had done. Cæsar affected some reluctance, then yielded to their intreaties: and, having withdrawn from every company such as were weak of body or of less courage than the rest, he left them in the camp with a legion and all the baggage. The rest of the army happily passed the river, by the assistance of a double line of cavalry, placed above and below them. Some of the infantry were carried away by the violence of the current, but they were picked up and saved by the horse below them, so that not one man was lost. This great obstacle being overcome, every thing else was easy; and notwithstanding the army was obliged to make a circuit of six miles, notwithstanding the time necessarily lost in crossing the river; the ardour of Cæsar's soldiers was such, that they got up at the ninth hour of the day to the enemy, who had set out at midnight.

When Afranius perceived them at some distance, being with reason intimidated, he suspended his march, halted on an eminence, and formed in order of battle. Cæsar would not hazard an action with his troops thus fatigued, and halted likewise in the plain. On this, the  
enemy



enemy resumed their march, and he the pursuit. A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.  
At last they encamped, in which they committed a great fault. For five miles off were mountains and defiles, where a very small number of men might have stopt Cæsar's whole army, by which means they would have continued their march to the Ebre, without fear or danger. But, being fatigued by a long march, during the whole of which they had continual skirmishes with Cæsar's cavalry, they deferred every thing until the next day. The opportunity, thus neglected, never returned, and this was the cause of their ruin.

About midnight, Cæsar was informed that Pompey's Lieutenants were decamping without noise. Immediately he gives his army the signal to march. The enemy, finding they should be pursued, kept still ; being afraid of a nocturnal fight, wherein they would have had greatly the disadvantage, on account of their heavy baggage which they had with them, and the superiority of Cæsar's cavalry. As, therefore, they could not give the slip to their vigilant adversary, they resolved not to hurry themselves, but to take their own time, and march at their ease by day-light ; satisfied they should be then more able to defend themselves, when attacked on their route. But this was not Cæsar's design. Full of that fire, which we can never admire too much, he had formed a scheme to go round the enemy's camp, and get before them to the defiles of the mountains. Afranius was master of the direct road. Cæsar was therefore obliged to march through vallies and precipices, and over steep rocks, which the soldiers could not climb, but by disencumbering themselves of their arms, and returning them

U 2

after.



A. R. 703. afterwards to one another. In this march they  
 Ant. C. 49. seemed at first to turn their backs on the enemy; wherefore Afranius's soldiers, who observed them from their camp, insulted them on their supposed flight. But they were strangely surprized, when they saw them after some time turn to the right, so that the most advanced of them were near their camp. They then ran all to arms, and were for making haste to the mountains. But the time was past: Cæsar had got the start of them: and as his cavalry perpetually incommoded the enemy, and retarded their march; his legions, notwithstanding the difficult ways, got first to the defiles.

Afranius saw now that he had the enemy both in front and rear. In this distress he halted on an eminence, from whence he detached four Spanish cohorts to take possession of the highest mountain thereabouts. His intention was to get to Octogesa over the hills, as he was debarred the way of the plain. But Cæsar's cavalry surrounded, and cut those four cohorts to pieces, in sight of both armies.

*He spares  
 his ene-  
 mies,  
 when he  
 has it in  
 his power  
 to cut them  
 to pieces,  
 chusing to  
 reduce  
 them to lay  
 down their  
 arms.*

Cæsar had a fine opportunity to exterminate Afranius's army, which, in the consternation it then was, would have made little resistance. He was pressed, on all sides, to give the signal; and the Officers got round him, proving by arguments, which he certainly had no occasion for, that victory was inevitable. But he absolutely refused to engage; because, he knew, he could bring things to a conclusion, without drawing a sword, and reduce the enemy by famine. "Why should I, said he, even supposing the event of the battle to be fortunate, why should I expose to death and wounds soldiers who have deserved so well of me? Why  
 " should



“ should I tempt fortune? Is it less worthy of  
 “ a good General to gain the victory by his  
 “ skill, than by the force of his arms?” He  
 was also, as he assures us, touched with com-  
 passion for Afranius’s soldiers; who, after all,  
 were his countrymen, and whom he must have  
 slaughtered, when he could equally succeed with-  
 out touching their lives. Perhaps, also, he too  
 much despised Pompey’s Lieutenants to match  
 himself with them; and had a mind to reduce  
 them to the mortifying necessity of laying down  
 their arms, and begging quarter.

This his resolution was not at all relished by  
 his army; who, in their discontent, said aloud,  
 that since Cæsar did not lay hold of so favour-  
 able an opportunity, nor let them fight when  
 they had a mind, they would not fight when  
 he had a mind. But nothing could shake him.  
 He was so sure of conquest, that he even re-  
 treated a little, to give Afranius and Petreius  
 liberty to regain their camp, which they did.  
 He then posted troops on the mountains to  
 guard the defiles, and came and encamped as  
 near the enemy as possible.

Cæsar was near reaping the very next day  
 the fruits of his clemency and good conduct.  
 For Pompey’s Lieutenants having undertook to  
 draw a fosse and parapet from their camp to  
 the place where they watered, and being gone  
 to give directions themselves about the work,  
 many of their soldiers, in their absence, entered  
 into conversation with those they knew in Cæ-  
 sar’s army. They began by thanking them  
 for having spared them the day before, owning  
 they were indebted to them for their lives.  
 Afterwards they asked them, if they might  
 trust to Cæsar’s honour; testifying much grief,  
 at

A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

*Treaty al-  
most con-  
cluded be-  
tween the  
soldiers of  
the two  
armies.  
Petreius  
prevents  
its execu-  
tion.  
Cruelty of  
that Lieu-  
tenant of  
Pompey.  
Cæsar’s  
clemency.*



A. R. 723  
A. L. C. 49.

at being obliged to fight with their countrymen and relations, with whom they were united by the holiest ties. At last, they stipulated even for their Generals, whom they would not seem to betray ; and promised, if the lives of Afranius and Petreius were granted them, to change sides. They had already sent some of their principal Officers to negotiate with Cæsar ; and, these preliminaries to an accommodation being settled, the soldiers of both armies went into one another's encampment, so that the two camps were now in a manner one. Things were carried to such a length, that Afranius's son sent to Cæsar, to desire he would give his word for his life, and that of his father. The joy was general, they mutually congratulated each other ; the one, in that they had escaped so imminent danger ; and the other, in that they had brought to a happy conclusion so important an enterprize without striking a blow.

This was the situation of affairs, when Afranius and Petreius, being informed thereof, returned to their camp. Afranius came easily to a resolution, being prepared for all events. But Petreius was not wanting to himself. He arms his slaves, and, joining them to his Spanish guard, falls on such of Cæsar's soldiers as he found among his own ; kills some of them, and forces the rest to make off.

After this he goes through the whole camp, begging his troops with tears to have pity on him, and Pompey their General ; and that they would not deliver them both up to the cruel vengeance of their enemies. Every one upon this flocks to the head-quarters. There Petreius proposes to the army to bind themselves by a new oath, not to abandon nor betray their Com-



Commanders, nor to act separately, but all in concert for the common good. He himself took this oath first, and then exacted it of Afranius, afterwards of the Officers, and lastly of every soldier.

Petreius's zeal stopped not here, he extended it even to cruelty. He issued an order, that all those who had any of Cæsar's soldiers in their tents should signify it, that they might be put to death in the sight of the whole army. Some obeyed ; but the majority detested this bloody order ; they carefully hid those who were under their protection, and procured them means to escape in the night. However, they all punctually observed their new oath. The agreement they had almost concluded with Cæsar was forgot, and nothing was now thought of but renewing the war.

It was in Cæsar's power to have made reprisals, for he had in his camp many of the enemy's officers and soldiers. But he was not at all disposed to make use of that right, which is often considered as legal, but, if coolly examined, is very inhuman. He let them all retire, without putting them in fear. Some of the Tribunes and Centurions chose to stay with him, and take on in his service. He entertained these with pleasure, and always distinguished, honoured, and advanced, them.

Petreius found it easier to renew the war, than to sustain it. He could neither forage, nor water, without much difficulty and danger. Provisions were scarce in his camp, and the Spaniards deserted in shoals. He had no other resource left than to get to some fortress, under whose walls he might shelter himself. He was between Tarragone and Lerida, and was some

*The war renewed. Cæsar, by barrassing and distressing his enemies, compels them to surrender.*



A. R. 703.  
Ann. C. 49.

time before he determined, towards which of those cities he should march. The last being nearest, he resolved to return there.

But the difficulty was how to get at it. Cæsar's cavalry continually harrassed his flying troops. In the plains, the rear, by making head from time to time against it, gave the van means of advancing somewhat. When they fell in with an eminence, they had more advantage; because those who were first could cover them behind. But, when they were to descend, it was exactly the contrary. Then the legions turned upon the adversary cavalry, and endeavoured to drive them back a good way, after which they ran down the valley precipitately, until they came to the opposite eminence. The infantry did all; for their cavalry was so terrified, that, far from being of any service, they were forced to place it in the center, to secure it.

It is easy to perceive, that so painful, and interrupted, a march, could not be expeditious. When Afranius and Petreius had advanced four miles, they halted on an eminence, and drew a line before them, as it were to encamp; but did not unload their beasts of burthen. Cæsar was hereby deceived; he began to establish his camp, pitched his tents, and sent his cavalry to forage. This was what Pompey's Lieutenants wanted. Suddenly therefore, towards noon, they resume their march briskly, hoping to be rid of that formidable cavalry, which so much incommoded them. But Cæsar sets out immediately with his legions, leaving a few cohorts to guard the baggage, and sends orders to his cavalry to return with all diligence. The cavalry returned with all diligence, and, having over-



overtook the enemy before the close of day, at-  
tacked them so vigorously, that they were forced  
to encamp where they then were, far from any  
water, and on very disadvantageous ground.

A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

Cæsar could have given a good account of this army, if he had attacked them. But he pursued his old plan, intending to compel the enemy to surrender, by harrassing them, and cutting them off from all necessaries. They were in the worst of situations. As their camp was bad, they endeavoured to change it. But the farther they extended, in order to better their position, the farther they went from water; and to avoid one inconvenience fell into another. The first night no body went out of the camp for water, and the next day the whole army was obliged to do it in order of battle, so that they could not forage that day. Want, and the desire of marching with less difficulty, soon constrained them to kill all the beasts of burthen.

Cæsar strangely augmented their confusion, by beginning to draw lines round their camp, to inclose them. He had already worked hard on them for two days, and made a considerable progress; when Afranius and Petreius, sensible of the consequences, drew all their forces out of the camp, and formed them in order of battle. Cæsar presently called in his workmen, and put his army in a condition to receive them, if they attacked him; but would not enter the first into action. Pompey's Lieutenants, seeing him in so good order, kept quiet; and in the evening both armies retired, without coming to blows. The next day, which was the fourth from the setting about the lines, Cæsar prepared to finish them. Afranius and Petreius endeavoured,



A. R. 703.  
Ann. C. 49. vowed, as their last resource, to find a fordable place in the Segre. But their vigilant adversary sent immediately over the river his light-armed Germans, and a good part of his cavalry, and posted on the banks at a small distance from one another many good corps-de-gardes.

*Interview of Afranius and Cæsar, each in his own camp, on the disbanding of the adversary troops.* At last Pompey's Lieutenants, having no hope left, and being in want of every thing, wood, forage, water, corn, were forced to do as Cæsar desired. Afranius asked for an interview; and that it might be, if possible, in some place out of the sight of the soldiers. Cæsar consented to the interview, but not under the circumstance Afranius desired. This last was all submission, and, having given his son for an hostage, went to the place appointed by the Victor. The conversation was at the head of the two armies, who could hear all that passed on both sides.

Afranius spoke with great humility. He excused himself on account of the fidelity he owed to Pompey his General, acknowledged himself vanquished, and conjured Cæsar very submissively, not to make a rigorous use of his victory, but to spare the lives of his unhappy countrymen.

Cæsar, though willing to exert his clemency, had yet a mind to prove Afranius in the wrong. He told him, that he and his colleague were only to blame, and the only enemies to peace; while the General they fought against, and the two armies, had done all they could to attain it. He added a short harangue in favour of his cause, and made a relation of all the pretended injuries he had received. He concluded, by ordering Afranius to disband his army. "I will not," says he, "take from you your soldiers, and  
" enlist



“ enlist them, as I could easily do, but I will  
 “ prevent your employing them against me.  
 “ Therefore leave these provinces, and disband  
 “ your forces: in which case no body shall  
 “ have reason to complain of my treatment.  
 “ This is my final resolution, and the only  
 “ condition I insist on.”

This discourse of Cæsar was very agreeable to Afranius's soldiers; who, instead of being punished, as they feared, were in some sort rewarded by the discharge their Conqueror procured them. They plainly shewed their satisfaction. For, while the place and time of their dismissal were debating, they signified by their gestures and cries, that they desired to be disbanded immediately. After some discussion of that article by Cæsar and Afranius, it was regulated, that those who had houses or possessions in Spain, who made near a third of the army, should be discharged on the spot; and the rest near the Var, a little river that parts Gaul from Italy. Cæsar on his side declared, that he would hurt nobody, nor force any one to take on in his service. He even promised to find them in corn until they got to the Var. And lastly, he carried his generosity so far, as to restore to them all they had lost in the war, that could be known again; indemnifying himself his own soldiers, who hereby lost part of their booty. By this conduct he acquired the friendship and confidence of the soldiers of the other party to such a degree, that from that time, during the two days that were spent in giving discharges to those who were to be forthwith disbanded, he was the arbiter of all the disputes they had, either among themselves, or with their Commanders. These two days expired, those who

*That condition is agreed to, and executed.*

were



A. R. 703  
Ann. C. 49.

were to go to the Var set out in this order. Two of Cæsar's legions marched at the head, the others in the rear, and the vanquished troops in the middle. Q. Fufius Calenus, one of Cæsar's Lieutenants, presided over the march. When they were come to the prescribed place, Afranius's soldiers were disbanded, their Chiefs and principal Officers went away to Pompey, and a great number of the soldiers entered into fresh engagements with Cæsar, and took on voluntarily in the service of a General, who knew so well how to conquer, and to make use of his victory.

This campaign of Cæsar, and the proofs he gave in it of his extraordinary skill in military affairs, and the art of choosing his ground, have gained the deserved applause of all ages ; and in these latter times, as I have elsewhere observed, the approbation of the great Conde has put the seal to this universal admiration. It is not proper for me to dwell on a subject so much above my knowledge. But the magnanimity of his proceedings, that fund of clemency, which even the injustice and cruelty of his adversaries could not exhaust ; his noble confidence of success, and generous refusal to increase his forces, by any other way than the free consent of those who listed under him ; these are virtues, whose worth I am extremely sensible of, and which I am only sorry to see

Cæsar con-  
quered  
ulterior

Spain, af-  
ter which  
he goes be-  
fore Mar-  
cellus.

Cæsar de B.  
Civ. ii. 17.

employed to so bad a purpose as that of enslaving his country.

Many pressing reasons recalled Cæsar to Rome. But Varro, a Lieutenant of Pompey, having under him two legions and thirty cohorts of auxiliaries, yet kept ulterior Spain ; and it was a maxim with Cæsar, to think he had done nothing, while any thing remained to be done.

He



He therefore sent there in haste Q. Cassius, <sup>A. R. 703.</sup>  
Tribune of the People, with two legions, whom <sup>Ant. C. 43.</sup>  
he presently followed with six hundred horse.  
But he found no employment for these forces.  
He had little to do, besides shewing himself, to  
reduce that province, which had been long  
well-affected to him ; as he had been Quæstor  
there, and had afterwards governed it as Pro-  
prætor. So that as soon as his troops appeared,  
and it was known that he was there, the whole  
country rose in his favour. At the same time,  
one of Varro's legions, which had been raised  
in the province, deserted under his eyes, and  
retired to Hispalis \*, which town had declared \* <sup>Seville.</sup>  
for Cæsar. Pompey's Lieutenant did not at-  
tempt a vain resistance. He delivered the le-  
gion that kept with him to the person Cæsar  
sent to take the command of it, went himself  
to him at Corduba, and brought with him what  
money he had in his hands, and an inventory  
of the stores and shipping.

Cæsar had nothing now to do at Corduba,  
where he had summoned a General Assembly,  
but to receive the submissions of the nations,  
and the congratulations of all the Roman  
Knights and Citizens in Bœtica. He rewarded  
those who had distinguished themselves in his  
favour ; and the city of Cadiz was honoured, <sup>Liv. Epit.</sup>  
on that occasion, with the freedom of Rome : <sup>110.</sup>  
on those he was necessitated to punish he only  
imposed pecuniary mulcts. After which, leav-  
ing Q. Cassius, with four legions, to command  
in his absence, he embarked on Varro's ships,  
and landed at Tarragone, where he received the  
deputations of the nations of almost all citerior  
Spain. From thence he went by land to Nar-  
bonne, and thence to his camp before Marseille ;  
which



A. R. 703. which was reduced to the last extremity, and  
 Ant. C. 49. only waited for his coming to surrender.

*Account of what had passed at the siege of Marseille in Cæsar's absence.*  
 Cæsar. de B. i. 56 & ii. 1. The Marseillians had defended themselves with extraordinary courage. They had twice tried their fortune in a sea-fight; once with their own force, and afterwards with a reinforcement of seventeen ships, sent them by Pompey, under the command of L. Nasidius. They were both times worsted by D. Brutus, Commander of the small fleet that Cæsar had stationed before their port. They did not, however, fail either through want of courage, or skill: and even might have succeeded in the second action, had Nasidius manifested a resolution equal to theirs. But he was not equally interested in the defence of Marseille; and, when the fight grew warm, bore away, and basely deserted his allies.

That which gave D. Brutus the superiority was the incredible valour of his soldiers, who had been carefully selected from among the stoutest men of every legion: and who, grappling with the enemy's ships, boarded them suddenly, and rendered useless to the Marseillians their superior skill in the construction and management of their ships. We may recollect the story I told elsewhere of a soldier, who, having lost his right-hand, fought with his left, until the adversary ship was forced and took. The inhabitants of Marseille had not only suffered by sea, but had been also vigorously attacked by land. Trebonius, to whose care Cæsar had entrusted the siege, constructed with infinite labour machines of all sorts, made frequent assaults, repulsed all the sallies, and, at last, after some months made a breach in the wall. Part of a tower, being undermined, fell,



fell, and the rest of it was in danger: which, if the Romans demolished, they opened to themselves a way into the town in spite of all opposition. In this extremity the besieged threw themselves on the mercy of the Victors. They come out of the gates in crouds in the manner of suppliants, extending their hands towards the Roman camp. At sight of them, the attack ceases; and the Marseillians advance to the commanding Officers, prostrate themselves before them, and beg of them to stay for Cæsar's arrival. They acknowledge they can no longer make any defence; and consequently, that Cæsar would be always master of their fate. They represent with tears, that, if the remainder of the tower was thrown down, and the breach thereby enlarged, it would be impossible to restrain the ardour of the soldiers, and their city would be inevitably pillaged, sacked, and utterly destroyed. All this was delivered in an affecting manner, by men, whom necessity alone would have made eloquent, if they had not added thereto the knowledge of polite literature, which had been always cultivated at Marseille with care and success.

Trebonius had instructions from Cæsar agreeable to what the inhabitants of Marseille desired. That great man, full of humanity, and love for learning in which he himself excelled, thought he should fully his glory, by destroying so famous a city, which was the habitation of the Gaulish muses, and the center of Gaulish politeness. He had therefore strongly recommended to his Lieutenant not to suffer the town to be stormed, lest the exasperated soldiers should put to the sword, as they threatened, all who were able to bear arms. Trebonius followed his orders;



A. R. 723.  
Ant. C. 49.

orders; yielded to the intreaties of the suppliants; and consented to a sort of truce; to the great discontent of his soldiers, who complained, that they were deprived of the fruit of their conquest, and hindered from taking a town that could make no defence.

*Perfidy  
charged on  
the inhabi-  
tants of  
Marseille,  
with little  
probability.*

The truce, as it is usual, was productive of negligence and security. The Romans, forgetting that strict discipline is never more necessary than when an accommodation with an enemy is on foot, as that is the time for surprize and treachery, were not at all on their guard, nor apprehended any danger. So fine an opportunity tempted the Marseillians, and made them guilty, if we are to take Cæsar's account literally, of an inexcusable perfidy. Observing one day, that the wind was high, and blew full on the Roman machines, they on a sudden set them on fire; and, the wind making it impossible for the besiegers to extinguish it, those works were in an instant consumed that had cost so much time and labour. This advantage rejoiced the Marseillians, but was of little real service to them. The Roman soldiers, animated by revenge, worked on the reconstruction of these machines with such diligence, that, in a few days, all things were restored to their pristine condition, and the besieged were reduced to a reiteration of their submission and intreaties.

Cæsar's narration is imperfect in this place. For although the thread of the story gives room to believe, that it was to Trebonius that these fresh supplications of the Marseillians were presented; yet he does not say so expressly. And indeed, if the soldiers shewed their indignation at the first truce granted the besieged;  
how



how would they, irritated, as they must be, <sup>A. R. 703. Ant. C. 49.</sup> anew by this horrible treachery, have suffered the concession of a second? On the other side, <sup>Cæf. de B. Civ. II. 22.</sup> when, after an interruption of some pages, Cæsar resumes the relation of the siege of Mar-seille, he does not say neither, that its inhabitants waited for his coming, to surrender. He does not say, that he reproached them, as was natural, with their infidelity and perjury. They are received as if they had not forfeited all pretensions to mercy. If to these considerations we add also his known hatred to those of Marseille, of which there are evident marks in his Commentaries, and which is also attested <sup>Cic. Phil. II. 94. & VIII. 19.</sup> by Cicero; may we not be allowed to doubt of what their enemy reports to their disadvantage; and to clear the inhabitants of that celebrated city from the opprobrium of a perfidy equally criminal and senseless in their then circumstances?

But, if we may suspect that Cæsar's hatred <sup>Cæsar's severe, but not cruel, behaviour to them.</sup> prevailed on him, either to mis-report facts, or, at least, to trust too lightly to the memories of those who conducted the siege in his absence; that hatred however was void of cruelty. He spared the Marseillians from being plundered: he left their walls and edifices standing; he did them no hurt in their persons; he deprived them not of their liberty. But he disarmed them, seized on all their ships, and took all the money out of the public Treasury. Domitius Ahenobarbus escaped by sea, before the surrender of the town; and went into Greece to join Pompey. Cæsar, having left two legions in Marseille, set out for Italy. Pompey and the Senate in his camp, to reward in what <sup>Dio.</sup> manner they were able, the fidelity of the



A. R. 703. Marseillians, gave the rights and privileges of  
 Ant. C. 49. a free city to Phocæa, in Ionia, which was the  
 mother-town of Marseille.

Wherever Cæsar went in person, fortune  
 faithfully accompanied him ; or rather the su-  
 periority of his genius ever rendered him vic-  
 torious. His Lieutenants were not always  
 equally successful ; and his party suffered this  
 year two considerable checks ; one in Illyri-  
 cum, and the other in Africa.

*Cæsar's  
 party re-  
 ceives a  
 check in  
 Illyricum.*

Lucan.

l. IV.

Flor. IV.

2.

Appian.

Dio.

Cæsar de B.

Civ. III.

67.

† pag. 20.

We have but few particulars of that in Il-  
 lyricum, because Cæsar's account of it is lost.  
 We only know, that Dolobella and C. Antonius,  
 who commanded for him on that coast, were  
 vanquished by M. Octavius and Scribonius  
 Libo, Pompey's Lieutenants, who had a su-  
 perior naval force ; and that C. Antonius was  
 obliged to surrender himself prisoner with fif-  
 teen cohorts. An expression of Cæsar, occa-  
 sionally, informs us, that there was treason in  
 the case ; and that one of his bravest Officers,  
 who was probably that Pulvio \*, of whom we  
 have related † a memorable action in the Gaul-  
 ish war, dishonoured himself here by a base  
 perfidy against his General, and occasioned the  
 loss of the army.

*The sol-  
 diers of  
 one of Cæ-  
 sar's co-  
 horts kill  
 one ano-  
 ther, ra-  
 ther than  
 surrender.*

One cohort, on the contrary, gave proof of  
 an almost incredible, and unexampled, fidelity.  
 Some troops, who escaped from C. Antonius's  
 defeat, built, to cross the sea with, three floats,  
 sustained on each side by great empty casks, so  
 disposed as to hide the oars ; so that these rafts  
 advanced without shewing what worked them.

\* At least, there is but the difference of one letter in the name. He is called T. Pulvio in the 5th book of the Gaulish war ; and T. Pulcio in the 3d book of the civil war.



In the middle was a tower. But, among Pompey's marines, were some of the old pirates, whom he formerly overcame; who were well-acquainted with all the artifices in use in sea wars. These fastened to the rocks; near those places the rafts were to pass through, twisted chains like nets, that were covered by the water. Two of the rafts avoided them; the third was taken in them. In it were some soldiers of Opitergium ||, a Venetian city, beyond the Po. || Oderzo? These brave men defended themselves till night with invincible courage. But, after many fruitless efforts to disengage themselves, finding it impossible to get off, they chose to turn their swords against one another; and mutually kill themselves, to the last man, rather than surrender to the enemy.

The cause of Cæsar's loss in Africa was Curio's rashness. No less audacious in the field; than he had been in domestic dissensions and his contests with the Senate; he set out from Sicily, which Cato abandoned to him, taking with him but two legions; out of four that Cæsar had appointed him, and five hundred horse. He greatly despised the enemy he was going against in Africa; and he was not in the wrong. This was Attius Varus; who, having been drove by Cæsar from Osimo, in the beginning of the war, fled directly into the province of Africa; which he had governed some years before as Proprætor; hoping, that a people, used to obey him, would respect his name and orders. He was not mistaken. He succeeded in seizing the Government; and raised men in that country, whom he formed into two legions. Mean while Tubero, whom the Senate had appointed Governor of that province, came

A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

|| Oderzo?

Curio  
passes over  
into Africa,  
to wage  
war with  
Attius Va-  
rus, and  
Juba,  
King of  
Maurita-  
nia.  
Cæsar de B.  
Civ. l. II.



A. R. 703. to take possession of it. Varus, who was am-  
 Ant. C. 49. bitious and covetous, paid no deference to the  
 Senate's authority ; and, as he was master of  
 the country and coasts, repulsed Tubero with  
 such severity, as not even to suffer him to set  
 ashore his son, who was sick. The two Tu-  
 bero's were therefore obliged to return in the  
 same ship that brought them ; and went to  
 Pompey. Such was Varus ; inconsiderate,  
 proud, and of small capacity.

But he had a powerful ally in Juba, King  
 of Mauritania and a part of Numidia. This  
 Prince was the son of Hiempsal, whose domi-  
 nions Pompey had formerly enlarged, when he  
 warred for Sylla in Africa. Besides this motive  
 of gratitude which attached Juba to Pompey's  
 party, he had another, from his personal hatred  
 to Curio ; who, when Tribune of the People,  
 had proposed a law to confiscate his kingdom,  
 and reduce it to the form of a Roman province.  
 This hatred, seconded by a great force, made  
 Juba a formidable enemy to Curio ; or, at least,  
 such a one as he ought to have carefully guarded  
 against, by observing a circumspect, prudent,  
 conduct. But this was what the young warrior  
 was not capable of : naturally presumptuous,  
 and overset with the success he had at his  
 first coming.

*Curio's  
 success.  
 as fr<sup>st</sup>.*

For he debarked in Africa, without danger  
 or trouble ; and, having encamped near the  
 river Bragada, he began by getting the better  
 in a combat of cavalry : in consequence of  
 which, he permitted his soldiers to proclaim  
 him Imperator. He then advanced nearer to  
 Varus, who was encamped under the walls of  
 Utica : and, being informed, that a reinforce-  
 ment of Numidians was coming from Juba to  
 the



the enemy, he went to meet them with his A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49. cavalry, and was again victorious.

He was not only bold in military actions, *Varus endeavours to debauch his troops.* but steady also, and wise in Council: and it was well for him, considering what troops he had under him. They were the legions who had served under Domitius Ahenobarbus, in Corfinium; and had afterwards enlisted with Cæsar. So that it was to be presumed, that their attachment to their new General was not much to be depended on: and, in fact, the night after the last engagement, two Captains and twenty-two Soldiers deserted, and went over to Varus. These run-aways reported, that all their comrades were of the same mind, and ready to abandon Curio; that all they wanted was an opportunity, which might be given them, by bringing the two armies in sight of one another, so that they might have some conversation together. In this hope, the next day, Varus drew out his forces, and formed them in battalia, at the head of his camp. Curio, on his side, did the same.

In the army of Attius Varus was Quintilius Varus, who had been Quæstor to Domitius Ahenobarbus; with whom having been shut in Corfinium, made prisoner, and released by Cæsar, he afterwards went into Africa. He was acquainted with the Officers of Curio's legions, the companions of his misfortune. He advanced to them, and essayed them by discourse proper to awaken in them the remembrance of the oath they formerly took to Domitius. But none of them seemed much affected thereby. Yet, when the army retired, Curio's camp was full of trouble, alarm, suspicion, and mistrust.



A. R. -c3.

An. C. 49.

Curio's

conspicancy

in that

danger.

His dis-

courses to

the Coun-

cil of war,

and the

journey.

† Castra

Cornelia

Curio called a Council of war to deliberate on the state of affairs; and found it divided. Some were for assaulting the enemy's camp; pretending, that nothing was so proper as action and fighting to drive such thoughts out of the soldiers heads, which leisure and idleness bred and entertained. Others, on the contrary, were for retreating immediately, and setting out at midnight for a place, which, ever since the first Scipio Africanus had encamped there, retained the name of Scipio's † Camp: a place naturally strong where they might, at leisure, revive in their soldiers the sentiments of fidelity and affection; and from whence, in case of necessity, they might easily return to Sicily.

\* Curio condemned both these opinions; blaming one for want, and the other for excess of courage; since the first advised an ignominious flight, and the others a rash attack. His discourse is related by Cæsar, probably, after some original memoirs; and, as Curio was accounted one of the greatest Orators of his age, I fancy I shall please the reader of taste, by laying before him this harangue, and that he afterwards made to the soldiers; which are the only pieces we have of him.

|| “What reason, says he, have we to hope  
“to force a camp, which situation and art  
“render

\* Curio utrumque impro-  
bans consilium, quantum al-  
teri sententiæ deesset animi,  
tantum alteri superesse dice-  
bat: hos turpissimæ fugæ  
rationem habere, illos iniquo  
etiam loco dimicandum pu-  
tare. *Cæs. de B. Civ.* II 231.

|| Qua enim, inquit, fidu-  
cia, & opere & natura loci  
munitissima castra expugna-  
ri posse speramus? aut vero  
quid proficiamus, si accepto  
magno detrimento ab op-  
pugnatione castrorum disce-  
dimus? quasi non & felici-

tas



render impregnable? And, what loss may  
 we not sustain, if we are repulsed? Do not  
 you know, that success insures to Generals  
 the esteem of their troops; and that, on the  
 contrary, disgraces make them contemptible  
 and odious? As to changing our camp, that  
 is the worst thing we can do. Besides the  
 ignominy of a precipitate flight, and a cow-  
 ardly despair discreditable to our arms, we  
 shall, by that step, even alienate the minds  
 of our soldiers. For the well-affected ought  
 not to know that we distrust them, nor the  
 ill-affected, that we fear them; because our  
 apprehensions will augment the audacity of  
 the last, and weaken the attachment of the  
 others. As for me, I am satisfied, that what  
 we have been told of the disaffection of the

tas rerum gestarum, exercitus  
 benevolentiam imperatoribus,  
 & res adversæ odia con-  
 cilient. Castrorum autem  
 mutatio quid habet, nisi tur-  
 pem fugam, & desperatio-  
 nem omnium, & alienatio-  
 nem exercitus? Nam neque  
 prudentes suspicari oportet  
 sibi parum credi, neque im-  
 probos scire se timeri: quod  
 illis licentiam timor augeat  
 noster, his studia diminuat.  
 Quod si jam hæc explorata  
 habemus, quæ de exercitus  
 alienatione dicuntur (quæ  
 quidem ego aut omnino  
 falsa, aut certe minora opi-  
 nione esse confido) quanto  
 hæc dissimulare & occultare,  
 quam per nos confirmari

præstat? An non, uti cor-  
 poris vulnera, ita exercitus  
 incommoda sunt tegenda, ne  
 spem adversariis augeamus?  
 At etiam ut media nocte  
 proficiscamur addunt: quo  
 majorem, credo, licentiam ha-  
 beant qui peccare conentur.  
 Namque hujusmodi res, aut  
 pudore, aut metu tenentur,  
 quibus rebus nox maxime  
 adversaria est. Quare neque  
 tanti sum animi, ut sine spe  
 castra oppugnanda censem;  
 neque tanti timoris, ut ipse  
 deficiam. Atque omnia prius  
 experienda arbitror; magna-  
 que \* ex parte jam me una  
 vobiscum de re judicium fac-  
 turum confido.

\* *These last words are obscure. I have given them that sense which seems to me most agreeable to circumstances.*



A. R. 723.  
Ann. C. 49.

“ troops, is either false, or exaggerated. But,  
“ supposing it true, ought we to expose our-  
“ selves our own weakness? Ought we not,  
“ on the contrary, to conceal it, that it may  
“ not give spirits to the enemy? It is advised  
“ too, to march away at midnight; perhaps,  
“ that such as are ill-disposed may not want  
“ an opportunity of executing their bad de-  
“ signs. For shame and fear chiefly detain  
“ those who want to desert; but night will  
“ remove this double objection. Upon the  
“ whole, I own I am not stout enough to at-  
“ tack a camp, without the least chance for  
“ success; and yet too stout to be wanting to  
“ myself; and therefore am of opinion that  
“ we ought to try every thing, before we  
“ comply with either of the schemes proposed.  
“ I hope, experience will soon satisfy you, that  
“ I think justly on the present occasion.”

After Curio had dismissed the Council of war, he assembled the army; to whom he made a very fine and dextrous harangue: but I shall abridge this discourse, as it is very long. He begins by displaying, on one side, the importance of the service they did Cæsar, in coming over to him, and setting an example that drew in all Italy; and, on the other, the marks of confidence Cæsar had given them. He adds\*,  
“ There are, I am told, those who persuade  
“ you to abandon us. Equally enemies to us  
“ both; what can they desire, more than at

\* Adfunt qui vos hortentur, ut à nobis desciscatis. Quid enim est illis optatius, quam uno tempore & nos circumvenire, & vos nefario scelere odstringere? aut quid

inatti gravius de vobis sentire possunt, quam ut eos prodatis, qui se vobis omnia debere judicant; in eorum potestatem veniatis, qui se per vos perisse existimant?

“ once



“ once to ruin us, and make you guilty of the  
 “ most horrid perjury? Their revenge on you  
 “ will doubtless be satisfied, if they succeed in  
 “ persuading you to betray Commanders, who  
 “ own they owe every thing to you; and to  
 “ put yourselves in the power of those who  
 “ consider you as the authors of their ruin.”

He then informs them of Cæsar's late glorious victory in Spain, which he had totally subdued in forty days; and makes this inference: \* “ Do you think, that a party, which  
 “ could not make head against us with its  
 “ entire force, can resist us, now that is ruined?  
 “ And you, who espoused Cæsar's cause,  
 “ while success was yet dubious; by what infatuation,  
 “ now that victory has declared for him, can you go over to the vanquished  
 “ faction, at the very time that you should  
 “ reap the fruits of your services? ”

He speaks with no less emphasis of his own success, and of the first advantages gained over Varus; after which he concludes, in these words: † “ It is then this glorious fortune,  
 “ and such Generals as Cæsar and I, that you  
 “ chose to renounce, to embrace a party in  
 “ which the disgrace at Corfinium, the flight  
 “ out of Italy, the loss of Spain, the disad-

\* An qui incolumes resistere non potuerunt, perditæ resistent? Vos autem, incerta victoria Cæsarem secuti, dijudicata jam belli fortuna, victum sequimini, quum vestri officii præmia percipere debeatis?

† Hac vos fortuna atque his ducibus repudiatis, Corfiniensem ignominiam, an Italiæ fugam, an Hispania-

rum deditionem, an Africi belli præjudicia sequimini? Equidem me Cæsaris militem dici volui. Vos me Imperatoris nomine appellavistis. Cujus si vos pœnitet, vestrum vobis beneficium remitto: mihi meum restituito nomen, ne ad contumeliam honorem dedisse videamini.

“ advantages



A. R. 703. " advantages already received in the African  
 Ant. C. 49. " war, plainly declare there is nothing to be  
 " expected but shame and misfortune. As  
 " for me, I never took any other title than  
 " that of Cæsar's Soldier. You have been  
 " been pleased to bestow on me that of Im-  
 " perator. If you repent of what you have  
 " done, take it again ; and restore me my  
 " own ; that it may not be said, that you did  
 " me honour at first, only to disgrace me the  
 " more afterwards."

*The sol-  
 diers pro-  
 mote fide-  
 lity.*

This harangue had all the effect Curio could desire. While he was yet speaking, he was often interrupted by the clamours of the soldiery, who bore very impatiently the suspicion of disloyalty : and, when he had concluded, they all exhorted him to take courage, and not be afraid to engage the enemy, but to put them to the proof. Curio, well pleased with the success of his resolution and eloquence, offered battle the next day ; and the enemy, thinking it improper to decline it, came also out of his camp.

*He defeats  
 Varus.*

Between the two armies was a valley, the descent into which was very steep. Varus having sent into this valley his cavalry and great part of his light-armed troops, Curio also detached his cavalry and two cohorts, whose first shock put the enemy's horse to flight ; so that their light-armed troops were cut to pieces in Varus's fight, without receiving any assistance from him, and without being able to make any resistance.

Curio had brought with him out of Sicily Caninius Rebilus, a Lieutenant of Cæsar, of great experience in military affairs. This old Officer comes up to him ; " the enemy, says he, is in-  
 " timided, make the proper advantage of it."  
 Curio immediately puts himself at the head of his  
 his



his legions, and goes to the attack by so difficult <sup>A. R. 703.</sup> and steep a way, that the first ranks could not <sup>Ant. C. 49.</sup> get up without the assistance of those behind. Varus's army, instead of making use of their advantageous situation, is panic-struck, disordered, and put to flight ; nobody aims at more than regaining the camp.

In this flight Varus had a narrow escape. For, hearing somebody call frequently after him, he stopped ; thinking it was one of his people, who had something to say to him. But the person that called him, who was a Captain in the other army (named Fabius) immediately levelled a blow with his sword at his shoulder, which Varus had just time to parry with his buckler. Fabius was killed on the spot by those about him.

He was the only man Curio lost in this engagement. On Varus's side Cæsar's Commentaries reckon six hundred slain, and a thousand wounded. And so great was the fright of these troops, that, of those who perished, more were stifled at the gates of the camp, than put to the sword by the enemy. The same panic followed them into their intrenchments, though Curio had retired : and as, the wounded being to be sent into Utica, many counterfeited hurts for a pretence to go there ; Varus found himself necessitated to retire into the town with his whole army, and abandon the camp. The next day Curio fate down before the city.

Utica was a trading town, which had for a long time seen nothing of war. The inhabitants, who had many obligations to Cæsar, were entirely devoted to him. The Roman citizens, who were very numerous, had various interests and different ways of thinking. The  
terror



A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49

*Juba  
comes to  
the assist-  
ance of  
Varus.*

*Curio's  
presump-  
tion.*

terror was universal in consequence of the late ill success. And a surrender was publicly talked of, and Varus was importuned not to hazard every thing by his obstinacy. But this disposition was changed by the arrival of a courier from Juba, with advice that he was coming with a great force to the succour of Varus and Utica.

Curio had also such intelligence. But elate with success, and the prosperity of Cæsar's arms in Spain, he knew not how to believe that the King of Mauritania durst come and attack him. Yet he could not but give credit to it at last, when Juba was advanced within twenty-five miles of Utica. He then prudently retreated to the camp of Scipio, that I have took notice of. This place was very advantageous, and could command all sorts of conveniencies; wood, corn, water, salt, every thing, was within reach; and the vicinity of the sea gave him an opportunity of being easily joined by the two legions he left in Sicily, which he sent for on this occasion. He determined then to take the advantage of this post, and to protract the war.

But he was not naturally prudent, and could not persevere in that wise resolution. Having received a piece of false intelligence by some deserters from the town; who, suborned, perhaps, by the enemy, told him that Juba had been obliged to return to defend his frontiers against some of his neighbours; and had left but a small force with Sabura his General, who was to go Utica in his stead; Curio resumed his first plan, and formed the vain, rash, design of going to meet the Numidians, and giving them battle.

What



What gave some colour to the false report A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49. that deceived him, was, that Sabura had advanced with a detachment, that was not very considerable, to the river Bragada; but the King followed him with the rest of the army at six miles distance. Curio, as soon as it was night, sent his cavalry to insult Sabura's camp. His horse easily put the Numidians into confusion, who knew not how to fortify a camp; slew many of them, and returned with some prisoners to their General.

Curio had marched with the greatest part of his forces three hours before day, and had advanced six miles when he met his cavalry. He inquires of the prisoners, who commanded in their camp. They tell him Sabura. On receiving this answer, without further examination, without entering into particulars, he takes the information of the prisoners for a full confirmation of the intelligence of the deserters from Utica. He communicates it to his army, and exhorts them to hasten, not to a fight, but to a victory. The ardour of his troops equalled his own. Thus he continued his march precipitately, ordering his cavalry to follow him. But that was in no condition to obey him, being greatly fatigued, with having marched, or fought, all night: the troopers, on their way, stopped some in one place, some in another; and only two hundred of them were able to keep up with the infantry. The Numidians shewed as much prudence, as the Romans impetuosity. Sabura immediately gave notice to his master of the night-engagement; and Juba, not doubting but Curio would presently come up to complete the victory began by his cavalry, sent to his General two thousand Spanish and Gaulish horse of his guard, and a select body of infantry.



A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

He himself prepared to follow them, but more slowly, with the rest of his army and forty elephants.

*Battle in  
which  
Curio's  
army is  
entirely  
routed.*

Sabura, seeing Curio approach, formed his troops in order of battle ; and advanced a detachment towards the enemy, as it were to skirmish ; with orders to run away, and shew all the signs of terror and fright. Curio suffered himself to be deceived by this common artifice. He quitted the eminences he was on, and descended into the plain ; made more confident than ever by the flight of the Numidians, not considering that he was going to engage with infantry, that were fatigued by a march of sixteen miles, and were unsupported by cavalry.

The Numidian General took advantage of his adversary's imprudence. As he knew his infantry was no match for that of the Romans, he did not suffer it to engage, but kept it in good order at some distance. His cavalry was good and numerous ; with that he acted ; ordering it to extend itself, and surround the legions. This order was well executed, and procured him the victory, spite of all the efforts of the Romans. Their two hundred horse did wonders wherever they charged ; but their weariness hindered them from pursuing those they broke. The infantry, who kept their ground, were ruined. If any cohort advanced out of the line, the active, alert, enemy dispersed, and, having took a circuit, returned to the attack on another side. Thus, all the loss fell on the Romans ; and the Numidians, on the contrary, were continually reinforced from Juba's army, which was not far off. Curio was now sensible of his error, and endeavoured to regain the eminences.



nences. But Sabura's cavalry prevented him, A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49. and deprived him of that last resource.

Affairs being desperate, Cn. Domitius, General of the horse, thought at least he ought to save the General. He comes to Curio, and proposes to him to retire into the camp, where were five cohorts, promising not to leave him. Curio makes himself be killed on the spot.

“No, says Curio, I will never appear before

“Cæsar, after having lost the army he in-

“trusted me with.” He continued therefore

to fight, until slain by the enemy. All the

foot were cut to pieces to a man. Of the two

hundred horse, who were in the action, very

few escaped. Those that stopped on the way

returned to the camp.

The Quæstor, M. Rufus, had staid there, and endeavoured to revive the drooping courage of the soldiers. They demanded clamorously to be carried back into Sicily. He was forced to promise it, and to prepare for the embarkation. But such was the terror by sea and land, that nothing could be done with order and tranquillity, so that few of them embarked and got to Sicily. The rest, a great majority, sent their Captains to Varus, and surrendered, on a promise of their lives. Juba, who came soon after to Utica, did not think himself bound by the word of the Roman General; and, spite of all representations, inhumanly butchered most of those who had surrendered, and sent the rest prisoners into his dominions. Unhappy fate of almost all who were not slain in the battle. Juba's cruelty and arrogance.

Thus totally perished that unfortunate army, by the bad conduct of its General: who made himself an end suitable to his misconduct, but unworthy of his parts. Descended from an illustrious house, born with a sublime genius and generous courage; he might, by honourable

steps,



A. R. 703. steps, have attained to the highest preferments:  
 ART. C. 49.

But being debauched in his youth, and extravagantly ambitious, when old enough to share in the administration of affairs ; being observant of no rules but his passions, nor duty but his interest, and disregardful of all laws and manners ; he only served to shew by his example, that the greatest gifts of nature become useless, and even fatal, to those who join not with them wisdom and moderation. His memory was so odious, that the antient Commentator on Virgil has applied to him this verse, which is in the enumeration of the flagitious dead that are punished in Tartarus : “ *Vendidit hic auro patri-*  
 “ *am, dominumque potentem imposuit.* This  
 “ man sold his Country, and brought in an  
 “ imperious Tyrant.” I do not say that the Poet had him in his thoughts, but the Commentator’s remark shews what was the general opinion concerning Curio. Cœlius will give us soon a similar example.

Juba was arrogant even to insolence. This appears by the little regard he shewed to the composition granted by Varus to Curio’s soldiers. He behaved in the same manner in every thing else. Utica was a city of the Roman Empire. He acted, notwithstanding, there as master, while he staid ; and gave such orders, and made such regulations, as he thought proper ; after which he returned into his kingdom. Africa from this time continued quiet, until some of the remains of the Pharlalian route, having got together again there, raised fresh troubles.



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BOOK THE FORTY-FOURTH.

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THE  
ROMAN HISTORY.

**C**ÆSAR's first Dictatorship, and second Consulship. He goes into Greece to war with Pompey. Battle of Pharsalia. Flight, and death, of Pompey. Years of Rome 703, 704.

S E C T. I.

*Cæsar named Dictator by Lepidus, Prætor of the city. Cæsar's ninth legion mutinies. His resolute, haughty, behaviour, by which he makes the mutineers return to their duty. Pride and indecency of Anthony's conduct. Cæsar comes to Rome, takes possession of the Dictatorship, causes himself to be elected Consul, and presides at the election of the other Magistrates. Regulation in favour of debtors. Recall of exiles. The children of proscribed persons restored to the capacity of serving public offices. Motions of Cælius and Milo. Their death. Pompey's preparations; his land*  
 VOL. XIII. Y army.



*army. Pompey encourages military exercises by his own example. General zeal and affection for Pompey's cause. Assembly of the Senate held by the Consuls at Thessalonica. Pompey declared sole Chief. Pompey's security as to Cæsar's passage into Greece. Cæsar's eagerness to get there. He goes into Greece with twenty thousand legionary soldiers and six hundred horse. He dispatches Vibullius to Pompey, with proposals for an accommodation. He makes himself master of almost all Epirus. Pompey comes up time enough to save Dyrrachium, and encamps over against his adversary, with the river Apsus between them. Pompey's fleet hinders the troops Cæsar had left in Italy from crossing the sea. Bibullus's death. Pompey's harsh answer to Vibullius. New advances of Cæsar, always rejected. Cæsar's forces at Brundisium are dilatory in joining him. He goes himself to fetch them. Famous speech of Cæsar to the master of the bark. Ardour of Cæsar's soldiers. On receiving new orders, Anthony passes from Italy into Greece with four legions. Metellus Scipio brings to Pompey the Syrian legions. Tyrannical behaviour of that Proconsul. Cæsar sends three detachments from his army into Ætolia, Thessalia, and Macedonia. Pompey avoids an engagement. Cæsar attempts to inclose Pompey in lines. Divers actions about the lines. Prodigious valour of one of Cæsar's cohorts, and above all of the Centurion Scæva. Incredible patience of Cæsar's troops, when in want. Fruitless negotiation began by Cæsar with Scipio. Pompey's army suffers much. Two Gaulish Officers of Cæsar's party desert, and acquaint Pompey with the weak parts of his adversary's lines. Pompey forces Cæsar's lines. Cæsar de-*  
*termines*



*termines to retreat into Thessalia. Shame and grief of his soldiers. Pompey, advised to go over to Italy, chooses to stay in Greece. Caesar joins Calvinus. His various dispositions according to the different designs Pompey might form. Caesar storms the city of Gamphi in Thessalia. He spares that of Metropolis. He comes to Pharsalia. Pompey follows him.*

**C**ÆSAR was informed at Marseille that A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.  
Cæsar he had been appointed Dictator. This nomination was wholly irregular. Supposing an named occasion for one, it could only be done by the Dictator Consuls, who were actually in Pompey's camp. by Lepidus, Prætor of the city. Lepidus was bold enough to usurp this important function of the supreme Magistrates; and, Cæs. de B. Civ. 2 & 3.  
Iut. Pom. & Cæs. by virtue of an ordinance of the People, a Prætor (by an unexampled attempt) nominated a Dictator. Appian. Civ. l. 2.  
Dio, l. 41. Cæsar, who was no formalist, was not offended at the irregularity of his nomination. He wanted some title, and set out for Rome, to take possession of the Dictatorship, when a more pressing affair constrained him to turn off to Placentia.

The ninth legion, which he had sent with the Cæsar's ninth legion mutinies. others into Italy before him, when arrived at Placentia, mutined, and demanded its dissolution. The pretence for this sedition was, that Suet. Cæs. c. 69.  
Appian. Dio. they were worn out by labour, and deserved to have at last some rest. The true reason was, that, instead of enjoying the licence they promised themselves, Cæsar made them observe strict discipline, and would not suffer them to plunder. \* “ By what caprice, say they in Lucan, “ while we are compelled to commit the greatest of all crimes, that of invading our native

Y 2

“ Coun-

\* Imis in omne nefas, manibus ferroque nocentes,  
Paupertate pii. *Lac.* v. 270.



A. R. 703.  
Ann. C. 49.

“Country, must we be examples of virtue,  
“by the poverty we are forced to be content  
“with.” Add, that he, who has made himself  
the head of a faction, has never so much com-  
mand over his troops as a lawful General. The  
same Lucan puts in the mouth of these muti-  
neers this reflection: \* “Cæsar, say they, was  
“our General on the Rhine; but here he is  
“our Accomplice. The crime, that is common  
“to us all, ought to equal us all.” Full of  
these notions, and sensible of the want Cæsar  
was in of their valour, they made no doubt of  
obtaining all they durst demand.

*His resolu-  
tion,  
taught by  
behaviour,  
by which  
he makes  
the muti-  
neers re-  
turn to  
their duty.*

They were much mistaken. Cæsar, indul-  
gent to his soldiers in every other matter, never  
forgave a breach of obedience; and being satis-  
fied that his presence would over-awe them,  
and that there was no other way to intimidate  
a mob, but to shew that he did not fear it, he  
went to them; though their fury seemed capa-  
ble of the greatest excesses, even to the endan-  
gering his person. He took, however, the  
precaution to be accompanied by some troops;  
and, having assembled the mutineers, treated  
them with the utmost contempt. He told  
them, that, since they demanded their dismissal,  
they should have it; that he had no occasion  
for their service, and that he should never want  
soldiers to share his prosperity and triumphs.  
But, he added, that, before he disbanded them,  
he should punish their crime, and should deci-  
mate the legion.

This stile of authority, and menace, annihili-  
lated the fierceness of the mutineers. They  
threw

\* ——— Rheni mihi Cæsar in undis

Dux erat, hic socius: facinus quos inquinat, æquat.

V. 289, 290.



threw themselves at his feet, begging pardon with tears and lamentations. Cæsar, finding them submissive, abated somewhat of his severity ; but would not, however, let their sedition go wholly unpunished. He ordered them to deliver up to him an hundred and twenty of the most guilty, of whom twelve were appointed by lot for execution. The Officers, in concert with him, managed so, that the lots fell on those who had been most insolent. There was, however, among the twelve an innocent soldier, who proved himself absent when the legion mutinied. Cæsar did him justice, and put in his place the Captain who had informed against him. The legion was not quit for the punishment of these twelve offenders. Cæsar had a mind to break it. The soldiers were obliged to renew their intreaties, prayers, and tears, to obtain of him leave to continue in his service.

It would have been well had he exacted modesty and good behaviour from his friends, with the same strictness as he exacted obedience from his soldiers. But he punished sedition severely, because it endangered the very foundation of his power and fortune, and he overlooked the disorders of such as were serviceable to him: Nothing can exceed the pride and indecency of the proceedings of Anthony, to whom Cæsar left the Government of Italy when he set out for Spain.

Anthony travelled over the whole country, from Brundisium to Rome, in a car drawn by lions. After him came in an open litter the actresses Cytheris. The Magistrates and most reputable Citizens of the municipal towns, that lay in his route, were obliged to go and meet Anthony, and pay their court to his actresses. Nor

A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

*Pride and  
indecentcy  
of Antho-  
ny's con-  
duct.*

Cic. ad  
Att. x. &  
Phil. ii.  
58. Plin.  
viii 16.  
Plut. Ant.



A. R. 703. were they always admitted when they presented  
 Ann. C. 49. themselves, for he often made them wait until  
 he had slept off his wine. \* “ Behold, says  
 “ Cicero, on this subject in a letter to Atticus,  
 “ what shame attends our ruin, and to what  
 “ unworthy victors we submit ! ”

*Cæsar comes to Rome. takes possession of the Dictatorship. he is appointed Dictator. he declines the Dictatorship, and presides at the election of the other Magistrates.*  
 Cæsar, having quelled, in the manner I have related, the sedition at Placentia, ordered all his troops to march towards Brundisium, from whence he intended to transport them to Greece ; and went himself to Rome, to take possession of the Dictatorship. Though he had caused himself to be appointed Dictator, which Magistrate had regal power, he did not propose to keep that place yet. But it was necessary to him at that time, either in order to make divers regulations agreeable to his interest, or for the particular purpose of making himself Consul, and presiding at the elections of the other Magistrates. He began by filling the vacant employments ; and in an Assembly of the People, at which he presided as Dictator, was himself appointed Consul for the following year. He takes care to remark in his Commentaries, like a strict observer of the laws, that he was then capable of a second Consulship, the interval of ten years being expired. This is a verbal homage he paid to his duty, which his actions continually violated. He gave himself for Collegue Servilius Isauricus, who obtained this dignity basely. For Piso, though Cæsar’s father-in-law, having exhorted him to send Deputies to Pompey to treat of an accommodation ; Isauricus opposed the notion, and was rewarded with

\* Vide quæm suppleto perierant. Cic. ad Att. x. 12.



with the Consulship. This alone may prove to the most dim-sighted, that all the advances Cæsar seemed to make to a peace were insincere. The Dictator afterwards appointed the Prætors, the most remarkable of whom were Cœlius and Trebonius; the Ædiles Curules, and the Quæstors.

Many expected from him a general abolition of debts; or, which is the same thing, a permission for all debtors to become bankrupts. This was what well agreed with the circumstances of many of his partizans. But he did not think proper to proceed so far, nor would absolutely sap the foundation of credit, which is the cement of all human society. He took a middle course, and ordered, that arbiters should be chose, who should make an estimate of the possessions of all debtors, and should convey them in payment to their creditors at the price they bore before the war. By this regulation the creditors lost about a fourth of their due. Dio adds, that, as many were suspected of concealing their money to avoid payment, Cæsar made an ordinance, forbidding any body to keep by him above \* sixty thousand sesterces. But the authority of this Historian is not sufficient to convince me of a fact of this sort, about which all other authors are silent.

The restoration of the exiles had been long expected. Cæsar at length put it into execution in this first Dictatorship. He palliates as much as possible in his Commentaries this odious measure, which annihilated past judgments, and indicated a total overthrow of the State. But he increased his strength thereby, and by this

Y 4

extra.

\* Between four and five hundred pounds.



A. R. 703. extraordinary benefit fixed in his party many  
Ann. C. 49. persons of distinction, who had it in their power  
to be very serviceable to him. Milo alone was  
excepted out of this general amnesty.

*The chil-  
dren of  
proscribed  
persons re-  
sisted to  
the open-  
ing of  
the way  
to public  
employ-  
ment.*

Cæsar merited less blame in exempting the children of proscribed persons from the punishment imposed by Sylla. By opening to them the door to public employments, which the murderer of their fathers had shut against them, he did but follow his constant system of politics, which was directly opposite to that of Sylla : and he put an end to a notorious injustice, which nothing but a particular conjuncture and the public quiet could have made supportable.

All this business was done in eleven days ; at the end of which Cæsar abdicated the Dictatorship ; and immediately set out for Brundisium, in order to pass from thence into Greece. But, before I attend him there, I shall relate by anticipation some commotions that happened in Italy during his absence ; and which, though inconsiderable in themselves, are interesting on account of their authors.

*Coelius* Coelius, who was so warm at first in Cæsar's cause, and who wrote so pathetically to Cicero to dissuade him from joining Pompey, altered on a sudden his way of thinking. Full of ambition, and the presumption which great parts give to a fiery young man, he took heinously that Cæsar should give Trebonius the Prætorship of the City, which was that of the greatest dignity, without subjecting him to draw lots for it. This preference was enough to detach him from a party wherein he thought himself despised.

Aiming



Aiming therefore at raising disturbances at <sup>A. R. 703.</sup> Rome, he took under his protection the cause <sup>Ant. C. 49.</sup> of the debtors ; in which he was personally concerned. For, \* though there were folly and rashness enough in his projects, yet was there more disorder in his private affairs. As Trebonius regulated the judgments he gave in this affair, by the law lately passed by Cæsar, Cœlius placed his Tribunal close by that of the Prætor of the city, and declared, that he would receive the appeals of those who should think themselves aggrieved by him. But Trebonius's prudence and mildness were such, that no-body appealed from him. Thus this first attempt of Cœlius proved unsuccessful. This did not however discourage him ; and being determined to keep no measures, since he could by no other means inflame and stir up the People, he proposed two most unjust and seditious laws ; the one, to exempt all the tenants in Rome from paying rent ; the other, for a general abolition of debts. This bait took with the multitude ; and Cœlius, at their head, came and attacked Trebonius on his Tribunal, drove him thence, and wounded some about him.

It was, doubtless, in these circumstances that he wrote Cicero a letter, in a very different stile from his preceding ones. In it he appears extremely concerned, that he did not go with him to Pompey's camp. He therein shews contempt and horror for those with whom he had united. † “ I had rather, says he, perish,

\* Pejor illi res familiaris, quam mens erat. *Vell.* II. 68. delitatis non esset, ejecti jampridem hinc essemus. Nam hic nunc, .... nec homo,

† Crede mihi ; perire satius est, quam hos videre. Quod si timor vestræ cru- nec ordo quisquam est, nisi Pompeianus. *Cæli. ad Cic.* 17.



A. R. 703. " than see such people. Every body hates us  
 Ann. C. 49 " here; there is no order of men, no, nor a  
 " single man, that is not a well-wisher to  
 " your cause. And, was there not some ap-  
 " prehension of severity from your party, we  
 " had been long ago drove out of Rome."  
 He, in consequence, invites Pompey to send  
 troops into Italy. \* " Your party, says he  
 " to Cicero, is asleep, and does not see our  
 " weakness, and where we are exposed. You  
 " hazard a battle, in which you are to blame.  
 " I do not know your troops; but I know  
 " that ours can fight well, and well sustain  
 " hunger and cold."

The expedient Cœlius proposed was very  
 distant, very uncertain; nor had he time given  
 him to wait for it. Servilius Isauricus, who, as  
 Consul had the supreme authority in the city;  
 having sent for some troops, made a *Senatus  
 consultum*, which interdicted to Cœlius the  
 functions of his office. And, in consequence  
 of it, he caused the bills of the laws of that  
 Prætor to be tore down; refused him admit-  
 tance into the Senate; and drove him out of  
 his Tribunal, whence he was going to harangue  
 the People. Cœlius resisted, for a while, be-  
 ing supported by his own obstinacy, and some  
 factious people.

I would not mention here a fact, ill-suited  
 the gravity of an Historian, did it not set in  
 a strong light the pertinacious, insulting, turn  
 of that Orator. The Consul having broke to

Quintil.  
 VI. 3.

• Vos dormitis, nec ad- expectatis, quod firmissimum  
 hac mihi videmini intelli- est. Vestras copias non novi.  
 gere, quam nos pateamus, & Nostri valde depugnare, &  
 quam sumus imbecilli . . . facile algere, & esurire con-  
 Quid istic facitis? Prælium fuerunt. *Idem, ibid.*

pieces



pieces his chair of office, he provided himself with another; which he garnished with straps of leather, to reproach his enemy with having been formerly whipped by his father. This sorry jest was of no service to him. He was at length obliged to give way to right and force; and desired permission to quit Rome, pretending to go and justify himself to Cæsar, who was then in Thessaly. But he had no such intention. He wanted to go and join Milo, who, in concert with him, was actually scouring about Italy, and labouring to excite new commotions.

The motive that animated Milo was anger, to find himself alone continued in banishment by Cæsar, when all other exiles had been recalled. As he was an old friend of Coelius, and they were both (though for different reasons) discontented with Cæsar, they easily associated. And Milo had some beginning of military force in the remains of the gladiators, which he bought formerly to entertain the People with in the shews he gave them.

These two men, equally audacious and enterprising, might, if they could have joined, have given some trouble to Cæsar's friends in Italy. But Milo's death quite disconcerted their projects. He had already got about him a number of vagabonds, wretches, and slaves, whose chains he had broke. With this band having undertook to besiege Compsa\*, in the country of the Hirpinii, he was slain by a stone from a machine on the walls. Coelius did not long survive him, but was killed also near Thurium†, by some of Cæsar's Spanish and

\* *Conza in the kingdom of Naples.*

† *The ancient Sybaris, a maritime city on the gulf of Tarento.*



A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

Gaulish troopers, whom he attempted to debauch and get on his side, by promises of money.

Milo and Cœlius do not appear to have been lamented by any body, though they had both great parts. Milo was the most courageous of men, but his valour degenerated into audacity and temerity. It is a singularity not at all to his credit, that he should be at once rejected by the two parties that then divided the Republic; and that, when he was banished Rome by Pompey, he should not be entertained by Cæsar.

As to Cœlius, he advanced much the glory of eloquence, and is reckoned (as well as Curio) among those Orators who are the ornament of a learned age. His letters to Cicero abound with wit, and unite gayety and humour with force and elevation. But great vices dishonoured these so inestimable talents. He was prodigal, debauched, without principles, without conduct, ready to sacrifice honour and virtue to his advancement, and his advancement itself to his resentment. For he was extravagantly choleric, so as to be insupportable in company. \* Of this Seneca has preserved an extraordinary instance. Cœlius supped one night with a client, who was a most patient, meek, man. This person, well-acquainted with the temper of his patron, approved of and applauded all he said. Cœlius grew hereupon impatient to find no

\* Cœlium Oratorem fuisse iracundissimum constat. Cum quo, ut aiunt, cœnabat in cubiculo lectæ patientiæ cliens: sed difficile erat illi in copulam coniecto rixam eius cum quo hærebat enegere.

Optimum judicavit, quidquid dixisset sequi, & secundas agere. Non tulit Cœlius assentientem, sed exclamavit: *Dic aliquid contra, ut duo simus.* Sen. de Ira. III. 8.

matter



matter for disputation, and cried out passionately to this eternal approver, “ For once say no, “ that we may differ.” A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49.

The insurrection and death of Milo and *Pompey's* Cœlius are facts that happened under Cæsar's *prepara-* second Consulship. There yet remains of the *tions :* Consulship of Lentulus and Marcellus the mili- *His land-* tary preparations made by Pompey. These *army.* Cæsar were great indeed ; for he had made a proper use of the time given him by Cæsar's Spanish expedition. Besides the five legions that he had transported with himself from Italy, another had been sent him from Sicily ; and he had raised three in Crete, Macedonia, and Asia, re-assembling all the veterans he could, who had been settled in those countries by former Generals. He expected also two legions that Metellus Scipio was to bring out of Syria.

As for auxiliary forces, all the Kings and Nations of Greece and the East had furnished him with archers, slingers, and cavalry. This foreign cavalry, of various nations, amounted to three thousand six hundred men. Some of the corps, of which it was composed, were commanded by their Kings, in person ; the most eminent among whom was old Dejotarus, whom zeal and affection for Pompey brought there, at the head of six hundred horse. The provisions, ammunition, and money, were proportionable to the greatness of this force. But, above all, Pompey had took care to provide a formidable fleet. He had collected ships from Asia and the Cyclades, from Corcyra, Athens, Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Sicilia, Phœnicia, and Egypt. \* It was in his marine, that

\* Pompeii omne consilium eum recessu rerum potiri. Themistocleum est. Existimat enim, qui mare teneat, *Cic. ad Att. X. 8.*



A. R. 703. he, after the example of Themistocles, placed  
 Ant. C. 49 his hopes of victory ; satisfied, that he, who  
 was master at sea, would necessarily give the  
 law. This fleet was stationed along the coast  
 of Epirus and Illyricum, under different Com-  
 manders, who were all subordinate to Bibulus,  
 as Admiral.

*Bibulus*  
*Admiral.*  
*Plot. Cat.* Pompey had, at first, designed this impor-  
 tant Command for Cato, and had promised  
 him it. But he reflected afterwards, or his  
 friends made him reflect, that he would there-  
 by give too much power to that rigid Repub-  
 lican, whose sole view was to maintain the old  
 Government : that, as soon as Cæsar was van-  
 quished, Cato would be for Pompey's laying  
 down his arms ; and that he would be in a  
 condition to compel him to it, when at the  
 head of a fleet of above five hundred ships.  
 This reflection struck Pompey, whose designs  
 were not quite so honest as Cato's, and de-  
 termined him to constitute Bibulus Admiral.  
 He could not have pitched on a man worse-  
 affected to Cæsar, but he could easily have  
 chose an abler Commander.

*Pompey*  
*encourages*  
*military*  
*exercises*  
*b. his own*  
*example*  
*Plot.*  
*Pomp.*  
*Appian.* Pompey took care to exercise himself his  
 land-forces. He did more, he set them an  
 example ; and, though he was near sixty years  
 old, he entered the lists, both on foot and  
 horseback, and was the first to lend a hand to  
 all military works. This behaviour made him  
 extremely popular. It charmed the soldiers,  
 and made them confident, to see Pompey per-  
 form his exercises as a young man, draw and  
 return his sword on horseback at full speed,  
 and lance a javelin, not only with skill, but  
 with a vigour that few in their prime could  
 surpass.

Mean



Mean time the year was near expiring ; and the Consuls, who had lent their names and ministry to all that had been hitherto done, had a mind, before they were out of office, to give as regular a form as circumstances would allow to the administration of affairs. They had about them the flower of the Senate, to the number of more than two hundred ; which consequently might well represent that august Assembly. The general opinion, that Pompey's cause was that of the State and Liberty, *General zeal and affection for Pompey's cause.* had united with him even those who had particular reasons to shun him. Brutus, whose father he had killed, and who, for that reason, *Plut.* would never before take any notice of, or see *Pomp & Brut.* him, came now to pay his respects, and submit to him, as head of the defenders of the Republic. A Senator, called by Plutarch Sex. Tadius, who was very old and lame, crossed the sea also to get to Pompey's camp. When he arrived, several laughed at him ; but Pompey got up, and received him with great civility ; judging rightly, that he did much honour to his cause, in overcoming the obstacles of age and infirmity, and in exposing himself to dangers with him, when he might have continued in Italy in safety.

This general affection to Pompey was much strengthened by his coming to a resolution, upon Cato's representation, not to kill any Roman in cold blood, and not to plunder any city in friendship or alliance with the Roman Empire. Every body was so charmed to find moderation and mildness added to the justice of the cause, that even those, who could not share in the war by actual service, did what they could by prayers and vows ; and they were



A. R. 703. were considered as enemies to Gods and Men;  
Ant. C. 49. who did not wish Pompey success.

*Assembly of the Senate held by the Consuls at Thessalonica.*  
*Pompey declared sole Chief.*  
Lucan.  
l. V.  
Appian.  
D. 5.  
The Consuls assembled the Senate in the city of Thessalonica; where, for stricter observation of the laws and customs, they had consecrated a place with augural ceremonies. For it was only in a place so prepared, that the Senate could regularly make decrees. Lentulus spoke first, and proposed, that it should be declared, that the Assembly, then actually sitting at Thessalonica, was the true Roman Senate. He added, that, nevertheless, as it was impossible for them to appoint Magistrates, it would be proper to order, that the Commands of all then in power should be continued; and that those who were then Consuls, Prætors, and Quæstors, should keep their authority, and exercise their functions, by the names of Proconsuls, Proprætors, and Proquæstors. Lastly, he represented, that the posture of affairs required a single Head; and that nobody could dispute that honour with Pompey. Every one applauded this proposal; and a decree passed accordingly. Thus Pompey obtained alone the supreme authority, which till then he had shared, nominally, at least, with the Consuls. This Senate also decreed honours and thanks to the Kings and Nations that favoured their cause. And in particular young Ptolomy, King of Egypt, under whose name, and by whose authority, Pompey was soon after murdered, had the possession of his Crown confirmed by this Assembly, in exclusion of his sister, the famous Cleopatra; though she had a right to it by the will of Ptolomy Auletes, their common father, who left his Crown to his eldest son and eldest daughter, jointly.

I said



I said, that the year was almost expired ; but, A. R. 703.  
Ant. C. 49. in reality, it was only the beginning of autumn, when all this happened. For it is to be observed, that, as the civil year of the Romans Pompey's  
security was then in great confusion, they reckoned that the end of December, which was really as to Cæ-  
sar's pas-  
sage into only the beginning of October. It was there- Greece. fore yet practicable to keep the field ; but Cæf. Pompey was going to distribute his troops among the maritime cities of Epirus, while his fleet was to guard the whole coast, and prevent Cæsar's passage. However, neither he, nor Bibulus, thought themselves under a necessity of being very watchful yet ; imagining they had before them great part of the autumn and all the winter, nor thinking that Cæsar could have any intention to come over before the return of the fine weather. This was being very ill-acquainted with Cæsar, and having little attended to the many proofs he had given of his prodigious activity. He was so eager to pass into Greece, that he would not even stay at Rome till the first of January, to take possession of the Consulship ; but set out for Brundisium when there remained only a few days of December. It was in that city he went through the ceremony of taking possession of that office.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR II.

P. SERVILIUS ISAURICUS.

A. R. 704.  
Ant. C. 48.

*He goes to*

Cæsar found at Brundisium twelve legions Greece and all his cavalry. But, notwithstanding his with orders to build and assemble as many ships as twenty possible, he had scarce enough to embark seven thousand legions and six hundred horse. And yet these legionary soldiers and six hundred horse.



A. R. 704.  
A. C. 48.

legions were far from being complete. The Gaulish wars, and their long march from Spain to Brundisium, had considerably thinned their ranks ; and their abode, during the heat of the summer, in the unwholesome country of Apulia had made most of them ill.

These many difficulties did not retard Cæsar. He assembles his forces, and represents to them, that the end of all their labours drew near, and they had now only one last effort to make ; that, as he had not ships answerable to their number, they would do well to leave behind them their baggage and slaves that would take up the room of serviceable people ; and that they should put all their hopes in victory, and the generosity of their General. They all readily consented to what was proposed ; and Cæsar embarked in his transports twenty thousand legionary soldiers and six hundred horse, under an escort of but twelve men of war. With this force he went to face a fleet of five or six hundred vessels, and a land army of above sixty thousand commanded by Pompey.

He set sail the fourth of January, according to the faulty calculation of the Romans, but, properly speaking, on the fourteenth of October. The next day he arrived at the \* Ceraunian mountains ; and having found among the rocks and shelves, with which that coast abounds, a tolerable road, he debarked : for he durst not go to any port, as he knew they were all in the enemy's possession. In fact, Lucretius Vespillo guarded that of Oricum † with eighteen men of war ; and Bibulus had an

\* *Monti della Chimera.*

† *A city of Epirus, near the Ceraunian mountains.*



hundred and ten at || Corcyra. But the first <sup>A. R. 704.</sup> durst not hazard an engagement; and the other <sup>Ant. C. 48,</sup> had not time to re-assemble his sailors and soldiers, who were dispersed in full security.

As soon as Cæsar had landed his troops, his first care was to send back his ships to Brundisium, to bring over his other legions and cavalry. Thirty of these vessels fell into the hands of Bibulus; who had put to sea, though somewhat late, and by a cruelty the more detestable, as it was contrary to the humane resolution made by those from whom he derived his authority, he not only burnt the ships, but also the masters they belonged to, and the sailors on board. Shame and vexation, for having suffered Cæsar to pass over, made him the more vigilant to prevent at least the passage of the forces yet in Italy; and he guarded with extraordinary care all the coast from Salona† in Dalmatia to Oricum.

Pompey was then in Macedonia. Cæsar, <sup>He dis-</sup> who designed to seize on the maritime cities of <sup>patches</sup> Epirus, and particularly on Dyrrachium, where <sup>Vibullius</sup> all the enemy's magazines were, dispatched to <sup>to Pompey,</sup> him, perhaps to amuse him, Vibullius Rufus <sup>with pro-</sup> with new proposals for a peace. This Vibullius <sup>posals for</sup> had been twice taken by Cæsar; the first time <sup>an accom-</sup> at Corfinium, the next in Spain. Having been <sup>modation.</sup> therefore twice indebted to him for his life, and being also much in Pompey's esteem, Cæsar thought him a proper person to negotiate between them.

His instructions were: "That, after the mis-  
" fortunes they had both experienced, Pom-

|| *Island of Corfeu*

† *This city is ruined; and out of its ruins has been formed the city of Spalatro, four miles off.*



A. R. 704.  
Ant. C. 48.

“ pey in Italy and Spain, and Cæsar in Illy-  
 “ ricum and Afric, it was time to learn from  
 “ those bloody lessons, and listen to an accom-  
 “ modation. That the present moment was  
 “ the most favourable in that respect, they  
 “ could ever expect ; because, not having yet  
 “ tried one another’s strength, and considering  
 “ themselves as equals, there would be more  
 “ likelihood of agreeing on terms ; whereas,  
 “ if one of them once got the superiority, he  
 “ would exact every thing from the other, and  
 “ give up nothing. He therefore proposed,  
 “ that they should agree to have their diffe-  
 “ rences determined at Rome by the Senate  
 “ and People ; and, that this judgment might  
 “ be made freely, that they should both swear  
 “ forthwith at the head of their armies, to dis-  
 “ band all their national and auxiliary forces  
 “ in the space of three days.”

These proposals were palpably fallacious. Pompey would never consent that this determination should be made at Rome, where his adversary was then master. The project of disbanding all the armies was more specious than practicable ; and, if it could have been executed, would have been very unequal. Cæsar’s veterans would have re-assembled about him on the first signal ; whereas Pompey’s new levies would not have been so easily recalled. Lastly, Cæsar well knew that Pompey had no inclination for peace. Thus it is plain, as I have frequently observed, that he only endeavoured to have appearances on his side, and the credit of pacific intentions, while he breathed nothing but war.

This he prosecuted with his usual diligence. It cost him no more to take possession of  
 Oricum



Oricum and Apollonia, than to present himself <sup>A. R. 704.</sup>  
 before those places; and all Epirus followed <sup>Ant. C. 48.</sup>  
 their example. There yet remained the city of <sup>He makes</sup>  
 Dyrrachium; towards which Cæsar advanced <sup>himself</sup>  
 with such diligence, that he marched a day <sup>master of</sup>  
 and a night without taking any rest himself, <sup>almost all</sup>  
 or allowing his soldiers to take any. This <sup>Epirus.</sup>  
 town was also the chief object of Pompey's <sup>Pompey</sup>  
 care, as soon as he knew of his adversary's <sup>comes</sup>  
 landing in Greece. He ran thither in haste, <sup>up time</sup>  
 and was happy enough to get there first. When <sup>enough to</sup>  
 Cæsar found Dyrrachium was safe from his at- <sup>save Dyr-</sup>  
 tack, he halted, and encamped on one side of <sup>rachium,</sup>  
 the river Apsus: Pompey came also with his <sup>and en-</sup>  
 whole force, and encamped on the other side. <sup>camps</sup>  
<sup>over-</sup>

Cæsar could not undertake any thing more <sup>against</sup>  
 now, till joined by his troops from Italy. But <sup>his adver-</sup>  
 the coast was so well guarded by the enemy, <sup>sary, with</sup>  
 that their passage was impracticable; and he <sup>the river</sup>  
 wrote to Calenus, whom he left at Brundisium, <sup>Apsus be-</sup>  
 not to be in haste about coming over. This <sup>tween</sup>  
 order was very timely. Calenus, who had <sup>them,</sup>  
 already sailed out of port, put back again. A <sup>Pompey's</sup>  
 single ship continued its route, and was taken <sup>fleet hin-</sup>  
 by Bibulus; who with his usual cruelty put to <sup>ders the</sup>  
 death all on board, both freemen and slaves. <sup>troops</sup>  
<sup>Cæsar</sup>  
<sup>had left</sup>  
<sup>in Italy</sup>  
<sup>from cross-</sup>  
<sup>ing the</sup>  
<sup>sea.</sup>  
<sup>Bibulus's</sup>  
<sup>death.</sup>

If Bibulus greatly incommoded Cæsar, by  
 being master of the sea; Cæsar, who was mas-  
 ter on shore, was very troublesome to Bibulus,  
 in his turn, by hindering him from getting  
 water or wood, or coming near the shore.  
 His fleet was obliged to fetch from the island  
 of Corcyra all its necessaries; and once, when  
 foul weather prevented their receiving refresh-  
 ments from thence, the soldiers were necessitated,  
 for want of water, to collect the dew which  
 in the night fell on the hides that covered their



A. R. 704.  
Ant. C. 48.

ships. Spite of these difficulties, Bibulus kept at sea. But at last he sunk under them ; for, being took ill, and not having proper assistance on board, yet refusing to quit his post, he died at sea. No body succeeded him in the command of the whole fleet ; but each squadron was governed, independently of the rest, by its particular Commander.

*Pompey's  
barge an-  
swer to  
Vibullius.*

The danger Dyrrachium was in, and Pompey's eagerness to succour it, had not afforded him leisure to give audience to Vibullius Rufus. When things were somewhat quieter, in the camp near the river Apsus, he sent for him, and ordered him to signify what he had to say from Cæsar. But Vibullius had scarce began, before Pompey interrupted him, by exclaiming, “ What is my life or country to me, “ if I must be beholden to Cæsar for them ? “ And will it be believed that I am not in- “ debted to him for them, if he by an accom- “ modation restores me to Rome ? ”

*New ad-  
vances of  
Cæsar  
always re-  
jected.*

Cæsar, informed of this answer, continued the old game ; and, the more intractable he found Pompey, the more he affected to make advances. Thus, as the soldiers of the two armies often joined in conversation, he took advantage of the opportunity ; and Vatinius by his order advanced to the river-side. We know what sort of a man this Vatinius was ; and that there centered in him every thing that was capable of exciting contempt and hatred. No mouth could be so proper to discredit even the language of equity and reason. He cried with a loud voice, “ Will it not be permitted to “ citizens to send Deputies to their fellow- “ citizens about peace ? This is what is never “ refused, even to robbers and pirates. And “ can



“ can there be purer intentions than ours, since A. R. 704.  
 “ we only labour to prevent the civil butchery Ant. C. 48.  
 “ of friends and countrymen ? ”

If we are to credit Cæsar's relation, his adversary consented to an interview, only to put in execution an act of perfidy : For the next day, when the Deputies on both sides were met at the time and place appointed, while Labienus was debating with Vatinius, on a sudden those of Pompey's party threw their javelins, and wounded several of Cæsar's people ; and Vatinius himself escaped with difficulty, being covered by the soldiers shields. Labienus then lifted up his voice, and cried, “ Leave off  
 “ prating of an accommodation : for you must  
 “ not expect peace, till you bring us Cæsar's  
 “ head.” A most brutal declaration from a man, who ought at least to have had in respectful remembrance the benefits he had received from his old General !

But I cannot help observing, that for the fact I have just now related, and some preceding ones of the same nature, we have no other authority than Cæsar's ; and it is not just to credit him altogether in what reflects on his enemies. To be sure there was great haughtiness and severity in the procedure of Pompey and his partizans. These accounts of their cruelty and perfidy may be true ; but they may also be exaggerated, and even altered in particulars of moment.

The armies of Cæsar and Pompey continued a good while in sight of one another, separated only by a small river, without any thing passing between them but some slight skirmishes. The great object of the care of their two Generals was the army left at Brundisium ; which Cæsar

*Cæsar's  
troops left  
at Brundisium are  
dilatatory in  
joining  
him.*



A. R. 704.  
Ann. C. 43.

impatiently expected, and whose passage Pompey was greatly interested to prevent. Libo, who commanded a fleet of fifty ships, flattered himself for some time that he should be able to detain these troops in Italy, and absolutely hinder them from putting to sea. He came with his fleet and took possession of a little island over-against the port of Brundisium; and, if he could have maintained his post, would have so blocked up the port that nothing could have stirred out. But Anthony, who was then in the town, having posted cavalry all along the coast to hinder the enemy from watering, Libo was forced to retire ignominiously.

Several months were spent in this manner, and the winter was almost over, which was the only time for Cæsar's forces to hazard the passage. If they stayed till fine weather, Pompey's fleet, being then able to act and extend itself, would render it absolutely impracticable. Cæsar could not but think that his Lieutenants were negligent, and had let slip some precious moment, when a fair wind might have brought them to Greece. A delay, so contrary to his temper, extremely vexed him. The want he was in of a reinforcement, his uneasiness and impatience, perhaps, too, even some suspicion of Anthony's fidelity, made him resolve on an experiment, which he takes no notice of in his Commentaries, doubtless on account of its rashness; but which all other writers unanimously report.

He determined to go in person after the tardy troops. For this purpose he sent, towards night, three slaves to hire a bark on the river, as it were for a courier from him to Italy,

He was  
brought to  
just them.

Famous  
fact of  
Cæsar to  
the manner  
of his  
end.  
Dion.  
Appian.  
Livy.  
Lucan.



Italy. Towards midnight he came himself, disguised as a slave ; and they set out. The

A. R. 704.  
Ant. C. 48.

wind was high ; however, they got well enough to the river's mouth. But there, the waves of the sea, meeting with the water of the river, put the little vessel in such manifest danger, that the master ordered the rowers to turn back, since it was not possible to advance. Cæsar upon this discovers himself ; and addressing the master, “ \* What are you afraid of ? ” says he, you carry Cæsar and his Fortune.” The master and crew, extremely surprized, redouble their efforts, and vigorously stem the waves. But they were at last forced to give way to an element not to be overcome by human obstinacy : and, as it was near day, and Cæsar was afraid of being seen by the advanced guards of the enemy, he suffered himself, with much reluctance, to be carried back to the place where he embarked. Thus he returned to his camp ; having attempted an action more becoming, if I may say so, a Partizan, than a General.

The courage and confidence of his soldiers were such, that, when they saw him come back, they complained, that he should not think himself secure of victory with them alone. They thought it strange, that he should expose himself in going after other forces, as if those he had were not sufficient. On the other side, those who were left in Italy burnt with impatience to cross the sea ; and, standing on the shore and beach, looked towards Epirus ;

\* Quid times ? Cæsarem vehis. Flor. Plutarch and Appian add, what I have

expressed, καὶ τὴν Κάισαρος τύχην.

hastening,



A. R. 704.  
Ant. C. 48.

hastening, at least by their wishes, the hour of their departure. But their Officers detained them on account of the danger.

*On receiving new orders, Anthony passes from Italy into Greece with four legions.*

Cæsar well knew the ardour of his soldiers. He therefore wrote in a severe manner to his Lieutenants at Brundisium, commanding them to sail the first fair wind; and, in case they did not speedily execute his orders, he gave Posthumius, who brought them, a letter addressed to the soldiers themselves; in which he exhorted them to embark under the conduct of this Posthumius, and to trouble themselves about nothing but getting on shore, without minding what became of the ships; because, he said, he wanted men, not ships. He acquainted them, that they would stand the best chance of escaping the enemy on the coast of Apollonia.

Cæf.

Such pressing orders had the desired effect. Anthony and Calenus took advantage of a south wind; and having embarked in their transports four legions (three of which were old corps, and one new-raised) and eight hundred horse, put to sea. They were in great danger in the passage; and escaped merely by a piece of luck, which, far from justifying, evidences on the contrary the temerity of their enterprize. They were discovered off of Dyrrachium. Immediately Coponius slips out of port after them, with sixteen Rhodian gallies. The fight would have been very unequal between gallies and transports. Therefore Anthony and Calenus had nothing to do but to make off as fast as possible. But finding themselves vigorously pursued, and almost overtaken, they ran into a small port, which did not shelter them from the south wind.



wind. But they preferred the hazard of being lost to that of fighting. At that instant the wind changed from south to south-west, and put them in perfect security. For the south-west wind did not incommode them in the port. The same wind, which is tempestuous, beat so furiously on the Rhodian gallies, that they were broke to pieces against the shore. Not one escaped ; and almost all their crews were drowned. Coponius however was saved. Several of the rowers were also took out of the water by Cæsar's people, and sent into their country, with great humanity. What would have become of Anthony, what of Cæsar himself, had it not been for this change of wind, which looks like an incident contrived on purpose to deliver them from a danger into which an excessive boldness had precipitated them ? What judgment would have passed on Cæsar's orders, if his transports had been either beat and took by the Rhodian squadron, or broke to pieces in the port by the violence of the wind ?

Two ships of Anthony's fleet were left behind ; and, not knowing what route their Commander had took, they dropped anchor over-against Lissus, a little town on the same coast as Dyrrachium, to the north, and three miles from the port of Nymphæum, wherein Anthony had been saved. Otacilius, who commanded in Lissus, immediately sent several ships to take these two vessels, or compel them to surrender. On this occasion appeared, as Cæsar observes, how great a difference different degrees of courage make in the condition of men exposed to the same danger. One of these vessels carried two hundred and twenty



A. R. 704.  
Ant. C. 48.

twenty new-raised soldiers ; the other less than two hundred veterans. The new levies, frightened at the number of their adversaries, and fatigued with sea-sickness, surrendered, on promise of their lives. But Otacilius did not keep his word ; for he ordered them all to be cruelly slain in his presence. The veterans, on the contrary, would not hear of laying down their arms, and obliged the pilot to run the vessel ashore. Thus they landed ; and, Otacilius having sent against them four hundred horse, they made a stout defence, killed some of them, and rejoined the main army.

Soon after, Anthony was received into Lissus ; from whence he returned most of his ships to Brundisium, to fetch over the remaining troops designed for transportation ; reserving nevertheless some ships of Gaulish structure, that, if Pompey (as it was rumoured) should attempt to return to Italy, Cæsar might be able to follow him.

Anthony's intention was to join his General. Pompey made some motions to hinder this junction ; and even endeavoured to surprize Anthony into an ambuscade ; but in vain. Cæsar, informed of the arrival of the long-expected reinforcement, went to meet it ; and, having effected the junction, found himself at the head of eleven legions, which, though incomplete, made nevertheless an army of forty thousand men.

*Metellus  
Scipio  
brings to  
Pompey  
the Syrian  
legions.  
Tarranica.  
Libaniscus  
of that  
Prætorial.*

Pompey's forces, which were already more considerable than Cæsar's, as to number, received also an augmentation about the same time, by the arrival of Metellus Scipio in Macedonia. This man, more illustrious on account of his birth and rank, than of his capacity



city and conduct, had been sent into Syria at the beginning of the war, as I mentioned, in the quality of Proconsul ; to draw from thence what troops were there, and bring them to the assistance of his son-in-law Pompey. He discharged his trust in a manner that did no honour to his party. He is accused in Cæsar's Commentaries of exactions, oppressions, and vexations of all sorts, throughout Syria and Asia Minor. True it is, that Cæsar seems to have had a personal dislike to him, and takes a palpable pleasure in speaking ill of him. But all we know from other hands, concerning the life and proceedings of Metellus Scipio, gives us no right to suspect Cæsar's testimony, though he was his enemy. We may call to mind some things we have mentioned elsewhere : and Josephus relates, that, while he was in Syria, he beheaded Alexander, Prince of the Jews, under the frivolous pretext of his having formerly occasioned some disturbance in Judæa ; but in truth, because he favoured Cæsar's cause, like his unfortunate father Aristobulus, who had been poisoned a little before by Pompey's partizans for the same reason.

A. R. 704.  
Ant. C. 48.

Joseph.  
Antiq.  
xiv. 13,  
& 15.

Scipio even pretended to have a particular reason for conniving at the licence of his troops ; who, having been originally destined to war against the Parthians, did not march with a good-will against a Roman, and a Consul. In order therefore to attach them to him, he allowed them all kinds of robbery ; and he himself took every opportunity to plunder, that he might have wherewithal to be liberal to them. He was going to seize on the treasures of the Ephesian Diana, when he received letters from Pompey, desiring him to hasten

Cæs.



A. R. 704  
Ant. C. 48.

hasten to him, because Cæsar had passed into Greece. This is what prevented the pillage of that celebrated, respected, temple.

*Cæsar  
sends three  
detach-  
ments from  
his army  
into Æto-  
lia, Thef-  
salia, and  
Macedo-  
nia.*

When Scipio got into Macedonia, he found himself opposed by Domitius Calvinus, a Lieutenant of Cæsar, at the head of two legions. For, as soon as Cæsar was strong enough, he took care to extend himself, and get more room. Till then he was supplied with provisions only from Epirus ; all the rest of Greece, and the sea, were in possession of the enemy. As therefore Deputies had been sent to him from Ætolia, Thessalia, and Macedonia, who engaged to make those countries declare for him, if he would send some troops there, he made three great detachments ; one of five cohorts and a small body of horse, for Ætolia, under Calvisius Sabinus ; another for Thessaly, of one legion and two hundred horse, under L. Cassius Longinus ; and a third (the most considerable) under Domitius Calvinus, for Macedonia, of two legions and five hundred horse.

Sabinus met with the least opposition. The Ætolians received him with open arms ; and he easily drove Pompey's garrisons out of *\* Lepanto.* Naupactum \* and Calydon.

In Thessaly there was a powerful party against Cæsar ; and, Metellus Scipio being come up with his army, L. Cassius was constrained to fly the country. He then fell on Acarnania, which he easily subdued. Some time after, upon receiving fresh orders from Cæsar, Cassius and Calvisius joined ; and Fusius Calenus, being sent to take the command of the combined detachment, entered into Bœotia and Phocis, and made himself master of Delphi, Thebes, and



and Orchomenus. He intended to penetrate into Peloponnesus; but Rutilius Lupus, Pompey's Lieutenant, hindered him by walling up the Isthmus of Corinth. A. R. 704.  
Ant. C. 48.

As for Domitius Calvinus, Metellus Scipio and he kept one another in play, without any thing of moment happening between them.

All these little expeditions were indecisive of the main business, which depended on the operations of the two grand armies. Pompey, having been disappointed with respect to Anthony, encamped at a place called Asparagium. Cæsar followed him, and offered him battle. But it was not agreeable to Pompey's views to hazard an action. He knew Cæsar's soldiers were invincible by fair fighting. Besides, he was in a good situation to protract the war, having plenty of all things, and being master of all the seas; so that no wind could blow but what brought him either reinforcements or convoys. Cæsar, on the contrary, was under difficulties; he was supplied with provisions by a country of small extent, and had scarce any corn. Pompey therefore pretended to reduce his adversary by want, without risking an engagement. He had acted wisely, and been happy, if he had persevered in this resolution to the last. *Pompey avoids an engagement.*

Cæsar could not compel him to fight. He therefore turned off to Dyrrachium, where Pompey's magazines were, as we have observed. Pompey was not aware of his adversary's design, till late, and so could not hinder Cæsar from getting between him and Dyrrachium. But he came and encamped a little way off, in a place called Petra, where he had still the advantage of the sea.



A. R. 704.

Ant. C. 48.

*Cæsar at-**tempts to**inclose**Pompey in**lines.*

Cæsar then formed the boldest project perhaps that ever came into a General's head. With an inferior army, almost famished, he undertook to inclose in lines more numerous forces, who had received no check, and abounded in all things. His views herein were, first to facilitate the passage of his convoys, which the enemy's cavalry, which was very strong and fine, would no longer cut off; next, to distress this very cavalry, for want of forage; and lastly, to lessen the great reputation and high idea entertained of Pompey. He had a mind to have it reported all over the world, that Pompey suffered himself to be blockaded, and as it were imprisoned, by Cæsar's works; and durst not hazard a battle to set himself at liberty.

The country itself gave Cæsar a hint towards this project. All round Pompey's camp, at a small distance, were steep hills. Cæsar built forts on these hills, and drew lines of communication from one fort to another. Pompey, who would not leave the sea and Dyrrachium, nor give battle, could do nothing but extend himself to give his adversary the more trouble. This he did: he made within the same works as Cæsar did without: he raised twenty-four forts, which took in a circumference of fifteen miles, wherein were arable and pasture lands to feed his horses and beasts of burthen. He even perfected the work before his adversary; as his took up a less circuit, and he had more hands.

*Divers  
actions  
about the  
lines.*

It is easy to conceive, that though there was no general action, because Pompey declined it, yet it was impossible to prevent many engagements, which sometimes became important.



tant. Of these I shall relate the most remarkable circumstances. In an action, in which Cæsar attempted to make a lodgement on an eminence that interfered with his lines, his troops were attacked so briskly by the Pompeians, that a retreat became necessary. This too was not easy, as it was to be made by a pretty steep descent : and Pompey went so far as to say, “ that he consented to be accounted “ a General of no merit, if Cæsar’s men got “ off without considerable loss.” Cæsar refuted this bravado by fact. He ordered his soldiers to fix in the ground some hurdles, in the manner we now use fascines ; behind which they dug a moderate ditch. When this was done, he began to file off the legionary soldiers, supporting them by some light-armed troops posted on their flanks, who with arrows and stones repulsed the enemy. Pompey’s troops failed not to pursue them with great outcries and fierce menaces, overturned the hurdles, and used them as bridges to get over the ditch. Cæsar, who did not choose to seem drove from a post, which he quitted voluntarily ; when his forces were got half down the hill, gave them the signal to face about and fall on the enemy ; which they did with such vigour and impetuosity, that their pursuers took to flight, and with much difficulty cleared the ditch and hurdles, which stopped their way. Many of them were killed : Cæsar lost but five men, and effected his retreat without any further interruption.

A much more memorable day than this was that wherein there happened six actions at once ; three near Dyrrachium, and three about the lines. We have lost the particulars



A. R. 704. Cæsar gave us of these engagements in his  
 Ant. C. 48. Commentaries. Almost all we know of them  
*Prodigious* is reducible to an instance of valour scarce to  
*valour of* be credited. One of Cæsar's cohorts (that is,  
*one of* a battalion of five hundred men at most, and  
*Cæsar's* which probably was incomplete) defended a  
*cohorts,* fort several hours against four of Pompey's  
*and above* Centurion legions.

*Scæva.* He who got the most honour in this glorious  
*Hist. Cæf.* defence was the Centurion Scæva \*. I have  
 Appian. already took notice of the extraordinary valour  
 Lucan. he shewed on this occasion. Being entrusted  
 Val Max. with the care of one of the gates of the fort,  
 III. 2. he drove off the enemy ; though he was wound-  
 ed in the head, run through the shoulders and  
 the thigh, and had lost one eye. In this con-  
 dition he called to a Centurion of the other side,  
 as it were to surrender ; who coming up to him  
 unguardedly, Scæva thrust his sword through  
 his body.

Cæf. In a word, the whole cohort kept their post  
 till two legions came to their assistance, who  
 easily discomfited Pompey's four. The in-  
 trepid warriors, who had maintained their  
 ground with such obstinate valour, were all  
 wounded : they brought and counted to Cæsar  
 about thirty thousand arrows that had been shot  
 into the fort ; and shewed him Scæva's buckler,  
 which was pierced in two hundred and thirty  
 places. Cæsar took care that such astonishing

\* See Vol XII. Some dif-  
 ferent circumstances may be  
 observed in these two rela-  
 tions. In the first I follow  
 Plutarch : Here particularly  
 Valerius Maximus and Lu-  
 can. The same fact cannot  
 pass through different hands,  
 without suffering some altera-  
 tion. As never a one of my  
 authors has on this occasion a  
 pre-eminent authority, I have  
 made no scruple of a little va-  
 riation in my narration. If  
 we had this story as related  
 by Cæsar, I should have ad-  
 hered to him implicitly.



valour should not go unrewarded. He presented Scæva with \* two hundred thousand asses, and advanced him directly from the eighth rank of Captains to the first. He also distributed military rewards among the other officers and soldiers of that cohort ; and assigned them double pay, and double allowance of corn.

However worthy of admiration the courage of this cohort may be, I do not know whether we ought not to admire more the patience with which the whole army persevered, in the greatest want. It is true, they had flesh, but they had no corn ; and, when instead of it they had barley or pulse given them, they took it chearfully, remembering that last year in Spain, and several times in Gaul, after having suffered much more, they had at last triumphed over their enemies. They discovered in the country a root, called by Cæsar Chara, which they pounded and kneaded with milk, so as to make a sort of bread of it : and when their adversaries reproached them with their want, by way of answer to their insults, they threw these loaves at them ; saying, that, as long as the earth produced such roots, they would never release them : and they often said to one another, that they would sooner live on the bark of trees than let Pompey escape. Where is the wonder that a General, who could inspire his soldiers with such sentiments, should be always victorious ? The talent of thus raising the courage of the soldiery implies many others, and almost gives me a higher idea of Cæsar than all his victories.

\* About six hundred pounds, sterling.



A. R. 704.  
Ant. C. 48.  
Suet. Cæf.  
c. 68.  
Plut. Cæf.

Pompey was frightened at the constancy and resolution of his adversaries. He said, “ he had to do with wild beasts ” ; and concealed as much as possible the loaves of Chara thrown into his lines, lest the sight of that strange nourishment should dishearten his army.

*Fruitless  
negotiation  
began by  
Cæsar  
with  
Scipio.*

While the war was carried on with such fury, Cæsar still feigned an inclination for peace. Having been so often repulsed by Pompey, he addressed himself now to Metellus Scipio ; and wanted to enter into a negotiation with him by the ministry of a common friend. His enemies continued to do him service, by taking on themselves the odium of the refusal. Scipio listened at first to Cæsar’s Deputy, but presently refused to hear or see him : and Clodius, for that was the name of this Negotiator, returned to Cæsar unsuccessful.

*Pompey’s  
army suf-  
fered much.*

Mean while Pompey, inclosed as he was by Cæsar, suffered great inconveniencies. He wanted two very necessary things, water and forage. He was in want of water, because his enemy turned the river, and stopped up the springs ; so that his troops were forced to look out for pools, and to dig wells, which the heat soon dried up. As to forage, the corn sown within their lines supplied them for some time ; but afterwards they were obliged to have it sent them by sea ; and, as they could not get enough that way, they were forced to have recourse to barley, herbage of all sorts, and even the leaves of trees. At last, all expedients being exhausted, and the horses dying daily, Pompey thought it time to attempt to force the barricade, and set himself at liberty.

While



While he was busied with this project, two <sup>A. R. 734. Ant. C. 48.</sup> deserters of consequence came to him, with in- <sup>Two Gaul- ish Officers</sup> formations that greatly facilitated its execution. They were two brothers, named Roscillus and <sup>of Cæsar's</sup> Ægus, Allobroges by birth, valiant men, who <sup>party de- jert, and</sup> had been long attached to Cæsar; and who, <sup>acquaint</sup> having been very serviceable to him in his <sup>Pompey</sup> Gaulish wars, had in recompence been loaded <sup>with the</sup> with honours and riches. These men, perceiv- <sup>weak</sup> ing how much they were considered by the <sup>parts of</sup> General, grew thereupon insolent; used their <sup>his adver- sary's lines.</sup> troopers ill, defrauded them often of their pay, and even imposed on Cæsar by receiving pay for more men than they had. Complaints were therefore made to Cæsar, who did not think proper to make a bustle, but reprimanded them in private. These haughty Gauls, piqued at the diminution of their credit, and at the raillery they were often forced to bear, resolved to change sides; and went into Pompey's camp with some of their dependents. The acquisition of these Officers was matter of triumph to that General; not only on account of their personal qualities, but because, till then, no-body had deserted from Cæsar; whereas scarce a day passed without some desertion from Pompey's army. Roscillus and Ægus were ostentatiously carried all over the camp. But, besides this satisfaction, which was rather vain than solid, they did their new friends an essential service, by acquainting them with the foible of Cæsar's lines.

Pompey laid hold on the advantage, and <sup>Pompey</sup> made so vigorous and well-contrived a sally, <sup>forces Cæ- sar's lines.</sup> that he carried all before him. He attacked the extremity of the enemy's lines, towards the sea, a good distance from the main camp: and



A. R. 704.  
Ant. C. 48.

and the forces there had like to have been cut to pieces, had not Mark Anthony come to their assistance with twelve cohorts. He put a stop to the Victor's progress. But the lines were forced, and Pompey was at liberty; being able to forage, and having an easy communication with the sea.

In this action, he who carried the eagle of the ninth legion manifested sentiments worthy of a soldier of Cæsar. As he was dangerously wounded, and found his strength fail, he called to some troopers who passed by, and said to them: \* “ I have preserved, to the last moment of my life, with the greatest care, this eagle, with which I have been entrusted; and, now I am dying, I return it to Cæsar, with the same fidelity. Carry it to him, I beseech you; nor suffer Cæsar's arms to experience, in losing it, an ignominy with which they have been hitherto unacquainted.” Thus the eagle was saved from the disaster of the legion.

Cæsar was not present in this engagement, the scene of action being remote from his quarters. He endeavoured the same day to have his revenge, by carrying off one of Pompey's legions. But some of the troops, intended for this expedition, missed their way; which gave Pompey time to succour the legion in danger. The face of affairs was instantly changed. Those who were before in a man-

\* Hanc ego & vivus multos per annos magna diligentia defendi, & nunc moriens, eadem fide Cæsari restituo. Nolite, obsecro, committere, quod ante in exer-

citu Cæsaris non accidit, ut rei militaris dedecus admittatur; incolumemque ad eum referte. *Cæs. de B. Civ.* III. 64.



ner besieged, took courage, and repulsed the assailants. Cæsar's forces, on the contrary, aimed at nothing but a retreat. But, as the ground was disadvantageous, the horse took fright first, and ran away. The panic communicated itself to the infantry. These invincible warriors fly precipitately, and throw one another down, under their General's eyes. All his efforts to rally them are fruitless. If he seized any by the arm, they struggled till they got away. If he laid hold of the colours, they left them in his hands. There was even an Ensign who presented the point of his sword, as going to stab him ; but he was immediately killed by those about Cæsar.

A. R. 704.  
Ant. C. 48.

The defeat was complete ; and, if Pompey had come up directly and attacked Cæsar's lines briskly, there would have been an end of Cæsar's army and fortune. He himself was of this opinion ; for he says on this subject, " that  
" his adversaries would have been victorious,  
" if their General had known how to conquer."

Plut.

Pomp. &

Cæs.

Pompey was apprehensive of an ambuscade, and lost, by over-caution, an opportunity that never returned.

Cæsar's loss in these two actions was considerable. He owns the slain and prisoners to amount to nine hundred and sixty private men, thirty Officers, and some Roman Knights and Senators sons. He lost also thirty-two colours. The prisoners were delivered up to Labienus on his request ; and this deserter, brutal and cruel, as usual, diverted himself with insulting them in their calamity ; and asked them sarcastically, if it was usual for veterans to run away ; after which he caused them to be put to death.

Cæsar,



A. R. 711.

Ann. C. 43.

Cæsar de-

terminis to

retreat

into Thess-

salia.

Stans and

grief of his

soldiers.

Cæsar, having received such a check, submitted to fortune. He found he could not prosecute his scheme, and therefore gave it up.

He called in all his forces from the forts; he no longer thought of attacking or inclosing the enemy; he aimed at nothing but a retreat, till such time as he should find, or make, a better opportunity.

He assembles his soldiers, and comforts them by all the arguments he could think of. This was what was very necessary; reprimands would have been unseasonable. For they were so ashamed and grieved, that they undertook to punish themselves by the severest impositions. Cæsar therefore contented himself with stigmatizing, and reducing to private men, some of the Ensigns: whose punishment the soldiers applauded. Moreover they demanded, with great outcries, to be led against the enemy, that they might expunge the stain their glory had received. But Cæsar did not think it prudent to expose to an action troops that had been just worsted, and in whom might remain too deep impressions of their late fright. He determined to quit Epirus, and go into Thessaly. He conducted this retreat so skilfully, that though he had very difficult ways to pass, and some great rivers to cross, he suffered no loss, though pursued by Pompey for three days. On the fourth, Cæsar having got a day's march, Pompey stopped, and left him to continue his route; he then held a Council on the use he should make of the superiority he had acquired over his adversary.

Pompey.

attended to

go over

to Italy,

cheels to

stay in

Greece

Pier

Pomp.

Afranius, and some others, were for going into Italy; and he enforced his opinion with some strong arguments. He represented, that Italy was not in a condition to make any defence;



fence; and that, as soon as they set foot in it, <sup>A. R. 704.</sup>  
the nations and cities would receive them with <sup>Ant. C. 48.</sup>  
joy. He added, that, when they were once  
masters of Italy, they should also necessarily be  
so of the dependent islands, Sicily, Sardinia,  
Corfica, and even of Gaul and Spain. Lastly,  
he pretended, that it became good citizens to  
deliver their Country, who expected it from  
them; and not to let it groan any longer under  
oppression, nor be vexed and insulted by the  
Ministers and Slaves of Tyrants.

Pompey was not affected by these reasons.  
It seemed to him inglorious to fly a second  
time, before an enemy who might follow them.  
Besides, he thought justly, that he ought not to  
abandon Metellus Scipio and his army, who, if  
he went into Italy, would inevitably fall a prey  
to Cæsar. And, as to the regard to be paid to  
his Country, he thought the best way to shew  
that, was, not to make Italy the scene of the  
horrors of war, but, on the contrary, to pro-  
secute it in a distant region; so that Rome,  
being meer spectatrix of the war, might have  
nothing to do but to admit her Conqueror. He  
therefore determined to continue in Greece, and  
there decide the quarrel.

He did not, however, obstinately follow <sup>Cæsar</sup>  
Cæsar, whom he had no hopes of overtaking,  
but formed a design of weakening him, by  
surprizing Domitius Calvinus, his Lieutenant,  
who with two legions stopped Metellus Scipio  
on the confines of Thessaly and Macedonia.  
This scheme was well-imagined, and had like  
to have succeeded. Calvinus knew nothing of  
what had happened at Dyrrachium. Cæsar's  
couriers had not been able to get to him; be-  
cause, since Pompey's success, all the country  
B b declared



A. R. 704.  
 ANL C. 48.

declared for him, whom they already considered as victorious. So that Calvinus was in perfect security ; and, having left Metellus Scipio for the convenience of provisions and forage, was actually marching (without knowing it) to meet Pompey, and deliver himself into his hands. A lucky accident saved him. Some of the enemy's scouts, of the number of those Allobroges deserters I spoke of, met those of Calvinus ; and knowing them, as they had served together formerly in Gaul, entered into conversation with them, and informed them of all that had passed ; of Pompey's victory, and Cæsar's retreat. Advice was immediately given of this to Calvinus ; and he marched back again so *à propos*, that Pompey missed of him but by four hours.

*Cæsar  
 joins Cal-  
 vinus.*

Cæsar foresaw Calvinus's danger, and was in full march to join him. But the care of his sick and wounded, whom he was necessitated to leave in some place of safety, and other unavoidable business, had retarded him. Calvinus however escaped from Pompey in the manner related, and joined Cæsar near Æginium, a town on the borders of Thessaly.

*His va-  
 rious dis-  
 positions,  
 according  
 to the dif-  
 ferent ac-  
 tions Pom-  
 pey might  
 form.*

This was what Cæsar principally desired. Uncertain what projects Pompey might form after the actions at Dyrrachium, he had considered every thing ; and thought it necessary at all events to turn towards Thessaly, and there re-unite his whole strength. If Pompey passed into Italy, he purposed (after having joined Calvinus) to wind round the Adriatic sea by the coast of Illyricum, and thus go to the defence of Italy. Pompey might take other measures, and fall on the maritime cities of Epirus, in which Cæsar had left garrisons.

In



In that case he reckoned to oblige him, by attacking Metellus Scipio, to leave every thing to succour him. Lastly, if Pompey marched towards Theffaly, Calvinus's danger would have compelled Cæsar to have done the same. And this last plan suited him best, because in that case his adversary, leaving the sea, lost the infinite advantage thence resulting; all things were then equal between them, except numbers which never frightened Cæsar.

Things having fell out according to his wishes, he endeavoured to penetrate into Theffaly. But the losses, lately sustained by him, had altered the disposition of the people; and, though before the whole country had sent Deputies to him to proffer their service, yet now the city of Gomphi, which was the first he came to, shut its gates against him. Cæsar was aware of the consequences of such a precedent; and, to prevent its bad effects, he immediately assaulted the town so vigorously, that he was master of it before evening, and gave it up to be plundered. The Conqueror found there all sorts of necessaries, and particularly great quantities of wine. As his troops had long fared ill, they now made themselves amends, and drank to excess, particularly the Germans. This debauch, by stirring the humours of their bodies, which were naturally robust and vigorous, re-established their health, which was impaired by the hardships they had endured; and that, which would have killed delicate men, restored to these veterans their pristine vigour.

Appian relates, that a house at Gomphi presented to those who entered it a very tragical spectacle; twenty dead bodies of venerable old men

A. R. 704.  
Ant. C. 48.

*Cæsar storms the city of Gomphi in Theffaly.*

Appian.  
Civ. l. II.



A. R. -61.  
Ann. C. 48.

men stretched on the ground, as in a drunken fit, having each of them his cup by him. Only one was yet sitting, with his cup in his hand. This was the Physician, who, after he had administered the poison to the others, had taken it himself in his turn. The apprehension of the terrible calamities that attend a storm drove them to this deed of desperation.

*He passes  
that of  
Metropolis.*

From Gomphi Cæsar marched expeditiously to the city of Metropolis, whose inhabitants at first imitated their neighbours, being unacquainted with their misfortune. But, as soon as informed of it by some prisoners from Gomphi, who were sent to them, they opened their gates in haste, and admitted Cæsar; who suffered no hostilities to be committed, nor any harm to be done them.

*He comes  
to Pharsalia.  
Pompey  
and Scipio  
meet.*

The different treatment of these two cities was a lesson to all the others in Thessaly. Not one refused to submit to Cæsar, and receive his orders, except Larissa, into which Metellus Scipio had entered with all his troops. He advanced then without difficulty to Pharsalia, a place he was going to immortalize by one of the most important battles that history has preserved. As the country was good, and covered with corn that was near ripe, Cæsar judged it a proper place to wait for Pompey in. Pompey did not loiter; but, having joined Metellus Scipio, came and encamped near Cæsar. He shared the honours of the command with his father-in-law, and would have him treated in all things as his equal.

*End of VOL. XIII.*

